How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS? METHODS: Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100. RESULTS: Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score. CONCLUSION: Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, therapeutic study.

Financial viability of endovascular aortic repair in the modern era.

BACKGROUND: In the current era of cost containment, the financial impact of high-cost procedures such as endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) remains an area of intensive interest. Previous reports suggested slim to negative operating margins with EVAR, prompting widespread initiatives to reduce cost and to improve reimbursement. In 2015, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) announced the reclassification of EVAR to more specific diagnosis-related group (DRG) coding and predicted an overall increase in hospital reimbursement. The potential impact of this change has not been described. METHODS: Patients undergoing elective EVAR at a single institution between January 2014 and December 2018 were identified retrospectively, then stratified by date. Group 1 patients underwent EVAR before DRG change in 2015 and were classified with DRG 237/238, major cardiovascular procedure. Group 2 patients underwent EVAR after the change and were classified as DRG 268/269, aortic/heart assist procedures. The total direct cost included implant cost, operating room (OR) labor, room and board, and other supply costs. Net revenue reflected real payer mix values without extrapolation based on standard Medicare rates. Hospital profit was defined as the contribution to indirect (CTI), subtracting total direct cost from net revenue. RESULTS: A total of 188 encounters were included, 67 (36%) in group 1 and 121 (64%) in group 2. Medicare patients composed 84% of group 1 and 81% of group 2. CTI (profit) increased by $4447 (+123%) from $3615 in group 1 to $8062 in group 2. Net revenue per encounter increased by $2054 (+7.1%). In group 1, the higher reimbursement DRG code 237 was applied in 5 of 67 (7.5%) patients, whereas DRG code 268 was assigned in 19 of 121 (15.1%) patients in group 2. Total direct cost per encounter decreased by $2012 (-7.9%). This decrease in cost was driven by a reduction in implant cost, from a mean $16,914 per encounter in group 1 to a mean $15,655 in group 2 (-$1259 or -7.4% per encounter) and by a decrease in OR labor cost, $2838 in group 1 to $2361 in group 2 (-$477 or -17.0% per encounter). CONCLUSIONS: A significant improvement in hospital CTI was observed for elective EVAR during the course of the study. The increased DRG reimbursement after the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services coding changes in 2015 was a major driver of this salutary change. Notably, efforts to reduce implant and OR cost as well as to improve coding and documentation accuracy over time had an equally important impact on financial return.

The financial evolution of endovascular aneurysm repair delivery in contemporary practice.

OBJECTIVE: The fiscal impact of endovascular repair (EVR) of aortic aneurysms and the requisite device costs have previously highlighted the tenuous long-term financial sustainability among Medicare beneficiaries. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services have since reclassified EVR remuneration paradigms with new Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Groups (MS-DRGs) intended to better address the procedure's cost profile. The impact of this change remains unknown. The purpose of this analysis was to compare EVR-specific costs and revenue among Medicare beneficiaries both before and after this change. METHODS: All infrarenal EVRs performed in fiscal years (FYs) 2014 and 2015, before the MS-DRG change, and those performed in FYs 2017 and 2018, after the MS-DRG change, were identified using the DRG codes 238 (n = 108) and 269 (n = 84), respectively. We then identified those who were treated according to the instructions for use guidelines with a single manufacturer's device and billed to Medicare (n = 23 in FY14-15; n = 22 in FY17-18). From these cohorts, we determined total procedure technical costs, technical revenue, and net technical margin in conjunction with the hospital finance department. Results were then compared between these two groups. RESULTS: The two cohorts demonstrated similar demographic profiles (FY14-15 vs FY17-18 cohort: age, 78 years vs 74 years; median length of stay, 1.0 day vs 1.0 day). Mean total technical costs were slightly higher in the FY17-18 group ($24,511 in FY14-15 vs $26,445 in FY17-18). Graft implants continued to account for a significant portion of the total cost, with the device cost accounting for 56% of the total procedure costs in both cohorts. Net revenue was greater in the FY17-18 group by $5800 ($30,698 in FY14-15 vs $36,498 in FY17-18), resulting in an increased overall margin in the FY17-18 group compared with the FY14-15 group ($6188 in FY14-15 vs $10,053 in FY17-18). CONCLUSIONS: Device costs remain the single greatest cost driver associated with EVR delivery. DRG reclassification of EVR to address total procedure and implant costs appears to better address the requisite associated procedure costs and may thereby better support long-term fiscal sustainability of this procedure for hospitals and health systems alike.

