RESUMO
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) presented a unique opportunity for the World Health Organization (WHO) to utilise public health intelligence (PHI) for pandemic response. WHO systematically captured mainly unstructured information (e.g. media articles, listservs, community-based reporting) for public health intelligence purposes. WHO used the Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources (EIOS) system as one of the information sources for PHI. The processes and scope for PHI were adapted as the pandemic evolved and tailored to regional response needs. During the early months of the pandemic, media monitoring complemented official case and death reporting through the International Health Regulations mechanism and triggered alerts. As the pandemic evolved, PHI activities prioritised identifying epidemiological trends to supplement the information available through indicator-based surveillance reported to WHO. The PHI scope evolved over time to include vaccine introduction, emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants, unusual clinical manifestations and upsurges in cases, hospitalisation and death incidences at subnational levels. Triaging the unprecedented high volume of information challenged surveillance activities but was managed by collaborative information sharing. The evolution of PHI activities using multiple sources in WHO's response to the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the future directions in which PHI methodologies could be developed and used.
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COVID-19 , Saúde Pública , Humanos , COVID-19/epidemiologia , SARS-CoV-2 , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Organização Mundial da Saúde , InteligênciaRESUMO
The end-of-outbreak declaration is an important step in controlling infectious disease outbreaks. Objective estimation of the confidence level that an outbreak is over is important to reduce the risk of postdeclaration flare-ups. We developed a simulation-based model with which to quantify that confidence and tested it on simulated Ebola virus disease data. We found that these confidence estimates were most sensitive to the instantaneous reproduction number, the reporting rate, and the time between the symptom onset and death or recovery of the last detected case. For Ebola virus disease, our results suggested that the current World Health Organization criterion of 42 days since the recovery or death of the last detected case is too short and too sensitive to underreporting. Therefore, we suggest a shift to a preliminary end-of-outbreak declaration after 63 days from the symptom onset day of the last detected case. This preliminary declaration should still be followed by 90 days of enhanced surveillance to capture potential flare-ups of cases, after which the official end of the outbreak can be declared. This sequence corresponds to more than 95% confidence that an outbreak is over in most of the scenarios examined. Our framework is generic and therefore could be adapted to estimate end-of-outbreak confidence for other infectious diseases.
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Surtos de Doenças/estatística & dados numéricos , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/epidemiologia , Controle de Infecções/estatística & dados numéricos , Saúde Global , HumanosRESUMO
BACKGROUND: Typhoid fever, caused by S. enterica ser. Typhi, continues to be a substantial health burden in developing countries. Little is known of the genotypic diversity of S. enterica ser. Typhi in Zimbabwe, but this is key for understanding the emergence and spread of this pathogen and devising interventions for its control. OBJECTIVES: To report the molecular epidemiology of S. enterica ser. Typhi outbreak strains circulating from 2012 to 2019 in Zimbabwe, using comparative genomics. METHODS: A review of typhoid cases records from 2012 to 2019 in Zimbabwe was performed. The phylogenetic relationship of outbreak isolates from 2012 to 2019 and emergence of antibiotic resistance was investigated by whole-genome sequence analysis. RESULTS: A total 22â479 suspected typhoid cases, 760 confirmed cases were reported from 2012 to 2019 and 29 isolates were sequenced. The majority of the sequenced isolates were predicted to confer resistance to aminoglycosides, ß-lactams, phenicols, sulphonamides, tetracycline and fluoroquinolones (including qnrS detection). The qnrS1 gene was associated with an IncN (subtype PST3) plasmid in 79% of the isolates. Whole-genome SNP analysis, SNP-based haplotyping and resistance determinant analysis showed that 93% of the isolates belonged to a single clade represented by multidrug-resistant H58 lineage I (4.3.1.1), with a maximum pair-wise distance of 22 SNPs. CONCLUSIONS: This study has provided detailed genotypic characterization of the outbreak strain, identified as S. Typhi 4.3.1.1 (H58). The strain has reduced susceptibility to ciprofloxacin due to qnrS carried by an IncN (subtype PST3) plasmid resulting from ongoing evolution to full resistance.
