The antimicrobial resistance monitoring and research (ARMoR) program: the US Department of Defense response to escalating antimicrobial resistance.

Responding to escalating antimicrobial resistance (AMR), the US Department of Defense implemented an enterprise-wide collaboration, the Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring and Research Program, to aid in infection prevention and control. It consists of a network of epidemiologists, bioinformaticists, microbiology researchers, policy makers, hospital-based infection preventionists, and healthcare providers who collaborate to collect relevant AMR data, conduct centralized molecular characterization, and use AMR characterization feedback to implement appropriate infection prevention and control measures and influence policy. A particularly concerning type of AMR, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, significantly declined after the program was launched. Similarly, there have been no further reports or outbreaks of another concerning type of AMR, colistin resistance in Acinetobacter, in the Department of Defense since the program was initiated. However, bacteria containing AMR-encoding genes are increasing. To update program stakeholders and other healthcare systems facing such challenges, we describe the processes and impact of the program.

Infection prevention and control in deployed military medical treatment facilities.

Infections have complicated the care of combat casualties throughout history and were at one time considered part of the natural history of combat trauma. Personnel who survived to reach medical care were expected to develop and possibly succumb to infections during their care in military hospitals. Initial care of war wounds continues to focus on rapid surgical care with debridement and irrigation, aimed at preventing local infection and sepsis with bacteria from the environment (e.g., clostridial gangrene) or the casualty's own flora. Over the past 150 years, with the revelation that pathogens can be spread from patient to patient and from healthcare providers to patients (including via unwashed hands of healthcare workers, the hospital environment and fomites), a focus on infection prevention and control aimed at decreasing transmission of pathogens and prevention of these infections has developed. Infections associated with combat-related injuries in the recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have predominantly been secondary to multidrug-resistant pathogens, likely acquired within the military healthcare system. These healthcare-associated infections seem to originate throughout the system, from deployed medical treatment facilities through the chain of care outside of the combat zone. Emphasis on infection prevention and control, including hand hygiene, isolation, cohorting, and antibiotic control measures, in deployed medical treatment facilities is essential to reducing these healthcare-associated infections. This review was produced to support the Guidelines for the Prevention of Infections Associated With Combat-Related Injuries: 2011 Update contained in this supplement of Journal of Trauma.

Multidrug-resistant bacterial colonization of combat-injured personnel at admission to medical centers after evacuation from Afghanistan and Iraq.

BACKGROUND: Multidrug-resistant organism (MDRO) infections, including those secondary to Acinetobacter (ACB) and extended spectrum ß-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Enterobacteriaceae (Escherichia coli and Klebsiella species) have complicated the care of combat-injured personnel during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Data suggest that the source of these bacterial infections includes nosocomial transmission in both deployed hospitals and receiving military medical centers (MEDCENs). Admission screening for MDRO colonization has been established to monitor this problem and effectiveness of responses to it. METHODS: Admission colonization screening of injured personnel began in 2003 at the three US-based MEDCENs receiving the majority of combat-injured personnel. This was extended to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC; Germany) in 2005. Focused on ACB initially, screening was expanded to include all MDROs in 2009 with a standardized screening strategy at LRMC and US-based MEDCENs for patients evacuated from the combat zone. RESULTS: Eighteen thousand five hundred sixty of 21,272 patients admitted to the 4 MEDCENs in calendar years 2005 to 2009 were screened for MDRO colonization. Average admission ACB colonization rates at the US-based MEDCENs declined during this 5-year period from 21% (2005) to 4% (2009); as did rates at LRMC (7-1%). In the first year of screening for all MDROs, 6% (171 of 2,989) of patients were found colonized at admission, only 29% (50) with ACB. Fifty-seven percent of patients (98) were colonized with ESBL-producing E. coli and 11% (18) with ESBL-producing Klebsiella species. CONCLUSIONS: Although colonization with ACB declined during the past 5 years, there seems to be replacement of this pathogen with ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae.

Response to infection control challenges in the deployed setting: Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom.

