Changes of creative ability and underlying brain network connectivity throughout the lifespan.

Creativity, or divergent thinking, is essential to and supported by cognitive functions necessary for everyday tasks. The current study investigates divergent thinking and its neural mechanisms from adolescence to late adulthood. To do this, 180 healthy participants completed a creativity task called the egg task including 86 adolescents (mean age (SD) = 13.62 (1.98)), 52 young adults (24.92 (3.60), and 42 older adults (62.84 (7.02)). Additionally, a subsample of 111 participants completed a resting-state fMRI scan. After investigating the impact of age on different divergent thinking metrics, we investigated the impact of age on the association between divergent thinking and resting-state functional connectivity within and between major resting-state brain networks associated with creative thinking: the DMN, ECN, and SN. Adolescents tended to be less creative than both young and older adults in divergent thinking scores related to expansion creativity, and not in persistent creativity, while young and older adults performed relatively similar. We found that adolescents' functional integrity of the executive control network (ECN) was positively associated with expansion creativity, which was significantly different from the negative association in both the young and older adults. These results suggest that creative performance and supporting brain networks change throughout the lifespan.

Differential effects of mindfulness meditation and cognitive training on cool and hot inhibitory control in children and adolescents.

Inhibitory control (IC) can occur either in a neutral context (cool) or in social contexts involving emotions (hot). Cool and hot IC have specific developmental trajectories; cool IC develops linearly from childhood to adulthood, whereas hot IC follows a quadratic trajectory. Some activities can improve the IC, such as cognitive training (CT) and mindfulness meditation (MM). The aim of our study was to compare the effects of 5 weeks of computerized MM versus CT on IC performance in 66 children (9-10 years old) and 63 adolescents (16-17 years old) by specifically analyzing cool and hot dimensions in the same participants and from a developmental perspective. We fit a linear mixed-effect model on the Stroop interference score with time (pretest vs. posttest) and type of conflict (cool vs. hot) as within-participant factors and intervention group (CT vs. MM) and age group (child vs. adolescent) as between-participant factors. The findings revealed that children but not adolescents benefitted from interventions. More specifically, CT improved cool IC but not hot IC, whereas MM practice improved hot IC but not cool IC. This study supports the benefits of MM at a young age. Theoretical issues linking MM programs to emotional competence grounded in hot IC skills are considered in academic settings.

Peers' Choices Influence Adolescent Risk-taking Especially When Explicit Risk Information is Lacking.

This study examines the impact of peers' previous cautious versus risky choices on adolescents' risk-taking depending on the level of information about the risk. Adolescents completed an adaptation of the BART that manipulated social influence (cautious and risky) and risk information (i.e., informed, noninformed). Results showed that social influence impacts adolescents' decisions on the noninformed BART but not on the informed BART. In the noninformed BART, the peers' cautious choices strongly decreased risk-taking and led to greater performance. The peers' risky choices increase adolescents' risk-taking, but this effect is limited to situations involving minimal risk. Thus social experience may be a specific social context that represents a valuable source of information during adolescence, especially in situations with high uncertainty.

Adolescents' inhibitory control: keep it cool or lose control.

Inhibitory control (i.e., the ability to resist automatisms, temptations, distractions, or interference and to adapt to conflicting situations) is a determinant of cognitive and socio-emotional development. In light of the discrepancies of previous findings on the development of inhibitory control in affectively charged contexts, two important issues need to be addressed. We need to determine (a) whether cool inhibitory control (in affectively neutral contexts) and hot inhibitory control (in affectively charged contexts) follow the same developmental pattern and (b) the degree of specificity of these two types of inhibitory control at different ages. Thus, in the present study, we investigated the developmental patterns of cool and hot inhibitory control and the degree of specificity of these abilities in children, adolescents and adults. Typically developing children, adolescents, and adults performed two Stroop-like tasks: an affectively neutral one (Cool Stroop task) and an affectively charged one (Hot Stroop task). In the Cool Stroop task, the participants were asked to identify the ink color of the words independent of color that the words named; in the Hot Stroop task, the participants were asked to identify the emotional expression of a face independent of the emotion named by a simultaneously displayed written word. We found that cool inhibitory control abilities develop linearly with age, whereas hot inhibitory control abilities follow a quadratic developmental pattern, with adolescents displaying worse hot inhibitory control abilities than children and adults. In addition, cool and hot inhibitory control abilities were correlated in children but not in adolescents and adults. The present study suggests (a) that cool and hot inhibitory control abilities develop differently from childhood to adulthood - i.e., that cool inhibition follows a linear developmental pattern and hot inhibition follows an adolescent-specific pattern - and (b) that they become progressively more domain-specific with age.

