Neuroanatomical correlates of veridical and illusory recognition memory: evidence from positron emission tomography.

Memory distortions and illusions have been thoroughly documented in psychological studies, but little is known about the neuroanatomical correlates of true and false memories. Vivid but illusory memories can be induced by asking people whether they recall or recognize words that were not previously presented, but are semantically related to other previously presented words. We used positron emission tomography to compare brain regions involved in veridical recognition of printed words that were heard several minutes earlier and illusory recognition of printed words that had not been heard earlier. Veridical and illusory recognition were each associated with blood flow increases in a left medial temporal region previously implicated in episodic memory; veridical recognition was distinguished by additional blood flow increases in a left temporoparietal region previously implicated in the retention of auditory/phonological information. This study reveals similarities and differences in the way the brain processes accurate and illusory memories.

Specifying criteria for postulating memory systems.

We have examined four criteria commonly used to distinguish separate memory systems: functional dissociation, independent neural systems, stochastic independence, and functional incompatibility. Current evidence fails to jointly satisfy these criteria in establishing independent systems, at least by our assessment. However, the proposed criteria are not all weighted equally in the literature. Certainly dissociation experiments, especially of neuropsychological patients, are weighted strongly in most formulations relative to the other three criteria. If all four criteria are considered equally important, as they should be in our opinion, evidence for the putative systems is much less clear-cut at this point, as indicated in our review.

Depression and implicit memory: a commentary.

In this invited commentary, we review four studies in which the issue of whether depression affects priming on implicit memory tests was examined. We conclude that a depressive mood does not affect amount of priming on several implicit memory tests under conditions in which marked effects are shown on conscious recollection (explicit memory). The mood congruity effect (depressives remember depression-related words better than controls; controls remember other types of material better than depressives) also largely disappears on perceptual implicit memory tests. We speculate about reasons for discrepancies in the literature, relate the findings to some current theories of individual differences in memory, and suggest some directions for future research.

Implicit memory. Retention without remembering.

Explicit measures of human memory, such as recall or recognition, reflect conscious recollection of the past. Implicit tests of retention measure transfer (or priming) from past experience on tasks that do not require conscious recollection of recent experiences for their performance. The article reviews research on the relation between explicit and implicit memory. The evidence points to substantial differences between standard explicit and implicit tests, because many variables create dissociations between these tests. For example, although pictures are remembered better than words on explicit tests, words produce more priming than do pictures on several implicit tests. These dissociations may implicate different memory systems that subserve distinct memorial functions, but the present argument is that many dissociations can be understood by appealing to general principles that apply to both explicit and implicit tests. Phenomena studied under the rubric of implicit memory may have important implications in many other fields, including social cognition, problem solving, and cognitive development.

Direct comparison of four implicit memory tests.

Four verbal implicit memory tests, word identification, word stem completion, word fragment completion, and anagram solution, were directly compared in one experiment and were contrasted with free recall. On all implicit tests, priming was greatest from prior visual presentation of words, less (but significant) from auditory presentation, and least from pictorial presentations. Typefont did not affect priming. In free recall, pictures were recalled better than words. The four implicit tests all largely index perceptual (lexical) operations in recognizing words, or visual word form representations.

Effects of imagery on perceptual implicit memory tests.

Four experiments demonstrate that imagery can promote priming on perceptual implicit memory tests. When Ss were given words during a study phase and asked to form mental images of corresponding pictures, more priming was obtained on a picture fragment identification test than from a study condition in which Ss performed semantic analyses of words. Imaginal priming of picture fragment identification occurred for recoverable fragments, but not for nonrecoverable fragments. The imagery effect was restricted to the imaged type of material: Imagining pictures (when presented with words) enhanced priming on a picture fragment identification test but not on word fragment completion. Similarly, when pictures were presented, imagining the corresponding words increased priming on word fragment completion but not on picture fragment identification. Overall, results support the hypothesis that imagining engages some of the same mechanisms used in perception and thereby produces priming.

Effects of exact repetition and conceptual repetition on free recall and primed word-fragment completion.

Experiments are reported in which effects of repeating words exactly (e.g., elephant, elephant) or repeating some meaningful aspect--a synonym (pachyderm), an associate (tusk), or a category coordinate (hippopotamus)--were examined on free recall and word-fragment completion. In free recall, large effects of both exact repetition and conceptual repetition were found; the magnitude of the latter was about half that of the former. In contrast, in primed word-fragment completion, repetition effects were rather small and there was no evidence of indirect (or conceptual) priming. Also, presentation of synonyms, associates, and coordinates in isolation failed to prime word-fragment completion. The results provide further evidence that the basis of primed word-fragment completion is different from that of free recall; the former seems to have a perceptual (or perhaps lexical) basis, whereas the latter relies more on meaningful processing.

