Habituation of auditory startle reflex is a new sign of minimally conscious state.

Neurological examination of non-communicating patients relies on a few decisive items that enable the crucial distinction between vegetative state (VS)-also coined unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS)-and minimally conscious state. Over the past 10 years, this distinction has proven its diagnostic value as well as its important prognostic value on consciousness recovery. However, clinicians are currently limited by three factors: (i) the current behavioural repertoire of minimally conscious state items is limited and restricted to a few cognitive domains in the goldstandard revised version of the Coma Recovery Scale; (ii) a proportion of ∼15-20% clinically VS/UWS patients are actually in a richer state than VS/UWS as evidenced by functional brain imaging; and (iii) the neurophysiological and cognitive interpretation of each minimally conscious state item is still unclear and debated. In the current study we demonstrate that habituation of the auditory startle reflex (hASR) tested at bedside constitutes a novel, simple and powerful behavioural sign that can accurately distinguish minimally conscious state from VS/UWS. In addition to enlarging the minimally conscious state items repertoire, and therefore decreasing the low sensitivity of current behavioural measures, we also provide an original and rigorous description of the neurophysiological basis of hASR through a combination of functional (high density EEG and 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose PET imaging) and structural (diffusion tensor imaging MRI) measures. We show that preservation of hASR is associated with the functional and structural integrity of a brain-scale fronto-parietal network, including prefrontal regions related to control of action and inhibition, and meso-parietal areas associated with minimally conscious and conscious states. Lastly, we show that hASR predicts 6-month improvement of consciousness. Taken together, our results show that hASR is a cortically-mediated behaviour, and suggest that it could be a new clinical item to clearly and accurately identify non-communicating patients who are in the minimally conscious state.

Anosognosia in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis: A cross-sectional study of 85 individuals and their relatives.

BACKGROUND: Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) has long been considered a pure motor neurodegenerative disease. However, now, extra-motor manifestations such as cognitive-behavioral disorders are considered not rare and are even a severity factor of the disease. Experiencing anosognosia (i.e., the inability to recognize neurological symptoms) might affect care and treatment compliance in ALS. Regardless, this pivotal feature has been little investigated. OBJECTIVES: By comparing patients' and caregivers' reports, we analysed whether patients with ALS would experience a lack of awareness about their executive disorders and their apathy symptoms. METHODS: From the ALS reference center in Paris, we included 85 patients (47 men, mean [SD] age 60.5 [12] years and ALS-Functional Rating Scale-revised score 8 to 46) and their primary family caregivers who all completed the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX) and the Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES). Overall scores and answers were compared by agreement/disagreement statistical methods. RESULTS: Caregivers reported higher levels of cognitive-behavioral disorders than did patients, but reports matched when cognitive-behavioral disorders were absent or mild. With published DEX and AES cutoffs, 32% and 51% of patients had executive disorders and apathy, respectively. In these patients with significant impairment, Bland-Altman plots (i.e., visual display agreement that represents the difference between the patient's and caregiver's scores as a function of their average) showed a strong discrepancy between joint reports: patients underestimated their symptoms by a mean bias of -6.81 DEX points (95% confidence interval -11.88, -1.75) and -8.85 AES points (95% confidence interval -11.72, -5.98). We found no clear relationship between bulbar or spinal ALS subtypes and anosognosia. CONCLUSIONS: ALS patients with a cognitive-behavioral phenotype show anosognosia by a mismatch between self and proxy reports, which warrants further investigation in neuroimaging. Systematic longitudinal screening of anosognosia is needed to propose targeted psychoeducation in patient-caregiver dyads showing disagreement.

Importance, limits and caveats of the use of "disorders of consciousness" to theorize consciousness.

The clinical and fundamental exploration of patients suffering from disorders of consciousness (DoC) is commonly used by researchers both to test some of their key theoretical predictions and to serve as a unique source of empirical knowledge about possible dissociations between consciousness and cognitive and/or neural processes. For instance, the existence of states of vigilance free of any self-reportable subjective experience [e.g. "vegetative state (VS)" and "complex partial epileptic seizure"] originated from DoC and acted as a cornerstone for all theories by dissociating two concepts that were commonly equated and confused: vigilance and conscious state. In the present article, we first expose briefly the major achievements in the exploration and understanding of DoC. We then propose a synthetic taxonomy of DoC, and we finally highlight some current limits, caveats and questions that have to be addressed when using DoC to theorize consciousness. In particular, we show (i) that a purely behavioral approach of DoC is insufficient to characterize the conscious state of patients; (ii) that the comparison between patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) and patients in a VS [also coined as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS)] does not correspond to a pure and minimal contrast between unconscious and conscious states and (iii) we emphasize, in the light of original resting-state positron emission tomography data, that behavioral MCS captures an important but misnamed clinical condition that rather corresponds to a cortically mediated state and that MCS does not necessarily imply the preservation of a conscious state.