Relationship between pathological gambling, alexithymia, and gambling type.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: The aim of this study is to see if: (i) alexithymia is associated with PG and with the severity of gambling behavior; (ii) alexithymia is associated with strategic and non-strategic gambling. METHODS: Two hundred and twenty-six gamblers were recruited in different gambling locations. First, pathological gamblers (PGs) (n = 106) were compared to non-pathological gamblers (NPGs) (n = 120). Second, strategic gamblers (n = 92) were compared to non-strategic gamblers (n = 96). RESULTS: After controlling for being or not depressed, PGs have significantly higher alexithymia scores. Alexithymia is positively correlated to the intensity of gambling behavior and associated with PG: being alexithymic (OR = 4.21, SEB = .32, p < .001), "difficulty identifying feelings" (OR = 1.07, SEB = .03, p = .038), and "externally-oriented thinking" (OR = 1.07, SEB = .03, p = .026) factors. Nevertheless, while alexithymia is associated with PG in strategic gamblers (being alexithymic (OR = 6.80, SEB = .50 p < .001) and "difficulty identifying feelings" (OR = 1.12, SEB = .05 p = .026) factor), this is not the case in non-strategic gamblers. In the latter, only depression is associated with PG (OR = 3.43, SEB = .50 p = .013). DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: The results highlight the importance of taking into account the gambling type in the relationship between alexithymia, depression, and PG. SCIENTIFIC SIGNIFICANCE: In non-strategic PGs, specific therapies targeting depression could be appropriate, while for strategic PGs, specific psychotherapeutic techniques like body-centered psychotherapy could help them to differentiate feelings from bodily sensations. (Am J Addict 2017;26:152-160).

Inhibitory Control as a Core Process of Creative Problem Solving and Idea Generation from Childhood to Adulthood.

Developmental cognitive neuroscience studies tend to show that the prefrontal brain regions (known to be involved in inhibitory control) are activated during the generation of creative ideas. In the present article, we discuss how a dual-process model of creativity-much like the ones proposed to account for decision making and reasoning-could broaden our understanding of the processes involved in creative ideas generation. When generating creative ideas, children, adolescents, and adults tend to follow "the path of least resistance" and propose solutions that are built on the most common and accessible knowledge within a specific domain, leading to fixation effect. In line with recent theory of typical cognitive development, we argue that the ability to resist the spontaneous activation of design heuristics, to privilege other types of reasoning, might be critical to generate creative ideas at all ages. In the present review, we demonstrate that inhibitory control at all ages can actually support creativity. Indeed, the ability to think of something truly new and original requires first inhibiting spontaneous solutions that come to mind quickly and unconsciously and then exploring new ideas using a generative type of reasoning.

The impact of alexithymia on pathological gamblers' decision making: a preliminary study of gamblers recruited in "sportsbook" casinos.

OBJECTIVE: We investigated whether alexithymia is at the root of the decision-making deficit classically reported in pathological gamblers. BACKGROUND: Alexithymia has been shown to be a recurrent personality trait of pathological gamblers and to impair the decision-making abilities of nonpathological gamblers, but no previous studies have investigated whether alexithymia significantly affects pathological gamblers' decision making. Although investigations of pathological gamblers typically have studied those seeking treatment, most pathological gamblers do not seek treatment. Thus, to study people representative of the general population of pathological gamblers, we conducted our study in "sportsbook" casinos with a small sample of gamblers who were not seeking treatment. METHODS: We recruited gamblers in sportsbooks and classified them based on their scores on the South Oaks Gambling Screen and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale: 3 groups of pathological gamblers (6 alexithymic, 8 possibly alexithymic, and 6 nonalexithymic) and 8 healthy controls. All of the participants completed an adaptation of the Iowa Gambling Task. RESULTS: The alexithymic group chose less advantageously on the task than the other groups. The severity of the deficit in decision-making abilities was related to the severity of alexithymia, even when we controlled for the effects of anxiety and depression. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings provide preliminary evidence that alexithymia might be a critical personality trait underlying pathological gamblers' decision-making deficits.

