Diversity of STs, plasmids and ESBL genes among Escherichia coli from humans, animals and food in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.

OBJECTIVES: This study aimed to compare ESBL-producing Escherichia coli causing infections in humans with infecting or commensal isolates from animals and isolates from food of animal origin in terms of the strain types, the ESBL gene present and the plasmids that carry the respective ESBL genes. METHODS: A collection of 353 ESBL-positive E. coli isolates from the UK, the Netherlands and Germany were studied by MLST and ESBL genes were identified. Characterization of ESBL gene-carrying plasmids was performed using PCR-based replicon typing. Moreover, IncI1-Iγ and IncN plasmids were characterized by plasmid MLST. RESULTS: The ESBL-producing E. coli represented 158 different STs with ST131, ST10 and ST88 being the most common. Overall, blaCTX-M-1 was the most frequently detected ESBL gene, followed by blaCTX-M-15, which was the most common ESBL gene in the human isolates. The most common plasmid replicon type overall was IncI1-Iγ followed by multiple IncF replicons. CONCLUSIONS: ESBL genes were present in a wide variety of E. coli STs. IncI1-Iγ plasmids that carried the blaCTX-M-1 gene were widely disseminated amongst STs in isolates from animals and humans, whereas other plasmids and STs appeared to be more restricted to isolates from specific hosts.

Public health risks of enterobacterial isolates producing extended-spectrum ß-lactamases or AmpC ß-lactamases in food and food-producing animals: an EU perspective of epidemiology, analytical methods, risk factors, and control options.

The blaESBL and blaAmpC genes in Enterobacteriaceae are spread by plasmid-mediated integrons, insertion sequences, and transposons, some of which are homologous in bacteria from food animals, foods, and humans. These genes have been frequently identified in Escherichia coli and Salmonella from food animals, the most common being blaCTX-M-1, blaCTX-M-14, and blaCMY-2. Identification of risk factors for their occurrence in food animals is complex. In addition to generic antimicrobial use, cephalosporin usage is an important risk factor for selection and spread of these genes. Extensive international trade of animals is a further risk factor. There are no data on the effectiveness of individual control options in reducing public health risks. A highly effective option would be to stop or restrict cephalosporin usage in food animals. Decreasing total antimicrobial use is also of high priority. Implementation of measures to limit strain dissemination (increasing farm biosecurity, controls in animal trade, and other general postharvest controls) are also important.

Real-world evidence from the first online healthcare analytics platform-Livingstone. Validation of its descriptive epidemiology module.

Incidence and prevalence are key epidemiological determinants characterizing the quantum of a disease. We compared incidence and prevalence estimates derived automatically from the first ever online, essentially real-time, healthcare analytics platform-Livingstone-against findings from comparable peer-reviewed studies in order to validate the descriptive epidemiology module. The source of routine NHS data for Livingstone was the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD). After applying a general search strategy looking for any disease or condition, 76 relevant studies were first retrieved, of which 10 met pre-specified inclusion and exclusion criteria. Findings reported in these studies were compared with estimates produced automatically by Livingstone. The published reports described elements of the epidemiology of 14 diseases or conditions. Lin's concordance correlation coefficient (CCC) was used to evaluate the concordance between findings from Livingstone and those detailed in the published studies. The concordance of incidence values in the final year reported by each study versus Livingstone was 0.96 (95% CI: 0.89-0.98), whilst for all annual incidence values the concordance was 0.93 (0.91-0.94). For prevalence, concordance for the final annual prevalence reported in each study versus Livingstone was 1.00 (0.99-1.00) and for all reported annual prevalence values, the concordance was 0.93 (0.90-0.95). The concordance between Livingstone and the latest published findings was near perfect for prevalence and substantial for incidence. For the first time, it is now possible to automatically generate reliable descriptive epidemiology from routine health records, and in near-real time. Livingstone provides the first mechanism to rapidly generate standardised, descriptive epidemiology for all clinical events from real world data.

