Reasoning strategies and prior knowledge effects in contingency learning.

Prior knowledge has been shown to be an important factor in causal judgments. However, inconsistent patterns have been reported regarding the interaction between prior knowledge and the processing of contingency information. In three studies, we examined the effect of the plausibility of the putative cause on causal judgments, when prior expectations about the rate at which the cause is accompanied by the effect in question are explicitly controlled for. Results clearly show that plausibility has a clear effect that is independent of contingency information and type of task (passive or active). We also examined the role of strategy use as an individual difference in causal judgments. Specifically, the dual-strategy model suggests that people can either use a Statistical or a Counterexample strategy to process information. Across all three studies, results showed that Strategy use has a clear effect on causal judgments that is independent of both plausibility and contingency.

Reasoning strategies determine the effect of disconfirmation on belief in false claims.

The dual-strategy model of reasoning proposes that people tend to use one of two reasoning strategies: either a statistical or a counterexample strategy, with the latter being more sensitive to potential counterexamples to a given conclusion. Previous studies have examined the effects of reasoning strategy in a variety of contexts. In the present study, we looked at the effects of gist repetition and disconfirmation on belief in an unknown claim. This is particularly interesting since there is no single normative analysis of this situation. We examine the hypotheses that (a) increasing gist repetition will result in higher levels of belief with both counterexample and statistical reasoners, and (b) that counterexample reasoners will have lower belief levels following a single disconfirming instance than will statistical reasoners. In a large-scale online study, over 2,000 adult participants received a False Claim procedure along with a Strategy Diagnostic. Results are consistent with the hypotheses. This provides strong evidence that the dual-strategy model captures a clear difference in information processing that is not captured by any normative/non-normative distinction.

Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning.

The dual strategy model proposes that people use one of two potential ways of processing information when making inferences. The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, while the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation, allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In the following studies, we explore the hypothesis that individual differences in strategy use are related to the ability to make rapid intuitive logical judgments. In Study 1, we show that this is the case for rapid judgments requiring a distinction between simple logical form and for a novel form of judgment, the ability to identify inferences that are not linked to their premises (non sequiturs). In Study 2, we show that strategy use is related to the ability to make the kinds of rapid logical judgments previously examined over and above contributions of working memory capacity. Study 3 shows that strategy use explains individual variability in rapid logical responding with belief-biased inferences over and above the contribution of IQ. The results of Studies 2 and 3 indicate that under severe time constraint cognitive capacity is a very poor predictor of reasoning, while strategy use becomes a stronger predictor. These results extend the notion that people can make rapid intuitive "logical" judgments while highlighting the importance of strategy use as a key individual difference variable.

Divergent Thinking Promotes Deductive Reasoning in Preschoolers.

This study explored the hypothesis that preschoolers' deductive reasoning would be improved by encouraging use of divergent thinking (DT). Children of 4-5 years of age (n = 120) were randomly given DT or neutral control exercises before deductive reasoning problems. To allow a stronger test of the hypothesis, half of the children receiving the DT exercises were given explicit examples, which have been shown to reduce ideational originality. Results indicate that, as predicted, DT exercises without examples significantly improved rates of deductive responding, compared to exercises with examples and the control condition. These findings indicate that DT is a key component in the early beginnings of deductive reasoning. Some educational implications are discussed.

Reasoning strategies and semantic memory effects in deductive reasoning.

Growing evidence supports the dual-strategy model, which suggests that reasoners have access to both a statistical and a counterexample reasoning strategy. In this paper, we explore further the processes underlying strategy use. We report three studies, the aim of which was to clarify the relation between this model and two forms of everyday reasoning. One of the most robust effects found with conditional reasoning with meaningful premises is the effect of alternative antecedents on the endorsement of AC and DA inferences. In a first study, we presented participants with conditional reasoning problems having more or fewer accessible alternatives as well as our dual-strategy diagnostic questionnaire. As hypothesized, results showed that strategy use had an independent effect on the inferences made with the AC and DA forms, over and above the effect of the number of antecedents, but was not related to responding to the MP and the MT forms. In a second study, we found that this relation extended to reasoning from an incompatibility statement. Finally, a third study showed that this relationship did not hold with probabilistic rather than logical response instructions, suggesting that the way reasoners transform a probabilistic evaluation into a dichotomous judgment is a key determinant of strategy use.

Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory, and attentional focus.

