On pattern completion, cues and future-oriented cognition.

Barzykowski and Moulin's view on involuntary autobiographical memory focuses on automatic activation of representations and inhibitory control mechanisms. We discuss how and when a known neural mechanism - pattern completion - may result in involuntary autobiographical memories, the types of cues that may elicit this phenomenon and consider interactions with future-oriented cognition.

The good old days and the bad old days: evidence for a valence-based dissociation between personal and public memory.

How does memory for the public past differ from memory for the personal past? Across five experiments (N = 457), we found that memories of the personal past were characterised by a positivity bias, whereas memories of the public past were characterised by a negativity bias. This valence-based dissociation emerged regardless of how far back participants recounted the personal and public past, whether or not participants were asked to think about significant events, how much time participants were given to retrieve relevant personal and public memories, and also generalised across various demographic categories, including gender, age, and political affiliation. Along with recent work demonstrating a similar dissociation in the context of future thinking, our findings suggest that personal and public event cognition fundamentally differ in terms of access to emotionally salient events. Direct comparisons between personal and public event memory should represent a fruitful avenue for research on event cognition.

Episodic specificity induction impacts activity in a core brain network during construction of imagined future experiences.

Recent behavioral work suggests that an episodic specificity induction-brief training in recollecting the details of a past experience-enhances performance on subsequent tasks that rely on episodic retrieval, including imagining future experiences, solving open-ended problems, and thinking creatively. Despite these far-reaching behavioral effects, nothing is known about the neural processes impacted by an episodic specificity induction. Related neuroimaging work has linked episodic retrieval with a core network of brain regions that supports imagining future experiences. We tested the hypothesis that key structures in this network are influenced by the specificity induction. Participants received the specificity induction or one of two control inductions and then generated future events and semantic object comparisons during fMRI scanning. After receiving the specificity induction compared with the control, participants exhibited significantly more activity in several core network regions during the construction of imagined events over object comparisons, including the left anterior hippocampus, right inferior parietal lobule, right posterior cingulate cortex, and right ventral precuneus. Induction-related differences in the episodic detail of imagined events significantly modulated induction-related differences in the construction of imagined events in the left anterior hippocampus and right inferior parietal lobule. Resting-state functional connectivity analyses with hippocampal and inferior parietal lobule seed regions and the rest of the brain also revealed significantly stronger core network coupling following the specificity induction compared with the control. These findings provide evidence that an episodic specificity induction selectively targets episodic processes that are commonly linked to key core network regions, including the hippocampus.

Beyond communication: Episodic memory is key to the self in time.

Mahr & Csibra (M&C) propose that episodic memory evolved to support epistemic authority in social communication. We argue for a more parsimonious interpretation whereby episodic memory subserves a broader preparatory function for both social and non-social behavior. We conclude by highlighting that functional accounts of episodic memory may need to consider the complex interrelations between self and subjective time.

Shifting visual perspective during retrieval shapes autobiographical memories.

The dynamic and flexible nature of memories is evident in our ability to adopt multiple visual perspectives. Although autobiographical memories are typically encoded from the visual perspective of our own eyes they can be retrieved from the perspective of an observer looking at our self. Here, we examined the neural mechanisms of shifting visual perspective during long-term memory retrieval and its influence on online and subsequent memories using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants generated specific autobiographical memories from the last five years and rated their visual perspective. In a separate fMRI session, they were asked to retrieve the memories across three repetitions while maintaining the same visual perspective as their initial rating or by shifting to an alternative perspective. Visual perspective shifting during autobiographical memory retrieval was supported by a linear decrease in neural recruitment across repetitions in the posterior parietal cortices. Additional analyses revealed that the precuneus, in particular, contributed to both online and subsequent changes in the phenomenology of memories. Our findings show that flexibly shifting egocentric perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval is supported by the precuneus, and suggest that this manipulation of mental imagery during retrieval has consequences for how memories are retrieved and later remembered.

A taxonomy of prospection: introducing an organizational framework for future-oriented cognition.