Assuntos
Farmacorresistência Bacteriana Múltipla , Salmonella typhi , Antibacterianos/farmacologia , Antibacterianos/uso terapêutico , Células Clonais , Farmacorresistência Bacteriana Múltipla/genética , Humanos , Testes de Sensibilidade Microbiana , Filogenia , Salmonella typhi/genética , Zimbábue/epidemiologiaRESUMO
Large-scale protracted outbreaks can be prevented through early detection, notification, and rapid control. We assessed trends in timeliness of detecting and responding to outbreaks in the African Region reported to the World Health Organization during 2017-2019. We computed the median time to each outbreak milestone and assessed the rates of change over time using univariable and multivariable Cox proportional hazard regression analyses. We selected 296 outbreaks from 348 public reported health events and evaluated 184 for time to detection, 232 for time to notification, and 201 for time to end. Time to detection and end decreased over time, whereas time to notification increased. Multiple factors can account for these findings, including scaling up support to member states after the World Health Organization established its Health Emergencies Programme and support given to countries from donors and partners to strengthen their core capacities for meeting International Health Regulations.
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Surtos de Doenças , Saúde Pública , África/epidemiologia , Saúde Global , Humanos , Vigilância da População , Fatores de Tempo , Organização Mundial da SaúdeRESUMO
Ebola virus (EBOV) can persist in immunologically protected body sites in survivors of Ebola virus disease, creating the potential to initiate new chains of transmission. From the outbreak in West Africa during 2014-2016, we identified 13 possible events of viral persistence-derived transmission of EBOV (VPDTe) and applied predefined criteria to classify transmission events based on the strength of evidence for VPDTe and source and route of transmission. For 8 events, a recipient case was identified; possible source cases were identified for 5 of these 8. For 5 events, a recipient case or chain of transmission could not be confidently determined. Five events met our criteria for sexual transmission (male-to-female). One VPDTe event led to at least 4 generations of cases; transmission was limited after the other events. VPDTe has increased the importance of Ebola survivor services and sustained surveillance and response capacity in regions with previously widespread transmission.
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Surtos de Doenças , Ebolavirus , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/epidemiologia , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/transmissão , Sobreviventes , Adolescente , Adulto , África Ocidental/epidemiologia , Ebolavirus/classificação , Ebolavirus/genética , Ebolavirus/isolamento & purificação , Feminino , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/virologia , Humanos , Masculino , Pessoa de Meia-Idade , Vigilância em Saúde Pública , Adulto JovemRESUMO
Background: We describe an outbreak that contributed to a near doubling of the incidence of tuberculosis in Southampton, UK. We examine the importance of 24 locus mycobacterial interspersed repetitive unit variable number tandem repeat (MIRU-VNTR) genotyping in its identification and management and the role of whole genome sequencing (WGS) in tracing the spread of the strain. Methods: Outbreak cases were defined as those diagnosed between January and December 2011 with indistinguishable 24 locus-MIRU-VNTR genotypes or, cases linked epidemiologically. A cluster questionnaire was administered by TB nurses to identify contacts and social settings. Results: Overall, 25 patients fulfilled the case definition. No cases with this MIRU-VNTR genotype had been detected in the UK previously. Connections were found between all cases through household contacts or social venues including a football club, Internet cafe and barber's shop. Public health actions included extended contact tracing, venue screening and TB awareness-raising. The outbreak resulted in a high rate of transmission and high incidence of clinical disease among contacts. Conclusions: This outbreak illustrates the value of combining active case-finding with prospective MIRU-VNTR genotyping to identify settings to undertake public health action. In addition WGS revealed that the VNTR-defined cluster was a single outbreak and that active TB transmission not reactivation was responsible for this outbreak in non-UK born individuals.
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Mycobacterium tuberculosis/genética , Tuberculose/epidemiologia , Tuberculose/genética , Adolescente , Adulto , Criança , Pré-Escolar , Surtos de Doenças , Feminino , Genótipo , Humanos , Lactente , Masculino , Inquéritos e Questionários , Reino Unido/epidemiologia , Sequenciamento Completo do Genoma , Adulto JovemRESUMO
Alison Galvani and colleagues describe a community-based protocol to improve cooperation with Ebola testing as well as contact tracing, quarantining, and treatment.
