The ordinal distance effect in working memory: does it exist in the absence of confounds?

In most daily-life situations, briefly remembering actions or words is not sufficient to reach a goal. You often have to remember them in a specific order. One behavioural observation of the processing of ordinal information in working memory is the ordinal distance effect. It refers to the facilitation in the ordinal processing of items that are at distant positions in comparison to items close to each other in working memory. So far, the ordinal distance effect has always been investigated with a simultaneous presentation of the items of the memory sequences. Such a presentation created a confound: items distant by their ordinal distance were also distant by their physical distance (i.e., the visuospatial distance between their positions on the screen). In the present study, we investigated whether the ordinal distance effect can be observed in the absence of a physical confound using a sequential presentation of the items of the memory sequence. Our findings revealed a combination of reversed and standard distance effects, unchanged by physical characteristics. The presence of a reversed distance effect suggests that a serial scanning strategy confers an advantage for adjacent items. Different strategies apply to the ordinal judgment of adjacent versus more distant items in verbal working memory. Interestingly, when ruling out the confound of primacy and recency effects, the standard distance effect disappeared while the reversed distance effect remained. Ultimately, our findings question the existence of the ordinal distance effect as a separate effect from other working memory confounds.

Contributions of age and clinical depression to metacognitive performance.

One aspect of metacognition is the ability to judge the accuracy of our own performance, even in the absence of external feedback, which is often measured using confidence ratings. Past research suggests that confidence is lower in Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). Less is known about the ability of MDD patients to discriminate correct from incorrect performance (metacognitive efficiency). The metacognitive performance of aged MDD patients (62-89y) was compared to an age-matched control group. A younger control group (21-28y) was included to also explore the relationshipbetweenageandmetacognitive performance. We found no difference in confidence bias nor metacognitive efficiency between MDD patients and age-matched controls.We found age-related differences in metacognition:normal aging was associated with higher confidencebut lower metacognitive efficiency. The overconfidence was specifically driven by overconfidence in incorrect trials. Our results point to the importance ofage while investigating the relation between MDD and metacognitive performance.

The neural signature of numerosity by separating numerical and continuous magnitude extraction in visual cortex with frequency-tagged EEG.

The ability to handle approximate quantities, or number sense, has been recurrently linked to mathematical skills, although the nature of the mechanism allowing to extract numerical information (i.e., numerosity) from environmental stimuli is still debated. A set of objects is indeed not only characterized by its numerosity but also by other features, such as the summed area occupied by the elements, which often covary with numerosity. These intrinsic relations between numerosity and nonnumerical magnitudes led some authors to argue that numerosity is not independently processed but extracted through a weighting of continuous magnitudes. This view cannot be properly tested through classic behavioral and neuroimaging approaches due to these intrinsic correlations. The current study used a frequency-tagging EEG approach to separately measure responses to numerosity as well as to continuous magnitudes. We recorded occipital responses to numerosity, total area, and convex hull changes but not to density and dot size. We additionally applied a model predicting primary visual cortex responses to the set of stimuli. The model output was closely aligned with our electrophysiological data, since it predicted discrimination only for numerosity, total area, and convex hull. Our findings thus demonstrate that numerosity can be independently processed at an early stage in the visual cortex, even when completely isolated from other magnitude changes. The similar implicit discrimination for numerosity as for some continuous magnitudes, which correspond to basic visual percepts, shows that both can be extracted independently, hence substantiating the nature of numerosity as a primary feature of the visual scene.

The relation between task-relatedness of anxiety and metacognitive performance.

