Modelling Environmental Impacts of Cesium-137 Under a Hypothetical Release of Radioactive Waste.

Waste tanks at the nuclear facility located at Sellafield, UK, represent a nuclear source which could release radionuclides to the atmosphere. A model chain which combines atmospheric transport, deposition as well as riverine transport to sea has been developed to predict the riverine activity concentrations of 137Cs. The source term was estimated to be 9 × 104 TBq of 137Cs, or 1% of the assumed total 137Cs inventory of the HAL (Highly Active Liquid) storage tanks. Air dispersion modelling predicted 137Cs deposition reaching 127 kBq m-2 at the Vikedal catchment in Western Norway. Thus, the riverine transport model predicted that the activity concentration of 137Cs in water at the river outlet could reach 9000 Bq m-3 in the aqueous phase and 1000 Bq kg-1 in solid phase at peak level. The lake and river reaches showed different transport patterns due to the buffering effects caused by dilution and slowing down of water velocity.

Uncertainties in atmospheric dispersion modelling during nuclear accidents.

Predictions of the atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides accidentally released from a nuclear power plant are influenced by two large sources of uncertainty: one associated with the meteorological data employed, and one with the source term, i.e. the temporal evolution of the amount and physical and chemical properties of the release. A methodology is presented for quantitative estimation of the variability of the prediction of atmospheric dispersion resulting from both sources of uncertainty. The methodology, which allows for efficient calculation, and thus is well suited for real-time assessment, is applied to a hypothetical accidental release of radionuclides.

Contribution of Poland to Atmospheric Nitrogen Deposition to the Baltic Sea.

Poland is the second most important emission source after Germany in contributing atmospheric nitrogen deposition to the Baltic Sea basin. The main sectors contributing to reactive nitrogen emissions from Polish sources, in the period 1995-2014, are combustion and transportation, responsible together for over 97% of nitrogen oxide emissions, and agriculture responsible for over 98% of ammonia emissions. The EMEP MSC-W model with 50-km resolution was used for estimating the contribution of nitrogen emission sources from Poland to nitrogen deposition into the Baltic Sea basin and its sub-basins, in the period 1995-2014. Polish contribution in this period is mainly visible in annual wet deposition of reduced nitrogen with the range 13-18% and in wet deposition of oxidized nitrogen: 9-15%. Concerning sub-basins, a major contribution for Polish sources to total nitrogen deposition can be noticed for Baltic Proper with the range 13-19%, followed by northern sub-basins (7-18%) and finally by three western sub-basins (5-7%). Polish contribution to the Baltic Sea Basin in the year 2013 was analyzed in more detail using two models, the EMEP MSC-W model with 50-km resolution and model developed at the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management in Warsaw with 14-km resolution (IMWM Model). Both models give similar results concerning the deposition of oxidized nitrogen from Polish sources, but results show that the deposition of reduced nitrogen calculated with IMWM model is lower. The most likely reasons for the differences are different parameterizations of the deposition processes and chemical reactions in both models.

Atmospheric transport of radioactive debris to Norway in case of a hypothetical accident related to the recovery of the Russian submarine K-27.

The Russian nuclear submarine K-27 suffered a loss of coolant accident in 1968 and with nuclear fuel in both reactors it was scuttled in 1981 in the outer part of Stepovogo Bay located on the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya. The inventory of spent nuclear fuel on board the submarine is of concern because it represents a potential source of radioactive contamination of the Kara Sea and a criticality accident with potential for long-range atmospheric transport of radioactive particles cannot be ruled out. To address these concerns and to provide a better basis for evaluating possible radiological impacts of potential releases in case a salvage operation is initiated, we assessed the atmospheric transport of radionuclides and deposition in Norway from a hypothetical criticality accident on board the K-27. To achieve this, a long term (33 years) meteorological database has been prepared and used for selection of the worst case meteorological scenarios for each of three selected locations of the potential accident. Next, the dispersion model SNAP was run with the source term for the worst-case accident scenario and selected meteorological scenarios. The results showed predictions to be very sensitive to the estimation of the source term for the worst-case accident and especially to the sizes and densities of released radioactive particles. The results indicated that a large area of Norway could be affected, but that the deposition in Northern Norway would be considerably higher than in other areas of the country. The simulations showed that deposition from the worst-case scenario of a hypothetical K-27 accident would be at least two orders of magnitude lower than the deposition observed in Norway following the Chernobyl accident.

Long-range tropospheric transport of uranium and plutonium weapons fallout from Semipalatinsk nuclear test site to Norway.

A combination of state-of-the-art isotopic fingerprinting techniques and atmospheric transport modelling using real-time historical meteorological data has been used to demonstrate direct tropospheric transport of radioactive debris from specific nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan to Norway via large areas of Europe. A selection of archived air filters collected at ground level at 9 stations in Norway during the most intensive atmospheric nuclear weapon testing periods (1957-1958 and 1961-1962) has been screened for radioactive particles and analysed with respect to the concentrations and atom ratios of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) using accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). Digital autoradiography screening demonstrated the presence of radioactive particles in the filters. Concentrations of (236)U (0.17-23nBqm(-3)) and (239+240)Pu (1.3-782µBqm(-3)) as well as the atom ratios (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.237) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.7) varied widely indicating several different sources. Filter samples from autumn and winter tended to have lower atom ratios than those sampled in spring and summer, and this likely reflects a tropospheric influence in months with little stratospheric fallout. Very high (236)U, (239+240)Pu and gross beta activity concentrations as well as low (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.077), (241)Pu/(239)Pu (0.00025-0.00062) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.046) atom ratios, characteristic of close-in and tropospheric fallout, were observed in filters collected at all stations in Nov 1962, 7-12days after three low-yield detonations at Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan). Atmospheric transport modelling (NOAA HYSPLIT_4) using real-time meteorological data confirmed that long range transport of radionuclides, and possibly radioactive particles, from Semipalatinsk to Norway during this period was plausible. The present work shows that direct tropospheric transport of fallout from atmospheric nuclear detonations periodically may have had much larger influence on radionuclide air concentrations and deposition than previously anticipated.