Assuntos
Protocolos Clínicos , Participação da Comunidade , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/diagnóstico , Sistemas Automatizados de Assistência Junto ao Leito/estatística & dados numéricos , Vigilância da População , Participação da Comunidade/estatística & dados numéricos , Humanos , LibériaRESUMO
BACKGROUND: We estimate the proportion of tuberculosis (TB) in England due to recent household transmission, identify factors associated with being a household transmitter, and investigate the impact that identification of a case has on time to treatment of subsequent cases. METHODS: TB cases notified between 2010 and 2012 in England in the same household as another case were identified; 24 locus MIRU-VNTR strain typing (ST) was used to identify household cases with likely recent transmission. Treatment delay in index and subsequent cases was compared. Risk factors for being a household transmitter were identified in univariable and multivariable analyses. RESULTS: Overall, 7.7% (1849/24,060) of TB cases lived in a household with another case. We estimate that 3.9% were due to recent household transmission. ST data was unavailable for 67% (1242) of household pairs. For those with ST data, 64% (386) had confirmed, 11% probable (66) and 25% (155) refuted household transmission. The median treatment delay was 65 days for index cases and 37 days for subsequent asymptomatic cases. Risk factors for being a household transmitter included being under 25 years old, UK-born with Black African, Indian or Pakistani ethnicity, or born in Somalia or Romania. CONCLUSIONS: This study has a number of implications for household TB contact tracing in low incidence countries, including the potential to reduce the diagnostic delay for subsequent household cases and the benefit of using ST to identify when to conduct source contact tracing outside the household. As 25% of TB cases in households had discordant strains, households with multiple TB cases do not necessarily represent household transmission. The additional fact that 25% of index cases within households only had extra-pulmonary TB demonstrates that, if household contact tracing is limited to pulmonary TB cases (as recently recommended in UK guidelines), additional cases of active TB in households will be missed. Our finding that no lineage of TB was associated with recent household transmission and with no increased transmissibility in the Beijing lineage compared to others, suggests that the lineage need not impact contact tracing efforts. Improvements in contact tracing have the potential to reduce transmission of TB in low incidence countries.
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Mycobacterium tuberculosis/genética , Tuberculose Pulmonar/diagnóstico , Adolescente , Adulto , Distribuição por Idade , Idoso , Criança , Pré-Escolar , Infecções Comunitárias Adquiridas/diagnóstico , Infecções Comunitárias Adquiridas/epidemiologia , Infecções Comunitárias Adquiridas/microbiologia , Infecções Comunitárias Adquiridas/transmissão , Inglaterra/epidemiologia , Feminino , Genes Bacterianos , Humanos , Incidência , Lactente , Recém-Nascido , Masculino , Pessoa de Meia-Idade , Repetições Minissatélites , Técnicas de Diagnóstico Molecular , Tipagem Molecular , Análise Multivariada , Estudos Retrospectivos , Fatores de Risco , Análise de Sequência de DNA , Tuberculose Pulmonar/epidemiologia , Tuberculose Pulmonar/microbiologia , Tuberculose Pulmonar/transmissão , Adulto JovemRESUMO
BACKGROUND: The ongoing West African Ebola epidemic began in December 2013 in Guinea, probably from a single zoonotic introduction. As a result of ineffective initial control efforts, an Ebola outbreak of unprecedented scale emerged. As of 4 May 2015, it had resulted in more than 19,000 probable and confirmed Ebola cases, mainly in Guinea (3,529), Liberia (5,343), and Sierra Leone (10,746). Here, we present analyses of data collected during the outbreak identifying drivers of transmission and highlighting areas where control could be improved. METHODS AND FINDINGS: Over 19,000 confirmed and probable Ebola cases were reported in West Africa by 4 May 2015. Individuals with confirmed or probable Ebola ("cases") were asked if they had exposure to other potential Ebola cases ("potential source contacts") in a funeral or non-funeral context prior to becoming ill. We performed retrospective analyses of a case line-list, collated from national databases of case investigation forms that have been reported to WHO. These analyses were initially performed to