Transmission of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) during animal transport.

The transmission of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) between food-producing animals (poultry, cattle and pigs) during short journeys (< 8 h) and long journeys (> 8 h) directed to other farms or to the slaughterhouse lairage (directly or with intermediate stops at assembly centres or control posts, mainly transported by road) was assessed. Among the identified risk factors contributing to the probability of transmission of antimicrobial-resistant bacteria (ARB) and antimicrobial resistance genes (ARGs), the ones considered more important are the resistance status (presence of ARB/ARGs) of the animals pre-transport, increased faecal shedding, hygiene of the areas and vehicles, exposure to other animals carrying and/or shedding ARB/ARGs (especially between animals of different AMR loads and/or ARB/ARG types), exposure to contaminated lairage areas and duration of transport. There are nevertheless no data whereby differences between journeys shorter or longer than 8 h can be assessed. Strategies that would reduce the probability of AMR transmission, for all animal categories include minimising the duration of transport, proper cleaning and disinfection, appropriate transport planning, organising the transport in relation to AMR criteria (transport logistics), improving animal health and welfare and/or biosecurity immediately prior to and during transport, ensuring the thermal comfort of the animals and animal segregation. Most of the aforementioned measures have similar validity if applied at lairage, assembly centres and control posts. Data gaps relating to the risk factors and the effectiveness of mitigation measures have been identified, with consequent research needs in both the short and longer term listed. Quantification of the impact of animal transportation compared to the contribution of other stages of the food-production chain, and the interplay of duration with all risk factors on the transmission of ARB/ARGs during transport and journey breaks, were identified as urgent research needs.

Antimicrobial resistance and virulence determinants in European Salmonella genomic island 1-positive Salmonella enterica isolates from different origins.

Salmonella genomic island 1 (SGI1) contains a multidrug resistance region conferring the ampicillin-chloramphenicol-streptomycin-sulfamethoxazole-tetracycline resistance phenotype encoded by bla(PSE-1), floR, aadA2, sul1, and tet(G). Its increasing spread via interbacterial transfer and the emergence of new variants are important public health concerns. We investigated the molecular properties of SGI1-carrying Salmonella enterica serovars selected from a European strain collection. A total of 38 strains belonging to S. enterica serovar Agona, S. enterica serovar Albany, S. enterica serovar Derby, S. enterica serovar Kentucky, S. enterica serovar Newport, S. enterica serovar Paratyphi B dT+, and S. enterica serovar Typhimurium, isolated between 2002 and 2006 in eight European countries from humans, animals, and food, were subjected to antimicrobial susceptibility testing, molecular typing methods (XbaI pulsed-field gel electrophoresis [PFGE], plasmid analysis, and multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis [MLVA]), as well as detection of resistance and virulence determinants (PCR/sequencing and DNA microarray analysis). Typing experiments revealed wide heterogeneity inside the strain collection and even within serovars. PFGE analysis distinguished a total of 26 different patterns. In contrast, the characterization of the phenotypic and genotypic antimicrobial resistance revealed serovar-specific features. Apart from the classical SGI1 organization found in 61% of the strains, seven different variants were identified with antimicrobial resistance properties associated with SGI1-A (S. Derby), SGI1-C (S. Derby), SGI1-F (S. Albany), SGI1-L (S. Newport), SGI1-K (S. Kentucky), SGI1-M (S. Typhimurium), and, eventually, a novel variant similar to SGI1-C with additional gentamicin resistance encoded by aadB. Only minor serovar-specific differences among virulence patterns were detected. In conclusion, the SGI1 carriers exhibited pathogenetic backgrounds comparable to the ones published for susceptible isolates. However, because of their multidrug resistance, they may be more relevant in clinical settings.

Evidence for a second genomic island conferring multidrug resistance in a clonal group of strains of Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium and its monophasic variant circulating in Italy, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.

