Disruption of dopamine D2/D3 system function impairs the human ability to understand the mental states of other people.

Difficulties in reasoning about others' mental states (i.e., mentalising/Theory of Mind) are highly prevalent among disorders featuring dopamine dysfunctions (e.g., Parkinson's disease) and significantly affect individuals' quality of life. However, due to multiple confounding factors inherent to existing patient studies, currently little is known about whether these sociocognitive symptoms originate from aberrant dopamine signalling or from psychosocial changes unrelated to dopamine. The present study, therefore, investigated the role of dopamine in modulating mentalising in a sample of healthy volunteers. We used a double-blind, placebo-controlled procedure to test the effect of the D2/D3 antagonist haloperidol on mental state attribution, using an adaptation of the Heider and Simmel (1944) animations task. On 2 separate days, once after receiving 2.5 mg haloperidol and once after receiving placebo, 33 healthy adult participants viewed and labelled short videos of 2 triangles depicting mental state (involving mentalistic interaction wherein 1 triangle intends to cause or act upon a particular mental state in the other, e.g., surprising) and non-mental state (involving reciprocal interaction without the intention to cause/act upon the other triangle's mental state, e.g., following) interactions. Using Bayesian mixed effects models, we observed that haloperidol decreased accuracy in labelling both mental and non-mental state animations. Our secondary analyses suggest that dopamine modulates inference from mental and non-mental state animations via independent mechanisms, pointing towards 2 putative pathways underlying the dopaminergic modulation of mental state attribution: action representation and a shared mechanism supporting mentalising and emotion recognition. We conclude that dopaminergic pathways impact Theory of Mind, at least indirectly. Our results have implications for the neurochemical basis of sociocognitive difficulties in patients with dopamine dysfunctions and generate new hypotheses about the specific dopamine-mediated mechanisms underlying social cognition.

Socio-cognitive processing in people with eating disorders: Computerized tests of mentalizing, empathy and imitation skills.

OBJECTIVE: Eating disorders are psychiatric illnesses characterized by extreme eating behaviors, such as sustained food restriction or loss of control over eating. Symptoms are thought to be maintained by a variety of mechanisms, one of which may be the socio-cognitive impairments associated with eating disorders. While some previous work has addressed socio-cognitive impairments in eating disorders, this work has relied mostly on self-report data. METHOD: Here we employed computerized tests of (a) mentalizing (ability to infer the mental states of others); (b) empathy (the degree to which the emotional states of others can be identified and the degree to which the states of others impact one's own emotional state); and (c) imitation (the degree to which observation of another's actions prompts the performance of those actions); in a group of 78 women with an eating disorder and a matched control group of 66 healthy women. RESULTS: People with eating disorders showed both hyper- and hypo-mentalizing and reduced accuracy of emotional and cognitive mental state inference. They displayed less imitation of observed actions, but no differences in empathy compared to healthy controls. Although anxiety and depressive symptoms had significant effects on mentalizing, most of the observed inter-group differences persisted. DISCUSSION: Women with eating disorders have difficulties mentalizing and imitating observed actions despite intact non-social automatic imitation, compared to healthy controls. These findings provide an indication that intervention modules to strengthen specific areas of social cognition might be helpful to improve patients' social skills.

Quantifying compliance and acceptance through public and private social conformity.

Social conformity is a class of social influence whereby exposure to the attitudes and beliefs of a group causes an individual to alter their own attitudes and beliefs towards those of the group. Compliance and acceptance are varieties of social influence distinguished on the basis of the attitude change brought about. Compliance involves public, but not private conformity, while acceptance occurs when group norms are internalised and conformity is demonstrated both in public and in private. Most contemporary paradigms measuring conformity conflate compliance and acceptance, while the few studies to have addressed this issue have done so using between-subjects designs, decreasing their sensitivity. Here we present a novel task which measures compliance and acceptance on a within-subjects basis. Data from a small sample reveal that compliance and acceptance can co-occur, that compliance is increased with an increasing majority, and demonstrate the usefulness of the task for future studies of conformity.