assist WHO's response during the epidemic, and have been updated for publication. We analysed data from 3,529 cases in Guinea, 5,343 in Liberia, and 10,746 in Sierra Leone; exposures were reported by 33% of cases. The proportion of cases reporting a funeral exposure decreased over time. We found a positive correlation (r = 0.35, p < 0.001) between this proportion in a given district for a given month and the within-district transmission intensity, quantified by the estimated reproduction number (R). We also found a negative correlation (r = -0.37, p < 0.001) between R and the district proportion of hospitalised cases admitted within ≤4 days of symptom onset. These two proportions were not correlated, suggesting that reduced funeral attendance and faster hospitalisation independently influenced local transmission intensity. We were able to identify 14% of potential source contacts as cases in the case line-list. Linking cases to the contacts who potentially infected them provided information on the transmission network. This revealed a high degree of heterogeneity in inferred transmissions, with only 20% of cases accounting for at least 73% of new infections, a phenomenon often called super-spreading. Multivariable regression models allowed us to identify predictors of being named as a potential source contact. These were similar for funeral and non-funeral contacts: severe symptoms, death, non-hospitalisation, older age, and travelling prior to symptom onset. Non-funeral exposures were strongly peaked around the death of the contact. There was evidence that hospitalisation reduced but did not eliminate onward exposures. We found that Ebola treatment units were better than other health care facilities at preventing exposure from hospitalised and deceased individuals. The principal limitation of our analysis is limited data quality, with cases not being entered into the database, cases not reporting exposures, or data being entered incorrectly (especially dates, and possible misclassifications). CONCLUSIONS: Achieving elimination of Ebola is challenging, partly because of super-spreading. Safe funeral practices and fast hospitalisation contributed to the containment of this Ebola epidemic. Continued real-time data capture, reporting, and analysis are vital to track transmission patterns, inform resource deployment, and thus hasten and maintain elimination of the virus from the human population.
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Surtos de Doenças , Ebolavirus/fisiologia , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/epidemiologia , Guiné/epidemiologia , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/transmissão , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/virologia , Humanos , Libéria/epidemiologia , Estudos Retrospectivos , Fatores de Risco , Serra Leoa/epidemiologiaRESUMO
BACKGROUND: The incidence of TB has doubled in the last 20â years in London. A better understanding of risk groups for recent transmission is required to effectively target interventions. We investigated the molecular epidemiological characteristics of TB cases to estimate the proportion of cases due to recent transmission, and identify predictors for belonging to a cluster. METHODS: The study population included all culture-positive TB cases in London residents, notified between January 2010 and December 2012, strain typed using 24-loci multiple interspersed repetitive units-variable number tandem repeats. Multivariable logistic regression analysis was performed to assess the risk factors for clustering using sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of cases and for cluster size based on the characteristics of the first two cases. RESULTS: There were 10â 147 cases of which 5728 (57%) were culture confirmed and 4790 isolates (84%) were typed. 2194 (46%) were clustered in 570 clusters, and the estimated proportion attributable to recent transmission was 34%. Clustered cases were more likely to be UK born, have pulmonary TB, a previous diagnosis, a history of substance abuse or alcohol abuse and imprisonment, be of white, Indian, black-African or Caribbean ethnicity. The time between notification of the first two cases was more likely to be <90â days in large clusters. CONCLUSIONS: Up to a third of TB cases in London may be due to recent transmission. Resources should be directed to the timely investigation of clusters involving cases with risk factors, particularly those with a short period between the first two cases, to interrupt onward transmission of TB.
