Estimating Chlamydia and Gonorrhea Burden Among US Army Soldiers From Military Health System Data: Mind the Gap.

BACKGROUND: Reporting systems are commonly used for chlamydia and gonorrhea surveillance and community burden assessments. Estimates are conservative given high proportions of asymptomatic cases and underreporting. The military's unified health system, which includes laboratory and medical encounter data, could offer insight into surveillance gaps and improve burden analyses. METHODS: Confirmed chlamydia and gonorrhea cases reported among active component soldiers were merged with laboratory and medical encounter records indicative of infection to identify incident cases during 2015-2019. Case capture across data systems was assessed, and reported case rates were compared with those derived from the enhanced 3-source database. Attributable medical encounters for total cases were extrapolated using average visits for the subset of cases with supporting encounter data. Multivariable generalized linear models were generated to characterize infections. RESULTS: Approximately 83% and 76% of respective chlamydia and gonorrhea cases were identified through reporting, compared with 87% and 67% through laboratory records, and 58% for both through medical encounters. Rates from enhanced 3-source surveillance peaked at 2844 chlamydia and 517 gonorrhea cases per 100,000 person-years in 2019, reflecting 17% and 28% increases in respective rates compared with reported rates. Overall, 3163 cases of chlamydia and/or gonorrhea per 100,000 person-years were detected in 2019, affecting 13,004 soldiers and requiring an estimated 21,690 medical encounters. Soldiers who were younger, female, racial/ethnic minorities, nonmarried, enlisted, less educated, and Southern residents had significantly higher risk. CONCLUSION: Integration of laboratory and medical encounter data substantially improved burden estimation over reporting alone. Rates generated remain conservative because they only reflect documented cases. Increasing rates support prevention prioritization, particularly among young soldiers.

A Comparative Analysis of Reported Chlamydia and Gonorrhea Cases Among US Army Soldiers, 2015 to 2019.

BACKGROUND: Chlamydia and gonorrhea have increased nationally and in the US Army. Rates reported in the Army are elevated relative to the general population, partly because of differing population demographics. METHODS: Age- and sex-specific chlamydia and gonorrhea case rates among Army active component soldiers and the wider 18- to 64-year-old US adult population were computed from reports submitted through national and military surveillance systems in 2015 to 2019. Rates were standardized using the 2015 Army age and sex population distribution. Multivariable generalized linear models were generated to evaluate associated risk factors. RESULTS: Army age- and sex-adjusted chlamydia rates (per 100,000 person-years) were nearly twice those of US adults (2019 rates, 2317 vs. 1241), whereas US age- and sex-adjusted gonorrhea rates surpassed Army rates (2019 rates, 536 vs. 396). Chlamydia and gonorrhea rates were significantly elevated in Army women younger than 25 years relative to US women aged 18 to 24 years (2015-2019 crude rates, 10,404 Army/4243 US for chlamydia and 1014 Army/694 US for gonorrhea). Gonorrhea rates were significantly elevated in US men aged 25 to 44 years (2015-2019 crude rates, 506 US/251 Army and 223 US/86 Army for men aged 25-34 and 35-44 years, respectively). Age, sex, and race-ethnicity were significantly associated with infection among soldiers. CONCLUSIONS: Observed increases in chlamydia and gonorrhea and identified risk factors are consistent with those reported nationally. Higher adjusted chlamydia rates among soldiers may reflect greater individual or sexual network risks, screening biases, or increased health care access. The Army's lower adjusted gonorrhea rates may reflect differences in high-risk subgroups (e.g., men who have sex with men), differing sexual networks, or other confounders.

Detection of Three Sexually Transmitted Infections by Anatomic Site: Evidence From an Internet-Based Screening Program.

Urogenital and rectal specimens collected from the "IWantTheKit" Internet-based sexually transmitted infection screening program were evaluated for Chlamydia trachomatis, Neisseria gonorrhoeae, and Trichomonas vaginalis. Of 881 paired specimens submitted from August 2013 to December 2016, 15.0% (n = 132) tested positive for 1 or more sexually transmitted infections, of which 50.8% (n = 67) were identified exclusively through rectal testing.

Acute Respiratory Disease in US Army Trainees 3 Years after Reintroduction of Adenovirus Vaccine 1.

The 1999 cessation of vaccination against adenovirus types 4 and 7 among US Army trainees resulted in reemergence of acute respiratory disease (ARD) outbreaks. The 2011 implementation of a replacement vaccine led to dramatic and sustained decreases in ARD cases, supporting continuation of vaccination in this population at high risk for ARD.

Seroprevalence and seroincidence of herpes simplex virus (2006-2010), syphilis (2006-2010), and vaccine-preventable human papillomavirus subtypes (2000-2010) among US military personnel.