The role of the right temporoparietal junction in the control of imitation.

Controlling neural representations of the self and other people is fundamental to social cognition. Brain imaging studies have implicated the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) in this ability, but causal evidence for its role is lacking. A debate is also ongoing regarding whether the control of, or switching between, self and other representations is a specialized or domain-general process: the rTPJ's well-established role in reorienting attention supports a domain-general process, but a role specific to social cognition has also been proposed. Neuronavigated repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation was used to target the rTPJ (and a control mid-occipital site) during a task requiring participants to switch between representations of others' actions on both a social and a nonsocial level, by manipulating imitative and spatial compatibility simultaneously and independently. Both imitative and spatial compatibility effects were apparent on response times; however, the effect of imitative compatibility was significantly stronger, indicating less control of imitation, during stimulation of the rTPJ relative to the control site. This suggests that the rTPJ is involved in switching between self and other representations, and further, that this process may not be entirely domain general.

Orienting Toward Face-Like Stimuli in Early Childhood.

Newborn infants orient preferentially toward face-like or "protoface" stimuli and recent studies suggest similar reflexive orienting responses in adults. Little is known, however, about the operation of this mechanism in childhood. An attentional-cueing procedure was therefore developed to investigate protoface orienting in early childhood. Consistent with the extant literature, 5- to 6-year-old children (n = 25) exhibited orienting toward face-like stimuli; they responded faster when target location was cued by the appearance of a protoface stimulus than when location was cued by matched control patterns. The potential of this procedure to investigate the development of typical and atypical social perception is discussed.

Stopping movements: when others slow us down.

Previous research has shown that performing joint actions can lead to the representation of both one's own and others' actions. In the present study we explored the influence of co-representation on response stopping. Are joint actions more difficult to stop than solo actions? Using a variation of the stop-signal task, we found that participants needed more time to stop a planned joint action compared with a planned solo action (Experiment 1). This effect was not observed when participants performed the task in the presence of a passive observer (Experiment 2). A third transcranial magnetic stimulation experiment (Experiment 3) demonstrated that joint stopping recruited a more selective suppression mechanism than solo stopping. Taken together, these results suggest that participants used a global inhibition mechanism when acting alone; however, they recruited a more selective and slower suppression mechanism when acting with someone else.

Autism-related language preferences of English-speaking individuals across the globe: A mixed methods investigation.

Over the past two decades, there have been increasing discussions around which terms should be used to talk about autism. Whilst these discussions have largely revolved around the suitability of identity-first language and person-first language, more recently this debate has broadened to encompass other autism-related terminology (e.g., 'high-functioning'). To date, academic studies have not investigated the language preferences of autistic individuals outside of the United Kingdom or Australia, nor have they compared levels of endorsement across countries. Hence, the current study adopted a mixed-methods approach, employing both quantitative and qualitative techniques, to explore the linguistic preferences of 654 English-speaking autistic adults across the globe. Despite variation in levels of endorsement between countries, we found that the most popular terms were similar-the terms 'Autism', 'Autistic person', 'Is autistic', 'Neurological/Brain Difference', 'Differences', 'Challenges', 'Difficulties', 'Neurotypical people', and 'Neurotypicals' were consistently favored across countries. Despite relative consensus across groups, both our quantitative and qualitative data demonstrate that there is no universally accepted way to talk about autism. Our thematic analysis revealed the reasons underlying participants' preferences, generating six core themes, and illuminated an important guiding principle-to respect personal preferences. These findings have significant implications for informing practice, research and language policy worldwide.

Autism-Related Language Preferences of French-Speaking Autistic Adults: An Online Survey.