Is human decision making under ambiguity guided by loss frequency regardless of the costs? A developmental study using the Soochow Gambling Task.

Converging developmental decision-making studies have demonstrated that until late adolescence, individuals prefer options for which the risk of a loss is low regardless of the final outcome. Recent works have shown a similar inability to consider both loss frequency and final outcome among adults. The current study aimed to identify developmental changes in feedback-monitoring ability to consider both loss frequency and final outcome in decision making under ambiguity. Children, adolescents, and adults performed an adapted version of the Soochow Gambling Task. Our results showed that children and adolescents presented an exclusive preference for options associated with infrequent punishment. In contrast, only adults seemed to consider both loss frequency and the final outcome by favoring the advantageous options when the frequency of losses was low. These findings suggest that the ability to integrate both loss frequency and final outcome develops with age. Moreover, the analysis of strategic adjustments following gains and losses reveals that adults switch less often after losses compared with children and adolescents. This finding suggests that psychological tolerance to loss may facilitate learning the characteristics of each option and improve the ability to choose advantageously.

Pleasant emotional induction broadens the visual world of young children.

These experiments aimed at studying the influence of emotional context on global/local visual processing in children. Children 5 years old, known to present an immature global visual bias, and 8 years old, known to pay attention predominantly to global information, were placed in either a neutral or pleasant emotional context and subsequently presented with a global/local visual judgement task. As with previous findings for adults, both age groups presented a pronounced perceptual bias toward global information following exposure to emotionally pleasant pictures. Interestingly, younger children, who do not present a global bias during the neutral exposure, presented the same preference for global information as older children when exposed to the pleasant context. These findings indicate that emotion may strongly affect visual perception in children, with important implications for educational practice and models of cognition.

Development of cool and hot theory of mind and cool and hot inhibitory control abilities from 3.5 to 6.5 years of age.

Attributing affectively neutral mental states such as thoughts (i.e., cool theory of mind, cool ToM) to others appears to be rooted in different processes than the ones involved in attributing affectively charged mental states such as emotions (i.e., hot ToM) to others. However, no study has investigated the developmental pattern of hot and cool ToM abilities using a similar task and the relative contribution of cool and hot inhibitory control (IC) to cool and hot ToM development. To do so, we tested 112 children aged 3.5 to 6.5 years on a cool and a hot version of a ToM task and on a cool and hot version of an IC task. We found that hot ToM abilities developed more rapidly than cool ToM. Importantly, we found that hot IC abilities mediated the relation between age and hot ToM abilities. Taken together, our results suggest that the ability to attribute emotions to others develops more rapidly than the ability to attribute thoughts and that the growing efficiency of hot ToM with age is specifically rooted in the growing efficiency of hot IC abilities.

How does social evaluation influence Hot and Cool inhibitory control in adolescence?

The aim of the present study is to examine whether in Hot, i.e., affectively charged contexts, or cool, i.e., affectively neutral contexts, inhibitory control capacity increases or decreases under social evaluation in adolescents and adults. In two experiments, adolescents and young adults completed two Stroop-like tasks under either a social evaluation condition or an alone condition. The social evaluation condition comprised the presence of a peer (Experiment 1) or an expert (Experiment 2) playing the role of an evaluator, while under the alone condition, the task was performed alone. In the Cool Stroop task, participants had to refrain from reading color names to identify the ink color in which the words were printed. In the Hot Stroop task, participants had to determine the emotional expression conveyed by faces from the NimStim database while ignoring the emotion word displayed beneath. The results were similar in both experiments. In adolescents, social evaluation by a peer (Experiment 1) or by an expert (Experience 2) facilitated Hot but not cool inhibitory control. In adults, social evaluation had no effect on Hot or cool inhibitory control. The present findings expand our understanding of the favorable influence of socioemotional context on Hot inhibitory control during adolescence in healthy individuals.

How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: evidence from the Iowa gambling task.

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased --> biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased --> logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.

The local properties of bold signal fluctuations at rest monitor inhibitory control training in adolescents.