Hypermnesia: the role of repeated testing.

The present study was designed to determine whether the increased recall of pictures across repeated tests (hypermnesia) is due to increasing strength of imaginal traces during the retention interval or to increased retrieval practice from prior tests. Subjects studied 60 pictures and then recalled them after various delays that were filled with instructions and, in two cases, reading a passage. Recall on a first test showed no change with retention interval. With retention interval held constant, however, the number of pictures recalled varied directly with the number of prior tests subjects had been given. This finding points up the critical nature of retrieval factors in producing hypermnesia.

Direct comparison of two implicit memory tests: word fragment and word stem completion.

In 3 experiments, the implicit memory tests of word fragment and word stem completion showed comparable effects over several variables: Study of words produced more priming than did study of pictures, no levels-of-processing effect occurred for words, more priming was obtained from pictures when Ss imaged the pictures' names than when they rated them for pleasantness, and forgetting rates were generally similar for the tests. A different pattern of results for the first 3 variables occurred under explicit test conditions with the same word fragments or word stems as cues. We conclude that the 2 implicit tests are measuring a similar form of perceptual memory. Furthermore, we argue that both tests are truly implicit because they meet Schacter, Bowers, & Booker's (1989) retrieval intentionality criterion: Levels of processing of words have a powerful effect on explicit versions of the tests but no effect on implicit versions.

Modality effects in false recall and false recognition.

R. E. Smith and R. R. Hunt (1998) reported a dramatic reduction in false remembering in a list-learning paradigm by switching from auditory to visual presentation at study. The current authors replicated these modality effects using written recall and visual recognition tests but obtained smaller effects than those in R. E. Smith and R. R. Hunt's study. In contrast, no modality effect occurred on auditory recognition tests. Manipulating study and test modality within-subjects (Experiment 2) and between-subjects (Experiment 3) yielded similar results. It was also found that subjects frequently judged critical nonstudied words as having been presented in the modality of their corresponding study lists. The authors concluded that subjects could retrieve distinctive information about a study list's presentation modality to reduce false remembering but only did so under certain conditions. The modality effect on false remembering is a function of both encoding and retrieval factors.

Social contagion of memory.

We report a new paradigm for studying false memories implanted by social influence, a process we call the social contagion of memory. A subject and confederate together saw six common household scenes (e.g., a kitchen) containing many objects, for either 15 or 60 sec. During a collaborative recall test, the 2 subjects each recalled six items from the scenes, but the confederate occasionally made mistakes by reporting items not from the scene. Some intrusions were highly consistent with the scene schema (e.g., a toaster) while others were less so (e.g., oven mitts). After a brief delay, the individual subject tried to recall as many items as possible from the six scenes. Recall of the erroneous items suggested by the confederate was greater than in a control condition (with no suggestion). Further, this social contagion effect was greater when the scenes were presented for less time (15 sec) and when the intruded item was more schema consistent (e.g., the toaster). As with other forms of social influence, false memories are contagious; one person's memory can be infected by another person's errors.

Associative false recognition occurs without strategic criterion shifts.

In the DRM (Deese/Roediger and McDermott) false memory paradigm, subjects studied lists of words associated with nonpresented critical words. They were tested in one of four instructional conditions. In a standard condition, subjects were not warned about the DRM Effect. In three other conditions, they were told to avoid false recognition of critical words. One group was warned before study of the lists (affecting encoding and retrieval processes), and two groups were warned after study (affecting only retrieval processes). Replicating prior work, the warning before study considerably reduced false recognition. The warning after study also reduced false recognition, but only when critical items had never been studied; when critical items were studied in half the lists so that subjects had to monitor memory for their presence or absence, the warning after study had little effect on false recognition. Because warned subjects were trying to avoid false recognition, the high levels of false recognition in the latter condition cannot be due to strategically guessing that critical test items were studied. False memories in the DRM paradigm are not caused by such liberal criterion shifts.

Direct comparison of auditory implicit memory tests.

In this experiment, we examined the degree to which four implicit tests and two explicit tests, all involving auditory presentation, were sensitive to the perceptual characteristics of the stimuli presented during study. Presenting stimuli visually decreased priming in all the implicit memory tests, relative to auditory presentation. However, changing voice between study and test decreased priming only in the implicit memory tests requiring identification of words degraded by noise or by low-pass filtering, but not in those tests requiring generation from word portions (stems and fragments). Modality effects without voice effects were observed in cued recall, but the opposite pattern of results (voice effects without modality effects) was obtained in recognition. The primary new finding is the demonstration that auditory memory tests, both explicit and implicit, differ in their sensitivity to the perceptual information encoded during study.