Background: In recent years, there have been increasing discussions surrounding the appropriate terminology to talk about autism. Initially, this debate revolved around the use of person-first language (e.g., person with autism) versus identity-first language (IFL; e.g., autistic person) but has recently expanded to other autism-related terms (e.g., deficits). However, to date, studies investigating autism-related language preferences have been limited to English-speaking countries, and little is known about preferences in other languages. This study addresses this gap by investigating the language preferences of French-speaking autistic adults. Methods: Five hundred and forty-one French-speaking autistic adults (formal diagnosis and self-identified) completed an online survey where they selected terms they preferred to use to talk about: (1) the nomenclature of autism; (2) an autistic person; (3) someone's autistic identity; (4) autism more broadly; (5) the abilities of autistic people; and (6) people without a diagnosis of autism. Participants also revealed more about their language preferences via an open-text response. Results: The most preferred terms were "Autisme," "Personne autiste," "Autiste," "Est Autiste," "Différence neurologique/cérébrale," "Différences," "Difficultés," "Personne neurotypique," "Neurotypique," and "Personne non-autiste." To better understand these preferences, participants' open comments were analyzed, revealing further support for IFL and the social model of disability, and a preference for simple, precise, and validated terms. Conclusions: These results are consistent with autism terminology preferences in English-speaking countries and provide additional insight into the reasons underlying these preferences. Such work has implications for informing the language of researchers, clinicians, and other professionals in the field, as well as the general public.

Community brief: Why is this an important issue?: More and more research is investigating which words should be used to talk about autism. Initially, this discussion revolved around the use of person-first language (e.g., person with autism) versus identity-first language (e.g., autistic person) but has recently expanded to other autism-related terms (e.g., disorder, deficits, high-functioning autism). To date, all the studies on this topic have focused on language preferences in English-speaking countries, and little is known about preferences in other languages.What was the purpose of this study?: We wanted to know whether French-speaking autistic adults would show similar or different autism-related language preferences than English-speaking autistic individuals. We also wanted to know the reasons for these language preferences.What did the researchers do?: In an online survey, we asked 541 French-speaking autistic adults around the world what terms they prefer to use to talk about (1) the nomenclature of autism, (2) an autistic person, (3) someone's autistic identity, (4) autism more broadly, (5) the abilities of autistic people, and (6) someone without an autism diagnosis. Participants also had the opportunity to tell us more about their language preferences in an open comment.What were the results of this study?: The most preferred terms were "Autisme," "Personne autiste," "Autiste," "Est Autiste," "Différence/neurologique," "Différences," "Difficultés," "Personne neurotypique," "Neurotypique," and "Personne non autiste." To better understand the reasons underlying these preferences, participants' open comments were analyzed, revealing further support for identity-first language and the social model of disability, and a preference for simple, precise, and validated terms. What do these findings add to what was already known?: We previously knew about language preferences of English-speaking autistic people. This study extends these findings by showing that French-speaking autistic adults also prefer terms that reflect the ideas of identity-first language (e.g., "Est Autiste," "Personne autiste") and the social model of disability (e.g., "Différence," "Handicap"). We also show that these are not the only reasons behind language preferences: Term simplicity, precision, and validity are also important when talking about autism.What are the potential weaknesses in the study?: The reported preferences are not representative of all autistic individuals, as our sample did not include children and adolescents. In addition, we did not make specific adaptations to our questionnaire for non-speaking people or people with intellectual difficulties, so we do not know to what extent their opinions are represented in our data. Further, recruitment was done almost exclusively online, resulting in a self-selecting recruitment method for our sample (i.e., participants who have access to Internet and a computer). Finally, participants who responded to the advertisements and completed the questionnaire are probably interested in the debate regarding language to talk about autism. Therefore, our sample may be more representative of the online autistic, pro-neurodiversity community.How will these findings help autistic adults now or in the future?: This study is the first to look at the language preferences of French-speaking autistic adults. Further, our results have substantial implications for informing the language of researchers, clinicians, and other professionals in the field, as well as the general public.

Comparing internal representations of facial expression kinematics between autistic and non-autistic adults.