Prospection--the ability to represent what might happen in the future--is a broad concept that has been used to characterize a wide variety of future-oriented cognitions, including affective forecasting, prospective memory, temporal discounting, episodic simulation, and autobiographical planning. In this article, we propose a taxonomy of prospection to initiate the important and necessary process of teasing apart the various forms of future thinking that constitute the landscape of prospective cognition. The organizational framework that we propose delineates episodic and semantic forms of four modes of future thinking: simulation, prediction, intention, and planning. We show how this framework can be used to draw attention to the ways in which various modes of future thinking interact with one another, generate new questions about prospective cognition, and illuminate our understanding of disorders of future thinking. We conclude by considering basic cognitive processes that give rise to prospective cognitions, cognitive operations and emotional/motivational states relevant to future-oriented cognition, and the possible role of procedural or motor systems in future-oriented behavior.

Ventromedial prefrontal cortex supports affective future simulation by integrating distributed knowledge.

Although the future often seems intangible, we can make it more concrete by imagining prospective events. Here, using functional MRI, we demonstrate a mechanism by which the ventromedial prefrontal cortex supports such episodic simulations, and thereby contributes to affective foresight: This region supports processes that (i) integrate knowledge related to the elements that constitute an episode and (ii) represent the episode's emergent affective quality. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex achieves such integration via interactions with distributed cortical regions that process the individual elements. Its activation then signals the affective quality of the ensuing episode, which goes beyond the combined affective quality of its constituting elements. The integrative process further augments long-term retention of the episode, making it available at later time points. This mechanism thus renders the future tangible, providing a basis for farsighted behavior.

Interpolated memory tests reduce mind wandering and improve learning of online lectures.

The recent emergence and popularity of online educational resources brings with it challenges for educators to optimize the dissemination of online content. Here we provide evidence that points toward a solution for the difficulty that students frequently report in sustaining attention to online lectures over extended periods. In two experiments, we demonstrate that the simple act of interpolating online lectures with memory tests can help students sustain attention to lecture content in a manner that discourages task-irrelevant mind wandering activities, encourages task-relevant note-taking activities, and improves learning. Importantly, frequent testing was associated with reduced anxiety toward a final cumulative test and also with reductions in subjective estimates of cognitive demand. Our findings suggest a potentially key role for interpolated testing in the development and dissemination of online educational content.

Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking: intersections between memory and decisions.

This article considers two recent lines of research concerned with the construction of imagined or simulated events that can provide insight into the relationship between memory and decision making. One line of research concerns episodic future thinking, which involves simulating episodes that might occur in one's personal future, and the other concerns episodic counterfactual thinking, which involves simulating episodes that could have happened in one's personal past. We first review neuroimaging studies that have examined the neural underpinnings of episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. We argue that these studies have revealed that the two forms of episodic simulation engage a common core network including medial parietal, prefrontal, and temporal regions that also supports episodic memory. We also note that neuroimaging studies have documented neural differences between episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking, including differences in hippocampal responses. We next consider behavioral studies that have delineated both similarities and differences between the two kinds of episodic simulation. The evidence indicates that episodic future and counterfactual thinking are characterized by similarly reduced levels of specific detail compared with episodic memory, but that the effects of repeatedly imagining a possible experience have sharply contrasting effects on the perceived plausibility of those events during episodic future thinking versus episodic counterfactual thinking. Finally, we conclude by discussing the functional consequences of future and counterfactual simulations for decisions.

Beyond the episodic-semantic continuum: the multidimensional model of mental representations.

Tulving's concept of mental time travel (MTT), and the related distinction of episodic and semantic memory, have been highly influential contributions to memory research, resulting in a wealth of findings and a deeper understanding of the neurocognitive correlates of memory and future thinking. Many models have conceptualized episodic and semantic representations as existing on a continuum that can help to account for various hybrid forms. Nevertheless, in most theories, MTT remains distinctly associated with episodic representations. In this article, we review existing models of memory and future thinking, and critically evaluate whether episodic representations are distinct from other types of explicit representations, including whether MTT as a neurocognitive capacity is uniquely episodic. We conclude by proposing a new framework, the Multidimensional Model of Mental Representations (MMMR), which can parsimoniously account for the range of past, present and future representations the human mind is capable of creating. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Coming to grips with the past: effect of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of episodic counterfactual thoughts.

