Examining a domain-specific link between perceived control and conspiracy beliefs: a brief report in the context of COVID-19.

Although anecdotal evidence suggests that control-threatening situations are associated with an increase in conspiracy beliefs, existing research does not support this "compensatory control" hypothesis. In the current study, we test a more refined hypothesis: that the link between control threat and conspiracy beliefs is domain specific, such that perceived control in a particular domain should lead to conspiracy beliefs pertaining to that domain only. Moreover, given that conspiracy beliefs are stigmatized (i.e., not socially acceptable), we propose that they should be endorsed only when other compensatory systems are frustrated. We test these ideas in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants from North Macedonia and New Zealand, who differed in perceived government effectiveness, filled in a questionnaire measuring domain-specific and domain-general perceived control, as well as domain-specific and domain-general conspiracy beliefs. As expected, domain specificity of the control threat predicted domain-specific conspiracy beliefs in the Macedonian group only. The results have implication for compensatory control theory, suggesting that the compensatory process may not always be as fluid as believed. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-021-01977-0.

Knowledge of Deaths in Hotel Rooms Diminishes Perceived Value and Elicits Guest Aversion.

Guest deaths are an inevitable aspect of the hospitality industry. In Study 1, participants read a vignette in which the previous guest died of natural causes, suicide, or homicide. Those who learned of a death (a) saw the room as less valuable, (b) opted to stay in a more basic room in which no death occurred, despite both rooms being offered for free, and (c) anticipated feeling uneasy when imagining an overnight stay. In Study 2, we investigated the persistence of this bias. Perceived room value and anticipatory well-being can be expected to return to baseline levels only many years after the death event. Similar to "stigmatized properties" in real estate, these data confirm an irrational and recalcitrant cognitive bias surrounding consumers' views of death-affected hotel rooms.

Addressing head injury risk in youth football: are heading guidelines the answer?

BACKGROUND: Recent findings of neurodegenerative pathology in former professional football players have once again called into question the role that "heading", a fundamental aspect of the game, plays in the onset of neurological disease. By introducing guidelines aimed at limiting heading among youth players, the United Kingdom recently joined the United States as the only two nations yet to implement heading regulation in response to growing concerns surrounding football's head injury burden. PURPOSE: Evaluating the efficacy of risk mitigation strategies requires the continual reviewal of available evidence, however, youth heading guidelines have yet to undergo such an empirical evaluation. This review aims to address this absence by first discussing the literature informing heading-related health risk, followed by an assessment of the decision to limit youth heading in response to this research. MAIN FINDINGS: The risk of injury due to heading remains highly uncertain, especially as it pertains to youth players for whom epidemiological data is severely lacking. However, consideration of policy making under conditions of scientific uncertainty, as well as intrinsic risk factors of acute head injury in children and adolescents, currently warrants a precautionary approach to youth heading regulation. CONCLUSIONS: Further research must be pursued to ensure that future risk management strategies remain grounded in evidence and enhance the safety of football for vulnerable individuals. While our understanding of the neurological outcomes of heading remains limited, the adoption of heading guidelines reflects an appropriate response to uncertain risk.

"Princess Alice is watching you": children's belief in an invisible person inhibits cheating.

Two child groups (5-6 and 8-9 years of age) participated in a challenging rule-following task while they were (a) told that they were in the presence of a watchful invisible person ("Princess Alice"), (b) observed by a real adult, or (c) unsupervised. Children were covertly videotaped performing the task in the experimenter's absence. Older children had an easier time at following the rules but engaged in equal levels of purposeful cheating as the younger children. Importantly, children's expressed belief in the invisible person significantly determined their cheating latency, and this was true even after controlling for individual differences in temperament. When "skeptical" children were omitted from the analysis, the inhibitory effects of being told about Princess Alice were equivalent to having a real adult present. Furthermore, skeptical children cheated only after having first behaviorally disconfirmed the "presence" of Princess Alice. The findings suggest that children's belief in a watchful invisible person tends to deter cheating.

The construction of awe in science communication.

Awe is a frequently represented and commonly experienced emotion in science communication. According to a popular account of this emotion, awe is an innate and universal human affective experience that occurs when a person evaluates a target as vast, forcing a shift in their worldview. This shift is portrayed in science communication as resulting in an enhanced interest in the scientific material at hand. Based on the latest research in affective science, however, we challenge this narrow version of awe in science communication and instead advocate a broader account of this emotion in line with a constructionist perspective. We argue that there are a variety of awe types in science communication, each with different forms and functions in relation to the mandates within the multiplicity of contexts in this cultural space. We also contend that people's awe experiences result from their previous interactions with this emotion and the unique affordances provided by the science communication situation.

