Attacker-defender game from a network science perspective.

ABSTRACT

Dealing with the protection of critical infrastructures, many game-theoretic methods have been developed to study the strategic interactions between defenders and attackers. However, most game models ignore the interrelationship between different components within a certain system. In this paper, we propose a simultaneous-move attacker-defender game model, which is a two-player zero-sum static game with complete information. The strategies and payoffs of this game are defined on the basis of the topology structure of the infrastructure system, which is represented by a complex network. Due to the complexity of strategies, the attack and defense strategies are confined by two typical strategies, namely, targeted strategy and random strategy. The simulation results indicate that in a scale-free network, the attacker virtually always attacks randomly in the Nash equilibrium. With a small cost-sensitive parameter, representing the degree to which costs increase with the importance of a target, the defender protects the hub targets with large degrees preferentially. When the cost-sensitive parameter exceeds a threshold, the defender switches to protecting nodes randomly. Our work provides a new theoretical framework to analyze the confrontations between the attacker and the defender on critical infrastructures and deserves further study.