Exploring the rapid expansion of office-based laboratories and peripheral vascular interventions across the United States.

OBJECTIVE: To characterize the relationship between office-based laboratory (OBL) use and Medicare payments for peripheral vascular interventions (PVI). METHODS: Using the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Provider Utilization and Payment Data Public Use Files from 2014 to 2017, we identified providers who performed percutaneous transluminal angioplasty, stent placement, and atherectomy. Procedures were aggregated at the provider and hospital referral region (HRR) level. RESULTS: Between 2014 and 2017, 2641 providers performed 308,247 procedures. The mean payment for OBL stent placement in 2017 was $4383.39, and mean payment for OBL atherectomy was $13,079.63. The change in the mean payment amount varied significantly, from a decrease of $16.97 in HRR 146 to an increase of $43.77 per beneficiary over the study period in HRR 11. The change in the rate of PVI also varied substantially, and moderately correlated with change in payment across HRRs (R2 = 0.40; P < .001). The majority of HRRs experienced an increase in rate of PVI within OBLs, which strongly correlated with changes in payments (R2 = 0.85; P < .001). Furthermore, 85% of the variance in change in payment was explained by increases in OBL atherectomy (P < .001). CONCLUSIONS: A rapid shift into the office setting for PVIs occurred within some HRRs, which was highly geographically variable and was strongly correlated with payments. Policymakers should revisit the current payment structure for OBL use and, in particular atherectomy, to better align the policy with its intended goals.

A neuromuscular-based analysis of the open payments program.

INTRODUCTION: In August 2013, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Open Payments Program (OPP) made eligible payment information publicly available. Data about industry payments to neuromuscular neurologists are lacking. METHOD: Financial relationships were investigated between industry and US neuromuscular neurologists from January 2014 through December 2018 using the CMS OPP database. RESULTS: The total annual payments increased more than 6-fold during the study period. The top 10% of physician-beneficiaries collected 80% to 90% of total industry payments except in 2014. In 2018, the most common drugs associated with payments to neuromuscular neurologists were nusinersen, vortioxetine, eteplirsen, alglucosidase alpha, edaravone, and intravenous immunoglobulin. DISCUSSION: A substantial increase in the annual payments to neuromuscular physicians during the study period is likely due to the development of new treatments, including gene therapy.

Current Interventional Radiology-Related Benchmarked Clinical Quality Measures Are Less Likely to be "Capped" Than Diagnostic Radiology Clinical Quality Measures.

In the merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS), quality measures are considered topped out if national median performance rates are ≥95%. Quality measures worth 10 points can be capped at 7 points if topped out for ≥2 years. This report compares the availability of diagnostic radiology (DR)-related and interventional radiology (IR)-related measures worth 10 points. A total of 196 MIPS clinical quality measures were reviewed on the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services MIPS website. There are significantly more IR-related measures worth 10 points than DR measures (2/9 DR measures vs 9/12 IR measures; P = .03), demonstrating that clinical IR services can help mixed IR/DR groups maximize their Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services payment adjustment.

Medicare Reimbursement Trends for Interventional Radiology Procedures: 2012 to 2020.

