Many heads are more utilitarian than one.

Moral judgments have a very prominent social nature, and in everyday life, they are continually shaped by discussions with others. Psychological investigations of these judgments, however, have rarely addressed the impact of social interactions. To examine the role of social interaction on moral judgments within small groups, we had groups of 4 to 5 participants judge moral dilemmas first individually and privately, then collectively and interactively, and finally individually a second time. We employed both real-life and sacrificial moral dilemmas in which the character's action or inaction violated a moral principle to benefit the greatest number of people. Participants decided if these utilitarian decisions were morally acceptable or not. In Experiment 1, we found that collective judgments in face-to-face interactions were more utilitarian than the statistical aggregate of their members compared to both first and second individual judgments. This observation supported the hypothesis that deliberation and consensus within a group transiently reduce the emotional burden of norm violation. In Experiment 2, we tested this hypothesis more directly: measuring participants' state anxiety in addition to their moral judgments before, during, and after online interactions, we found again that collectives were more utilitarian than those of individuals and that state anxiety level was reduced during and after social interaction. The utilitarian boost in collective moral judgments is probably due to the reduction of stress in the social setting.

Diffusion of punishment in collective norm violations.

People assign less punishment to individuals who inflict harm collectively, compared to those who do so alone. We show that this arises from judgments of diminished individual causal responsibility in the collective cases. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 1002) assigned less punishment to individuals involved in collective actions leading to intentional and accidental deaths, but not failed attempts, emphasizing that harmful outcomes, but not malicious intentions, were necessary and sufficient for the diffusion of punishment. Experiments 2.a compared the diffusion of punishment for harmful actions with 'victimless' purity violations (e.g., eating a dead human's flesh as a group; N = 752). In victimless cases, where the question of causal responsibility for harm does not arise, diffusion of collective responsibility was greatly reduced-an outcome replicated in Experiment 2.b (N = 479). Together, the results are consistent with discounting in causal attribution as the underlying mechanism of reduction in proposed punishment for collective harmful actions.

Self-control is linked to interoceptive inference: Craving regulation and the prediction of aversive interoceptive states induced with inspiratory breathing load.

The interoceptive inference framework suggests that our brain continuously anticipates future states of our body and aims to avoid events that might counteract homeostasis by minimizing prediction errors through active inference; e.g. appropriate actions. If predicted interoceptive models are inaccurate, behavior inconsistent with our long-term homeostatic goals may result; e.g. in failures in self-control. Using a within-subject design including an inspiratory breathing-load task to examine the prediction of aversive interoceptive perturbation and a craving-regulation for palatable foods task, we examined the relationship between self-control and aversive interoceptive predictive models. Those individuals (n = 51 healthy individuals from the general population) who were more accurate in predicting their interoceptive state with respect to anticipated versus experienced dyspnea were significantly more effective in the down-regulation of craving using negative future-thinking strategies. These individuals also scored higher on a measure of trait self-control, i.e. self-regulation to achieve long-term goals. Thus, individuals with more accurate predictive interoceptive models are better able to modulate cravings and thus exert better self-control.

Parsing cultural impacts on regret and risk in Iran, China and the United Kingdom.

Value-based choices are influenced both by powerful counterfactuals, such as regret, and also by risk in potential outcomes. Culture can profoundly affect how humans perceive and act in the world, but it remains unknown how regret in value-based choice and key aspects of risk-taking may differ between cultures. Here our computational approach provides precise and independent metrics, grounded in extensive neurobiological evidence, for the influences of risk and regret on choice. We test for commonalities and differences across three diverse cultures: Iran, China and the UK. Including Iran matters because cross-cultural work on value-based choice is lacking for this key 21st Century culture, and also because patterns across the three cultures arbitrates between explanations for differences. We find commonalities, with regret influencing choice across cultures and no consistent cultural difference seen. However, for risk, unlike in both Chinese and Westerners' choices, Iranians are risk-seeking - findings consistent across two task variants and further explained by Iranians showing less subjective impact of negative, but not positive, outcomes of risky choices. Our computational approach dissects cultural impacts on two key neurobiologically-grounded quantities in value-based choice, showing that neuroscientific accounts cannot a priori isolate such quantities from culture in the cognitive processes underlying choice.