Factors that determine false recall: a multiple regression analysis.

In the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, subjects study lists of words that are designed to elicit the recall of an associatively related critical item. The 55 lists we have developed provide levels of false recall ranging from .01 to .65, and understanding this variability should provide a key to understanding this memory illusion. Using a simultaneous multiple regression analysis, we assessed the contribution of seven factors in creating false recall of critical items in the DRM paradigm. This analysis accounted for approximately 68% of the variance in false recall, with two main predictors: associative connections from the study words to the critical item (r = +.73; semipartial r = +.60) and recallability of the lists (r = -.43; semipartial r = -.34). Taken together, the variance in false recall captured by these predictors accounted for 84% of the variance that can be explained, given the reliability of the false recall measures (r = .90). Therefore, the results of this analysis strongly constrain theories of false memory in this paradigm, suggesting that at least two factors determine the propensity of DRM lists to elicit false recall. The results fit well within the theoretical framework postulating that both semantic activation of the critical item and strategic monitoring processes influence the probability of false recall and false recognition in this paradigm.

Exact and conceptual repetition dissociate conceptual memory tests: problems for transfer appropriate processing theory.

Three experiments examined whether a conceptual implicit memory test (specifically, category instance generation) would exhibit repetition effects similar to those found in free recall. The transfer appropriate processing account of dissociations among memory tests led us to predict that the tests would show parallel effects; this prediction was based upon the theory's assumption that conceptual tests will behave similarly as a function of various independent variables. In Experiment 1, conceptual repetition (i.e., following a target word [e.g., puzzles] with an associate [e.g., jigsaw]) did not enhance priming on the instance generation test relative to the condition of simply presenting the target word once, although this manipulation did affect free recall. In Experiment 2, conceptual repetition was achieved by following a picture with its corresponding word (or vice versa). In this case, there was an effect of conceptual repetition on free recall but no reliable effect on category instance generation or category cued recall. In addition, we obtained a picture superiority effect in free recall but not in category instance generation. In the third experiment, when the same study sequence was used as in Experiment 1, but with instructions that encouraged relational processing, priming on the category instance generation task was enhanced by conceptual repetition. Results demonstrate that conceptual memory tests can be dissociated and present problems for Roediger's (1990) transfer appropriate processing account of dissociations between explicit and implicit tests.

The effect of proportion overlap and repeated testing on primed work fragment completion.

Subjects studied a list of words (e.g., cheetah) and received an implicit word fragment completion test (complete -h-t-h). On the test, the ratio of studied to nonstudied items (proportion overlap) was 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100%. Subjects were administered the identical test twice. Proportion overlap did not affect priming in word fragment completion, on either the first or second test. Also, the completion of studied and nonstudied fragments increased over repeated tests, but priming (the studied-nonstudied rate) remained unchanged. The proportion overlap of items between study and test does not affect performance on primed word fragment completion.

Hypermnesia occurs in recall but not in recognition.

Two experiments investigated the effect of encoding conditions and type of test (recall vs. recognition) on the phenomenon of hypermnesia (improved performance across repeated tests). Subjects in Experiment 1 studied a list of words using either imaginal or semantic elaboration strategies and then received three successive tests. Different groups of subjects received either free recall, four-alternative forced-choice recognition, or yes/no recognition tests. Reliable hypermnesia was found only in the recall conditions, with the recognition conditions showing either no change in performance levels across tests (forced-choice tests) or significant forgetting (yes/no tests). In Experiment 2, subjects studied a list of words, and encoding was manipulated using three orienting tasks. Once again, hypermnesia was found with the recall tests but not with the forced choice recognition tests. Finding hypermnesia in recall but not in recognition indicates that retrieval processes in recall play a major role in producing hypermnesia. Also, the finding that the magnitude of the recall hypermnesias increased with an increase in total cumulative recall levels across study conditions suggests that cumulative recall levels are an important factor in determining the presence or absence of recall hypermnesia.

Cognitive psychology. Forgetting the presidents.

Two studies examined how U.S. presidents are forgotten. A total of 415 undergraduates in 1974, 1991, and 2009 recalled as many presidents as possible and attempted to place them in their correct ordinal positions. All showed roughly linear forgetting of the eight or nine presidents prior to the president holding office at the time, and recall of presidents without respect to ordinal position also showed a regular pattern of forgetting. Similar outcomes occurred with 497 adults (ages 18 to 69) tested in 2014. We fit forgetting functions to the data to predict when six relatively recent presidents will recede in memory to the level of most middle presidents (e.g., we predict that Truman will be forgotten to the same extent as McKinley by about 2040). These studies show that forgetting from collective memory can be studied empirically, as with forgetting in other forms of memory.