It is well established that anxiety influences a range of cognitive processes such as cognitive control or decision-making. What is less known is how anxiety influences the metacognitive evaluations individuals make about their own performance. The present study explored the importance of task-relatedness in the relation between anxiety and metacognitive awareness. More specifically, we hypothesized that induced anxiety would affect metacognitive performance in opposite directions depending solely on whether the threat is perceived as related or unrelated to the performance. We conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis. In both studies, electric shocks were administered randomly, regardless of participant's performance. In experiment 1, participants were informed that the shocks would be administered randomly, unrelated to performance. In experiment 2, participants were told that their metacognitive performance would influence the administration of the electric shocks (i.e. fewer electric shocks with better metacognitive performance). Our predictions were confirmed. Threat perceived as unrelated to metacognitive performance (Experiment 1) decreased metacognitive performance. Threat believed to be related to metacognitive performance resulted in improved performance (Experiment 2). These findings confirm that induced anxiety exerts a strong influence on metacognitive awareness while sparing first-order task performance. We furthermore demonstrate that the perceived relatedness of the anxiety determines whether metacognitive performance decreases or improves performance under threat.

Happy is easy: the influence of affective states on cognitive control and metacognitive reports.

In many situations, engaging cognitive control is required to override automatic responses and to behave in an adaptive manner. However, cognitive control is also effortful and costly which makes it aversive. A fundamental question is how individuals decide to engage or not in cognitive control based on the costs of this effort and the motivation to achieve the goals. In the present study, we explored the hypothesis that affective states can influence this decision by changing participants' subjective experiences during the task. Participants performed a conflict task (arrow priming) and judged their feeling of difficulty after each trial. Affective states were induced by presenting emotional faces (happy, fearful or neutral) at the beginning of each trial. We found that participants subjectively judged happy trials as easier even though they objectively made more errors in this condition. Follow-up analyses revealed that participants engaged less cognitive control with happy than with neutral or fearful faces. We conclude that affective states influence the recruitment of cognitive control and associated metacognitive experiences.

Continuous track paths reveal additive evidence integration in multistep decision making.

Multistep decision making pervades daily life, but its underlying mechanisms remain obscure. We distinguish four prominent models of multistep decision making, namely serial stage, hierarchical evidence integration, hierarchical leaky competing accumulation (HLCA), and probabilistic evidence integration (PEI). To empirically disentangle these models, we design a two-step reward-based decision paradigm and implement it in a reaching task experiment. In a first step, participants choose between two potential upcoming choices, each associated with two rewards. In a second step, participants choose between the two rewards selected in the first step. Strikingly, as predicted by the HLCA and PEI models, the first-step decision dynamics were initially biased toward the choice representing the highest sum/mean before being redirected toward the choice representing the maximal reward (i.e., initial dip). Only HLCA and PEI predicted this initial dip, suggesting that first-step decision dynamics depend on additive integration of competing second-step choices. Our data suggest that potential future outcomes are progressively unraveled during multistep decision making.

Why try saving the ANS? An alternative proposal.

Leibovich et al. propose that continuous magnitudes and a number sense are used holistically to judge numerosity. We point out that their proposal is incomplete and implausible: incomplete, as it does not explain how continuous magnitudes are calculated; implausible, as it cannot explain performance in estimation tasks. We propose that we do not possess a number sense. Instead, we assume that numerosity judgments are accomplished by weighing the different continuous magnitudes constituting numerosity.

Assessing the Approximate Number System: no relation between numerical comparison and estimation tasks.

Whether our general numerical skills and the mathematical knowledge that we acquire at school are entwined is a debated issue, which many researchers are still striving to investigate. The findings reported in the literature are actually inconsistent; some studies emphasized the existence of a relationship between the acuity of the Approximate Number System (ANS) and arithmetic competence, while some others did not observe any significant correlation. One potential explanation of the discrepancy might stem from the evaluation of the ANS itself. In the present study, we correlated two measures used to index ANS acuity with arithmetic performance. These measures were the Weber fraction (w), computed from a numerical comparison task and the coefficient of variation (CV), computed from a numerical estimation task. Arithmetic performance correlated with estimation CV but not with comparison w. We further investigated the meaning of this result by taking the relationship between w and CV into account. We expected a tight relation as both these measures are believed to assess ANS acuity. Crucially, however, w and CV did not correlate with each other. Moreover, the value of w was modulated by the congruity of the relation between numerical magnitude and non-numerical visual cues, potentially accounting for the lack of correlation between the measures. Our findings thus challenge the overuse of w to assess ANS acuity and more generally put into question the relevance of correlating this measure with arithmetic without any deeper understanding of what they are really indexing.

