Time to Pay Attention? Information Search Explains Amplified Framing Effects Under Time Pressure.

Decades of research have established the ubiquity and importance of choice biases, such as the framing effect, yet why these seemingly irrational behaviors occur remains unknown. A prominent dual-system account maintains that alternate framings bias choices because of the unchecked influence of quick, affective processes, and findings that time pressure increases the framing effect have provided compelling support. Here, we present a novel alternative account of magnified framing biases under time pressure that emphasizes shifts in early visual attention and strategic adaptations in the decision-making process. In a preregistered direct replication (N = 40 adult undergraduates), we found that time constraints produced strong shifts in visual attention toward reward-predictive cues that, when combined with truncated information search, amplified the framing effect. Our results suggest that an attention-guided, strategic information-sampling process may be sufficient to explain prior results and raise challenges for using time pressure to support some dual-system accounts.

Reframing rationality: Exogenous constraints on controlled information search.

Bermúdez argues that framing effects are rational because particular frames provide goal-consistent reasons for choice and that people exert some control over the framing of a decision-problem. We propose instead that these observations raise the question of whether frame selection itself is a rational process and highlight how constraints in the choice environment severely limit the rational selection of frames.

On the neural implausibility of the modular mind: Evidence for distributed construction dissolves boundaries between perception, cognition, and emotion.

Firestone & Scholl (F&S) rely on three problematic assumptions about the mind (modularity, reflexiveness, and context-insensitivity) to argue cognition does not fundamentally influence perception. We highlight evidence indicating that perception, cognition, and emotion are constructed through overlapping, distributed brain networks characterized by top-down activity and context-sensitivity. This evidence undermines F&S's ability to generalize from case studies to the nature of perception.

How bad becomes good: A neurocomputational model of affect-informed choice.

People often draw on their current affective experience to inform their decisions, yet little is known about the underlying mechanisms of this process. Understanding them has important implications for many big questions in both the affective and decision sciences. Do the same neural circuits that generate affect generate value? What differentiates people who have greater contextual flexibility in their reliance on affect? Do affective choices invoke processes that are distinct from less affective choices? To investigate these questions, we developed a neurocomputational model of affect-informed choice, in which people convert subjective affect into context-sensitive decision value through a process of weighted evidence accumulation. We then tested model predictions by recording electroencephalography and facial electromyography during a novel affective choice paradigm in a sample of racially diverse undergraduate participants (data collected in 2018-2019). In addition to validating our model, we found that generation of affective responses occurs earlier than, and is neurally distinct from, valuation of that affect. Moreover, individual differences in contextual flexibility of affective weighting correlated only with later valuation processes, not earlier affect generation processes. Our results have important theoretical implications for emotion, emotion regulation, and decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

A neurocomputational account of the link between social perception and social action.

People selectively help others based on perceptions of their merit or need. Here, we develop a neurocomputational account of how these social perceptions translate into social choice. Using a novel fMRI social perception task, we show that both merit and need perceptions recruited the brain's social inference network. A behavioral computational model identified two non-exclusive mechanisms underlying variance in social perceptions: a consistent tendency to perceive others as meritorious/needy (bias) and a propensity to sample and integrate normative evidence distinguishing high from low merit/need in other people (sensitivity). Variance in people's merit (but not need) bias and sensitivity independently predicted distinct aspects of altruism in a social choice task completed months later. An individual's merit bias predicted context-independent variance in people's overall other-regard during altruistic choice, biasing people towards prosocial actions. An individual's merit sensitivity predicted context-sensitive discrimination in generosity towards high and low merit recipients by influencing other-regard and self-regard during altruistic decision-making. This context-sensitive perception-action link was associated with activation in the right temporoparietal junction. Together, these findings point towards stable, biologically based individual differences in perceptual processes related to abstract social concepts like merit, and suggest that these differences may have important behavioral implications for an individual's tendency toward favoritism or discrimination in social settings.

Affect and Decision Making: Insights and Predictions from Computational Models.

In recent years interest in integrating the affective and decision sciences has skyrocketed. Immense progress has been made, but the complexities of each field, which can multiply when combined, present a significant obstacle. A carefully defined framework for integration is needed. The shift towards computational modeling in decision science provides a powerful basis and a path forward, but one whose synergistic potential will only be fully realized by drawing on the theoretical richness of the affective sciences. Reviewing research using a popular computational model of choice (the drift diffusion model), we discuss how mapping concepts to parameters reduces conceptual ambiguity and reveals novel hypotheses.

Acetaminophen influences social and economic trust.

Acetaminophen has long been assumed to selectively alleviate physical pain, but recent research has started to reveal its broader psychological effects. Building on this work, we find suggestive evidence that acetaminophen affects the basic social process of trust across a national survey and five lab experiments. In a national community sample (MIDUS II), acetaminophen usage was negatively associated with neighborhood trust and feelings of social integration. In a series of lab experiments (N = 767), acetaminophen reduced the influence of self-generated expectations on investments in a trust game. When we manipulated trust game investor expectations, acetaminophen increased investments regardless of expectations. These results provide the first demonstration that an over-the-counter drug can impact trust-related behavior. Overall, the findings paint a complex picture of how situational factors may influence drug effects.

Decreased Empathic Responses to the 'Lucky Guy' in Love: The Effect of Intrasexual Competition.

People have a greater desire to date highly attractive partners, which induces intrasexual competition between same-sex individuals. The present study used functional magnetic resonance imaging to explore whether and how intrasexual competition modulates pain empathy for a same-sex rival and the underlying neural mechanism. Participants were scanned while processing the pain of a same-sex 'lucky guy' who had an attractive partner and one with a plain partner. The results revealed that participants reported lower pain intensity for the lucky guy. Neurally, reduced pain-related activations in anterior insula and anterior mid-cingulate cortex and increased activations in right superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and medial prefrontal gyrus (MPFC) were found for the lucky guy compared to the one with a plain partner. Right SFG and MPFC activations could predict participants' subsequent pain intensity ratings for the lucky guy. These findings suggest intrasexual competition can modulate normal empathic responses.

The neural basis of regret and relief during a sequential risk-taking task.

Regret and relief are associated with counterfactual thinking and are sensitive to various social contexts. In the present fMRI study, we investigated the neural basis for regret and relief and how social context (following vs. not following advice) modulates them by employing a sequential risk-taking task. Participants were asked to open a series of boxes consecutively until they decided to stop. Each box contained a reward (gold), except for one that contained an adverse stimulus (devil), which caused the participant to lose all the gold collected in that trial. Before each trial, participants received advice about when to stop, which they then chose to follow or not. Behaviorally, subjective regret and relief were primarily dependent on the number of missed chances and the trade-off between obtained gains and missed chances, respectively. Participants felt less regret when they chose not to follow the advice than when they did. At the neural level, striatum, vmPFC/mOFC, and vACC activations were associated with greater relief. Meanwhile, dmPFC and left superior temporal gyrus were associated with greater regret. Additionally, dACC showed stronger activation in the Not-Follow context than the Follow context.