PURPOSE: To investigate the reimbursement trends for interventional radiology (IR) procedures from 2012 to 2020. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Reimbursement data from the Physician Fee Schedule look-up tool from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services was compiled for 20 common IR procedures. The authors then investigated compensation trends after adjusting for inflation and from the unadjusted data between 2012 and 2020. RESULTS: From 2012 to 2020, the mean unadjusted reimbursement for procedures decreased by -6.9% (95% confidence interval [CI], -13.5% to -0.34%). This trend was even more profound after inflation was taken into account, with a mean decline in adjusted reimbursement of -18.7% (95% CI, -24.4% to -12.9%) during the study period, with a mean yearly decline of -2.8%. The difference between the mean unadjusted and adjusted payment amounts was significant (P = .012). Similarly, linear regression analysis of the adjusted average reimbursement across all procedures revealed an overall decline from 2012 to 2020 (R2 = 0.97), indicating a steady decline in reimbursement over time. CONCLUSIONS: In just under a decade, IR has experienced significant reimbursement cuts by Medicare, as demonstrated by both the unadjusted and inflation-adjusted payment trends. Knowledge of these trends is critically important for practicing interventional radiologists, leaders within the field, and legislators, who may play a role in formulating future reimbursement schedules for IR. These data may be used to help support more amenable reimbursement plans to sustain and facilitate the growth of the specialty.

Procedure Reimbursement, Inflation, and the Declining Buying Power of the Vascular Surgeon (2011-2021).

PURPOSE: The purpose of this study was to evaluate trends in Medicare reimbursement for common vascular procedures over the last decade. To enrich the context of this analysis, vascular procedure reimbursement is directly compared to inflation-adjusted changes in other surgical specialties. METHODS: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Physician/Supplier Procedure Summary file was utilized to identify the 20 procedures most commonly performed by vascular surgeons from 2011-2021. A similar analysis was performed for orthopedic, general, and neurological surgeons. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Physician-Fee Schedule Look-Up Tool was queried for each procedure, and reimbursement data was extracted. All monetary data was adjusted for inflation to 2021 dollars utilizing the consumer price index. Average year-over-year and total percentage change in reimbursement were calculated based on adjusted data for included procedures. Comparisons to other specialty data were made with ANOVA. RESULTS: From 2011-2021, the average, unadjusted change in reimbursement for vascular procedures was -7.2%. Accounting for inflation, the average procedural reimbursement declined by 20.1%. The greatest decline was observed in phlebectomy of varicose veins (-50.6%). Open arteriovenous fistula revision was the only vascular procedure with an increase in inflation-adjusted reimbursement (+7.5%). Year-over-year, inflation-adjusted reimbursement for common vascular procedures decreased by 2.0% per year. Venous procedures experienced the largest decrease in average adjusted reimbursement (-42.4%), followed by endovascular (-20.1%) and open procedures (-13.9%). These changes were significantly different across procedural subgroups (P < 0.001). During the same period, the average adjusted change in reimbursement for the 20 most common procedures in orthopedic surgery, general surgery, and neurosurgery was -11.6% vs. -20.1% for vascular surgery (P = 0.004). CONCLUSION: Medicare reimbursement for common surgical procedures has declined over the last decade. While absolute reimbursement has remained relatively stable for several procedures, accounting for a decade of inflation demonstrates the true diminution of buying power for equivalent work. The most alarming observation is that vascular surgeons have faced a disproportionate decrease in inflation-adjusted reimbursement in comparison to other surgical specialists. Awareness of these trends is a crucial first step towards improved advocacy and efforts to ensure the "value" of vascular surgery does not continue to erode.

Industry Payment to Vascular Neurologists: A 6-Year Analysis of the Open Payments Program From 2013 Through 2018.

