Measuring uncertainty in human visual segmentation.

Segmenting visual stimuli into distinct groups of features and visual objects is central to visual function. Classical psychophysical methods have helped uncover many rules of human perceptual segmentation, and recent progress in machine learning has produced successful algorithms. Yet, the computational logic of human segmentation remains unclear, partially because we lack well-controlled paradigms to measure perceptual segmentation maps and compare models quantitatively. Here we propose a new, integrated approach: given an image, we measure multiple pixel-based same-different judgments and perform model-based reconstruction of the underlying segmentation map. The reconstruction is robust to several experimental manipulations and captures the variability of individual participants. We demonstrate the validity of the approach on human segmentation of natural images and composite textures. We show that image uncertainty affects measured human variability, and it influences how participants weigh different visual features. Because any putative segmentation algorithm can be inserted to perform the reconstruction, our paradigm affords quantitative tests of theories of perception as well as new benchmarks for segmentation algorithms.

Metacognitive evaluation of postdecisional perceptual representations.

Perceptual confidence is thought to arise from metacognitive processes that evaluate the underlying perceptual decision evidence. We investigated whether metacognitive access to perceptual evidence is constrained by the hierarchical organization of visual cortex, where high-level representations tend to be more readily available for explicit scrutiny. We found that the ability of human observers to evaluate their confidence did depend on whether they performed a high-level or low-level task on the same stimuli, but was also affected by manipulations that occurred long after the perceptual decision. Confidence in low-level perceptual decisions degraded with more time between the decision and the response cue, especially when backward masking was present. Confidence in high-level tasks was immune to backward masking and benefitted from additional time. These results can be explained by a model assuming confidence heavily relies on postdecisional internal representations of visual stimuli that degrade over time, where high-level representations are more persistent.

Suprathreshold perceptual decisions constrain models of confidence.

Perceptual confidence is an important internal signal about the certainty of our decisions and there is a substantial debate on how it is computed. We highlight three confidence metric types from the literature: observers either use 1) the full probability distribution to compute probability correct (Probability metrics), 2) point estimates from the perceptual decision process to estimate uncertainty (Evidence-Strength metrics), or 3) heuristic confidence from stimulus-based cues to uncertainty (Heuristic metrics). These metrics are rarely tested against one another, so we examined models of all three types on a suprathreshold spatial discrimination task. Observers were shown a cloud of dots sampled from a dot generating distribution and judged if the mean of the distribution was left or right of centre. In addition to varying the horizontal position of the mean, there were two sensory uncertainty manipulations: the number of dots sampled and the spread of the generating distribution. After every two perceptual decisions, observers made a confidence forced-choice judgement whether they were more confident in the first or second decision. Model results showed that the majority of observers were best-fit by either: 1) the Heuristic model, which used dot cloud position, spread, and number of dots as cues; or 2) an Evidence-Strength model, which computed the distance between the sensory measurement and discrimination criterion, scaled according to sensory uncertainty. An accidental repetition of some sessions also allowed for the measurement of confidence agreement for identical pairs of stimuli. This N-pass analysis revealed that human observers were more consistent than their best-fitting model would predict, indicating there are still aspects of confidence that are not captured by our modelling. As such, we propose confidence agreement as a useful technique for computational studies of confidence. Taken together, these findings highlight the idiosyncratic nature of confidence computations for complex decision contexts and the need to consider different potential metrics and transformations in the confidence computation.

Cross-modal metacognition: Visual and tactile confidence share a common scale.

Humans can judge the quality of their perceptual decisions-an ability known as perceptual confidence. Previous work suggested that confidence can be evaluated on an abstract scale that can be sensory modality-independent or even domain-general. However, evidence is still scarce on whether confidence judgments can be directly made across visual and tactile decisions. Here, we investigated in a sample of 56 adults whether visual and tactile confidence share a common scale by measuring visual contrast and vibrotactile discrimination thresholds in a confidence-forced choice paradigm. Confidence judgments were made about the correctness of the perceptual decision between two trials involving either the same or different modalities. To estimate confidence efficiency, we compared discrimination thresholds obtained from all trials to those from trials judged to be relatively more confident. We found evidence for metaperception because higher confidence was associated with better perceptual performance in both modalities. Importantly, participants were able to judge their confidence across modalities without any costs in metaperceptual sensitivity and only minor changes in response times compared to unimodal confidence judgments. In addition, we were able to predict cross-modal confidence well from unimodal judgments. In conclusion, our findings show that perceptual confidence is computed on an abstract scale and that it can assess the quality of our decisions across sensory modalities.