A common explanation for individual differences in the ability to draw rule-based inferences, when a putative conclusion suggests a competing belief-based inference, is that the ability to do so depends on working memory capacity. In the following studies, we examined the hypothesis that the ability to draw rule-based inferences in belief bias tasks can also be explained by individual differences in reasoning strategies and in the related attentional focus. The dual-strategy model differentiates counterexample and statistical strategies that involve different information-processing styles. In the first study (N = 139), participants completed a working memory task (operation span), a strategy diagnostic questionnaire, and a belief bias task. The results showed that individual differences in strategy use predicted performance in the belief bias problems over and above any effects of working memory capacity, with counterexample reasoners producing rule-based inferences more often than statistical reasoners. In the second study (N = 196), an eye-tracking methodology was used as a process-tracing technique to investigate attentional differences between the two strategies. On problems showing a conflict between rule-based and belief-based information, counterexample reasoners demonstrated longer fixation times on the premises than did statistical reasoners, thus providing direct evidence that individual differences in strategy use reflect different processing styles. These results clearly indicate that individual differences in strategy use are an important determinant of the way that people make inferences when rule-based and belief-based cues are both present.

The development of fast and slow inferential responding: Evidence for a parallel development of rule-based and belief-based intuitions.

Dual process theories postulate the existence of two levels of processing, Type 1, which uses belief-based cues to make very rapid inferences, and Type 2, which uses more conscious, working memory-based processes that are, in principle, capable of making rule-based judgments. There is a common assumption that Type 1 processes are more rapidly produced, while Type 2 processes take more time. Evidence for this assumption is mixed. Recently, Newman, Gibb, and Thompson (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(7): 1154, 2017) have provided clear evidence that very fast responses use a combination of both belief-based and rule-based cues. In these studies, we initially replicated this basic result with adults using a different methodology and extended them to examine in greater detail patterns of change with restricted time. The results also show the same combination of rule-based and belief-based cues in fast responses, and suggest that time constraints differentially affect each form of cue. We then examined the developmental pattern of both fast and slow responding. Children aged between 8 and 10 years of age were examined using the methodology of the initial study. Results show that both developmental patterns and the effect of reduced time on children produce parallel changes in both belief-based and rule-based responding. These results suggest the existence of two simultaneously developing processes, consistent with a dual-strategy model of reasoning.

Reasoning from an incompatibility: False dilemma fallacies and content effects.

In the present studies, we investigated inferences from an incompatibility statement. Starting with two propositions that cannot be true at the same time, these inferences consist of deducing the falsity of one from the truth of the other or deducing the truth of one from the falsity of the other. Inferences of this latter form are relevant to human reasoning since they are the formal equivalent of a discourse manipulation called the false dilemma fallacy, often used in politics and advertising in order to force a choice between two selected options. Based on research on content-related variability in conditional reasoning, we predicted that content would have an impact on how reasoners treat incompatibility inferences. Like conditional inferences, they present two invalid forms for which the logical response is one of uncertainty. We predicted that participants would endorse a smaller proportion of the invalid incompatibility inferences when more counterexamples are available. In Study 1, we found the predicted pattern using causal premises translated into incompatibility statements with many and few counterexamples. In Study 2A, we replicated the content effects found in Study 1, but with premises for which the incompatibility statement is a non-causal relation between classes. These results suggest that the tendency to fall into the false dilemma fallacy is modulated by the background knowledge of the reasoner. They also provide additional evidence on the link between semantic information retrieval and deduction.

The capacity to generate alternative ideas is more important than inhibition for logical reasoning in preschool-age children.

There is little consensus about the nature of logical reasoning and, equally important, about how it develops. To address this, we looked at the early origins of deductive reasoning in preschool children. We examined the contribution of two factors to the reasoning ability of very young children: inhibitory capacity and the capacity to generate alternative ideas. In a first study, a total of 32 preschool children were all given generation, inhibition, and logical reasoning measures. Logical reasoning was measured using knowledge-based premises such as "All dogs have legs," and two different inferences: modus ponens and affirmation of the consequent. Results revealed that correctly reasoning with both inferences is not related to the measure of inhibition, but is rather related to the capacity to generate alternative ideas. In a second study, 32 preschool children were given either the generation or the inhibition task before the logical reasoning measure. Results showed that receiving the generation task beforehand significantly improved logical reasoning compared to the inhibition task given beforehand. Overall, these results provide evidence for the greater importance of idea generation in the early development of logical reasoning.

Interactions between inferential strategies and belief bias.

The dual strategy model of reasoning proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d'Ydewalle (Thinking & Reasoning, 11(3), 239-278, 2005a; Memory & Cognition, 33(1), 107-119, 2005b) suggests that people can use either a statistical or a counterexample-based strategy to make deductive inferences. Subsequent studies have supported this distinction and investigated some properties of the two strategies. In the following, we examine the further hypothesis that reasoners using statistical strategies should be more vulnerable to the effects of conclusion belief. In each of three studies, participants were given abstract problems used to determine strategy use and three different forms of syllogism with believable and unbelievable conclusions. Responses, response times, and feeling of rightness (FOR) measures were taken. The results show that participants using a statistical strategy were more prone to the effects of conclusion belief across all three forms of reasoning. In addition, statistical reasoners took less time to make inferences than did counterexample reasoners. Patterns of variation in response times and FOR ratings between believable and unbelievable conclusions were very similar for both strategies, indicating that both statistical and counterexample reasoners were aware of conflict between conclusion belief and premise-based reasoning.