Background and Purpose- Industry payments to physicians raise concerns regarding conflicts of interest that could impact patient care. We explored nonresearch and nonownership payments from industry to vascular neurologists to identify trends in compensation. Methods- Using Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology data, we explored financial relationships between industry and US vascular neurologists from 2013 to 2018. We analyzed payment characteristics, including payment categories, payment distribution among physicians, regional trends, and biomedical manufacturers. Furthermore, we analyzed the top 1% (by compensation) of vascular neurologists with detailed payment categories, their position, and their contribution to stroke guidelines. Results- The number of board certified vascular neurologist increased from 1169 in 2013 to 1746 in 2018. The total payments to vascular neurologist increased from $99 749 in 2013 to $1 032 302 in 2018. During the study period, 16% to 17% of vascular neurologists received industry payments. Total payments from industry and mean physician payments increased yearly over this period, with consulting fee (31.1%) and compensation for services other than consulting (30.7%) being the highest paid categories. The top 10 manufacturers made the majority of the payments, and the top 10 products changed from drug or biological products to devices. Physicians from south region of the United States received the highest total payment (38.72%), which steadily increased. Payments to top 1% vascular neurologists increased from 64% to 79% over the period as payments became less evenly distributed. Among the top 1%, 42% specialized in neuro intervention, 11% contributed to American Heart Association/American Stroke Association guidelines, and around 75% were key leaders in the field. Conclusions- A small proportion of US vascular neurologists consistently received the majority of industry payments, the value of which grew over the study period. Only 11% of the top 1% receiving industry payments have authored American Heart Association/American Stroke Association guidelines, but ≈75% seem to be key leaders in the field. Whether this influences clinical practice and behavior requires further investigation.

Clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of teledermatology: Where are we now, and what are the barriers to adoption?

There has been rapid growth in teledermatology over the past decade, and teledermatology services are increasingly being used to support patient care across a variety of care settings. Teledermatology has the potential to increase access to high-quality dermatologic care while maintaining clinical efficacy and cost-effectiveness. Recent expansions in telemedicine reimbursement from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) ensure that teledermatology will play an increasingly prominent role in patient care. Therefore, it is important that dermatologists be well informed of both the promises of teledermatology and the potential practice challenges a continuously evolving mode of care delivery brings. In this article, we will review the evidence on the clinical and cost-effectiveness of teledermatology and we will discuss system-level and practice-level barriers to successful teledermatology implementation as well as potential implications for dermatologists.

Are we ready for bundled payments for major bowel surgery?

BACKGROUND: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recently announced a new voluntary episode payment model for major bowel surgery. The purpose of this study was to examine the financial impact of bundled payments for major bowel surgery. METHODS: An institutional database was retrospectively queried for all patients who underwent major bowel surgery between July 2016 and June 2018. Procedures were categorized using MS-DRG coding: MS-DRG 329 (with MCC, major complications and comorbidity), MS-DRG 330 (with CC, complications and comorbidity), and MS-DRG 331 (without CC/MCC). RESULTS: A total of 745 patients underwent 798 procedures, with mean age 62.1 years and BMI 29.2 kg/m2. The median LOS was 4.0 days, with 12.5% of patients being discharged to a post-acute care facility for an average of 38.5 days. The mean hospital cost was $18,525. The mean payment to a post-acute care facility was $423 per day. The 90-day readmission rate was 8.6% at an average cost of $12,859 per readmission. Patients with major complications and comorbidity (MS-DRG 329) had higher CMS Hierarchical Condition Categories scores, longer LOS, higher costs, more required home health services or post-acute care facilities, and had higher 90-day readmissions. In a fee-for-service model, hospital reimbursements resulted in a negative margin of - 8.2% for MS-DRG 329, - 2.6% for MS-DRG 330, but a positive margin of 2.8% for MS-DRG 331. In a bundled payment model, the hospital would incur a loss of - 13.1%, - 11.1%, and - 1.9% for MS-DRG 329, 330, and 331, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: Patients undergoing major bowel surgery are often a heterogeneous population with varied pre-existing comorbid conditions who require a high level of complex care and utilize greater hospital resources. Further study is needed to identify areas of cost containment without compromising the overall quality of care.

Barriers to Revision Total Hip Service Lines: A Surgeon's Perspective Through a Deterministic Financial Model.