Sleep deprivation selectively disrupts top-down adaptation to cognitive conflict in the Stroop test.

Sleep deprivation is known to exert detrimental effects on various cognitive domains, including attention, vigilance and working memory. Seemingly at odds with these findings, prior studies repeatedly failed to evidence an impact of prior sleep deprivation on cognitive interference in the Stroop test, a hallmark paradigm in the study of cognitive control abilities. The present study investigated further the effect of sleep deprivation on cognitive control using an adapted version of the Stroop test that allows to segregate top-down (attentional reconfiguration on incongruent items) and bottom-up (facilitated processing after repetitions in responses and/or features of stimuli) components of performance. Participants underwent a regular night of sleep or a night of total sleep deprivation before cognitive testing. Results disclosed that sleep deprivation selectively impairs top-down adaptation mechanisms: cognitive control no longer increased upon detection of response conflict at the preceding trial. In parallel, bottom-up abilities were found unaffected by sleep deprivation: beneficial effects of stimulus and response repetitions persisted. Changes in vigilance states due to sleep deprivation selectively impact on cognitive control in the Stroop test by affecting top-down, but not bottom-up, mechanisms that guide adaptive behaviours.

Feeling and deciding: Subjective experiences rather than objective factors drive the decision to invest cognitive control.

When presented with the choice to invest cognitive control in a task, several signals are monitored to reach a decision. Leading theoretical frameworks argued that the investment of cognitive control is determined by a cost-benefit computation. However, previous accounts remained silent on the potential role of subjective experience in this computation. We experience confidence when giving an answer, feel the excitement of an anticipated reward, and reflect on how much effort is required for successful task performance. Two questions are investigated in the present work: how objective task parameters give rise to subjective experience and whether these drive the decision to allocate cognitive control. To this end, we designed a task in which we manipulated three objective parameters in the same sequence of events (stimulus uncertainty, physical effort, and reward prediction error). We asked participants to report their subjective experiences associated with these manipulations: confidence, subjective physical effort, and reward satisfaction. At the end of each trial, participants indicated whether they wanted to repeat that trial on the next day. In response to the first question, we demonstrate that subjective ratings are reliable and selective. Subjective experiences closely mirrored their objective manipulations. In response to the second question, we demonstrate that subjective experiences provide a better fit for the decisions on future control investments. While objective task parameters are considered when deciding, they do not always produce the expected changes in subjective experience, and when dissociations occur, it is the subjective experience that better explains the decision to allocate cognitive control.

The role of goal-directed behavior in intention attribution in children.

In this study, we addressed the question of the nature of the information needed by 13-month-old infants to understand another agent's intentions. In two experiments, an experimenter was either unable or unwilling to give a toy to an infant. Importantly, an implement (a gutter in which the toy could roll down toward the infant) was used to make the experimenter's behavior as similar as possible in the two conditions. When the experimenter remained still in both conditions, infants did not behave differently according to the experimenter's intentions, suggesting that they did not infer them. By contrast, in a second experiment, where the experimenter performed an action directed toward the gutter in both conditions, the infants looked away from the experimental setting more often and longer in the unwilling condition than in the unable condition. They also looked more toward the experimenter in the unable condition than in the unwilling condition. Therefore, we conclude that an agent's intentional attitude can already be inferred by a 13-month-old provided that this intention is concretely shown through a goal-directed action.

The development of the SNARC effect: evidence for early verbal coding.

In a recent study, Gevers and colleagues (2010, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, Vol. 139, pp. 180-190) showed that the SNARC (spatial numerical association of response codes) effect in adults results not only from spatial coding of magnitude (e.g., mental number line hypothesis) but also from verbal coding. Because children are surrounded by rulers, number lines, and the like in the classroom, it is intuitively appealing to assume that they first use their mental number line to represent numbers and that only later in development a verbal recoding of magnitude information takes place. However, this hypothesis has never been tested. The goal of the current study was to define the developmental pattern of both accounts (spatial and verbal) in explaining the SNARC effect. To this end, 9- and 11-year-olds were tested in a magnitude comparison task. Surprisingly, clear and robust evidence for verbal coding of magnitude information was observed in both age groups. Our results imply that the ability to use verbal coding of magnitude information is robustly present early in formal schooling.