Metacognition and abstract reasoning.

The nature of people's meta-representations of deductive reasoning is critical to understanding how people control their own reasoning processes. We conducted two studies to examine whether people have a metacognitive representation of abstract validity and whether familiarity alone acts as a separate metacognitive cue. In Study 1, participants were asked to make a series of (1) abstract conditional inferences, (2) concrete conditional inferences with premises having many potential alternative antecedents and thus specifically conducive to the production of responses consistent with conditional logic, or (3) concrete problems with premises having relatively few potential alternative antecedents. Participants gave confidence ratings after each inference. Results show that confidence ratings were positively correlated with logical performance on abstract problems and concrete problems with many potential alternatives, but not with concrete problems with content less conducive to normative responses. Confidence ratings were higher with few alternatives than for abstract content. Study 2 used a generation of contrary-to-fact alternatives task to improve levels of abstract logical performance. The resulting increase in logical performance was mirrored by increases in mean confidence ratings. Results provide evidence for a metacognitive representation based on logical validity, and show that familiarity acts as a separate metacognitive cue.

Additional evidence for a dual-strategy model of reasoning: Probabilistic reasoning is more invariant than reasoning about logical validity.

One of the major debates concerning the nature of inferential reasoning is between counterexample-based strategies such as mental model theory and the statistical strategies underlying probabilistic models. The dual-strategy model proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d'Ydewalle (2005a, 2005b) suggests that people might have access to both kinds of strategies. One of the postulates of this approach is that statistical strategies correspond to low-cost, intuitive modes of evaluation, whereas counterexample strategies are higher-cost and more variable in use. We examined this hypothesis by using a deductive-updating paradigm. The results of Study 1 showed that individual differences in strategy use predict different levels of deductive updating on inferences about logical validity. Study 2 demonstrated no such variation when explicitly probabilistic inferences were examined. Study 3 showed that presenting updating problems with probabilistic inferences modified performance on subsequent problems using logical validity, whereas the opposite was not true. These results provide clear evidence that the processes used to make probabilistic inferences are less subject to variation than those used to make inferences of logical validity.

On the road toward formal reasoning: reasoning with factual causal and contrary-to-fact causal premises during early adolescence.

Understanding the development of conditional (if-then) reasoning is critical for theoretical and educational reasons. Here we examined the hypothesis that there is a developmental transition between reasoning with true and contrary-to-fact (CF) causal conditionals. A total of 535 students between 11 and 14 years of age received priming conditions designed to encourage use of either a true or CF alternatives generation strategy and reasoning problems with true causal and CF causal premises (with counterbalanced order). Results show that priming had no effect on reasoning with true causal premises. By contrast, priming with CF alternatives significantly improved logical reasoning with CF premises. Analysis of the effect of order showed that reasoning with CF premises reduced logical responding among younger students but had no effect among older students. Results support the idea that there is a transition in the reasoning processes in this age range associated with the nature of the alternatives generation process required for logical reasoning with true and CF causal conditionals.

Are There Two Kinds of Reasoners?

There is little consensus about the underlying parameters of human reasoning. Two major theories have been proposed that suppose very different mechanisms. The mental model theory proposes that people use working memory intensive processes in order to construct limited models of problem parameters. Probabilistic theories propose that reasoning is a process by which people use the sum of their existing knowledge in order to generate an estimate of the probability of a conclusion given problem parameters. Following an initial proposition by Verschueren et al., the dual-strategy model supposes that these different approaches to reasoning are in fact an important individual difference. Specifically, a recently developed diagnostic questionnaire has identified two major categories of reasoners: Counterexample reasoners use a mental model form of processing, while Statistical reasoners use a probabilistic form of processing. In the following, I describe results that show that the Counterexample/Statistical distinction affects information processing across a variety of reasoning and judgment tasks. In addition, strategy use correlates with performance on very different kinds of thinking, such as contingency judgments, processing of negative emotions, or susceptibility to social biases. Although this distinction is related to differences in cognitive ability, it has been found to predict performance over and above these differences. More recent results have shown that it is possible to experimentally modify strategy use. These results suggest that strategy use is an important individual difference that can affect performance in a wide variety of contexts.

The effects of strength and activation level of belief on belief-biased reasoning.