Recent developments suggest that autistic individuals require dynamic angry expressions to have a higher speed in order for them to be successfully identified. Therefore, it is plausible that autistic individuals do not have a 'deficit' in angry expression recognition, but rather their internal representation of these expressions is characterised by very high-speed movement. In this study, matched groups of autistic and non-autistic adults completed a novel emotion-based task which employed dynamic displays of happy, angry and sad point light facial (PLF) expressions. On each trial, participants moved a slider to manipulate the speed of a PLF stimulus until it moved at a speed that, in their 'mind's eye', was typical of happy, angry or sad expressions. Participants were shown three different types of PLFs-those showing the full-face, only the eye region, and only the mouth region, wherein the latter two were included to test whether differences in facial information sampling underpinned any dissimilarities in speed attributions. Across both groups, participants attributed the highest speeds to angry, then happy, then sad, facial motion. Participants increased the speed of angry and happy expressions by 41% and 27% respectively and decreased the speed of sad expressions by 18%. This suggests that participants have 'caricatured' internal representations of emotion, wherein emotion-related kinematic cues are over-emphasised. There were no differences between autistic and non-autistic individuals in the speeds attributed to full-face and partial-face angry, happy and sad expressions respectively. Consequently, we find no evidence that autistic adults possess atypically fast internal representations of anger.

Regulating mirroring of emotions: A social-specific mechanism?

There is evidence that humans mirror others' emotional responses: brain responses to observed and experienced emotion overlap, and reaction time costs of observing others' pain suggest that others' emotional states interfere with our own. Such emotional mirroring requires regulation to prevent personal distress. However, currently it is unclear whether this "empathic interference effect" is uniquely social, arising only from the observation of human actors, or also from the observation of non-biological objects in "painful" states. Moreover, the degree to which this interference relates to individual differences in self-reported levels of empathy is yet to be revealed. We introduce a modified pain observation task, measuring empathic interference effects induced by observation of painful states applied to both biological and non-biological stimuli. An initial validation study (N = 50) confirmed that painful states applied to biological stimuli were rated explicitly as more painful than non-painful states applied to biological stimuli, and also than both painful and non-painful states applied to non-biological stimuli. Subsequently, across two independent discovery (N = 83) and replication (N = 80) samples, the task elicited slowing of response times during the observation of painful states when compared to non-painful states, but the magnitude of this effect did not differ between biological and non-biological stimuli. Little evidence was found for reliable relationships between empathic interference and self-reported empathy. Caution should therefore be taken in using the current task to pursue an individual differences approach to empathic interference, but the task shows promise for investigating the specificity of the mechanism involved in regulating emotional mirroring.

Differences Between Autistic and Non-Autistic Adults in the Recognition of Anger from Facial Motion Remain after Controlling for Alexithymia.

To date, studies have not established whether autistic and non-autistic individuals differ in emotion recognition from facial motion cues when matched in terms of alexithymia. Here, autistic and non-autistic adults (N = 60) matched on age, gender, non-verbal reasoning ability and alexithymia, completed an emotion recognition task, which employed dynamic point light displays of emotional facial expressions manipulated in terms of speed and spatial exaggeration. Autistic participants exhibited significantly lower accuracy for angry, but not happy or sad, facial motion with unmanipulated speed and spatial exaggeration. Autistic, and not alexithymic, traits were predictive of accuracy for angry facial motion with unmanipulated speed and spatial exaggeration. Alexithymic traits, in contrast, were predictive of the magnitude of both correct and incorrect emotion ratings.

Dopaminergic challenge dissociates learning from primary versus secondary sources of information.