Confidence judgments are associated with face identification accuracy: Findings from a confidence forced-choice task.

Confidence is assumed to be an indicator of identification accuracy in legal practices (e.g., forensic face examination). However, it is not clear whether people can evaluate the correctness of their face-identification decisions reliably using confidence reports. In the current experiment, confidence in the correctness of the perceptual decision was measured with a confidence forced-choice methodology: Upon completion of two perceptual face-identity matching trials, the participants were asked to compare the two decisions and to select the trial on which they felt more confident. On each face-identity matching trial, participants viewed three face images (two same-identity images, one different-identity image) and were instructed to select the image of the different identity. In order to measure the extent to which difficulty level informs confidence decisions, we selected face-image triads using item-difficulty estimates extracted from psychometric modeling applied in a prior study. The difference in difficulty between the paired face-image triads predicted the proportion of high-confidence judgments allocated to the easier trial of the pair. Consistent with the impact of difficulty monitoring on confidence judgments, performance was significantly more accurate on trials associated with higher confidence. Overall, the results suggested that people reliably evaluate the correctness of their perceptual face-identity matching decisions and use trial difficulty to evaluate confidence.

Contrasting contributions of movement onset and duration to self-evaluation of sensorimotor timing performance.

Movement execution is not always optimal. Understanding how humans evaluate their own motor decisions can give us insights into their suboptimality. Here, we investigated how humans time the action of synchronizing an arm movement with a predictable visual event and how well they can evaluate the outcome of this action. On each trial, participants had to decide when to start (reaction time) and for how long to move (movement duration) to reach a target on time. After each trial, participants judged the confidence they had that their performance on that trial was better than average. We found that participants mostly varied their reaction time, keeping the average movement duration short and relatively constant across conditions. Interestingly, confidence judgements reflected deviations from the planned reaction time and were not related to planned movement duration. In two other experiments, we replicated these results in conditions where the contribution of sensory uncertainty was reduced. In contrast to confidence judgements, when asked to make an explicit estimation of their temporal error, participants' estimates were related in a similar manner to both reaction time and movement duration. In summary, humans control the timing of their actions primarily by adjusting the delay to initiate the action, and they estimate their confidence in their action from the difference between the planned and executed movement onset. Our results highlight the critical role of the internal model for the self-evaluation of one's motor performance.

Adaptation to one perceived motion direction can generate multiple velocity aftereffects.

Sensory adaptation is a useful tool to identify the links between perceptual effects and neural mechanisms. Even though motion adaptation is one of the earliest and most documented aftereffects, few studies have investigated the perception of direction and speed of the aftereffect at the same time, that is the perceived velocity. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we simultaneously recorded the perceived direction and speed of leftward or rightward moving random dots before and after adaptation. For the adapting stimulus, we chose a horizontally-oriented broadband grating moving upward behind a circular aperture. Because of the aperture problem, the interpretation of this stimulus is ambiguous, being consistent with multiple velocities, and yet it is systematically perceived as moving at a single direction and speed. Here we ask whether the visual system adapts to the multiple velocities of the adaptor or to just the single perceived velocity. Our results show a strong repulsion aftereffect, away from the adapting velocity (downward and slower), that increases gradually for faster test stimuli as long as these stimuli include some velocities that match some of the ambiguous ones of the adaptor. In summary, the visual system seems to adapt to the multiple velocities of an ambiguous stimulus even though a single velocity is perceived. Our findings can be well described by a computational model that assumes a joint encoding of direction and speed and that includes an extended adaptation component that can represent all the possible velocities of the ambiguous stimulus.

Perceptual confidence judgments reflect self-consistency.