During the 2000s, a new clonal group with resistances to ampicillin, streptomycin, sulfonamides, and tetracycline (ASSuT) emerged in Italy among strains of Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium and its monophasic variant, Salmonella enterica subspecies enterica serovar 4,[5],12:i:-. The PulseNet Europe database allowed us to identify ASSuT strains of both S. Typhimurium and its monophasic variant, isolated in Denmark and the United Kingdom, with the same or very closely related pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) patterns as the Italian strains, suggesting that the ASSuT clonal group is circulating in different European countries. With the aim of analyzing the molecular basis of antibiotic resistance, resistance genes were identified and their localization was investigated in 66 ASSuT strains and, as controls, in 11 strains with different resistance patterns and PFGE profiles, belonging both to S. Typhimurium and to its monophasic variant, isolated from humans in Italy, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. All the ASSuT strains were positive for the following resistance genes: bla(TEM-1), strA-strB, sul2, and tet(B). A localization experiment demonstrated that the ASSuT resistance genes are chromosomally located. This study confirms that a multidrug-resistant clonal group, ASSuT, of S. Typhimurium and its monophasic variant has emerged and is circulating in Italy, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the results of this work demonstrate that the multidrug resistance in this clonal group of Salmonella strains is conferred by a new genomic island.

Assessment of the microbiological safety of edible dried seeds from retail premises in the United Kingdom with a focus on Salmonella spp.

Sesame seed products have recently been associated with a number of Salmonella outbreaks in the UK and elsewhere. Aside from sesame seeds, there is little published information on the prevalence of Salmonella spp. in edible seeds. A study of 3735 samples of retail edible dried seeds in the UK was therefore carried out between October 2007 and March 2008 to assess their microbiological safety in relation to Salmonella contamination and levels of Escherichia coli, an indicator of faecal contamination. Overall, Salmonella was detected in 23 samples (0.6%), of which over half (57%) were sesame seeds. Other seeds contaminated with Salmonella were linseed (1 sample), sunflower (1 sample), alfalfa (1 sample), melon (4 samples) and mixed seeds (3 samples). E. coli was detected in 9% of samples, with 1.5% containing unsatisfactory levels (> or = 10(2)/g). These included melon, pumpkin, sesame, hemp, poppy, linseed, sunflower and mixed seeds. The UK retailers affected by the detection of Salmonella in their products recalled the contaminated batches, and Food Standards Agency food alerts were issued to advise against the consumption of affected seed products. This study highlights the importance of good hygiene practices and effective decontamination procedures during the production of these products.

Outbreak of Salmonella Thompson infections linked to imported rucola lettuce.

On November 15, 2004, a cluster of three cases of Salmonella Thompson infection was registered by the Norwegian reference laboratory. In the following days further cases occurred, prompting a case-control study among the first 13 cases and 26 matched controls. By December 31, 21 cases had been reported, with the first onset on October 24. Consumption of rucola lettuce (Eruca sativa, also known as rocket salad or arugula) (OR 8,8 [1,2-infinity]) and mixed salad (OR 5,0 [1,0-infinity]) was associated with illness. On November 26, Swedish authorities notified the finding of Salmonella Thompson in rucola lettuce through the EU Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed. Later, several countries reported finding this and other Salmonella serovars and Campylobacter in rucola produced in Italy. In response to our alert through the international Enter-net surveillance network, Sweden and England also reported an increase of cases. Salmonella Thompson isolates from products and patients from several countries showed high similarity by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, but some isolates showed significant differences. We think that the outbreak in Norway reflected a larger international outbreak caused by rucola imported from one Italian producer. Findings of other pathogens indicate a massive contamination, possibly caused by irrigation with nonpotable water. Rapid international information exchange is invaluable when investigating outbreaks caused by internationally marketed products.

Packed with Salmonella--investigation of an international outbreak of Salmonella Senftenberg infection linked to contamination of prepacked basil in 2007.

