Human intuition as a defense against attribute inference.

Attribute inference-the process of analyzing publicly available data in order to uncover hidden information-has become a major threat to privacy, given the recent technological leap in machine learning. One way to tackle this threat is to strategically modify one's publicly available data in order to keep one's private information hidden from attribute inference. We evaluate people's ability to perform this task, and compare it against algorithms designed for this purpose. We focus on three attributes: the gender of the author of a piece of text, the country in which a set of photos was taken, and the link missing from a social network. For each of these attributes, we find that people's effectiveness is inferior to that of AI, especially when it comes to hiding the attribute in question. Moreover, when people are asked to modify the publicly available information in order to hide these attributes, they are less likely to make high-impact modifications compared to AI. This suggests that people are unable to recognize the aspects of the data that are critical to an inference algorithm. Taken together, our findings highlight the limitations of relying on human intuition to protect privacy in the age of AI, and emphasize the need for algorithmic support to protect private information from attribute inference.

Social diffusion sources can escape detection.

Influencing others through social networks is fundamental to all human societies. Whether this happens through the diffusion of rumors, opinions, or viruses, identifying the diffusion source (i.e., the person that initiated it) is a problem that has attracted much research interest. Nevertheless, existing literature has ignored the possibility that the source might strategically modify the network structure (by rewiring links or introducing fake nodes) to escape detection. Here, without restricting our analysis to any particular diffusion scenario, we close this gap by evaluating two mechanisms that hide the source-one stemming from the source's actions, the other from the network structure itself. This reveals that sources can easily escape detection, and that removing links is far more effective than introducing fake nodes. Thus, efforts should focus on exposing concealed ties rather than planted entities; such exposure would drastically improve our chances of detecting the diffusion source.

Hiding opinions from machine learning.

Recent breakthroughs in machine learning and big data analysis are allowing our online activities to be scrutinized at an unprecedented scale, and our private information to be inferred without our consent or knowledge. Here, we focus on algorithms designed to infer the opinions of Twitter users toward a growing number of topics, and consider the possibility of modifying the profiles of these users in the hope of hiding their opinions from such algorithms. We ran a survey to understand the extent of this privacy threat, and found evidence suggesting that a significant proportion of Twitter users wish to avoid revealing at least some of their opinions about social, political, and religious issues. Moreover, our participants were unable to reliably identify the Twitter activities that reveal one's opinion to such algorithms. Given these findings, we consider the possibility of fighting AI with AI, i.e., instead of relying on human intuition, people may have a better chance at hiding their opinion if they modify their Twitter profiles following advice from an automated assistant. We propose a heuristic that identifies which Twitter accounts the users should follow or mention in their tweets, and show that such a heuristic can effectively hide the user's opinions. Altogether, our study highlights the risk associated with developing machine learning algorithms that analyze people's profiles, and demonstrates the potential to develop countermeasures that preserve the basic right of choosing which of our opinions to share with the world.

Beijing's central role in global artificial intelligence research.

Nations worldwide are mobilizing to harness the power of Artificial Intelligence (AI) given its massive potential to shape global competitiveness over the coming decades. Using a dataset of 2.2 million AI papers, we study inter-city citations, collaborations, and talent migrations to uncover dependencies between Eastern and Western cities worldwide. Beijing emerges as a clear outlier, as it has been the most impactful city since 2007, the most productive since 2002, and the one housing the largest number of AI scientists since 1995. Our analysis also reveals that Western cities cite each other far more frequently than expected by chance, East-East collaborations are far more common than East-West or West-West collaborations, and migration of AI scientists mostly takes place from one Eastern city to another. We then propose a measure that quantifies each city's role in bridging East and West. Beijing's role surpasses that of all other cities combined, making it the central gateway through which knowledge and talent flow from one side to the other. We also track the center of mass of AI research by weighing each city's geographic location by its impact, productivity, and AI workforce. The center of mass has moved thousands of kilometers eastward over the past three decades, with Beijing's pull increasing each year. These findings highlight the eastward shift in the tides of global AI research, and the growing role of the Chinese capital as a hub connecting researchers across the globe.

Trading contact tracing efficiency for finding patient zero.

As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, identifying the origin of a pandemic remains a challenging task. The search for patient zero may benefit from the widely-used and well-established toolkit of contact tracing methods, although this possibility has not been explored to date. We fill this gap by investigating the prospect of performing the source detection task as part of the contact tracing process, i.e., the possibility of tuning the parameters of the process in order to pinpoint the origin of the infection. To this end, we perform simulations on temporal networks using a recent diffusion model that recreates the dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that increasing the budget for contact tracing beyond a certain threshold can significantly improve the identification of infected individuals but has diminishing returns in terms of source detection. Moreover, disease variants of higher infectivity make it easier to find the source but harder to identify infected individuals. Finally, we unravel a seemingly-intrinsic trade-off between the use of contact tracing to either identify infected nodes or detect the source of infection. This trade-off suggests that focusing on the identification of patient zero may come at the expense of identifying infected individuals.