Setting the stage subliminally: unconscious context effects.

An important approach to understand how the brain gives rise to consciousness is to probe the depth of unconscious processing, thus to define the key features that cause conscious awareness. Here, we investigate the possibility for subliminal stimuli to shape the context for unconscious processing. Context effects have generally been assumed to require consciousness. In the present experiment, unconscious context processing was investigated by looking at the impact of the context on the response activation elicited by a subliminal prime. We compared the effects of the same subliminal prime on target processing when the prime was embedded in different unconscious contexts. Results showed that the same prime can evoke opposite responses depending on the unconscious context in which it is presented. Taken together, the results of this study show that context effects can be unconscious.

The Role of Subjective Experiences in Conflict Tasks: A Review.

Cognitive control research is concerned with the question how we install adaptive behaviour in the case of (cognitive) conflict. In this review we focus on the role that awareness of this conflict plays in our ability to exert cognitive control. We will argue that visual conflict is not the only building block of metacognitive experiences of conflict and discuss how they are related to cognitive control. So, a first aim of the current review is to understand how these different metacognitive judgements are created. To do so, we draw some remarkable parallels with research on metacognition in decision making and memory research. Next, we elaborate on the relationship between metacognition and adaptive behaviour, with a specific focus on the role of subjective experiences in the Gratton effect. The grey areas that persist in the current literature are highlighted. In addition to deciphering the mechanisms of metacognitive judgements in cognitive control, this overview also aims to further enlarge our understanding of metacognitive abilities at a more general level.

The influence of sad mood induction on task performance and metacognition.

In many situations, the ability to make appropriate metacognitive judgements on our performance is essential to make decisions and adapt our behaviour. Past research suggests a strong relationship between metacognition and emotional disorders such as depression. Depressive disorders have been associated with an underestimation bias: depressive patients report lower confidence in their performance than healthy individuals. It is currently not clear whether the induction of a negative mood in healthy participants has similar consequences. Yet, such knowledge would permit to isolate the causal influence of the negative affect on metacognition, free of all the comorbidities associated with depression. In this study, we used a combination of films, pictures, and recalls to induce negative and neutral moods during a perceptual metacognitive task. Negative mood induction had no impact on the perceptual task. Participants did report lower confidence levels in the negative condition compared with a neutral condition. This study thus confirms a causal relationship between negative affect and metacognitive abilities.

Local build-up of sleep pressure could trigger mind wandering: Evidence from sleep, circadian and mind wandering research.

Mind wandering (MW), or having thoughts unrelated to the task at hand, is a very pervasive phenomenon. Although research on MW has exponentially grown during the last decade and a half, the mechanisms behind this omnipresent phenomenon remain largely unknown. In this review, we will discuss some factors that have been shown to contribute to the occurrence of MW: the quality of sleep, the time of day when the task is performed, the chronotype of the individual and the duration of the task. The intriguing commonality between these specific factors is that they all suggest a relation between MW and sleep pressure. In line with recent work relating MW to local sleep-like activity, we here will argue that one of the mechanisms underlying the pervasiveness of MW might be the local build-up of homeostatic sleep pressure that inevitably occurs during task performance in the brain areas related to the task. Mind wandering could then occur not only to serve a biological purpose, e.g. brain protection, but also a functional one, e.g. off-line learning, that can be beneficial for behavioral performance.

Ordinality: The importance of its trial list composition and examining its relation with adults' arithmetic and mathematical reasoning.