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Análise por Conglomerados , Mycobacterium tuberculosis , Tuberculose Pulmonar/transmissão , Adulto , Feminino , Genótipo , Humanos , Incidência , Londres/epidemiologia , Masculino , Mycobacterium tuberculosis/isolamento & purificação , Valor Preditivo dos Testes , Estudos Retrospectivos , Fatores de Risco , Sensibilidade e Especificidade , Tuberculose Pulmonar/diagnóstico , Tuberculose Pulmonar/epidemiologia , Tuberculose Pulmonar/microbiologiaRESUMO
As one of the three West African countries highly affected by the 2014-2015 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic, Liberia reported approximately 10,000 cases. The Ebola epidemic in Liberia was marked by intense urban transmission, multiple community outbreaks with source cases occurring in patients coming from the urban areas, and outbreaks in health care facilities (HCFs). This report, based on data from routine case investigations and contact tracing, describes efforts to stop the last known chain of Ebola transmission in Liberia. The index patient became ill on December 29, 2014, and the last of 21 associated cases was in a patient admitted into an Ebola treatment unit (ETU) on February 18, 2015. The chain of transmission was stopped because of early detection of new cases; identification, monitoring, and support of contacts in acceptable settings; effective triage within the health care system; and rapid isolation of symptomatic contacts. In addition, a "sector" approach, which divided Montserrado County into geographic units, facilitated the ability of response teams to rapidly respond to community needs. In the final stages of the outbreak, intensive coordination among partners and engagement of community leaders were needed to stop transmission in densely populated Montserrado County. A companion report describes the efforts to enhance infection prevention and control efforts in HCFs. After February 19, no additional clusters of Ebola cases have been detected in Liberia. On May 9, the World Health Organization declared the end of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia.
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Epidemias/prevenção & controle , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/prevenção & controle , Adolescente , Adulto , Criança , Análise por Conglomerados , Feminino , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/epidemiologia , Humanos , Libéria/epidemiologia , Masculino , Pessoa de Meia-Idade , Adulto JovemRESUMO
The 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) came into force for all Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) in June 2007 and the deadline for achieving compliance was June 2012. The purpose of the IHR is to prevent, protect against, control - and provide a public health response to - international spread of disease. The territory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that of several other Member States, such as China, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United States of America, include overseas territories, which cover a total population of approximately 15 million people. Member States have a responsibility to ensure that all parts of their territory comply with the IHR. Since WHO has not provided specific guidance on compliance in the special circumstances of the overseas territories of Member States, compliance by these territories is an issue for self-assessment by Member States themselves. To date, no reports have been published on the assessment of IHR compliance in countries with overseas territories. We describe a gap analysis done in the United Kingdom to assess IHR compliance of its overseas territories. The findings and conclusions are broadly applicable to other countries with overseas territories which may have yet to assess their compliance with the IHR. Such assessments are needed to ensure compliance across all parts of a Member States' territory and to increase global health security.
Le Règlement sanitaire international de 2005 (RSI) est entré en vigueur pour tous les États membres de l'Organisation mondiale de la Santé en juin 2007, et la date limite pour sa mise en conformité était juin 2012. L'objectif du RSI est de prévenir, de protéger, de contrôler et d'apporter une réponse de santé publique à la propagation internationale des maladies. Le territoire du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et celui d'autres États membres, comme la Chine, le Danemark, la France, les Pays-Bas et les États-Unis d'Amérique, se composent de territoires d'outre-mer, lesquels couvrent une population totale d'environ 15 millions d'habitants. Les États membres ont la responsabilité de veiller à ce que toutes les parties de leur territoire se conforment au RSI. Étant donné que l'OMS ne fournit pas d'orientation spécifique concernant la conformité dans les circonstances spéciales des territoires d'outre-mer des États membres, leur conformité est une question d'auto-évaluation par les États membres eux-mêmes. À ce jour, aucun rapport n'a été publié sur l'évaluation de la conformité au RSI dans les pays possédant des territoires d'outre-mer. Nous décrivons une analyse des lacunes effectuée au Royaume-Uni pour évaluer la conformité au RSI de ses territoires d'outre-mer. Les résultats et les conclusions sont largement applicables aux autres pays possédant des territoires d'outre-mer, qui peuvent cependant évaluer leur propre conformité au RSI. Ces évaluations sont nécessaires pour veiller à la conformité dans toutes les parties du territoire d'un État membre et pour augmenter la sécurité sanitaire mondiale.
