Medicare's Stewardship Role to Improve Care Delivery: Opportunities for the Biden Administration.

Medicare initiatives have been instrumental in improving care delivery and payment as exemplified by its role in broadly expanding the use of telehealth during the COVID-19 pandemic. Medicare innovations have been adopted or adapted in Medicaid and by private payers, while Medicare Advantage plans successfully compete with traditional Medicare only because their payment rates are tied by regulation to those in the traditional Medicare program. However, Medicare has not succeeded in implementing new, value-based payment approaches that also would serve as models for other payers, nor has Medicare succeeded in improving quality by relying on public reporting of measured performance. It is increasingly clear that burdensome attention to measurement and reporting distracts from what could be successful efforts to actually improve care through quality improvement programs, with Medicare leading in partnership with providers, other payers, and patients. Although Congress is unlikely to adopt President Biden's proposals to decrease the eligibility age for Medicare or to adopt a public option based on Medicare prices and payment methods in the marketplaces, the Biden administration has an opportunity to provide overdue, strategic direction to the pursuit of value-based payments and to replace failed pay-for-performance with provider-managed projects to improve quality and reduce health disparities.

The Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and Unethical Behavior.

This Viewpoint discusses the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and its flaws, including how they might be remedied by severing CMS dependence on Relative Value Update Committee estimates of time and intensity.

Structuring payment to medical homes after the affordable care act.

The Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) is a leading model of primary care reform, a critical element of which is payment reform for primary care services. With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the Accountable Care Organization (ACO) has emerged as a model of delivery system reform, and while there is theoretical alignment between the PCMH and ACOs, the discussion of physician payment within each model has remained distinct. Here we compare payment for medical homes with that for accountable care organizations, consider opportunities for integration, and discuss implications for policy makers and payers considering ACO models. The PCMH and ACO are complementary approaches to reformed care delivery: the PCMH ultimately requires strong integration with specialists and hospitals as seen under ACOs, and ACOs likely will require a high functioning primary care system as embodied by the PCMH. Aligning payment incentives within the ACO will be critical to achieving this integration and enhancing the care coordination role of primary care in these settings.

The Road To Value Can't Be Paved With A Broken Medicare Physician Fee Schedule.

Value-based payment has been promoted for increasing quality, controlling spending, and improving patient and practitioner experience. Meanwhile, needed reforms to fee-for-service payment (the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule) have been ignored as policy makers seek to move payment toward alternatives, even though the fee schedule is an intrinsic part of Alternative Payment Models. In this article, we show how value-based payment and the fee schedule should be viewed as complementary, rather than as separate silos. We trace the origins of embedded flaws in the fee schedule that must be fixed if value-based payment is to succeed. These include payment distortions that directly compromise value by overpaying for certain procedures and imaging services while underpaying for services that add value for beneficiaries. We also show how the fee schedule can accommodate bundled payments and population-based payments that are central to Alternative Payment Models. We draw two conclusions. First, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services should correct misvalued services and establish a hybrid payment for primary care that blends fee-for-service and population-based payment. Second, Congress should alter the thirty-five-year-old statutory basis for setting Medicare fees to allow CMS to explicitly consider policy priorities such as workforce shortages in refining fee levels.

Variation in processes of care for total hip arthroplasty across high-income countries.

Total hip arthroplasty (THA) is among the most commonly performed elective surgeries in high-income countries, and wait times for THA have frequently been cited by US commentators as evidence that countries with universal insurance programs or national health systems "ration" care. This novel qualitative study explores processes of care for hip replacement in the United States and 6 high-income countries with a focus on eligibility, wait times, decision-making, postoperative care, and payment policies. We found no evidence of rationing or government interference in decision-making across high-income countries. Compared with the 6 other high-income countries in our study, the United States has developed efficient care processes that often allow for a same-day discharge. In contrast, THA patients in Germany stay in the hospital 7-9 days and receive 2-3 weeks of inpatient rehabilitation. However, the payment per THA in the United States remains far above other countries, despite far fewer inpatient days.

Beyond demonstrations: implementing a primary care hybrid payment model in Medicare.