Understanding whether a sequence is presented in an order or not (i.e., ordinality) is a robust predictor of adults' arithmetic performance, but the mechanisms underlying this skill and its relationship with mathematics remain unclear. In this study, we examined (a) the cognitive strategies involved in ordinality inferred from behavioural effects observed in different types of sequences and (b) whether ordinality is also related to mathematical reasoning besides arithmetic. In Experiment 1, participants performed an arithmetic, a mathematical reasoning test, and an order task, which had balanced trials on the basis of order, direction, regularity, and distance. We observed standard distance effects (DEs) for ordered and non-ordered sequences, which suggest reliance on magnitude comparison strategies. This contradicts past studies that reported reversed distance effects (RDEs) for some types of sequences, which suggest reliance on retrieval strategies. Also, we found that ordinality predicted arithmetic but not mathematical reasoning when controlling for fluid intelligence. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether the aforementioned absence of RDEs was because of our trial list composition. Participants performed two order tasks: in both tasks, no RDE was found demonstrating the fragility of the RDE. In addition, results showed that the strategies used when processing ordinality were modulated by the trial list composition and presentation order of the tasks. Altogether, these findings reveal that ordinality is strongly related to arithmetic and that the strategies used when processing ordinality are highly dependent on the context in which the task is presented.

Local use-dependent activity triggers mind wandering: Resource depletion or executive dysfunction?

Mind wandering (MW) is a highly prevalent phenomenon despite its negative consequences on behavior. Current views about its origin share the idea that MW occurs due to changes in the executive functions system. Here, we argue that not all instances of MW are necessarily related to changes in that system. Combining results from MW and sleep research, we propose that MW could also be related to the depletion of resources in primary task-related networks. To test this hypothesis, participants performed four sessions of the texture discrimination task (TDT) on a day. The TDT is a perceptual learning task in which performance is negatively related to the local build-up of sleep pressure. During the TDT, MW was recorded in both a subjective (i.e., with thought probes) and an objective (i.e., phasic pupillary response) manner. Results showed that accuracy on the TDT was mirrored in the objective measure of MW. For the subjective measure, the pattern was similar to that of task performance but could not be interpreted as reliable. These results demonstrate that not all MW is necessarily related to changes in the executive system and support the hypothesis that MW could be related to the depletion of local, task-related resources. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Automatic Processing of Numerosity in Human Neocortex Evidenced by Occipital and Parietal Neuromagnetic Responses.

Humans and other animal species are endowed with the ability to sense, represent, and mentally manipulate the number of items in a set without needing to count them. One central hypothesis is that this ability relies on an automated functional system dedicated to numerosity, the perception of the discrete numerical magnitude of a set of items. This system has classically been associated with intraparietal regions, however accumulating evidence in favor of an early visual number sense calls into question the functional role of parietal regions in numerosity processing. Targeting specifically numerosity among other visual features in the earliest stages of processing requires high temporal and spatial resolution. We used frequency-tagged magnetoencephalography to investigate the early automatic processing of numerical magnitudes and measured the steady-state brain responses specifically evoked by numerical and other visual changes in the visual scene. The neuromagnetic responses showed implicit discrimination of numerosity, total occupied area, and convex hull. The source reconstruction corresponding to the implicit discrimination responses showed common and separate sources along the ventral and dorsal visual pathways. Occipital sources attested the perceptual salience of numerosity similarly to both other implicitly discriminable visual features. Crucially, we found parietal responses uniquely associated with numerosity discrimination, showing automatic processing of numerosity in the parietal cortex, even when not relevant to the task. Taken together, these results provide further insights into the functional roles of parietal and occipital regions in numerosity encoding along the visual hierarchy.

Unconscious task application.

The nature of unconscious information processing is a heavily debated issue in cognitive science (e.g., Kouider & Dehaene, 2007), and neuroscience (e.g., Crick & Koch, 1998). Traditionally, it has been thought that unconscious cognitive processing is restricted to knowledge that is strongly prepared by conscious processes (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998). In three experiments, we show that the task that is performed consciously can also be applied unconsciously to items outside the current task set. We found that a same-different judgment of two target stimuli was also performed on two subliminally presented prime stimuli. This was true for target and prime stimuli from entirely different categories, as well as for prime and target stimuli at different levels of abstraction. These results reveal that unconscious processing can generalize more widely than previously accepted.