RESUMO
The National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Human Rights and its 350 correspondent academy members seeks to ease the plight of individual scientists, engineers, and medical personnel suffering severe repression. It has engaged in a program of private inquiry, public remonstrance, and moral support in behalf of individuals from 11 countries. In developing this activity, members of the committee had to engage in a series of troubling issues related to the nature of human rights, the choice of cases, and the format of protest. But most troubling of all are the issues raised by the profound distortions of humanness, nationhood, and science that follow in the wake of repression.
RESUMO
Technological hazards are evaluated in terms of quantitatively expressed physical, biological, and social descriptors. For each hazard a profile is constructed that considerably extends the conventional definition of risk. The profile, which is termed hazardousness, was understood in pilot experiments on perception and appeared to capture a large fraction of lay people's concern with hazard. It also suggests an orderly method for establishing priorities for the management of hazards.
Assuntos
Saúde Ambiental , Tecnologia , Exposição Ambiental , Humanos , Risco , TriagemAssuntos
Meio Ambiente , Pesquisa , Condições Sociais , Países em Desenvolvimento , Ecossistema , PolíticaAssuntos
Planeta Terra , Sobrevida , Animais , Civilização , Meio Ambiente , Humanos , Densidade DemográficaRESUMO
Four propositions drawn from 60 years of natural hazard and reconstruction research provide a comparative and historical perspective on the reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Decisions taken over its 288-year history that have made New Orleans so vulnerable to Katrina reflect a long-term pattern of societal response to hazard events--reducing consequences to relatively frequent events, and increasing vulnerability to very large and rare events. Thus Katrina's consequences for New Orleans were truly catastrophic--accounting for most of the estimated 1,570 deaths of Louisiana residents and $40-50 billion in monetary losses. A comparative sequence and timing of recovery provides a calendar of historical experience against which to gauge progress in reconstruction. Using this calendar, the emergency post-disaster period appears to be longer in duration than that of any other studied disaster. The restoration period, the time taken to restore urban services for the smaller population, is in keeping with or ahead of historical experience. The effort to reconstruct the physical environment and urban infrastructure is likely to take 8-11 years. Conflicting policy goals for reconstruction of rapid recovery, safety, betterment, and equity are already evident. Actions taken demonstrate the rush to rebuild the familiar in contrast to planning efforts that emphasize betterment. Because disasters tend to accelerate existing economic, social, and political trends, the large losses in housing, population, and employment after Katrina are likely to persist and, at best, only partly recover. However, the possibility of breaking free of this gloomy trajectory is feasible and has some historical precedent.
Assuntos
Cidades , Desastres , Socorro em Desastres , Cidades/economia , Cidades/estatística & dados numéricos , Desastres/economia , Desastres/história , Objetivos , História do Século XVIII , História do Século XIX , História do Século XX , História do Século XXI , LouisianaRESUMO
Hazards are threats to people and what they value and risks are measures of hazards. Comparative analyses of the risks and hazards of technology can be dated to Starr's 1969 paper [Starr, C. (1969) Science 165, 1232-1238] but are rooted in recent trends in the evolution of technology, the identification of hazard, the perception of risk, and the activities of society. These trends have spawned an interdisciplinary quasi profession with new terminology, methodology, and literature. A review of 54 English-language monographs and book-length collections, published between 1970 and 1983, identified seven recurring themes: (i) overviews of the field of risk assessment, (ii) efforts to estimate and quantify risk, (iii) discussions of risk acceptability, (iv) perception, (v) analyses of regulation, (vi) case studies of specific technological hazards, and (vii) agenda for research. Within this field, science occupies a unique niche, for many technological hazards transcend the realm of ordinary experience and require expert study. Scientists can make unique contributions to each area of hazard management but their primary contribution is the practice of basic science. Beyond that, science needs to further risk assessment by understanding the more subtle processes of hazard creation and by establishing conventions for estimating risk and for presenting and handling uncertainty. Scientists can enlighten the discussion of tolerable risk by setting risks into comparative contexts, by studying the process of evaluation, and by participating as knowledgeable individuals, but they cannot decide the issue. Science can inform the hazard management process by broadening the range of alternative control actions and modes of implementation and by devising methods to evaluate their effectiveness.