The belief bias effect designates the tendency to judge the validity of a conclusion based on its believability. Most studies have compared highly believable with unbelievable conclusions when examining belief-biased reasoning. In two studies, we examine a hypothesis raised by Banks (2013, Cognitive Science, 37[3], 544-577), who postulated that level of activation of belief should affect the extent to which reasoning is biased. Here, a first study found that moderately believable conclusions produced a significant biasing effect, but one that was smaller than with highly believable conclusions. The second study found that activating the category referenced by a conclusion significantly increased the biasing effect of the same conclusion. These results suggest that strength of belief is a necessary parameter of any model of belief bias. They also show that context can affect the extent to which belief affects reasoning.

Young adults' desired life tradeoffs: love first, sex last.

Every human and non-human animal must make tradeoffs in investments in terms of time, energy, and resources. The aim of this study was to extrapolate from the types of investments in survival and reproduction that non-human animals make and translate these into human motivations. 16 potential goals were presented to 851 childless, 18-23-year-old adults from 11 world regions in an online study. Each young adult was asked to weight the importance of every goal to his or her ideal life. Weights had to sum to 100, requiring tradeoffs. Results revealed striking agreement across young adults with only four goals weighted above chance: Finding a beloved romantic partner, being physically and emotionally healthy, and earning money or resources. Having lots of sexual partners was the least important goal across all world regions for both sexes. Nevertheless, men more than women valued having many sexual partners, being talented outside work, being physically strong, and having a physically attractive romantic partner. Overall, there was cultural variation in some of the less important goals. Helping young adults achieve success requires understanding their own goals, rather than focusing on popularized depictions of what young adults desire.

Interpretation of ambiguous trials along with reasoning strategy is related to causal judgements in zero-contingency learning.

The dual strategy model suggests that people can use either a Statistical or a Counterexample reasoning strategy, which reflects two qualitatively different ways of processing information. This model has been shown to capture individual differences in a wide array of tasks, such as contingency learning. Here, we examined whether this extends to individual differences in the interpretation of contingency information where effects are ambiguous. Previous studies, using perceptually complex stimuli, have shown that the way in which participants interpret ambiguous effects predicts causal judgements. In two studies, we attempted to replicate this effect using a small number of clearly identifiable cues. Results show that the interpretation of ambiguous effects as effect present is related to final contingency judgements. In addition, results showed that Statistical reasoners had a stronger tendency to interpret ambiguous effects as effect present than Counterexample reasoners, which mediates the difference in contingency judgements.

The paradoxical effects of time pressure on base rate neglect.

Base rate neglect refers to the well-documented tendency for people to primarily rely on diagnostic information to identify event probabilities while discounting information about relative probabilities (base rates). It is often postulated that using base rate information requires some form of working memory intensive processes. However, recent studies have put this interpretation into doubt, showing that rapid judgments can also lead to base rate use. Here we examine the idea that base rate neglect can be explained by the degree of attention paid to diagnostic information, which predicts that having more time should lead to greater rates of base rate neglect. Participants were presented with base rate problems either with a limited time to respond or with no time restrictions. Results show that having more time results in a decrease in base rate use.

Can we change how people reason? Effects of instructions to reason differently and reasoning strategy.

Mental model (Johnson-Laird, 2001) and probabilistic theories (Oaksford & Chater, 2009) claim to provide distinct explanations of human reasoning. However, the dual strategy model of reasoning suggests that this distinction corresponds to different reasoning strategies, termed counterexample and statistical, respectively. There is clear evidence that most people have a preference for a given strategy, and that this predicts performance on a variety of forms of reasoning and judgment (Thompson & Markovits, 2021). To date, however, the evidence for this conclusion has been correlational in nature; in the current studies, we manipulated strategy use. To this end, we gave people (N = 885) explicit instructions to reason either using a counterexample strategy or a probabilistic strategy. In two studies, we observed that the ability to follow these instructions was constrained by people's spontaneous strategy use, and that the effect of instructions carried over to two subsequent forms of reasoning (a) belief-biased inferences and (b) base-rate judgments. Finally, the ability to follow instructions was correlated with reasoning accuracy on both tasks. These results provide strong evidence for the underlying reality of the dual strategy model and show that explicit instructions to reason differently can modify performance on different forms of reasoning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Married women with children experience greater intrasexual competition than their male counterparts.

Human males are considered to be more competitive than females. However, females must also compete for resources necessary for their own and their offsprings' survival. Since females use more indirect forms of competition than males, comparing observable forms of competition may be misleading. One critical driver of competition is resource asymmetry. Since competition occurs primarily within sex, reactions to resource asymmetry with same-sex peers should provide an important measure of competitiveness. We asked 596 married participants, 25-45 years of age with at least one child from three different countries to evaluate how same-sex individuals they know would react to a target individual who had a valuable resource that the same-sex individuals did not have. Half the participants evaluated reactions to same-sex targets, while the other half evaluated reactions to other-sex targets. Participants reported that women would react more negatively than men to resource asymmetry with same-sex targets, but not other-sex targets. These results suggest that women may be even more competitive than men in contexts when important resources related to reproductive success are at stake.