Salmonella Senftenberg is uncommon in the United Kingdom. In January-June 2007, the Health Protection Agency reported on 55 primary human cases of Salmonella Senftenberg in England and Wales. In May 2007, fresh basil sold in the United Kingdom was found to be contaminated with Salmonella Senftenberg. We launched an investigation to elucidate the cause of this outbreak. Isolates were examined using plasmid profiling and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, and the outbreak strain (SSFTXB.0014) was identified. We enquired via Enter-net whether other countries had isolated the outbreak strain, analyzed samples of fresh herbs from U.K. retailers, and interviewed patients on food history. Thirty-two patient-cases were referred to this outbreak in England and Wales. Onsets of illness occurred between 5 March and 6 June 2007. Fifty-six percent of patient-cases were females and 90% adults (>20 years old); three were admitted to hospital as a result of Salmonella infection. Scotland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States reported on 19 cases of Salmonella Senftenberg infection presenting with the outbreak strain since January 2007. Eight samples of prepacked fresh basil imported from Israel tested positive with the same strain. A minority of patients could recall the consumption of basil before illness, and some reported consumption of products where basil was a likely ingredient. Environmental investigations in Israel did not identify the contamination source. Microbiological evidence suggested an association between contamination of fresh basil and the cases of Salmonella Senftenberg infection, leading to withdrawal of basil from all potentially affected batches from the U.K. market.

Evaluation of the application for a new alternative processing method for animal by-products of Category 3 material (ChainCraft B.V.).

EFSA received an application from the Dutch Competent Authority, under Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 and Regulation (EU) No 142/2011, for the evaluation of an alternative method for treatment of Category 3 animal by-products (ABP). It consists of the hydrolysis of the material to short-carbon chains, resulting in medium-chain fatty acids that may contain up to 1% hydrolysed protein, for use in animal feed. A physical process, with ultrafiltration followed by nanofiltration to remove hazards, is also used. Process efficacy has been evaluated based on the ability of the membrane barriers to retain potential biological hazards present. Small viruses passing the ultrafiltration membrane will be retained at the nanofiltration step, which represents a Critical Control Point (CCP) in the process. This step requires the Applicant to validate and provide certification for the specific use of the nanofiltration membranes used. Continuous monitoring and membrane integrity tests should be included as control measures in the HACCP plan. The ultrafiltration and nanofiltration techniques are able to remove particles of the size of virus, bacteria and parasites from liquids. If used under controlled and appropriate conditions, the processing methods proposed should reduce the risk in the end product to a degree which is at least equivalent to that achieved with the processing standards laid down in the Regulation for Category 3 material. The possible presence of small bacterial toxins produced during the fermentation steps cannot be avoided by the nanofiltration step and this hazard should be controlled by a CCP elsewhere in the process. The limitations specified in the current legislation and any future modifications in relation to the end use of the product also apply to this alternative process, and no hydrolysed protein of ruminant origin (except ruminant hides and skins) can be included in feed for farmed animals or for aquaculture.

Update of the list of QPS-recommended biological agents intentionally added to food or feed as notified to EFSA 7: suitability of taxonomic units notified to EFSA until September 2017.

The qualified presumption of safety (QPS) concept was developed to provide a harmonised generic pre-evaluation to support safety risk assessments of biological agents performed by EFSA's scientific Panels. The identity, body of knowledge, safety concerns and antimicrobial resistance of valid taxonomic units were assessed. Safety concerns identified for a taxonomic unit are, where possible and reasonable in number, considered to be 'qualifications' which should be assessed at the strain level by the EFSA's scientific Panels. No new information was found that would change the previously recommended QPS taxonomic units and their qualifications. The BIOHAZ Panel confirms that the QPS approach can be extended to a genetically modified production strain if the recipient strain qualifies for the QPS status, and if the genetic modification does not indicate a concern. Between April and September 2017, the QPS notification list was updated with 46 applications for market authorisation. From these, 14 biological agents already had QPS status and 16 were not included as they are filamentous fungi or enterococci. One notification of Streptomyces K-61 (notified as former S. griseoviridis) and four of Escherichia coli were not considered for the assessment as they belong to taxonomic units that were excluded from further evaluations within the current QPS mandate. Eight notifications of Bacillus thuringiensis and one of an oomycete are pending the reception of the complete application. Two taxonomic units were evaluated: Kitasatospora paracochleata, which had not been evaluated before, and Komagataella phaffii, previously notified as Pichia pastoris included due to a change in the taxonomic identity. Kitasatospora paracochleata cannot be granted QPS status due to lack of information on its biology and to its possible production of toxic secondary metabolites. The species Komagataella phaffii can be recommended for the QPS list when used for enzyme production.

Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II).

The European Commission asked EFSA for a scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease in two parts. Part one, on surveillance, animal health risk-based measures and public health risks, was published in January 2017. This opinion (part two) addresses the remaining Terms of Reference, namely, 'are the conclusions and recommendations in the EFSA opinion of June 2004 on diagnostic methods for chronic wasting disease still valid? If not, an update should be provided', and 'update the conclusions of the 2010 EFSA opinion on the results of the European Union survey on chronic wasting disease in cervids, as regards its occurrence in the cervid population in the European Union'. Data on the performance of authorised rapid tests in North America are not comprehensive, and are more limited than those available for the tests approved for statutory transmissible spongiform encephalopathies surveillance applications in cattle and sheep. There are no data directly comparing available rapid test performances in cervids. The experience in Norway shows that the Bio-Rad TeSeE™ SAP test, immunohistochemistry and western blotting have detected reindeer, moose and red deer cases. It was shown that testing both brainstem and lymphoid tissue from each animal increases the surveillance sensitivity. Shortcomings in the previous EU survey limited the reliability of inferences that could be made about the potential disease occurrence in Europe. Subsequently, testing activity in Europe was low, until the detection of the disease in Norway, triggering substantial testing efforts in that country. Available data neither support nor refute the conclusion that chronic wasting disease does not occur widely in the EU and do not preclude the possibility that the disease was present in Europe before the survey was conducted. It appears plausible that chronic wasting disease could have become established in Norway more than a decade ago.

Updated quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of the BSE risk posed by processed animal protein (PAP).

EFSA was requested: to assess the impact of a proposed quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) 'technical zero' on the limit of detection of official controls for constituents of ruminant origin in feed, to review and update the 2011 QRA, and to estimate the cattle bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk posed by the contamination of feed with BSE-infected bovine-derived processed animal protein (PAP), should pig PAP be re-authorised in poultry feed and vice versa, using both light microscopy and ruminant qPCR methods, and action limits of 100, 150, 200, 250 and 300 DNA copies. The current qPCR cannot discriminate between legitimately added bovine material and unauthorised contamination, or determine if any detected ruminant material is associated with BSE infectivity. The sensitivity of the surveillance for the detection of material of ruminant origin in feed is currently limited due to the heterogeneous distribution of the material, practicalities of sampling and test performance. A 'technical zero' will further reduce it. The updated model estimated a total BSE infectivity four times lower than that estimated in 2011, with less than one new case of BSE expected to arise each year. In the hypothetical scenario of a whole carcass of an infected cow entering the feed chain without any removal of specified risk material (SRM) or reduction of BSE infectivity via rendering, up to four new cases of BSE could be expected at the upper 95th percentile. A second model estimated that at least half of the feed containing material of ruminant origin will not be detected or removed from the feed chain, if an interpretation cut-off point of 100 DNA copies or more is applied. If the probability of a contaminated feed sample increased to 5%, with an interpretation cut-off point of 300 DNA copies, there would be a fourfold increase in the proportion of all produced feed that is contaminated but not detected.

Update of the list of QPS-recommended biological agents intentionally added to food or feed as notified to EFSA 8: suitability of taxonomic units notified to EFSA until March 2018.