When people revisit previous experiences, they often engage in episodic counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of alternative ways in which personal past events could have occurred. The present study employed a novel experimental paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical memories. One week later, they self-generated upward, downward, and neutral counterfactual alternatives to those memories. The following day, they resimulated each of those counterfactuals either once or four times. The results indicate that repeated simulation of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases their perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of the ease, detail, and valence of the simulations. This finding suggests a difference between episodic counterfactual thoughts and other kinds of self-referential simulations. Possible implications of this finding for pathological and nonpathological anxiety are discussed.

Memory for emotional simulations: remembering a rosy future.

Mental simulations of future experiences are often concerned with emotionally arousing events. Although it is widely believed that mental simulations enhance future behavior, virtually nothing is known about how memory for these simulations changes over time or whether simulations of emotional experiences are especially well remembered. We used a novel paradigm that combined recently developed methods for generating simulations of future events and well-established procedures for testing memory to examine the retention of positive, negative, and neutral simulations over delays of 10 min and 1 day. We found that at the longer delay, details associated with negative simulations were more difficult to remember than details associated with positive or neutral simulations. We suggest that these effects reflect the influence of the fading-affect bias, whereby negative reactions fade more quickly than positive reactions, and that this influence results in a tendency to remember a rosy simulated future. We discuss implications of our findings for individuals with affective disorders, such as depression and anxiety.

The reciprocal relationship between episodic memory and future thinking: How the outcome of predictions is subsequently remembered.

Evidence suggests that memory is involved in making simulations and predictions about the future (i.e., future thinking), but less work has examined how the outcome of those predictions (whether events play out as predicted or expected) subsequently affects episodic memory. In this investigation, we examine whether memory is better for outcomes that are consistent with predictions, or whether memory is enhanced for outcomes that are inconsistent with predictions, after the predicted event occurs. In this experiment, participants learned a core trait associated with social targets (e.g., high in extroversion), before making predictions about behaviors targets would perform. Participants then were shown behaviors the social targets actually performed (i.e., prediction outcome), which was either consistent or inconsistent with predictions. After that, participants completed a memory test (recognition; recall) for the prediction outcomes. For recognition, the results revealed better memory for outcomes that were consistent with traits associated with targets (i.e., trait-consistent outcomes), compared to outcomes that were inconsistent (i.e., trait-inconsistent outcomes). Finding a memory advantage for trait-consistent outcomes suggests that outcomes that are in line with the contents of memory (e.g., what one knows; schemas) are more readily remembered than those that are inconsistent with memory, which may reflect an adaptive memory process. For recall, memory did not differ between trait-consistent and trait-inconsistent outcomes. Altogether, the results of this experiment advance understanding of the reciprocal relationship between episodic memory and future thinking and show that outcome of predictions has an influence on subsequent episodic memory, at least as measured by recognition.

Individual differences in time perspective predict autonoetic experience.

Tulving (1985) posited that the capacity to remember is one facet of a more general capacity-autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness was proposed to underlie the ability for "mental time travel" both into the past (remembering) and into the future to envision potential future episodes (episodic future thinking). The current study examines whether individual differences can predict autonoetic experience. Specifically, the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI, Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) was administered to 133 undergraduate students, who also rated phenomenological experiences accompanying autobiographical remembering and episodic future thinking. Scores on two of the five subscales of the ZTPI (Future and Present-Hedonistic) predicted the degree to which people reported feelings of mentally traveling backward (or forward) in time and the degree to which they reported re- or pre-experiencing the event, but not ten other rated properties less related to autonoetic consciousness.

Imagining the near and far future: the role of location familiarity.

Plausible personal events envisioned as occurring in the near future tend to be reported as more vivid than those set in the far future. Why is this? The present set of three experiments identified one's familiarity with the location in which the event is placed as critical in this regard. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that amongst a wide range of phenomenological characteristics, clarity of location appears to drive the overall difference in vividness between events imagined to take place in the near and the far future. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to further elucidate this finding. Experiment 2 demonstrated that near future events are more likely than far future events to be imagined in familiar locations. Experiment 3 showed that future events set in familiar locations tend to be imagined with greater clarity than those set in unfamiliar locations. The results of all three experiments converge on the conclusion that the difference in vividness of events imagined as occurring in the near and far future is mediated by one's familiarity with the location in which the event is imagined to occur.