BACKGROUND: Revision THA represents approximately 5% to 10% of all THAs. Despite the complexity of these procedures, revision arthroplasty service lines are generally absent even at high-volume orthopaedic centers. We wanted to evaluate whether financial compensation is a barrier for the development of revision THA service lines as assessed by RVUs. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: Therefore, we asked: (1) Are physicians fairly compensated for revision THA on a per-minute basis compared with primary THA? (2) Are physicians fairly compensated for revision THA on a per-day basis compared with primary THA? METHODS: Our deterministic financial model was derived from retrospective data of all patients undergoing primary or revision THA between January 2016 and June 2018 at an academic healthcare organization. Patients were divided into five cohorts based on their surgical procedure: primary THA, head and liner exchange, acetabular component revision THA, femoral component revision THA, and combined femoral and acetabular component revision THA. Mean surgical times were calculated for each cohort, and each cohort was assigned a relative value unit (RVU) derived from the 2018 Center for Medicaid and Medicare assigned RVU fee schedule. Using a combination of mean surgical time and RVUs rewarded for each procedure, three models were developed to assess the financial incentive to perform THA services for each cohort. These models included: (1) RVUs earned per the mean surgical time, (2) RVUs earned for a single operating room for a full day of THAs, and (3) RVUs earned for two operating rooms for a full day of primary THAs versus a single rooms for a full day of revision THAs. A sixth cohort was added in the latter two models to more accurately reflect the variety in a typical surgical day. This consisted of a blend of revision THAs: one acetabular, one femoral, and one full revision. The RVUs generated in each model were compared across the cohorts. RESULTS: Compared with primary THA by RVU per minute, in revision THA, head and liner exchange demonstrated a 4% per minute deficit, acetabular component revision demonstrated a 29% deficit, femoral component revision demonstrated a 32% deficit, and full revision demonstrated a 27% deficit. Compared with primary service lines with one room, revision surgeons with a variety of revision THA surgeries lost 26% potential relative value units per day. Compared with a two-room primary THA service, revision surgeons lost 55% potential relative value units per day. CONCLUSIONS: In a comparison of relative value units of a typical two-room primary THA service line versus those of a dedicated revision THA service line, we found that revision specialists may lose between 28% and 55% of their RVU earnings. The current Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services reimbursement model is not viable for the arthroplasty surgeon and limits patient access to revision THA specialists. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, economic and decision analysis.

Hospital ownership of postacute care providers and the cost of care.

BACKGROUND: Hospitals are facing incentives to manage the total cost of care for episodes of illness, including the costs of inpatient care as well as the cost of care provided by physicians and postacute care (PAC) providers. PAC is an especially important component of the overall cost of care. One strategy hospitals employ in managing this cost is to own PAC providers. Prior work on the relationship between PAC ownership and cost has reached mixed conclusions. PURPOSE: The aim of this study was to examine the associations between the episodic costs of care and hospital ownership of PAC providers, including skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), home health agencies (HHAs), and inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRF). METHODOLOGY: We examine panel data on hospital ownership of PAC providers from the American Hospital Association for 2013-2015 and cost of care data from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' Value-Based Purchasing Program. Using ordinary least squares, we quantify the association between a hospital's PAC ownership choice (both ownership of any PAC provider and ownership of particular types of providers) and the episodic cost of care. RESULTS: In 2015, 80% of hospitals owned some type of PAC provider. We find that ownership of SNFs and HHAs is associated with a lower episodic cost of care, whereas ownership of inpatient rehabilitation facilities is associated with higher episodic costs of care. The effects of ownership do not differ for hospitals that participate in a voluntary shared saving program (Bundled Payment for Care Improvement). CONCLUSION: The effects of PAC ownership vary by the type of PAC provider owned. Our results suggest that ownership of SNFs and HHAs may be a viable strategy for success in reimbursement programs that reward hospitals for managing the total costs for episodes of care.

The emergency care model: A new paradigm for skilled nursing facilities.