The qualified presumption of safety (QPS) was developed to provide a harmonised generic pre-evaluation procedure to support safety risk assessments of biological agents performed by EFSA's Scientific Panels. The identity, body of knowledge, safety concerns and antimicrobial resistance of valid taxonomic units were assessed. Safety concerns identified for a taxonomic unit are, where possible and reasonable in number, reflected by 'qualifications' which should be assessed at the strain level by the EFSA's Scientific Panels. During the current assessment, no new information was found that would change the previously recommended QPS taxonomic units and their qualifications. The Panel clarified that the qualification 'for production purpose only' implies the absence of viable cells of the production organism in the final product and can also be applied for food and feed products based on microbial biomass. Between September 2017 and March 2018, the QPS notification list was updated with 46 microorganisms from applications for market authorisation. From these, 28 biological agents already had QPS status, 15 were excluded of the QPS exercise from the previous QPS mandate (10 filamentous fungi and one bacteriophage) or from further evaluations within the current mandate (two notifications of Streptomyces spp. and one of Escherichia coli), and one was excluded where confirmatory data for the risk assessment of a plant protection product (PPP) was requested (Pseudomonas sp.). Three taxonomic units were (re)evaluated: Paracoccus carotinifaciens and Paenibacillus lentus had been previously evaluated in 2008 and 2014, respectively, and were now re-evaluated within this mandate, and Yarrowia lipolytica, which was evaluated for the first time. P. carotinifaciens and P. lentus cannot be granted QPS status due to lack of scientific knowledge. Y. lipolytica is recommended for QPS status, but only for production purpose.

Listeria monocytogenes contamination of ready-to-eat foods and the risk for human health in the EU.

Food safety criteria for Listeria monocytogenes in ready-to-eat (RTE) foods have been applied from 2006 onwards (Commission Regulation (EC) 2073/2005). Still, human invasive listeriosis was reported to increase over the period 2009-2013 in the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA). Time series analysis for the 2008-2015 period in the EU/EEA indicated an increasing trend of the monthly notified incidence rate of confirmed human invasive listeriosis of the over 75 age groups and female age group between 25 and 44 years old (probably related to pregnancies). A conceptual model was used to identify factors in the food chain as potential drivers for L. monocytogenes contamination of RTE foods and listeriosis. Factors were related to the host (i. population size of the elderly and/or susceptible people; ii. underlying condition rate), the food (iii. L. monocytogenes prevalence in RTE food at retail; iv. L. monocytogenes concentration in RTE food at retail; v. storage conditions after retail; vi. consumption), the national surveillance systems (vii. improved surveillance), and/or the bacterium (viii. virulence). Factors considered likely to be responsible for the increasing trend in cases are the increased population size of the elderly and susceptible population except for the 25-44 female age group. For the increased incidence rates and cases, the likely factor is the increased proportion of susceptible persons in the age groups over 45 years old for both genders. Quantitative modelling suggests that more than 90% of invasive listeriosis is caused by ingestion of RTE food containing > 2,000 colony forming units (CFU)/g, and that one-third of cases are due to growth in the consumer phase. Awareness should be increased among stakeholders, especially in relation to susceptible risk groups. Innovative methodologies including whole genome sequencing (WGS) for strain identification and monitoring of trends are recommended.

Corrigendum: Molecular Characterization of Salmonella Serovars Anatum and Ealing Associated with Two Historical Outbreaks, Linked to Contaminated Powdered Infant Formula.

[This corrects the article on p. 1664 in vol. 7, PMID: 27818652.].

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids.

