RESUMO
INTRODUCTION: The effectiveness of video-observed therapy (VOT) for treating tuberculosis (TB) has not been measured in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where >95% of TB cases and deaths occur. In this study, we analyse the effectiveness and patient cost-difference of VOT compared to clinic-based directly observed therapy (DOT) in improving medication adherence in Moldova, a LMIC in Eastern Europe. METHODS: The study was a two-arm individually randomised trial with 197 TB patients (n=99 DOT control group; n=98 VOT treatment group; multidrug-resistant TB cases were excluded). The primary outcome was observed medication adherence, measured by the number of days that a patient failed to be observed adhering to medication for every 2-week period during the course of their treatment. RESULTS: VOT significantly decreased nonadherence by 4â days (95% CI 3.35-4.67â days, p<0.01) per 2-week period: 5.24â days missed per 2-week period for DOT and 1.29â days for VOT. VOT patients spent MDLâ 504 (â¼EURâ 25) (95% CI MDLâ 277-730, p<0.01) and 58â h (95% CI 48-68â h, p<0.01) less on their treatment. In addition, VOT increased self-reported satisfaction with treatment. We found no significant results pertaining to treatment success, patient wellbeing or patient employment status and some evidence of an increase in side-effects. DISCUSSION: In this trial, VOT increased observed medication adherence for TB patients in Moldova, a LMIC, when compared to clinic-based DOT. Additionally, VOT significantly reduced the time and money patients spent on their treatment.
Assuntos
Antituberculosos , Tuberculose , Antituberculosos/uso terapêutico , Terapia Diretamente Observada , Europa Oriental , Humanos , Adesão à Medicação , Moldávia , Tuberculose/tratamento farmacológicoRESUMO
We report results from a large online randomised tax experiment in Guatemala. The trial involves short messages and choices presented to taxpayers as part of a CAPTCHA pop-up window immediately before they file a tax return, with the aim of priming honest declarations. In total our sample includes 627,242 taxpayers and 3,232,430 tax declarations made over four months. Treatments include: honesty declaration; information about public goods; information about penalties for dishonesty, questions allowing a taxpayer to choose which public good they think tax money should be spent on; or questions allowing a taxpayer to state a view on the penalty for not declaring honestly. We find no impact of any of these treatments on the average amount of tax declared. We discuss potential causes for this null effect and implications for 'online nudges' around honesty priming.