Inhibitory control (IC) plays a critical role in cognitive and socio-emotional development. Short-term IC training improves IC abilities in children and adults. Surprisingly, few studies have investigated the IC training effect during adolescence, a developmental period characterized by high neuroplasticity and the protracted development of IC abilities. We investigated behavioural and functional brain changes induced by a 5-week computerized and adaptive IC training in adolescents. We focused on the IC training effects on the local properties of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) signal fluctuations at rest (i.e., Regional Homogeneity [ReHo] and fractional Amplitude of Low Frequency Fluctuations [fALFF]). Sixty adolescents were randomly assigned to either an IC or an active control training group. In the pre- and post-training sessions, cognitive ('Cool') and emotional ('Hot') IC abilities were assessed using the Colour-Word and Emotional Stroop tasks. We found that ReHo and fALFF signals in IC areas (IFG, ACC, Striatum) were associated with IC efficiency at baseline. This association was different for Cool and Hot IC. Analyses also revealed that ReHo and fALFF signals were sensitive markers to detect and monitor changes after IC training, while behavioural data did not, suggesting that brain functional changes at rest precede behavioural changes following training.

Neural basis of functional fixedness during creative idea generation: An EEG study.

Decades of problem solving and creativity research have converged to show that the ability to generate new and useful ideas can be blocked or impeded by intuitive biases leading to mental fixations. The present study aimed at investigating the neural bases of the processes involved in overcoming fixation effects during creative idea generation. Using the AU task adapted for EEG recording, we examined whether participant's ability to provide original ideas was related to alpha power changes in both the frontal and temporo-parietal regions. Critically, for half of the presented objects, the classical use of the object was primed orally, and a picture of the classical use was presented visually to increase functional fixedness (Fixation Priming condition). For the other half, only the name of the object and a picture of the object was provided to the participants (control condition). As expected, priming the classical use of an object before the generation of creative alternative uses of the object impeded participants' performances in terms of remoteness. In the control condition, while the frontal alpha synchronization was maintained across all successive time windows in participants with high remoteness scores, the frontal alpha synchronization decreased in participants with low remoteness scores. In the Fixation Priming condition, in which functional fixedness was maximal, both participants with high and low remoteness scores maintained frontal alpha synchronization throughout the period preceding their answer. Whereas participants with high remoteness scores maintained alpha synchronization in the temporo-parietal regions throughout the creative idea generation period, participants with low remoteness scores displayed alpha desynchronization in the same regions during this period. We speculate that individuals with high remoteness scores might generate more creative ideas than individuals with low remoteness scores because they rely more on internal semantic association and selection processes.

How minimal executive feedback influences creative idea generation.

The fixation effect is known as one of the most dominant of the cognitive biases against creativity and limits individuals' creative capacities in contexts of idea generation. Numerous techniques and tools have been established to help overcome these cognitive biases in various disciplines ranging from neuroscience to design sciences. Several works in the developmental cognitive sciences have discussed the importance of inhibitory control and have argued that individuals must first inhibit the spontaneous ideas that come to their mind so that they can generate creative solutions to problems. In line with the above discussions, in the present study, we performed an experiment on one hundred undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychology at Paris Descartes University, in which we investigated a minimal executive feedback-based learning process that helps individuals inhibit intuitive paths to solutions and then gradually drive their ideation paths toward creativity. Our results provide new insights into novel forms of creative leadership for idea generation.

Helping reasoners succeed in the Wason selection task: when executive learning discourages heuristic response but does not necessarily encourage logic.

Reasoners make systematic logical errors by giving heuristic responses that reflect deviations from the logical norm. Influential studies have suggested first that our reasoning is often biased because we minimize cognitive effort to surpass a cognitive conflict between heuristic response from system 1 and analytic response from system 2 thinking. Additionally, cognitive control processes might be necessary to inhibit system 1 responses to activate a system 2 response. Previous studies have shown a significant effect of executive learning (EL) on adults who have transferred knowledge acquired on the Wason selection task (WST) to another isomorphic task, the rule falsification task (RFT). The original paradigm consisted of teaching participants to inhibit a classical matching heuristic that sufficed the first problem and led to significant EL transfer on the second problem. Interestingly, the reasoning tasks differed in inhibiting-heuristic metacognitive cost. Success on the WST requires half-suppression of the matching elements. In contrast, the RFT necessitates a global rejection of the matching elements for a correct answer. Therefore, metacognitive learning difficulty most likely differs depending on whether one uses the first or second task during the learning phase. We aimed to investigate this difficulty and various matching-bias inhibition effects in a new (reversed) paradigm. In this case, the transfer effect from the RFT to the WST could be more difficult because the reasoner learns to reject all matching elements in the first task. We observed that the EL leads to a significant reduction in matching selections on the WST without increasing logical performances. Interestingly, the acquired metacognitive knowledge was too "strictly" transferred and discouraged matching rather than encouraging logic. This finding underlines the complexity of learning transfer and adds new evidence to the pedagogy of reasoning.