Public faith in science in the United States through the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

OBJECTIVES: Given the centrality of science over the course of the COVID-19 crisis, we evaluate changes in people's beliefs in the power of science in the United States over the first four months of the pandemic. STUDY DESIGN: Post-hoc analysis of cross-sectional survey data. METHODS: A convenience sample of 1327 participants was recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk service for three surveys carried out in 14-25 January, 27 March to 1 April, and 28-29 May of 2020. Respondents completed a ten-item instrument measuring different aspects of their perceptions of science including trust, interest, and faith (answer to the question: "How much do you agree with the following statement: Science can sort out any problem."). We conducted multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with faith, interest, and trust as dependent variables, time as the independent variable, and political orientation and religiosity as between-subjects covariates. RESULTS: The data revealed that public levels of faith in science increased between January (M â€‹= â€‹3.2) and both March (M â€‹= â€‹3.42) and May (M â€‹= â€‹3.4). By contrast, we observed no changes in interest and trust in science over the same time period. CONCLUSIONS: We speculate that increases in faith in science during the first four months of the pandemic helped people cope with the uncertainty and existential anxiety resulting from this public health crisis.

Strategies to Stay Alive: Adaptive Toolboxes for Living Well with Suicidal Behavior.

Suicidal behavior constitutes a major global problem. Qualitative research utilizing the first-hand experiences of those who have survived attempts to take their own lives can offer much in the way of understanding how to live well despite ongoing suicidal behavior. Given that suicidal intentions and behaviors occur within the person's subjective construal, the solutions to living-and preferably living well-despite such inclinations must also be subjective and adaptive. The aim of this study was therefore to understand how individuals live with different aspects of their suicidal behavior and their use of effective strategies to protect themselves from future attempts. Thematic analysis of semi-structured, qualitative interviews with 17 participants with lived experience of suicidal behavior from the USA yielded two main themes: (i) the 'dynamic relationship with suicidal behavior: living with, and through', and (ii) 'the toolbox'. Each of these themes had four subthemes. Participants in this study offered important insights into what helped them not just survive ongoing suicidal behavior, but how they created unique toolboxes to continue living, and to live well. These toolboxes contained personalized solutions to dealing with recurring threats to their subjective wellbeing and included diverse solutions from spirituality, pets, peer-support, participating in the arts, through to traditional therapeutic supports. Some participants also discussed the importance of broader social policy and societal changes that help them live. The findings highlight crucial implications for suicide prevention efforts, especially in terms of encouraging collaborations with the lived experience community and furthering a strengths-based approach to mitigating suicidal behaviors. We encourage the clinical community to work in partnership with service-users to enable them to generate effective solutions to living-and living well-through suicidal behavior.

Children's Tattling: the reporting of everyday norm violations in preschool settings.

Tattling, defined as the reporting to a second party of norm violations committed by a third party, is a frequent but little-studied activity among young children. Participant observation and quantitative sampling are used to provide a detailed characterization of tattling in 2 preschools (initial mean age = 4.08 years, N = 40). In these populations, tattling represents the majority of talk about peers' behavior to third parties. It is usually truthful, it rarely refers to transgressions committed against other individuals, it is not often ignored by adults, it is performed more frequently by dominant children, and it correlates with teacher reports of relational aggression. These exploratory results suggest several new avenues of research into children's developing understanding of social norms.

Does Perceived Lack of Control Lead to Conspiracy Theory Beliefs? Findings from an online MTurk sample.

It is widely believed that conspiracy theory beliefs are the product of perceived lack of control. However, to date there is mixed evidence, at best, to support this claim. We consider the reasons why conspiracy theory beliefs do not appear to be based in any straightforward way on control beliefs, interrogating existing findings and presenting new data that call the relationship into question. Across six studies conducted online using MTurk samples, we observed no effect of control manipulations on conspiracy theory beliefs, while replicating previously reported correlational evidence of their association. The results suggest that conspiracy beliefs are not suitable for compensating for threats to control. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy between experimental and correlational effects and examine the limitations of the studies.

Aversion to organs donated by suicide victims: The role of psychological essentialism.

People are known to be susceptible to psychological essentialism when reasoning about organ transplantation, believing that the mental characteristics of the donor will transfer to the recipient. Because psychological essentialism is exacerbated in negative social contexts (i.e., moral contagion bias), the effect may be especially apparent when people consider the impact of receiving organs from donors who died by stigmatized causes, such as suicide and homicide. In a forced-choice paradigm, participants overwhelmingly ranked a suicide victim as their least preferred donor, with accident victims being the most preferred donors and homicide victims the most common second choice. In a follow-up study, we investigated the psychological mechanisms underlying this unease about suicide donors. Compared to those who imagined receiving a heart from homicide or accident victims, participants who imagined a suicide donor expressed greater unease about the source of their transplant. The effect could not be explained by participants' rumination about the source of the transplant, or by the explicitly perceived stigma of suicide, but did depend on their essentialist beliefs. Those who believed that negative or neutral (but not positive) traits of the donor could transfer to them were more hesitant about receiving a heart from a suicide relative to other donors. These data suggest that the bias against suicide organ donors is moderated by socially relevant essentialist beliefs.