Some theories of human cultural evolution posit that humans have social-specific learning mechanisms that are adaptive specialisations moulded by natural selection to cope with the pressures of group living. However, the existence of neurochemical pathways that are specialised for learning from social information and individual experience is widely debated. Cognitive neuroscientific studies present mixed evidence for social-specific learning mechanisms: some studies find dissociable neural correlates for social and individual learning, whereas others find the same brain areas and, dopamine-mediated, computations involved in both. Here, we demonstrate that, like individual learning, social learning is modulated by the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist haloperidol when social information is the primary learning source, but not when it comprises a secondary, additional element. Two groups (total N = 43) completed a decision-making task which required primary learning, from own experience, and secondary learning from an additional source. For one group, the primary source was social, and secondary was individual; for the other group this was reversed. Haloperidol affected primary learning irrespective of social/individual nature, with no effect on learning from the secondary source. Thus, we illustrate that dopaminergic mechanisms underpinning learning can be dissociated along a primary-secondary but not a social-individual axis. These results resolve conflict in the literature and support an expanding field showing that, rather than being specialised for particular inputs, neurochemical pathways in the human brain can process both social and non-social cues and arbitrate between the two depending upon which cue is primarily relevant for the task at hand.

The role of movement kinematics in facial emotion expression production and recognition.

The kinematics of peoples' body movements provide useful cues about emotional states: for example, angry movements are typically fast and sad movements slow. Unlike the body movement literature, studies of facial expressions have focused on spatial, rather than kinematic, cues. This series of experiments demonstrates that speed comprises an important facial emotion expression cue. In Experiments 1a-1c we developed (N = 47) and validated (N = 27) an emotion-induction procedure, and recorded (N = 42) posed and spontaneous facial expressions of happy, angry, and sad emotional states. Our novel analysis pipeline quantified the speed of changes in distance between key facial landmarks. We observed that happy expressions were fastest, sad were slowest, and angry expressions were intermediate. In Experiment 2 (N = 67) we replicated our results for posed expressions and introduced a novel paradigm to index communicative emotional expressions. Across Experiments 1 and 2, we demonstrate differences between posed, spontaneous, and communicative expression contexts. Whereas mouth and eyebrow movements reliably distinguished emotions for posed and communicative expressions, only eyebrow movements were reliable for spontaneous expressions. In Experiments 3 and 4 we manipulated facial expression speed and demonstrated a quantifiable change in emotion recognition accuracy. That is, in a discovery (N = 29) and replication sample (N = 41), we showed that speeding up facial expressions promotes anger and happiness judgments, and slowing down expressions encourages sad judgments. This influence of kinematics on emotion recognition is dissociable from the influence of spatial cues. These studies demonstrate that the kinematics of facial movements provide added value, and an independent contribution to emotion recognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Kinematics and observer-animator kinematic similarity predict mental state attribution from Heider-Simmel style animations.

The ability to ascribe mental states, such as beliefs or desires to oneself and other individuals forms an integral part of everyday social interaction. Animations tasks, in which observers watch videos of interacting triangles, have been extensively used to test mental state attribution in a variety of clinical populations. Compared to control participants, individuals with clinical conditions such as autism typically offer less appropriate mental state descriptions of such videos. Recent research suggests that stimulus kinematics and movement similarity (between the video and the observer) may contribute to mental state attribution difficulties. Here we present a novel adaptation of the animations task, suitable to track and compare animation generator and -observer kinematics. Using this task and a population-derived stimulus database, we confirmed the hypotheses that an animation's jerk and jerk similarity between observer and animator significantly contribute to the correct identification of an animation. By employing random forest analysis to explore other stimulus characteristics, we reveal that other indices of movement similarity, including acceleration- and rotation-based similarity, also predict performance. Our results highlight the importance of movement similarity between observer and animator and raise new questions about reasons why some clinical populations exhibit difficulties with this task.

The specificity of the link between alexithymia, interoception, and imitation.