Traffic networks are vulnerable to disinformation attacks.

Disinformation continues to raise concerns due to its increasing threat to society. Nevertheless, a threat of a disinformation-based attack on critical infrastructure is often overlooked. Here, we consider urban traffic networks and focus on fake information that manipulates drivers' decisions to create congestion at a city scale. Specifically, we consider two complementary scenarios, one where drivers are persuaded to move towards a given location, and another where they are persuaded to move away from it. We study the optimization problem faced by the adversary when choosing which streets to target to maximize disruption. We prove that finding an optimal solution is computationally intractable, implying that the adversary has no choice but to settle for suboptimal heuristics. We analyze one such heuristic, and compare the cases when targets are spread across the city of Chicago vs. concentrated in its business district. Surprisingly, the latter results in more far-reaching disruption, with its impact felt as far as 2 km from the closest target. Our findings demonstrate that vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure may arise not only from hardware and software, but also from behavioral manipulation.

How weaponizing disinformation can bring down a city's power grid.

Social media has made it possible to manipulate the masses via disinformation and fake news at an unprecedented scale. This is particularly alarming from a security perspective, as humans have proven to be one of the weakest links when protecting critical infrastructure in general, and the power grid in particular. Here, we consider an attack in which an adversary attempts to manipulate the behavior of energy consumers by sending fake discount notifications encouraging them to shift their consumption into the peak-demand period. Using Greater London as a case study, we show that such disinformation can indeed lead to unwitting consumers synchronizing their energy-usage patterns, and result in blackouts on a city-scale if the grid is heavily loaded. We then conduct surveys to assess the propensity of people to follow-through on such notifications and forward them to their friends. This allows us to model how the disinformation may propagate through social networks, potentially amplifying the attack impact. These findings demonstrate that in an era when disinformation can be weaponized, system vulnerabilities arise not only from the hardware and software of critical infrastructure, but also from the behavior of the consumers.

How to Hide One's Relationships from Link Prediction Algorithms.

Our private connections can be exposed by link prediction algorithms. To date, this threat has only been addressed from the perspective of a central authority, completely neglecting the possibility that members of the social network can themselves mitigate such threats. We fill this gap by studying how an individual can rewire her own network neighborhood to hide her sensitive relationships. We prove that the optimization problem faced by such an individual is NP-complete, meaning that any attempt to identify an optimal way to hide one's relationships is futile. Based on this, we shift our attention towards developing effective, albeit not optimal, heuristics that are readily-applicable by users of existing social media platforms to conceal any connections they deem sensitive. Our empirical evaluation reveals that it is more beneficial to focus on "unfriending" carefully-chosen individuals rather than befriending new ones. In fact, by avoiding communication with just 5 individuals, it is possible for one to hide some of her relationships in a massive, real-life telecommunication network, consisting of 829,725 phone calls between 248,763 individuals. Our analysis also shows that link prediction algorithms are more susceptible to manipulation in smaller and denser networks. Evaluating the error vs. attack tolerance of link prediction algorithms reveals that rewiring connections randomly may end up exposing one's sensitive relationships, highlighting the importance of the strategic aspect. In an age where personal relationships continue to leave digital traces, our results empower the general public to proactively protect their private relationships.

Strategic distribution of seeds to support diffusion in complex networks.

Usually, the launch of the diffusion process is triggered by a few early adopters-i.e., seeds of diffusion. Many studies have assumed that all seeds are activated once to initiate the diffusion process in social networks and therefore are focused on finding optimal ways of choosing these nodes according to a limited budget. Despite the advances in identifying influencing spreaders, the strategy of activating all seeds at the beginning might not be sufficient in accelerating and maximising the coverage of diffusion. Also, it does not capture real scenarios in which marketing campaigns continuously monitor and support the diffusion process by seeding more nodes. More recent studies investigate the possibility of activating additional seeds as the diffusion process goes forward. In this work, we further examine this approach and search for optimal ways of distributing seeds during the diffusion process according to a pre-allocated seeding budget. Theoretically, we show that a universally best solution does not exist, and we prove that finding an optimal distribution of supporting seeds over time for a particular network is an NP-hard problem. Numerically, we evaluate several seeding strategies on different networks regarding maximising the coverage and minimising the spreading time. We find that each network topology has a best strategy given some spreading parameters. Our findings can be crucial in identifying the best strategies for budget allocation in different scenarios such as marketing or political campaigns.