Making precise movements increases confidence in perceptual decisions.

Perceptual decision-making often lacks explicit feedback, making confidence in our choices pivotal for guiding subsequent actions. Recent studies have highlighted the role of motor responses in modulating decision confidence. Two competing mechanisms have been proposed to elucidate this phenomenon. The "fluency hypothesis" posits that the ease and smoothness of executing a motor response can serve as a cue to enhance retrospective confidence. Conversely, the "monitoring hypothesis" suggests that the extent of action monitoring during response selection may boost retrospective confidence, with heightened monitoring potentially offsetting response fluency. We conducted a pre-registered experiment to directly test these hypotheses. Participants engaged in a perceptual task involving the discrimination of Gabor patch orientation. Perceptual responses required high or low motor precision, manipulated by the size of target circles that participants had to reach with the computer mouse to provide a response. Contrary to the "fluency hypothesis", our results showed that, in trials requiring higher precision (utilizing small circles), participants reported higher confidence levels compared to trials with less demanding responses (involving larger circles). Importantly, this increase in confidence did not coincide with any change in perceptual accuracy. These findings align with the "monitoring hypothesis," suggesting that the degree of action monitoring during response execution can indeed influence retrospective decision confidence.

What the eyes, confidence, and partner's identity can tell about change of mind.

Perceptual confidence reflects the ability to evaluate the evidence that supports perceptual decisions. It is thought to play a critical role in guiding decision-making. However, only a few empirical studies have actually investigated the function of perceptual confidence. To address this issue, we designed a perceptual task in which participants provided a confidence judgment on the accuracy of their perceptual decision. Then, they viewed the response of a machine or human partner, and they were instructed to decide whether to keep or change their initial response. We observed that confidence predicted participants' changes of mind more than task difficulty and perceptual accuracy. Additionally, interacting with a machine, compared to a human, decreased confidence and increased participants tendency to change their initial decision, suggesting that both confidence and changes of mind are influenced by contextual factors, such as the identity of a partner. Finally, variations in confidence judgments but not change of mind were correlated with pre-response pupil dynamics, indicating that arousal changes are linked to confidence computations. This study contributes to our understanding of the factors influencing confidence and changes of mind and also evaluates the possibility of using pupil dynamics as a proxy of confidence.

Confidence in visual detection, familiarity and recollection judgments is preserved in schizophrenia spectrum disorder.

An effective way to quantify metacognitive performance is to ask participants to estimate their confidence in the accuracy of their response during a cognitive task. A recent meta-analysis1 raised the issue that most assessments of metacognitive performance in schizophrenia spectrum disorders may be confounded with cognitive deficits, which are known to be present in this population. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the reported metacognitive deficits are metacognitive in nature or rather inherited from cognitive deficits. Arbitrating between these two possibilities requires equating task performance between experimental groups. Here, we aimed to characterize metacognitive performance among individuals with schizophrenia across three tasks (visual detection, familiarity, recollection) using a within-subject design while controlling experimentally for intra-individual task performance and statistically for between-subject task performance. In line with our hypotheses, we found no metacognitive deficit for visual detection and familiarity judgments. While we expected metacognition for recollection to be specifically impaired among individuals with schizophrenia, we found evidence in favor of an absence of a deficit in that domain also. We found no specific metacognitive deficit in schizophrenia spectrum disorder in the visual or memory domain. The clinical relevance of our findings is discussed in light of a hierarchical framework of metacognition.