BACKGROUND: Infections caused by multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs), including Acinetobacter, have complicated the care of military personnel injured in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. Cumulative data suggest that nosocomial transmission of MDROs in deployed medical treatment facilities (MTFs) has contributed to these infections. A 2008 review of deployed MTFs identified multiple factors impeding the performance of infection prevention and control (IC) practices. In response, efforts to emphasize IC basics, improve expertise, and better track MDRO colonization were pursued. METHODS: Efforts to increase awareness and enhance IC in deployed MTFs were focused on educating leaders and deploying personnel, producing deployed IC resources, and standardizing level IV and V admission screening for MDRO colonization. A repeat mission in 2009 reviewed interval progress. RESULTS: Increased awareness and the need for emphasis on basic IC practice, including hand hygiene, use of transmission-based (isolation) precautions, and cohorting of patients, were imparted to leaders and deploying personnel through briefings, presentations, and an All Army Activities message. Enhancement of IC expertise was implemented through increased standardization of IC practice, establishment of a predeployment IC short course, an IC teleconsultation service, and dedicated Internet resources. Standardization of admission colonization screening of personnel evacuated from the combat theater was established to better define and respond to the MDRO problem. A repeat review of the deployed MTFs found overall improvement in IC practice, including clear command emphasis in the Iraqi theater of operations. CONCLUSIONS: Maintaining a strong IC effort in the deployed setting, even in a stabilized operational environment, is difficult. Use of innovative strategies to enhance expertise and practice were implemented to reduce MDRO infections.

Occupational transmission of Acinetobacter baumannii from a United States serviceman wounded in Iraq to a health care worker.

BACKGROUND: Acinetobacter baumannii is increasingly recognized as being a significant pathogen associated with nosocomial outbreaks in both civilian and military treatment facilities. Current analyses of these outbreaks frequently describe patient-to-patient transmission. To date, occupational transmission of A. baumannii from a patient to a health care worker (HCW) has not been reported. We initiated an investigation of an HCW with a complicated case of A. baumannii pneumonia to determine whether a link existed between her illness and A. baumannii-infected patients in a military treatment facility who had been entrusted to her care. METHODS: Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis and polymerase chain reaction/electrospray ionization mass spectrometry, a form of multilocus sequencing typing, were done to determine clonality. To further characterize the isolates, we performed a genetic analysis of resistance determinants. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: A "look-back" analysis revealed that the multidrug resistant A. baumannii recovered from the HCW and from a patient in her care were indistinguishable by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. In addition, polymerase chain reaction/electrospray ionization mass spectrometry indicated that the isolates were similar to strains of A. baumannii derived from European clone type II (Walter Reed Army Medical Center strain type 11). The exposure of the HCW to the index patient lasted for only 30 min and involved endotracheal suctioning without use of an HCW mask. An examination of 90 A. baumannii isolates collected during this investigation showed that 2 major and multiple minor clone types were present and that the isolates from the HCW and from the index patient were the most prevalent clone type. Occupational transmission likely occurred in the hospital; HCWs caring for patients infected with A. baumannii should be aware of this potential mode of infection spread.

Lessons public health professionals learned from past disasters.

OBJECTIVES: Delineate the lessons that public health professionals learned during past disasters and information/resources found to be lacking during past disasters. DESIGN/SAMPLE: Qualitative research consisting of 32 participants who attended the 2006 Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology Conference and participated in 1 of 3 focus groups. MEASUREMENTS: Focus group sessions were audiotaped; tapes were transcribed verbatim. Content analysis included identifying, coding, and categorizing participants' responses. Major themes were identified and categorized. RESULTS: Disasters can result in public health crises if infection prevention/control interventions are not implemented rapidly and appropriately. Gaps in past public health disaster response include infection prevention/control in mass casualty incidents, public education, internal and external communication, mental health, physical plant, and partnerships with outside agencies. Participants emphasized the need to provide consistent messages to the public, communicate between agencies, and provide public education on disaster preparedness. These tasks can be challenging during infectious disease emergencies when recommendations change. Effective communication is necessary to maintain public trust. Infection control issues in shelters, such as hand hygiene products/facilities, sanitation, outbreaks of unusual infectious diseases, overcrowded conditions, and poor environmental decontamination, were identified as critical to prevent secondary disease transmission. CONCLUSION: Public health and infection control nurses must partner and continue to address gaps in disaster planning.