BACKGROUND: Sexually transmitted infections have historically been burdensome in military populations. We describe the seroprevalence and seroincidence of vaccine-preventable human papillomavirus (VP-HPV) subtypes in a sample of 200 servicemen, along with the seroprevalence and seroincidence of herpes simplex virus (HSV-1/2) and syphilis in a sample of 200 men and 200 women. METHODS: Sera from 200 men, along with associated demographic data, were obtained and tested for HPV serotypes at service entry and 10 years later. Similarly, 200 active-duty men and 200 active-duty women were tested for HSV-1/2 at entry to service and 4 years later. RESULTS: The baseline prevalence of VP-HPV subtypes was 14.5%, and cumulative seroincidence of new infection was 34% over a 10-year period (n = 68). Of these, 63% (n = 43) represented HPV-6, HPV-11, or both; 18% of new infections were either HPV-16 or HPV-18, and 19% (n = 13) were a mixture of all 4 strains. At entry to military service, 33.5% of men were seropositive for HSV-1 and 1.5% were positive for HSV-2; seroincidence was 3.4 and 1.1 per 100 person-years, respectively. Among women, 39% were seropositive for HSV-1 and 4.0% for HSV-2; seroincidence was 5.5 and 3.3 per 100 person-years, respectively. There were 2 prevalent and 3 incident cases of syphilis. CONCLUSIONS: Sexually transmitted infections in military populations are highly prevalent, incident, and epidemiologically distinct. Our data show the rates of HPV and HSV-1/2 acquisition that are higher than those seen in the general public, again highlighting the need for continued preventive efforts. Consideration of universal HPV vaccination among men is warranted.

Preparedness of Military Public Health for Epidemic and Pandemic Recognition and Response.

Disease epidemics have threatened American military preparedness and operational capabilities since 1775. The ongoing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (COVID-19) pandemic, which began in 2019, again demonstrates the significant potential for infectious diseases to impact military units and threaten military readiness. We reviewed the historical and continuing threats to the U.S. Military from infectious disease outbreaks, as well as changes in U.S. Military capabilities for conducting meaningful surveillance and response. We concluded that a structured review of military public health and preventive medicine capabilities should be conducted to assess the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and determine the capabilities necessary for infectious disease surveillance and response to future threats.

Adenovirus-associated deaths in US military during postvaccination period, 1999-2010.

Adenoviruses are frequent causes of respiratory disease in the US military population. A successful immunization program against adenovirus types 4 and 7 was terminated in 1999. Review of records in the Mortality Surveillance Division, Armed Forces Medical Examiner System, identified 8 deaths attributed to adenovirus infections in service members during 1999-2010.

Influenza and wound infections: laboratory support for deployed U.S. forces.

Since 1997, the absence of a global, DoD public health laboratory system has been identified as a vulnerability in the U.S. military's effort to identify and quickly respond to emerging infections. The AFHSC Division of GEIS Operations has attempted to mitigate this vulnerability by supporting initiatives such as the DoD Global Influenza Surveillance Program and the DoD Directory of Public Health Laboratory Services. AFHSC continues to be engaged in identifying and addressing diagnostics needed to protect deployed forces. The GASI and the enhanced capability for identification of MDROs and threatening influenza strains in deployed areas are recent examples of GEIS utilizing its financial resources and position as a DoD organization to coordinate the efforts of the military services and other U.S. government organizations to improve preparedness for EID agents. However, the absence of a defined, comprehensive public health system that contains surveillance systems, reference laboratories, and public health communication systems functioning in unison to provide reach back and reference laboratory support to the global MHS remains a significant gap.

Hazardous Non-Combat Exposures in the U.S. Department of Defense.

Hazardous non-combat exposures are inherent to military service and occur in three settings: installation workplaces, installation environments, and deployment environments. Few military clinicians receive training in how to recognize, assess, and manage patients with these exposures, and systems improvements are needed to support clinicians with respect to exposure recognition and management. This commentary highlights key concepts surrounding military non-combat exposures by discussing three case examples of exposures occurring in each of these settings. In the workplace, well-coordinated, interdisciplinary occupational health teams improve identification of exposure-related illnesses, and these teams may be further supported by the development of automated clinical decision-support systems. Installation environmental exposures are characterized by high perceived risk, uncertainty in estimating actual risk, and a wide range of stakeholders including military family members and individuals in the surrounding community. Recognizing environmental exposure concerns, gathering a thorough environmental exposure history, and practicing exposure risk communication are vital skills to address these situations. During deployments, exposures may initially be perceived as low risk but then become a concern years later. A functional understanding of the capabilities and limitations of exposure monitoring and potential health effects of exposures helps the military clinician effectively communicate potential health risks to line leaders. For any of these exposure settings, service public health centers and OEM specialty leaders and consultants are available for consultation.

Military Epidemics, Then and Now: Smallpox and COVID-19.

We compared the COVID-19 experience in the first year of the current pandemic in the US with the smallpox experience of the 18th century, focusing on the US military but recognizing civilian and military populations are not separate and distinct. Despite the epidemics being separated by 21/2 centuries and with great advancements in technology having occurred over that time, we observed similarities which led us to several conclusions: • Infectious disease outbreaks will continue to occur and novel agents, naturally occurring or manipulated by humans, will threaten military and civilian populations nationally and globally. • Infectious disease outbreaks can affect both military and civilian populations, persist for long periods, and be catastrophic to military peacetime and wartime operations. • Effective surveillance is a prerequisite for early identification and subsequent meaningful responses to novel and reemerging threat agents and diseases. • Socio-cultural, religious, or political factors may limit the implementation of effective interventions in military or civilian populations. Public health officials must assess impediments to implementation of interventions and develop plans to overcome them.