The population of individuals age 65 and older is increasing in the United States. One third of these individuals will utilize nursing home care before death. Nursing home residents ("NHR") average 1.8 emergency department visits annually. Improving the quality of nursing home care is of vital importance. This project describes a new paradigm for the management of acute emergent health issues affecting NHR. The model features a multidisciplinary team coordinated by emergency providers resulting in a 55% reduction in unplanned hospital admissions compared to skilled nursing facility regional data. Additionally, a reduction in ancillary lab costs was observed. Implementation of this paradigm on a national scale could result in a projected cost savings in excess of $10 billion per year for the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS").

Improving the US hospital reimbursement: how patient satisfaction in HCAHPS reflects lower readmission.

PURPOSE: The purpose of this paper is to examine whether patient readmission rates are associated with patient satisfaction and Medicare reimbursement rates in the US hospitals. DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: The Hospital Compare database was obtained from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in the US. A total of 2,711 acute care hospitals were analyzed for this present study. The data included patient satisfaction surveys, hospital 30-days readmission ratios for heart failure and pneumonia patients and related payments. Exploratory factor analysis was applied in the first stage to operationalize constructs for scale development. Partial least squares (PLS) modeling analysis via Smart-PLS was utilized for testing the hypotheses. FINDINGS: Results indicated that data provided from the Hospital Compare database for the acute care hospitals accurately reflect quality outcomes. Nevertheless, the Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) did not penalize the hospitals when patients reported lower satisfaction via the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) scores. ORIGINALITY/VALUE: The findings suggest that a high-readmission rate is not associated with lower payment. Such results appear to conflict with the goals of value-based purchasing programs, which seek to penalize hospitals financially for higher readmission rates.

Patient Experiences with Chronic Care Management Services and Fees: a Qualitative Study.

BACKGROUND: As of 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) pays for chronic care management (CCM) services for Medicare beneficiaries with two or more chronic conditions. CMS requires eligible providers to first obtain patients' verbal (and, prior to 2017, written) consent, to ensure that patients who participate in CCM services understand their rights and agree to any applicable cost sharing. CCM providers must also enhance patients' access to continuous and coordinated care, including ongoing care management. OBJECTIVE: To understand patients' perceptions of the consent process, their reasons for choosing to participate, and their experiences receiving CCM services. DESIGN: Qualitative study using semi-structured interviews with Medicare beneficiaries who had two or more CCM claims submitted by an eligible provider. Beneficiaries were selected from a sampling frame of Medicare claims submitted between January and September 2015. KEY RESULTS: Most patients reported no concerns about being asked to participate in CCM. The majority of patients had secondary insurance (or Medicaid) that covered any coinsurance for CCM and therefore could not say with certainty whether they would participate if they had to pay for CCM services out-of-pocket. Reasons for participating included having insurance that covered the copay and peace of mind about having access to the CCM team. Patients reported multiple benefits of participating in CCM services, including better access to their primary care team, improved continuity of care, and improved care coordination. Most patients reported no downside to participating in CCM services, although some felt they were relatively healthy and questioned whether they needed CCM services. CONCLUSIONS: These findings on patients' experiences participating in CCM services during the first 9 months of the policy's implementation can help providers and policymakers understand their perceived benefits and unintended consequences. Our findings also have implications for providers when approaching patients about CCM services.

Variation in Physician-Specific Episode Payments for Major Cancer Surgery and Implications for the Merit-Based Incentive Program.