El Reglamento Sanitario Internacional 2005 (RSI) entró en vigor para todos los Estados miembros de la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS) en junio de 2007 con junio de 2012 como fecha límite para lograr el cumplimiento. El objetivo del RSI es prevenir, proteger, controlar y proporcionar una respuesta de salud pública a la propagación internacional de enfermedades. El territorio del Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte y otros Estados miembros como China, Dinamarca, Francia, los Países Bajos y los Estados Unidos de América cuentan con territorios de ultramar que abarcan una población total de aproximadamente 15 millones de personas. Los Estados miembros tienen la responsabilidad de garantizar que todos sus territorios cumplan con el RSI. Puesto que la OMS no ha proporcionado orientación específica sobre el cumplimiento para las circunstancias especiales de los territorios de ultramar de los Estados miembros, el cumplimiento por parte de estos territorios es un problema que los propios Estados miembros tienen que evaluar. Hasta la fecha no se han publicado informes sobre la evaluación del cumplimiento del RSI en los países con territorios de ultramar. Describimos un análisis de las deficiencias realizado en el Reino Unido con objeto de evaluar el cumplimiento del RSI de sus territorios de ultramar. Los resultados y conclusiones son ampliamente aplicables a otros países con territorios de ultramar que quizá aún tengan que evaluar su cumplimiento con el RSI. Dichas evaluaciones son necesarias para asegurar el cumplimiento en todos los territorios de los Estados miembros y para aumentar la seguridad sanitaria mundial.
Assuntos
Controle de Doenças Transmissíveis/legislação & jurisprudência , Surtos de Doenças/prevenção & controle , Fidelidade a Diretrizes , Cooperação Internacional/legislação & jurisprudência , Implementação de Plano de Saúde , Promoção da Saúde/legislação & jurisprudência , Humanos , Irlanda do Norte/epidemiologia , Serviços Preventivos de Saúde/legislação & jurisprudência , Saúde Pública , Controle Social Formal , Reino Unido/epidemiologia , Organização Mundial da SaúdeRESUMO
WHO works, on a daily basis, with countries globally to detect, prepare for and respond to acute public health events. A vital component of a health response is the dissemination of accurate, reliable and authoritative information. The Disease Outbreak News (DON) reports are a key mechanism through which WHO communicates on acute public health events to the public. The decision to produce a DON report is taken on a case-by-case basis after evaluating key criteria, and the subsequent process of producing a DON report is highly standardised to ensure the robustness of information. DON reports have been published since 1996, and up to 2022 over 3000 reports have been published. Between 2018 and 2022, the most frequently published DON reports relate to Ebola virus disease, Middle East respiratory syndrome, yellow fever, polio and cholera. The DON web page is highly visited with a readership of over 2.6 million visits per year, on average. The DON report structure has evolved over time, from a single paragraph in 1996 to a detailed report with seven sections currently. WHO regularly reviews the DON report process and structure for improvements. In the last 25 years, DON reports have played a unique role in rapidly disseminating information on acute public health events to health actors and the public globally. They have become a key information source for the global public health response to the benefit of individuals and communities.
Assuntos
Infecções por Coronavirus , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola , Humanos , Saúde Pública , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/epidemiologia , Infecções por Coronavirus/epidemiologia , Surtos de Doenças/prevenção & controle , Organização Mundial da SaúdeRESUMO
On 31 December 2019, the Municipal Health Commission of Wuhan, China, reported a cluster of atypical pneumonia cases. On 5 January 2020, the WHO publicly released a Disease Outbreak News (DON) report, providing information about the pneumonia cases, implemented response interventions, and WHO's risk assessment and advice on public health and social measures. Following 9 additional DON reports and 209 daily situation reports, on 17 August 2020, WHO published the first edition of the COVID-19 Weekly Epidemiological Update (WEU). On 1 September 2023, the 158th edition of the WEU was published on WHO's website, marking its final issue. Since then, the WEU has been replaced by comprehensive global epidemiological updates on COVID-19 released every 4 weeks. During the span of its publication, the webpage that hosts the WEU and the COVID-19 Operational Updates was accessed annually over 1.4 million times on average, with visits originating from more than 100 countries. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the WEU process, from data collection to publication, focusing on the scope, technical details, main features, underlying methods, impact and limitations. We also discuss WHO's experience in disseminating epidemiological information on the COVID-19 pandemic at the global level and provide recommendations for enhancing collaboration and information sharing to support future health emergency responses.