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's (NASEM's) 2021 report on primary care called for a hybrid payment approach-a mix of fee-for-service and population-based payment-with performance accountability to strike the proper balance for desired practice transformation and to support primary care's important and expanding role. The NASEM report also proposed substantial increases to primary care payment and reforms to the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. This paper addresses pragmatic ways to implement these recommendations, describing and proposing solutions to the main implementation challenges. The urgent need for primary care payment reform calls for adopting a hybrid model within the Medicare fee schedule rather than engaging in another round of demonstrations, despite legal and practical obstacles to adoption. The paper explores reasons for adopting a roughly 50:50 blend of fee-for-service and population-based payment and addresses other design features, presenting reasons why spending accountability should rely on utilization measures under primary care control rather than performance on total cost of care, and proposes a fresh approach to quality, emphasizing that quality measures should be parsimonious, focused on important outcomes with demonstrated quality improvement.

How Price Regulation Is Needed To Advance Market Competition.

In US health policy, conventional wisdom holds that market competition and price regulation are mutually exclusive strategies to stem high and rising provider prices. This incorrect assumption centers on the belief that robust competition in US commercial health insurance markets must include provider price competition. Other developed countries, however, commonly implement price regulation to support competition over important care delivery components other than prices, including quality of care and patient choice, and to provide stronger incentives for providers to improve operating efficiency. Conventional US policy wisdom also holds that price regulation inevitably will fail because of excessive complexity or succumb to the interests of regulated entities. This analysis challenges conventional wisdom by urging policy makers to consider regulations that limit out-of-network provider prices and establish flexible hospital budgets. Each of these proposals would require less administrative complexity and burden than other proposed approaches. We conclude that it is time to move discussions from whether to regulate hospital prices to determining how best to do so.

How Denmark, England, Estonia, France, Germany, and the USA Pay for Variable, Specialized and Low Volume Care: A Cross-country Comparison of In-patient Payment Systems.

BACKGROUND: Diagnosis-related group (DRG)-based hospital payment can potentially be inadequately low (or high) for highly variable, highly specialized, and/or low volume care. DRG-based payment can be combined with other payment mechanisms to avoid unintended consequences of inadequate payment. The aim of this study was to analyze these other payment mechanisms for acute inpatient care across six countries (Germany, Denmark, England, Estonia, France, the United States [Medicare]). METHODS: Information was collected about elements excluded from DRG-based payment, the rationale for exclusions, and payment mechanisms complementing DRG-based payment. A conceptual framework was developed to systematically describe, visualise and compare payment mechanisms across countries. RESULTS: Results show that the complexity of exclusion mechanisms and associated additional payment components differ across countries. England and Germany use many different additional mechanisms, while there are only few exceptions from DRG-based payment in the Medicare program in the United States. Certain areas of care are almost always excluded (eg, certain areas of cancer care or specialized pediatrics). Denmark and England use exclusion mechanisms to steer service provision for highly complex patients to specialized providers. CONCLUSION: Implications for researchers and policy-makers include: (1) certain areas of care might be better excluded from DRG-based payment; (2) exclusions may be used to incentivize the concentration of highly specialized care at specialized institutions (as in Denmark or England); (3) researchers may apply our analytical framework to better understand the specific design features of DRG-based payment systems.

Use of physicians' services under Medicare's resource-based payments.

BACKGROUND: In 1992, Medicare implemented the resource-based relative-value scale, which established payments for physicians' services based on relative costs. We conducted a study to determine how the use of physicians' services changed during the first decade after the implementation of this scale. METHODS: With the resource-based relative-value scale, Medicare payments are based on the number of relative-value units (RVUs) assigned to physicians' services. The total number of RVUs reflects the volume of physicians' work (the time, skill, and training required for a physician to provide the service), practice expenses, and professional-liability insurance. Using national data from Medicare on physicians' services and American Medical Association files on RVUs, we analyzed the growth in RVUs per Medicare beneficiary from 1992 to 2002 according to the type of service and specialty. We also examined this growth with respect to the quantity and mix of services, revisions in the valuation of RVUs, and new service codes. RESULTS: Between 1992 and 2002, the volume of physicians' work per Medicare beneficiary grew by 50%, and the total RVUs per Medicare beneficiary grew by 45%. The quantity and mix of services were the largest sources of growth, increasing by 19% for RVUs for physicians' work and by 22% for total RVUs. Our findings varied among services and specialties. Revised valuation of RVUs was a key source of the growth in RVUs for physicians' work and total RVUs for evaluation and management and for tests. New service codes were the largest drivers of growth for major procedures (accounting for 36% of the growth in RVUs for physicians' work and 35% of the growth in total RVUs), and the quantity and mix of existing services were the largest drivers of growth for imaging. The growth in RVUs for physicians' work was greatest in cardiology (114%) and gastroenterology (72%). The total growth in RVUs was greatest in cardiology (99%) and dermatology (105%). CONCLUSIONS: In the first 10 years after the implementation of the resource-based relative-value scale, RVUs per Medicare beneficiary grew substantially. The leading sources of growth varied among service types and specialties. An understanding of these sources of growth can inform policies to control Medicare spending.