BACKGROUND: Nearly 1.5 million clinicians in the United States will be affected by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' (CMS) new payment program, the Merit-based Incentive Program (MIPS), where clinicians will be penalized or rewarded based on the health care expenditures of their patients. We therefore examined expenditures for major cancer surgery to understand physician-specific variation in episode payments. METHODS: We used Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results-Medicare data to identify patients aged 66-99 y who underwent a prostatectomy, nephrectomy, lung, or colorectal resection for cancer from 2008 to 2012. We calculated 90-d episode payments, attributed each episode to a physician, and evaluated physician-level payment variation. Next, we determined which component (index admission, readmission, physician services, postacute care, hospice) drove differences in payments. Finally, we evaluated payments by geographic region, number of comorbidities, and cancer stage. RESULTS: We identified 39,109 patients who underwent surgery by 1 of 7182 providers. There was wide variation in payments for each procedure (prostatectomy: $7046-$40,687; nephrectomy: $8855-$82,489; lung resection: $11,167-$223,467; colorectal resection: $9711-$199,480). The largest component difference in episode payments varied by condition: physician payments for prostatectomy (29%), postacute care for nephrectomy (38%) and colorectal resections (38%), and index hospital admission for lung resections (43%) but were fairly stable across region, comorbidity number, and cancer stage. CONCLUSIONS: For patients undergoing major cancer surgery, 90-d episode payments vary widely across surgeons. The components driving such variation differ by condition but remain stable across region, number of comorbidities, and cancer stage. These data suggest that programs to reduce specific component payments may have advantages over those targeting individual physicians for decreasing health care expenditures.

2018 John Charnley Award: Analysis of US Hip Replacement Bundled Payments: Physician-initiated Episodes Outperform Hospital-initiated Episodes.

BACKGROUND: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) launched the Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative in 2013 to create incentives to improve outcomes and reduce costs in various clinical settings, including total hip arthroplasty (THA). This study seeks to quantify BPCI initiative outcomes for THA and to determine the optimal party (for example, hospital versus physician group practice [PGP]) to manage the program. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: (1) Is BPCI associated with lower 90-day payments, readmissions, or mortality for elective THA? (2) Is there a difference in 90-day payments, readmissions, or mortality between episodes initiated by PGPs and episodes initiated by hospitals for elective THA? (3) Is BPCI associated with reduced total Elixhauser comorbidity index or age for elective THA? METHODS: We performed a retrospective analysis on the CMS Limited Data Set on all Medicare primary elective THAs without a major comorbidity performed in the United States (except Maryland) between January 2013 and March 2016, totaling more than USD 7.1 billion in expenditures. Episodes were grouped into hospital-run BPCI (n = 42,922), PGP-run BPCI (n = 44,662), and THA performed outside of BPCI (n = 284,002). All Medicare Part A payments were calculated over a 90-day period after surgery and adjusted for inflation and regional variation. For each episode, age, sex, race, geographic location, background trend, and Elixhauser comorbidities were determined to control for major confounding variables. Total payments, readmissions, and mortality were compared among the groups with logistic regression. RESULTS: When controlling for demographics, background trend, geographic variation, and total Elixhauser comorbidities in elective Diagnosis-Related Group 470 THA episodes, BPCI was associated with a 4.44% (95% confidence interval [CI], -4.58% to -4.30%; p < 0.001) payment decrease for all participants (USD 1244 decrease from a baseline of USD 18,802); additionally, odds ratios (ORs) for 90-day mortality and readmissions were unchanged. PGP groups showed a 4.81% decrease in payments (95% CI, -5.01% to -4.61%; p < 0.001) after enrolling in BPCI (USD 1335 decrease from a baseline of USD 17,841). Hospital groups showed a 4.04% decrease in payments (95% CI, -4.24% to 3.84%; p < 0.01) after enrolling in BPCI (USD 1138 decrease from a baseline of USD 19,799). The decrease in payments of PGP-run episodes was greater compared with hospital-run episodes. ORs for 90-day mortality and readmission remained unchanged after BPCI for PGP- and hospital-run BPCI programs. Patient age and mean Elixhauser comorbidity index did not change after BPCI for PGP-run, hospital-run, or overall BPCI episodes. CONCLUSIONS: Even when controlling for decreasing costs in traditional fee-for-service care, BPCI is associated with payment reduction with no change in adverse events, and this is not because of the selection of younger patients or those with fewer comorbidities. Furthermore, physician group practices were associated with greater payment reduction than hospital programs with no difference in readmission or mortality from baseline for either. Physicians may be a more logical group than hospitals to manage payment reduction in future healthcare reform. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level II, economic and decision analysis.