Fear and anger have opposite effects on risk seeking in the gain frame.

Emotions strongly influence our decisions, particularly those made under risk. A classic example of the effect of emotion on decision making under risk is the "framing effect," which involves predictable shifts in preferences when the same problem is formulated in different ways. According to dual process theories, this bias could stem from an affective heuristic belonging to an intuitive type of reasoning. In this study, we examined whether specific incidental negative emotions (i.e., fear and anger) influence framing susceptibility and risk-taking identically. In each trial, participants received an initial amount of money, and pictures of angry or fearful faces were presented to them. Finally, participants chose between a sure option and a gamble option of equally expected value in a gain or loss frame. Risk-taking was modulated by emotional context: fear and anger influenced risk-taking specifically in the gain frame and had opposite effects. Fear increased risk-averse choices, whereas anger decreased risk-averse choices, leading to a suppression of the framing effect. These results confirm that emotions play a key role in framing susceptibility.

Does ambiguity aversion influence the framing effect during decision making?

Decision-makers present a systematic tendency to avoid ambiguous options for which the level of risk is unknown. This ambiguity aversion is one of the most striking decision-making biases. Given that human choices strongly depend on the options' presentation, the purpose of the present study was to examine whether ambiguity aversion influences the framing effect during decision making. We designed a new financial decision-making task involving the manipulation of both frame and uncertainty levels. Thirty-seven participants had to choose between a sure option and a gamble depicting either clear or ambiguous probabilities. The results revealed a clear preference for the sure option in the ambiguity condition regardless of frame. However, participants presented a framing effect in both the risk and ambiguity conditions. Indeed, the framing effect was bidirectional in the risk condition and unidirectional in the ambiguity condition given that it did not involve preference reversal but only a more extreme choice tendency.

What have we learned about the processes involved in the Iowa Gambling Task from developmental studies?

Developmental studies using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) or child-friendly adaptations of the IGT converged in showing that children and adolescents exhibit a strong bias in favor of disadvantageous choices whereas adults learn to decide advantageously during the course of the task. In the present article, we reviewed developmental studies that used the IGT or child-friendly adaptations of the IGT to show how these findings provide a better understanding of the processes involved in decision-making under uncertainty. For instance, developmental studies have underlined that until late adolescence, the dominant strategy is to focus only on the frequency of punishment and to choose among options with infrequent losses. Indeed, school-aged children and adolescents' choices in the IGT seem to be guided by the loss frequency leading them to fail in distinguishing between advantageous and disadvantageous options. In addition, recent developmental studies revealed that adults switch less often after losses than school-aged children and adolescents. These findings suggest that psychological tolerance to loss may facilitate learning the characteristics of each option, which in turn improves the ability to choose advantageously. In conclusion, developmental studies help us refine our understanding of decision-making.

Impact of emotional context congruency on decision making under ambiguity.

In this study, we tested the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) by using an adaptation of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in which the emotional context associated with primary inducers was systematically manipulated. In this modified version of the IGT, a picture of either a happy face or a fearful face was presented after each feedback. Critically, the expression of the face was either congruent or incongruent with the feedback delivered. Analyses of participants' choices revealed that the congruency of the emotional context with the feedback affects performance on the IGT: The ability to choose advantageously increases when the emotional context is congruent with feedback (i.e., happy faces after rewards and fearful ones after punishments), whereas this ability is impaired with an incongruent emotional context (i.e., fearful faces after rewards and happy faces after punishments). These findings provide evidence that decision making under ambiguity is driven by emotion-related signals, as postulated by the SMH.