Each perceptual decision is commonly attached to a judgment of confidence in the uncertainty of that decision. Confidence is classically defined as the estimate of the posterior probability of the decision to be correct, given the evidence. Here we argue that correctness is neither a valid normative statement of what observers should be doing after their perceptual decision nor a proper descriptive statement of what they actually do. Instead, we propose that perceivers aim at being self-consistent with themselves. We present behavioral evidence obtained in two separate psychophysical experiments that human observers achieve that aim. In one experiment adaptation led to aftereffects, and in the other prior stimulus occurrences were manipulated. We show that confidence judgments perfectly follow changes in perceptual reports and response times, regardless of the nature of the bias. Although observers are able to judge the validity of their percepts, they are oblivious to how biased these percepts are. Focusing on self-consistency rather than correctness leads us to interpret confidence as an estimate of the reliability of one's perceptual decision rather than a distance to an unattainable truth.

Underconfidence in peripheral vision.

Our visual experience appears uniform across the visual field, despite the poor resolution of peripheral vision. This may be because we do not notice that we are missing details in the periphery of our visual field and believe that peripheral vision is just as rich as central vision. In other words, the uniformity of the visual scene could be explained by a metacognitive bias. We deployed a confidence forced-choice method to measure metacognitive performance in peripheral as compared to central vision. Participants judged the orientation of gratings presented in central and peripheral vision, and reported whether they thought they were more likely to be correct in the perceptual decision for the central or for the peripheral stimulus. Observers were underconfident in the periphery: higher sensory evidence in the periphery was needed to equate confidence choices between central and peripheral perceptual decisions. When performance on the central and peripheral tasks was matched, observers were still more confident in their ability to report the orientation of the central gratings over the one of the peripheral gratings. In a second experiment, we measured metacognitive sensitivity, as the difference in perceptual sensitivity between perceptual decisions that are chosen with high confidence and decisions that are chosen with low confidence. Results showed that metacognitive sensitivity is lower when participants compare central to peripheral perceptual decisions compared to when they compare peripheral to peripheral or central to central perceptual decisions. In a third experiment, we showed that peripheral underconfidence does not arise because observers based confidence judgments on stimulus size or contrast range rather than on perceptual performance. Taken together, results indicate that humans are impaired in comparing central with peripheral perceptual performance, but metacognitive biases cannot explain our impression of uniformity, as this would require peripheral overconfidence.

Confidence Forced-Choice and Other Metaperceptual Tasks.

Metaperception is the self-monitoring and self-control of one's own perception. Perceptual confidence is the prototypical example of metaperception. Perceptual confidence refers to the ability to judge whether a perceptual decision is correct. We argue that metaperception is not limited to confidence but includes other judgments such as the estimation of familiarity and the aesthetic experience of sensory events. Perceptual confidence has recently received a surge of interests due in particular to the design of careful psychophysical experiments and powerful computational models. In psychophysics, the use of confidence ratings is the dominant methodology, but other paradigms are available, including the confidence forced choice. In this latter paradigm, participants are presented with two stimuli, make perceptual decisions about these stimuli, and then choose which decision is more likely to be correct. One benefit of confidence forced choice is that it disregards confidence biases to focus on confidence sensitivity. Confidence forced choice might also be a paradigm that will allow us to establish whether confidence is estimated serially or in parallel to the perceptual decision.

Disambiguating serial effects of multiple timescales.

What has been previously experienced can systematically affect human perception in the present. We designed a novel psychophysical experiment to measure the perceptual effects of adapting to dynamically changing stimulus statistics. Observers are presented with a series of oriented Gabor patches and are asked occasionally to judge the orientation of highly ambiguous test patches. We developed a computational model to quantify the influence of past stimuli presentations on the observers' perception of test stimuli over multiple timescales and to show that this influence is distinguishable from simple response biases. The experimental results reveal that perception is attracted toward the very recent past and simultaneously repulsed from stimuli presented at short to medium timescales and attracted to presentations further in the past. All effects differ significantly both on their relative strength and their respective duration. Our model provides a structured way of quantifying serial effects in psychophysical experiments, and it could help experimenters in identifying such effects in their data and distinguish them from less interesting response biases.

Persistent states in vision break universality and time invariance.

