Dissemination of an Enterococcus Inc18-Like vanA plasmid associated with vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.

Of the 9 vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (VRSA) cases reported to date in the literature, 7 occurred in Michigan. In 5 of the 7 Michigan VRSA cases, an Inc18-like vanA plasmid was identified in the VRSA isolate and/or an associated vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) isolate from the same patient. This plasmid may play a critical role in the emergence of VRSA. We studied the geographical distribution of the plasmid by testing 1,641 VRE isolates from three separate collections by PCR for plasmid-specific genes traA, repR, and vanA. Isolates from one collection (phase 2) were recovered from surveillance cultures collected in 17 hospitals in 13 states. All VRE isolates from 2 Michigan institutions (n = 386) and between 60 and 70 VRE isolates (n = 883) from the other hospitals were tested. Fifteen VRE isolates (3.9%) from Michigan were positive for an Inc18-like vanA plasmid (9 E. faecalis [12.5%], 3 E. faecium [1.0%], 2 E. avium, and 1 E. raffinosus). Six VRE isolates (0.6%) from outside Michigan were positive (3 E. faecalis [2.7%] and 3 E. faecium [0.4%]). Of all E. faecalis isolates tested, 6.0% were positive for the plasmid, compared to 0.6% for E. faecium and 3.0% for other spp. Fourteen of the 15 plasmid-positive isolates from Michigan had the same Tn1546 insertion site location as the VRSA-associated Inc18-like plasmid, whereas 5 of 6 plasmid-positive isolates from outside Michigan differed in this characteristic. Most plasmid-positive E. faecalis isolates demonstrated diverse patterns by PFGE, with the exception of three pairs with indistinguishable patterns, suggesting that the plasmid is mobile in nature. Although VRE isolates with the VRSA-associated Inc18-like vanA plasmid were more common in Michigan, they remain rare. Periodic surveillance of VRE isolates for the plasmid may be useful in predicting the occurrence of VRSA.

Foundations of the severe acute respiratory syndrome preparedness and response plan for healthcare facilities.

OBJECTIVE: To help facilities prepare for potential future cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), assisted by members of professional societies representing public health, healthcare workers, and healthcare administrators, developed guidance to help facilities both prepare for and respond to cases of SARS. INTERVENTIONS: The recommendations in the CDC document were based on some of the important lessons learned in healthcare settings around the world during the SARS outbreak of 2003, including that (1) a SARS outbreak requires a coordinated and dynamic response by multiple groups; (2) unrecognized cases of SARS-associated coronavirus are a significant source of transmission; (3) restricting access to the healthcare facility can minimize transmission; (4) airborne infection isolation is recommended, but facilities and equipment may not be available; and (5) staffing needs and support will pose a significant challenge. CONCLUSIONS: Healthcare facilities were at the center of the SARS outbreak of 2003 and played a key role in controlling the epidemic. Recommendations in the CDC's SARS preparedness and response guidance for healthcare facilities will help facilities prepare for possible future outbreaks of SARS.