Greater Internet use is not associated with faster growth in political polarization among US demographic groups.

We combine eight previously proposed measures to construct an index of political polarization among US adults. We find that polarization has increased the most among the demographic groups least likely to use the Internet and social media. Our overall index and all but one of the individual measures show greater increases for those older than 65 than for those aged 18-39. A linear model estimated at the age-group level implies that the Internet explains a small share of the recent growth in polarization.

Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change.

A journalist reports to a voter on an unknown, policy-relevant state. Competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter. A reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests' claims to the voter. In equilibrium, the voter can remain uninformed even when the journalist is perfectly informed. Communication is improved if the journalist discloses her partisan leanings. The model provides an account of persistent public ignorance on climate change that is consistent with narrative and quantitative evidence.

A note on internet use and the 2016 U.S. presidential election outcome.

We use data from the American National Election Studies from 1996 to 2016 to study the role of the internet in the 2016 U.S. presidential election outcome. We compare trends in the Republican share of the vote between likely and unlikely internet users, and between actual internet users and non-users. Relative to prior years, the Republican share of the vote in 2016 was as high or higher among the groups least active online.

FUNGIBILITY AND CONSUMER CHOICE: EVIDENCE FROM COMMODITY PRICE SHOCKS.

We formulate a test of the fungibility of money based on parallel shifts in the prices of different quality grades of a commodity. We embed the test in a discrete-choice model of product quality choice and estimate the model using panel microdata on gasoline purchases. We find that when gasoline prices rise consumers substitute to lower octane gasoline, to an extent that cannot be explained by income effects. Across a wide range of specifications, we consistently reject the null hypothesis that households treat "gas money" as fungible with other income. We compare the empirical fit of three psychological models of decision-making. A simple model of category budgeting fits the data well, with models of loss aversion and salience both capturing important features of the time series.

WHO IS 'BEHAVIORAL'? COGNITIVE ABILITY AND ANOMALOUS PREFERENCES.

In this paper, we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cognitive ability. Evidence from a new laboratory study of Chilean high-school students with similar schooling backgrounds shows that small-stakes risk aversion and short-run discounting are less common among those with higher standardized test scores. The relationship with test scores survives controls for parental education and wealth. We find some evidence that elementary-school GPA is predictive of preferences measured at the end of high school. Two laboratory interventions provide suggestive evidence of a possible causal impact of cognitive resources on expressed preferences. (JEL: J24, D14, C91).

Thin-Slice Forecasts of Gubernatorial Elections.

We showed 10-second, silent video clips of unfamiliar gubernatorial debates to a group of experimental participants and asked them to predict the election outcomes. The participants' predictions explain more than 20 percent of the variation in the actual two-party vote share across the 58 elections in our study, and their importance survives a range of controls, including state fixed effects. In a horse race of alternative forecasting models, participants' forecasts significantly outperform economic variables in predicting vote shares, and are comparable in predictive power to a measure of incumbency status. Participants' forecasts seem to rest on judgments of candidates' personal attributes (such as likeability), rather than inferences about candidates' policy positions. Though conclusive causal inference is not possible in our context, our findings may be seen as suggestive evidence of a causal effect of candidate appeal on election outcomes.