Alexithymia is a subclinical condition traditionally characterized by difficulties identifying and describing one's own emotions. Recent formulations of alexithymia, however, suggest that the condition may result from a generalized impairment in the perception of all bodily signals ("interoception"). Interoceptive accuracy has been associated with a variety of deficits in social cognition, but recently with an improved ability to inhibit the automatic tendency to imitate the actions of others. The current study tested the consequences for social cognition of the hypothesized association between alexithymia and impaired interoception by examining the relationship between alexithymia and the ability to inhibit imitation. If alexithymia is best characterized as a general interoceptive impairment, then one would predict that alexithymia would have the same relationship with the ability to control imitation as does interoceptive accuracy. Forty-three healthy adults completed measures of alexithymia, imitation-inhibition, and as a control, inhibition of nonimitative spatial compatibility. Results revealed the predicted relationship, such that increasing alexithymia was associated with an improved ability to inhibit imitation, and that this relationship was specific to imitation-inhibition. These results support the characterization of alexithymia as a general interoceptive impairment and shed light on the social ability of alexithymic individuals-with implications for the multitude of psychiatric, neurological, and neurodevelopmental disorders associated with high rates of alexithymia. (PsycINFO Database Record

Intact Automatic Imitation and Typical Spatial Compatibility in Autism Spectrum Disorder: Challenging the Broken Mirror Theory.

A lack of imitative behavior is frequently described as a core feature of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), and is consistent with claims of mirror neuron system dysfunction in these individuals. Previous research has questioned this characterization of ASD however, arguing that when tests of automatic imitation are used--which do not require higher-level cognitive processing--imitative behavior is intact or even enhanced in individuals with ASD. In Experiment 1, 60 adult individuals with ASD and a matched Control group completed an automatic imitation task in which they were required to perform an index or a middle finger lift while observing a hand making either the same, or the alternate, finger movement. Both groups demonstrated a significant imitation effect whereby actions were executed faster when preceded by observation of the same action, than when preceded by the alternate action. The magnitude of this "imitation effect" was statistically indistinguishable in the ASD and Control groups. Experiment 2 utilized an improved automatic imitation paradigm to demonstrate that, when automatic imitation effects are isolated from those due to spatial compatibility, increasing autism symptom severity is associated with an increased tendency to imitate. Notably, there was no association between autism symptom severity and spatial compatibility, demonstrating the specificity of the link between ASD symptoms and increased imitation. These results provide evidence against claims of a lack of imitative behavior in ASD, and challenge the "Broken Mirror Theory of Autism."

The 20-item prosopagnosia index (PI20): a self-report instrument for identifying developmental prosopagnosia.

Self-report plays a key role in the identification of developmental prosopagnosia (DP), providing complementary evidence to computer-based tests of face recognition ability, aiding interpretation of scores. However, the lack of standardized self-report instruments has contributed to heterogeneous reporting standards for self-report evidence in DP research. The lack of standardization prevents comparison across samples and limits investigation of the relationship between objective tests of face processing and self-report measures. To address these issues, this paper introduces the PI20; a 20-item self-report measure for quantifying prosopagnosic traits. The new instrument successfully distinguishes suspected prosopagnosics from typically developed adults. Strong correlations were also observed between PI20 scores and performance on objective tests of familiar and unfamiliar face recognition ability, confirming that people have the necessary insight into their own face recognition ability required by a self-report instrument. Importantly, PI20 scores did not correlate with recognition of non-face objects, indicating that the instrument measures face recognition, and not a general perceptual impairment. These results suggest that the PI20 can play a valuable role in identifying DP. A freely available self-report instrument will permit more effective description of self-report diagnostic evidence, thereby facilitating greater comparison of prosopagnosic samples, and more reliable classification.

The 20 item prosopagnosia index (PI20): relationship with the Glasgow face-matching test.

The 20 item prosopagnosia index (PI20) was recently developed to identify individuals with developmental prosopagnosia. While the PI20's principal purpose is to aid researchers and clinicians, it was suggested that it may serve as a useful screening tool to identify people with face recognition difficulties in applied settings where face matching is a critical part of their occupation. Although the PI20 has been validated using behavioural measures of face recognition, it has yet to be validated against a measure of face-matching ability that is more representative of applied settings. In this study, the PI20 was therefore administered with the Glasgow face-matching test (GFMT). A strong correlation was observed between PI20 and GFMT scores, providing further validation for the PI20, indicating that it is likely to be of value in applied settings.