Healthier by precommitment.

We tested a voluntary self-control commitment device to help grocery shoppers make healthier food purchases. Participants, who were already enrolled in a large-scale incentive program that discounts the price of eligible groceries by 25%, were offered the chance to put their discount on the line. Agreeing households pledged that they would increase their purchases of healthy food by 5 percentage points above their household baseline for each of 6 months. If they reached that goal, their discount was awarded as usual; otherwise, their discount was forfeited for that month. Thirty-six percent of households that were offered the binding commitment agreed; they subsequently showed an average 3.5-percentage-point increase in healthy grocery items purchased in each of the 6 months; households that declined the commitment and control-group households that were given a hypothetical option to precommit did not show such an increase. These results suggest that self-aware consumers will seize opportunities to create restrictive choice environments for themselves, even at some risk of financial loss.

Causal models frame interpretation of mathematical equations.

We offer evidence that people can construe mathematical relations as causal. The studies show that people can select the causal versions of equations and that their selections predict both what they consider most understandable and how they expect variables to influence one another. When asked to write down equations, people have a strong preference for the version that matches their causal model. Causal models serve to structure equations by determining the preferred order of variables: Causes should be on one side of an equality, and a single effect should appear on the other.

A scale distortion theory of anchoring.

We propose that anchoring is often best interpreted as a scaling effect--that the anchor changes how the response scale is used, not how the focal stimulus is perceived. Of importance, we maintain that this holds true even for so-called objective scales (e.g., pounds, calories, meters, etc.). In support of this theory of scale distortion, we show that prior exposure to a numeric standard changes respondents' use of that specific response scale but does not generalize to conceptually affiliated judgments rendered on similar scales. Our findings highlight the necessity of distinguishing response language effects from representational effects in places where the need for that distinction has often been assumed away.