Studies of perception usually emphasize processes that are largely universal across observers and--except for short-term fluctuations--stationary over time. Here we test the universality and stationarity assumptions with two families of ambiguous visual stimuli. Each stimulus can be perceived in two different ways, parameterized by two opposite directions from a continuous circular variable. A large-sample study showed that almost all observers have preferred directions or biases, with directions lying within 90 degrees of the bias direction nearly always perceived and opposite directions almost never perceived. The biases differ dramatically from one observer to the next, and although nearly every bias direction occurs in the population, the population distributions of the biases are nonuniform, featuring asymmetric peaks in the cardinal directions. The biases for the two families of stimuli are independent and have distinct population distributions. Following external perturbations and spontaneous fluctuations, the biases decay over tens of seconds toward their initial values. Persistent changes in the biases are found on time scales of several minutes to 1 hour. On scales of days to months, the biases undergo a variety of dynamical processes such as drifts, jumps, and oscillations. The global statistics of a majority of these long-term time series are well modeled as random walk processes. The measurable fluctuations of these hitherto unknown degrees of freedom show that the assumptions of universality and stationarity in perception may be unwarranted and that models of perception must include both directly observable variables as well as covert, persistent states.

Timing in the absence of a clock reset.

Prominent models of time perception assume a reset of the timing mechanism with an explicit onset of the interval to be timed. Here we investigated the accuracy and precision of temporal estimations when the duration does not have such an explicit onset. Participants were tracking a disc moving on a circular path with varying speeds, and estimated the duration of one full revolution before the stimulus stopped. The onset of that revolution was either cued (explicit), or undetermined until the stimulus stopped (implicit). Reproduced duration was overestimated for short and underestimated for long durations, and variability of the estimates scaled with the duration in both temporal conditions. However, the bias was more pronounced in the implicit condition. In addition, if the stimulus path was partially occluded, duration of the occluded motion was correctly estimated. In a second experiment, we compared the precision in the explicit and implicit conditions by asking participants to discriminate the duration of one revolution before the stimulus stopped to that of a static stimulus presentation in a forced-choice task. Sensitivity of discrimination was worse in the implicit onset condition, but surprisingly, still comparable to the explicit condition. In summary, the estimates follow principles described in prospective timing paradigms, although not knowing beforehand when to start timing decreases sensitivity of temporal estimations. Since in naturalistic contexts, we often do not know in advance which durations might be relevant to estimate, the simple task presented here could become a valuable tool for testing models of temporal estimation.

Contextual effects on real bicolored glossy surfaces.

The material property of glossiness, which is attributed to many objects in our daily life, is physically independent of the objects' color. However, perceived glossiness can change with the contrast between the highlight and the area around the specular highlight. Hitherto, experiments mainly investigated gloss on unicolored surfaces. It is well known that the context in which a surface is embedded can influence its perceived lightness. Here we investigated whether similar contextual effects exist also for gloss perception by presenting single surfaces containing two different colors. We tested the influence of the second color on participants' gloss judgments with both real surfaces and photographs of those surfaces. In both conditions, participants were influenced by the second color on the surface even though they were asked to ignore it. We found contrasting contextual effects on the bicolored surfaces. However, when explicitly asked to rate the global gloss on the bicolored surfaces, participants took both parts of the surface equally into account.

Early, local motion signals generate directional preferences in depth ordering of transparent motion.

Superposition of two dot clouds moving in different directions results in the perception of two transparent layers. Despite the ambiguous depth order of the layers, there are consistent preferences to perceive the layer, which is moving either rightward or downward in front of the other layer. Here we investigated the origin of these depth order biases. For this purpose, we measured the interaction with stereoscopic disparity and the influence of global and local motion properties. Motion direction and stereoscopic disparity were equally effective in determining depth order at a disparity of one arcmin. Global motion properties, such as the aperture location in the visual field or the aperture's motion direction did not affect directional biases. Local motion properties however were effective. When the moving elements were oriented lines rather than dots, the directional biases were shifted towards the direction orthogonal to the lines rather than the actual motion direction of the lines. Therefore, depth order was determined before the aperture problem was fully resolved. Varying the duration of the stimuli, we found that the time constant of the aperture problem was much lower for depth order than for perceived motion direction. Altogether, our results indicate that depth order is determined in one shot on the basis of an early motion signal, while perceived motion direction is continuously updated. Thus, depth ordering in transparent motion appears to be a surprisingly fast process, that relies on early, local motion signals and that precedes high-level motion analysis.

Principles of multisensory behavior.