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COVID-19 , Humanos , Pandemias , SARS-CoV-2 , Saúde Pública , Organização Mundial da SaúdeRESUMO
Early warning and response are key to tackle emerging and acute public health risks globally. Therefore, the World Health Organization (WHO) has implemented a robust approach to public health intelligence (PHI) for the global detection, verification and risk assessment of acute public health threats. WHO's PHI operations are underpinned by the International Health Regulations (2005), which require that countries strengthen surveillance efforts, and assess, notify and verify events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). PHI activities at WHO are conducted systematically at WHO's headquarters and all six regional offices continuously, throughout every day of the year. We describe four interlinked steps; detection, verification, risk assessment, and reporting and dissemination. For PHI operations, a diverse and interdisciplinary workforce is needed. Overall, PHI is a key feature of the global health architecture and will only become more prominent as the world faces increasing public health threats.
RESUMO
BACKGROUND: The WHO African region frequently experiences outbreaks and epidemics of infectious diseases often exacerbated by weak health systems and infrastructure, late detection, and ineffective outbreak response. To address this, the WHO Regional Office for Africa developed and began implementing the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response strategy in 1998. OBJECTIVES: This systematic review aims to document the identified successes and challenges surrounding the implementation of IDSR in the region available in published literature to highlight areas for prioritization, further research, and to inform further strengthening of IDSR implementation. METHODS: A systematic review of peer-reviewed literature published in English and French from 1 July 2012 to 13 November 2019 was conducted using PubMed and Web of Science. Included articles focused on the WHO African region and discussed the use of IDSR strategies and implementation, assessment of IDSR strategies, or surveillance of diseases covered in the IDSR framework. Data were analyzed descriptively using Microsoft Excel and Tableau Desktop 2019. RESULTS: The number of peer-reviewed articles discussing IDSR remained low, with 47 included articles focused on 17 countries and regional level systems. Most commonly discussed topics were data reporting (n = 39) and challenges with IDSR implementation (n = 38). Barriers to effective implementation were identified across all IDSR core and support functions assessed in this review: priority disease detection; data reporting, management, and analysis; information dissemination; laboratory functionality; and staff training. Successful implementation was noted where existing surveillance systems and infrastructure were utilized and streamlined with efforts to increase access to healthcare. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS: These findings highlighted areas where IDSR is performing well and where implementation remains weak. While challenges related to IDSR implementation since the first edition of the technical guidelines were released are not novel, adequately addressing them requires sustained investments in stronger national public health capabilities, infrastructure, and surveillance processes.
Assuntos
Doenças Transmissíveis/epidemiologia , Surtos de Doenças/prevenção & controle , Vigilância em Saúde Pública , África/epidemiologia , HumanosRESUMO
BACKGROUND: The COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented challenges to the systematic and timely sharing of COVID-19 field data collection and management. The World Health Organization (WHO) is working with health partners on the rollout and implementation of a robust electronic field data collection platform. The delay in the deployment and rollout of this electronic platform in the WHO African Region, as a consequence of the application of large-scale public health and social measures including movement restrictions and geographical area quarantine, left a gap between data collection and management. This lead to the need to develop interim data management solutions to accurately monitor the evolution of the pandemic and support the deployment of appropriate public health interventions. OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study is to review the design, development, and implementation of the COVID-19 Data Summarization and Visualization (DSV) tool as a rapidly deployable solution to fill this critical data collection gap as an interim solution. METHODS: This paper reviews the processes undertaken to research and develop a tool to bridge the data collection gap between the onset of a COVID-19 outbreak and the start of data collection using a prioritized electronic platform such as Go.Data in the WHO African Region. RESULTS: In anticipation of the implementation of a prioritized tool for field data collection, the DSV tool was deployed in 18 member states for COVID-19 outbreak data management. We highlight preliminary findings and lessons learned from the DSV tool deployment in the WHO African Region. CONCLUSIONS: We developed a rapidly deployable tool for COVID-19 data collection and visualization in the WHO African Region. The lessons drawn on this experience offer an opportunity to learn and apply these to improve future similar public health informatics initiatives in an outbreak or similar humanitarian setting, particularly in low- and middle-income countries.