Contextual processing in episodic future thought.

Remembering events from one's past (i.e., episodic memory) and envisioning specific events that could occur in one's future (i.e., episodic future thought) invoke highly overlapping sets of brain regions. The present study employed functional magnetic resonance imaging to test the hypothesis that one source of this shared architecture is that episodic future thought--much like episodic memory--tends to invoke memory for known visual-spatial contexts. That is, regions of posterior cortex (within posterior cingulate cortex [PCC], parahippocampal cortex [PHC], and superior occipital gyrus [SOG]) elicit indistinguishable activity during remembering and episodic future thought, and similar regions have been identified as important for establishing visual-spatial contextual associations. In the present study, these regions were similarly engaged when participants thought about personal events in familiar contexts, irrespective of temporal direction (past or future). The same regions, however, exhibited very little activity when participants envisioned personal future events in unfamiliar contextual settings. These findings suggest that regions within PCC, PHC, and SOG support the activation of well-known contextual settings that people tend to imagine when thinking about personal events, whether in the past or future. Hence, this study pinpoints an important similarity between episodic future thought and episodic memory.

Evidence for an implicit influence of memory on future thinking.

The capacity to think about specific events that one might encounter in the future--episodic future thought--involves the flexible (re)organization of memory. The present study demonstrates that implicit processes play an important role here. In two experiments (N = 180), participants were asked to generate a personal event that they expected to plausibly occur in the following week. The content of the participants' responses was biased (i.e., primed) by recent thoughts about a specific category of experiences. For instance, participants who had recently been induced to think about social experiences, in the context of an ostensibly unrelated task, were more likely than nonprimed participants to generate similar events occurring in their immediate future. Importantly, the participants were unaware of this unintentional influence of memory. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings for understanding episodic future thought and its relation to memory are discussed.

A negativity bias in detail generation during event simulation.

Novel negative events are simulated in more event-specific detail than novel positive events. In the present study, we set out to assess whether this negative event detail bias is specific to simulations of personal events or whether evoking negative valence, in the context of simulations of personal and nonpersonal events, is sufficient for boosting simulated event detail. Participants simulated novel negative and positive events that might take place in their future, the future of an acquaintance, or the future of a familiar individual with whom they have not had prior contact. Across 2 experiments, we found that novel negative events were simulated in more event-specific detail than novel positive events irrespective of whether the events under consideration were personal or nonpersonal. This pattern of results also emerged when negative and positive events did not differ on a subjective measure of arousal, indicating that negative valence may play a key role in encouraging detailed elaboration of novel negative events. Implications of our findings for the role of event simulation in adaptive behavior are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Future thinking about social targets: The influence of prediction outcome on memory.

Work on future thinking suggests that people use what they know about the world (e.g., contents of memory) to make predictions about events to come, which reflects an adaptive use of memory. Less work, however, has examined whether the outcomes of these predictions-whether the outcome is consistent or inconsistent with predictions-influences memory. In two experiments, participants learned trait information about social targets and used that information to predict which of two behaviors social targets would be most likely to engage in: one behavior consistent with previously learned trait information about the target and the other behavior inconsistent. Participants then learned which behavior the social target actually performed (outcome) and then judged whether or not they expected that outcome (expectancy). Across both studies, prediction-consistent outcomes were better remembered than inconsistent ones, suggesting that participants relied on their existing representations of social targets when making memory judgments rather than incorporating inconsistent information into memory. Further, there was a memory advantage for prediction-inconsistent outcomes, but only when participants subjectively rated these outcomes as unexpected. Overall, these findings extend understanding of future thinking and suggest a reliable memory advantage for outcomes that are consistent with predictions.

Testing during study insulates against the buildup of proactive interference.

Recent interest in the benefits of retrieval practice on long-term retention--the testing effect--has spawned a considerable amount of research toward understanding the underlying nature of this ubiquitous memory phenomenon. Taking a test may benefit retention through both direct means (engaging appropriate retrieval processes) and indirect means (fostering directed study). Here the authors report 4 experiments demonstrating a novel benefit of testing. Extended study sessions cause a buildup of proactive interference, but interpolating tests during the study sequence insulates against this negative influence. These findings highlight a unique benefit of testing and have important implications for study strategies.