US approaches to physician payment: the deconstruction of primary care.

The purpose of this paper is to address why the three dominant alternatives to compensating physicians (fee-for-service, capitation, and salary) fall short of what is needed to support enhanced primary care in the patient-centered medical home, and the relevance of such payment reforms as pay-for-performance and episodes/bundling. The review illustrates why prevalent physician payment mechanisms in the US have failed to adequately support primary care and why innovative approaches to primary care payment play such a prominent role in the PCMH discussion. FFS payment for office visits has never effectively rewarded all the activities that comprise prototypical primary care and may contribute to the "hamster on a treadmill" problems in current medical practice. Capitation payments are associated with risk adjustment challenges and, perhaps, public perceptions of conflict with patients' best interests. Most payers don't employ and therefore cannot generally place physicians on salary; while in theory such salary payments might neutralize incentives, operationally, "time is money;" extra effort devoted to meeting the needs of a more complex patient will likely reduce the services available to others. Fee-for-service, the predominant physician payment scheme, has contributed to both the continuing decline in the primary care workforce and the capability to serve patients well. Yet, the conceptual alternative payment approaches, modified fee-for-service (including fee bundles), capitation, and salary, each have their own problems. Accordingly, new payment models will likely be required to support restoration of primary care to its proper role in the US health care system, and to promote and sustain the development of patient-centered medical homes.

How to buy a medical home? Policy options and practical questions.

In this paper, we describe a range of payment options to support the PCMH, identifying their conceptual strengths and weaknesses. These include enhanced FFS payment for office visits to the PCMH; paying additional FFS for "new" PCMH services; variations of traditional FFS combined with new PCMH-oriented per patient per month capitation; and combined capitation payments for traditional primary care medical services as well as new medical home services. In discussing options for PCMH payment reform we consider issues in patient severity adjustment, performance payment, and the role of payments to community service organizations to collaborate with the PCMH. We also highlight some of the practical challenges that can complicate reimbursement reform for primary care and the PCMH. Through this discussion we identify key dimensions to provider payment reform relevant to promoting enhanced primary care through the patient centered medical home. These consist of paying for the basic medical home services, rewarding excellent performance of medical homes, incentivizing medical home connections to other community health care resources, and overcoming implementation challenges to medical home payments. Each of these overarching policy issues invokes a substantial subset of policy relevant research questions that collectively comprise a robust research agenda. We conclude that the conceptual strengths and weaknesses of available payment models for medical home functions invoke a complex array of options with varying levels of real-world feasibility. The different needs of patients and communities, and varying characteristics of practices must also be factors guiding PCMH payment reform. Indeed, it may be that different circumstances will require different payment approaches in various combinations.

Home Health Use In Medicare Advantage Compared To Use In Traditional Medicare.

Medicare covers home health benefits for homebound beneficiaries who need intermittent skilled care. While home health care can help prevent costlier institutional care, some studies have suggested that traditional Medicare beneficiaries may overuse home health care. This study compared home health use in Medicare Advantage and traditional Medicare, as well as within Medicare Advantage by beneficiary cost sharing, prior authorization requirement, and plan type. In 2016 Medicare Advantage enrollees were less likely to use home health care than traditional Medicare enrollees were, had 7.1 fewer days per home health spell, and were less likely to be admitted to the hospital during their spell. Among Medicare Advantage plans, those that imposed beneficiary cost sharing or prior authorization requirements had lower rates of home health use. Qualitative interviews suggested that Medicare Advantage payment and contracting approaches influenced home health care use. Therefore, changes in traditional Medicare home health payment policies implemented in 2020 may reduce these disparities in home health use and spell length.