Disaster preparedness lessons learned and future directions for education: results from focus groups conducted at the 2006 APIC Conference.

BACKGROUND: Infection control professionals (ICP) who have experienced disaster response have not been assessed in terms of the lessons they have learned, gaps they perceive in disaster preparedness, and their perceived priorities for future emergency response training. METHODS: Focus groups were conducted at the APIC 2006 Conference to evaluate ICPs' perceived needs related to disaster planning topics, products they feel are needed for education and reference materials, and lessons learned from past disasters. RESULTS: ICPs' role in disaster preparedness and response is essential, even in noninfectious disease emergencies. Infection control issues in shelters, such as overcrowding, foodborne illness, lack of restroom facilities, inadequate environmental cleaning procedures and products, difficulty assessing disease outbreaks in shelters, inability to isolate potentially contagious patients, and too few hand hygiene supplies can contribute to secondary disease transmission. Other important topics on which ICPs need to be trained include surge capacity, employee health and safety, incident command system, educating responders and the public on disaster preparedness, addressing changing standards/recommendations, and partnering with public health. ICPs need quick reference materials, such as checklists, templates, tool kits, and algorithms to better equip them for disaster response. CONCLUSION: Infection control must continue to partner with public health and other responding agencies to address gaps in disaster planning.

Hospital infectious disease emergency preparedness: a survey of infection control professionals.

BACKGROUND: Hospital preparedness for infectious disease emergencies is imperative for local, regional, and national response planning. METHODS: A secondary data analysis was conducted of a survey administered to Infection Control Professionals (ICPs) in May, 2005. RESULTS: Most hospitals have ICP representation on their disaster committee, around-the-clock infection control support, a plan to prioritize health care workers to receive vaccine or antivirals, and non-health care facility surge beds. Almost 20% lack a surge capacity plan. Some lack negative pressure rooms for current patient loads or any surge capacity. Less than half have a plan for rapid set-up of negative pressure, and Midwest hospitals are less likely than other areas to have such plans. Smaller hospitals have less negative pressure surge capacity than do larger hospitals. About half have enough health care workers to respond to a surge that involves < or =50 patients; few can handle > or =100 patients. Many do not have sufficient ventilators or can handle < or =10 additional ventilated patients. Most do not have enough National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health-approved respirators, and less than half have sufficient surgical masks to handle a significant surge. CONCLUSIONS: United States hospitals lack negative pressure, health care worker, and medical equipment/supplies surge capacity. Hospitals must continue to address gaps in infectious disease emergency planning.

Infection prevention and control competencies for hospital-based health care personnel.

BACKGROUND: Infection prevention and control education for hospital-based health care personnel has differed across organizations because of a lack of identified practice competencies. This gap also has resulted in variation of the educational curriculum in the academic setting and a lack of consistent preparation for emergency responses. The purpose of this study was to develop a list of competencies and measurable activities, or terminal objectives, for hospital-based health care personnel applicable for use during routine patient care activities as well as during natural and man-made disasters. METHODS: Competencies and terminal objectives related to infection prevention and control were developed using an evidence-based approach comprising the following steps: (a) review of the literature, (b) review of existing competencies and published curricula/training objectives, (c) synthesis of new competencies and terminal objectives, (d) expert panel review and competency refinement using the Delphi survey process, and (e) delineation of competencies by occupation. The 8 disciplines addressed were nurses (RNs and LPNs), nursing assistants, physicians, respiratory therapists, physical and occupational therapists, environmental services, laboratory professionals, and ancillary staff. RESULTS: An initial list of competency statements and terminal objectives were compiled and then vetted by a Delphi panel of experts in infection prevention and control until > 80% agreement was achieved on all competency statements and terminal objectives. CONCLUSION: The final matrix of competencies and terminal objectives developed through this process may be used as a content framework for educational curricula and training materials for hospital-based health care personnel. The process also may be of use in determining the core competencies and terminal objectives regarding infection prevention and control for health care personnel in other settings. Validation of these results is an important next step.