The combined use of multisensory signals is often beneficial. Based on neuronal recordings in the superior colliculus of cats, three basic rules were formulated to describe the effectiveness of multisensory signals: the enhancement of neuronal responses to multisensory compared with unisensory signals is largest when signals occur at the same location ("spatial rule"), when signals are presented at the same time ("temporal rule"), and when signals are rather weak ("principle of inverse effectiveness"). These rules are also considered with respect to multisensory benefits as observed with behavioral measures, but do they capture these benefits best? To uncover the principles that rule benefits in multisensory behavior, we here investigated the classical redundant signal effect (RSE; i.e., the speedup of response times in multisensory compared with unisensory conditions) in humans. Based on theoretical considerations using probability summation, we derived two alternative principles to explain the effect. First, the "principle of congruent effectiveness" states that the benefit in multisensory behavior (here the speedup of response times) is largest when behavioral performance in corresponding unisensory conditions is similar. Second, the "variability rule" states that the benefit is largest when performance in corresponding unisensory conditions is unreliable. We then tested these predictions in two experiments, in which we manipulated the relative onset and the physical strength of distinct audiovisual signals. Our results, which are based on a systematic analysis of response time distributions, show that the RSE follows these principles very well, thereby providing compelling evidence in favor of probability summation as the underlying combination rule.

Dual process for intentional and reactive decisions.

Efficient cognitive decisions should be adjustable to incoming novel information. However, most current models of decision making have so far neglected any potential interaction between intentional and stimulus-driven decisions. We report here behavioral results and a new model on the interaction between a perceptual decision and non-predictable novel information. We asked participants to anticipate their response to an external stimulus and presented this stimulus with variable delay. Participants were clearly able to adjust their initial decision to the new stimulus if this latter appeared sufficiently early. To account for these results, we present a two-stage model in which two systems, an intentional and a stimulus-driven, interact only in the second stage. In the first stage of the model, the intentional and stimulus-driven processes race independently to reach a transition threshold between the two stages. The model can also account for results of a second experiment where a response bias is introduced. Our model is consistent with some physiological results that indicate that both parallel and interactive processing take place between intentional and stimulus-driven information. It emphasizes that in natural conditions, both types of processing are important and it helps pinpoint the transition between parallel and interactive processing.

The prediction of visual stimuli influences auditory loudness discrimination.

The brain combines information from different senses to improve performance on perceptual tasks. For instance, auditory processing is enhanced by the mere fact that a visual input is processed simultaneously. However, the sensory processing of one modality is itself subject to diverse influences. Namely, perceptual processing depends on the degree to which a stimulus is predicted. The present study investigated the extent to which the influence of one processing pathway on another pathway depends on whether or not the stimulation in this pathway is predicted. We used an action-effect paradigm to vary the match between incoming and predicted visual stimulation. Participants triggered a bimodal stimulus composed of a Gabor and a tone. The Gabor was either congruent or incongruent compared to an action-effect association that participants learned in an acquisition phase.We tested the influence of action-effect congruency on the loudness perception of the tone. We observed that an incongruent-task-irrelevant Gabor stimulus increases participant's sensitivity to loudness discrimination. An identical result was obtained for a second condition in which the visual stimulus was predicted by a cue instead of an action. Our results suggest that prediction error is a driving factor of the crossmodal interplay between vision and audition.

Multistage maturation optimizes vision.

Late development of color vision improves object recognition.

What the eyes, confidence, and partner's identity can tell about change of mind.

Perceptual confidence reflects the ability to evaluate the evidence that supports perceptual decisions. It is thought to play a critical role in guiding decision-making. However, only a few empirical studies have actually investigated the function of perceptual confidence. To address this issue, we designed a perceptual task in which participants provided a confidence judgment on the accuracy of their perceptual decision. Then, they viewed the response of a machine or human partner, and they were instructed to decide whether to keep or change their initial response. We observed that confidence predicted participants' changes of mind more than task difficulty and perceptual accuracy. Additionally, interacting with a machine, compared to a human, decreased confidence and increased participants tendency to change their initial decision, suggesting that both confidence and changes of mind are influenced by contextual factors, such as the identity of a partner. Finally, variations in confidence judgments but not change of mind were correlated with pre-response pupil dynamics, indicating that arousal changes are linked to confidence computations. This study contributes to our understanding of the factors influencing confidence and changes of mind and also evaluates the possibility of using pupil dynamics as a proxy of confidence.