Racial Discrimination and Administrative Burden in Access to Public Services.

Equal access to public services is a foundational element of democratic societies. Yet, stark inequalities in access to public services persist, partially due to bureaucratic discrimination, or differential treatment by bureaucrats. This study investigates the causal mechanism of bureaucratic discrimination, arguing that racial discrimination can serve as a means of cream skimming, when there are economic incentives to prioritize easier-to-serve clientele. We predict that in the absence of information regarding prospective clients' performance, group-level performance information will be imposed on racially minoritized individuals. We implemented a nationwide email correspondence audit experiment including all charter school principals in the U.S. (n = 5850). The findings show that Black email aliases faced significantly higher administrative burdens in trying to get access to charter schools than White email aliases when no performance signal was provided. However, when a direct signal of clients' performance was introduced, the racial disparities diminished. Overall, these results provide evidence on the causal mechanism of bureaucratic discrimination as a means of cream-skimming.

Policy makers believe money motivates more than it does.

To motivate contributions to public goods, should policy makers employ financial incentives like taxes, fines, subsidies, and rewards? While these are widely considered as the classic policy approach, a substantial academic literature suggests the impact of financial incentives is not always positive; they can sometimes fail or even backfire. To test whether policy makers are overly bullish about financial incentives, we asked county heads, mayors, and municipal government representatives of medium-to-large towns in Germany to predict the effects of a financial incentive on COVID-19 vaccination, and tested the exact same incentive in a field experiment involving all 41,548 inhabitants (clustered in 10,032 addresses) of the German town of Ravensburg. Whereas policy makers overwhelmingly predict that the financial incentive will increase vaccination-by 15.3 percentage points on average-the same financial incentive yielded a precisely estimated null effect on vaccination. We discuss when financial incentives are most likely to fail, and conclude that it is critical to educate policy makers on the potential pitfalls of employing financial incentives to promote contributions to public goods.

Messenger effects in COVID-19 communication: Does the level of government matter?

Public efforts to limit the spread of the coronavirus rely on motivating people to cooperate with the government. We test the effectiveness of different governmental messengers to encourage preventive health actions. We administered a survey experiment among a sample (n = 1,545) of respondents across the United States, presenting them with the same social media message, but experimentally varying the government sender (i.e., Federal, State, County, a combination of Federal + County, and a control condition) to test whether local relevance influences messaging efficacy. We find that in an information saturated environment the messenger does not matter. There is, however, variation in treatment response by partisanship, education, income, and the degree to which respondents are affected by the pandemic. While the main effect of the level of government on intended behavior is null, public health organizations are universally perceived as more trustworthy, relevant, and competent than anonymous messengers.