Children's attributions of intentions to an invisible agent.

Children ages 3-9 years were informed that an invisible agent (Princess Alice) would help them play a forced-choice game by "telling them, somehow, when they chose the wrong box," whereas a matched control group of children were not given this supernatural prime. On 2 unexpected event trials, an experimenter triggered a simulated unexpected event (i.e., a light turning on/off; a picture falling), and children's behavioral response to these events (i.e., moving their hand to the opposite box) was coded. Results showed a significant Age GroupxExperimental Condition interaction; the only children to reliably alter their behavior in response to the unexpected events were the oldest children (M=7 years 4 months), who were primed with the invisible agent concept. For children's posttest verbal explanations, also, only these children saw the unexpected events as being referential and declarative (e.g., "Princess Alice did it because I chose the wrong box"). Together, these data suggest that children may not regularly begin to see communicative signs as embedded in unexpected events until they are around 7 years of age.

Reasoning about dead agents reveals possible adaptive trends.

We investigated whether (a) people positively reevaluate the characters of recently dead others and (b) supernatural primes concerning an ambient dead agent serve to curb selfish intentions. In Study 1, participants made trait attributions to three strangers depicted in photographs; one week later, they returned to do the same but were informed that one of the strangers had died over the weekend. Participants rated the decedent target more favorably after learning of his death whereas ratings for the control targets remained unchanged between sessions. This effect was especially pronounced for traits dealing with the decedent's prosocial tendencies (e.g., ethical, kind). In Study 2, a content analysis of obituaries revealed a similar emphasis on decedents' prosocial attributes over other personality dimensions (e.g., achievement-relatedness, social skills). Finally, in Study 3, participants who were told of an alleged ghost in the laboratory were less likely to cheat on a competitive task than those who did not receive this supernatural prime. The findings are interpreted as evidence suggestive of adaptive design.

The development of afterlife beliefs in religiously and secularly schooled children.

Children aged from 4;10 to 12;9 attending either a Catholic school or a public, secular school in an eastern Spanish city observed a puppet show in which a mouse was eaten by an alligator. Children were then asked questions about the dead mouse's biological and psychological functioning. The pattern of results generally replicated that obtained earlier in an American sample, with older children being more apt to state that functions cease after death than younger children (11- to 12-year-olds > 8- to 9-year-olds > 5- to 6-year-olds), and all children being more likely to attribute epistemic, desire, and emotion states to the dead mouse than biological, psychobiological, and perceptual states. Although children attending Catholic school were generally more likely to state that functions continue after death than children attending secular school, the pattern of change with regard to question type did not differ between the Catholic and secular groups. The results were interpreted as reflecting the combined roles of religious instruction/exposure and universal ontogeny of cognitive abilities on the development of children's afterlife beliefs.

The natural emergence of reasoning about the afterlife as a developmental regularity.

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds.

The folk psychology of souls.

The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is "like" to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive "system" dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment.

A critical review of the "enculturation hypothesis": the effects of human rearing on great ape social cognition.

Numerous investigators have argued that early ontogenetic immersion in sociocultural environments facilitates cognitive developmental change in human-reared great apes more characteristic of Homo sapiens than of their own species. Such revamping of core, species-typical psychological systems might be manifest, according to this argument, in the emergence of mental representational competencies, a set of social cognitive skills theoretically consigned to humans alone. Human-reared great apes' capacity to engage in "true imitation," in which both the means and ends of demonstrated actions are reproduced with fairly high rates of fidelity, and laboratory great apes' failure to do so, has frequently been interpreted as reflecting an emergent understanding of intentionality in the former. Although this epigenetic model of the effects of enculturation on social cognitive systems may be well-founded and theoretically justified in the biological literature, alternative models stressing behavioral as opposed to representational change have been largely overlooked. Here I review some of the controversy surrounding enculturation in great apes, and present an alternative nonmentalistic version of the enculturation hypothesis that can also account for enhanced imitative performance on object-oriented problem-solving tasks in human-reared animals.

The generalization of deferred imitation in enculturated chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Deferred imitation of object-related actions and generalization of imitation to similar but not identical tasks was assessed in three human-reared (enculturated) chimpanzees, ranging in age from 5 to 9 years. Each ape displayed high levels of deferred imitation and only slightly lower levels of generalization of imitation. The youngest two chimpanzees were more apt to generalize the model's actions when they had displayed portions of the target behaviors at baseline, consistent with the idea that learning is more likely to occur when working within the "zone of proximal development." We argue that generalization of imitation is the best evidence to date of imitative learning in chimpanzees.