In April and May of 2016, Norway confirmed two cases of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in a wild reindeer and a wild moose, respectively. In the light of this emerging issue, the European Commission requested EFSA to recommend surveillance activities and, if necessary, additional animal health risk-based measures to prevent the introduction of the disease and the spread into/within the EU, specifically Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden, and considering seven wild, semidomesticated and farmed cervid species (Eurasian tundra reindeer, Finnish (Eurasian) forest reindeer, moose, roe deer, white-tailed deer, red deer and fallow deer). It was also asked to assess any new evidence on possible public health risks related to CWD. A 3-year surveillance system is proposed, differing for farmed and wild or semidomesticated cervids, with a two-stage sampling programme at the farm/geographically based population unit level (random sampling) and individual level (convenience sampling targeting high-risk animals). The current derogations of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1918 present a risk of introduction of CWD into the EU. Measures to prevent the spread of CWD within the EU are dependent upon the assumption that the disease is already present; this is currently unknown. The measures listed are intended to contain (limit the geographic extent of a focus) and/or to control (actively stabilise/reduce infection rates in an affected herd or population) the disease where it occurs. With regard to the zoonotic potential, the human species barrier for CWD prions does not appear to be absolute. These prions are present in the skeletal muscle and other edible tissues, so humans may consume infected material in enzootic areas. Epidemiological investigations carried out to date make no association between the occurrence of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans and exposure to CWD prions.

Guidance on the requirements for the development of microbiological criteria.

The European Food Safety Authority asked the Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) to deliver a scientific opinion providing: (i) a review of the approaches used by the BIOHAZ Panel to address requests from risk managers to suggest the establishment of microbiological criteria; (ii) guidance on the required scientific evidence, data and methods/tools necessary for considering the development of microbiological criteria for pathogenic microorganisms and indicator microorganisms; (iii) recommendations on methods/tools to design microbiological criteria and (iv) guidelines for the requirements and tasks of risk assessors, compared to risk managers, in relation to microbiological criteria. This document provides guidance on approaches when: (i) a quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) is available, (ii) prevalence and concentration data are available, but not a QMRA model, and (iii) neither a QMRA nor prevalence and/or concentration data are available. The role of risk assessors should be focused on assessing the impact of different microbiological criteria on public health and on product compliance. It is the task of the risk managers to: (1) formulate unambiguous questions, preferably in consultation with risk assessors, (2) decide on the establishment of a microbiological criterion, or target in primary production sectors, and to formulate the specific intended purpose for using such criteria, (3) consider the uncertainties in impact assessments on public health and on product compliance and (4) decide the point in the food chain where the microbiological criteria are intended to be applied and decide on the actions which should be taken in case of non-compliance. It is the task of the risk assessors to support risk managers to ensure that questions are formulated in a way that a precise answer can be given, if sufficient information is available, and to ensure clear and unambiguous answers, including the assessment of uncertainties, based on available scientific evidence.

Evaluation of the Application for new alternative biodiesel production process for rendered fat of Cat 1 (BDI-RepCat process, AT).

A new alternative method for the production of biodiesel from rendered fat of all categories of animal by-products was assessed. The process was compared to the approved biodiesel production process described in Chapter IV Section 2 D of Annex IV of Commission Regulation (EU) 142/2011. Tallow derived from Category 1 material is treated according to Method 1 from the same Regulation (133°C, 20 min, 3 bar) and subsequently mixed with 15% methanol, heated to reaction temperature (220°C) in several heat exchangers and transferred into the continuous conversion reactor by means of a high pressure pump (80 bar) for 30 min. In the conversion phase, there is an exposure to methanol in the absence of alkaline or acidic conditions. The impact of this procedure on the thermostability of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) has not been assessed in the literature. After the reaction, the biodiesel/glycerol mixture is distilled under vacuum at a minimum temperature of 150°C and a maximum pressure of 10 mbar, which is equivalent to the distillation step in the approved biodiesel production process, for which a 3 log10 reduction factor in PrP27-30 was obtained. Therefore, a similar level of TSE infectivity reduction could be expected for that phase of the method. A previous EFSA Opinion established that a reduction of 6 log10 in TSE infectivity should be achieved by any proposed alternative method in order to be equivalent to the approved processing method. This level of reduction has not been shown with experimental trials run under conditions equivalent to the ones described for the RepCat process. It was not possible to conclude whether or not the level of TSE infectivity reduction in the RepCat process is at least of 6 log10. Therefore, it was also not possible to conclude about the equivalence with the approved biodiesel production process.