Intuitive physics learning in a deep-learning model inspired by developmental psychology.

'Intuitive physics' enables our pragmatic engagement with the physical world and forms a key component of 'common sense' aspects of thought. Current artificial intelligence systems pale in their understanding of intuitive physics, in comparison to even very young children. Here we address this gap between humans and machines by drawing on the field of developmental psychology. First, we introduce and open-source a machine-learning dataset designed to evaluate conceptual understanding of intuitive physics, adopting the violation-of-expectation (VoE) paradigm from developmental psychology. Second, we build a deep-learning system that learns intuitive physics directly from visual data, inspired by studies of visual cognition in children. We demonstrate that our model can learn a diverse set of physical concepts, which depends critically on object-level representations, consistent with findings from developmental psychology. We consider the implications of these results both for AI and for research on human cognition.

Human-centred mechanism design with Democratic AI.

Building artificial intelligence (AI) that aligns with human values is an unsolved problem. Here we developed a human-in-the-loop research pipeline called Democratic AI, in which reinforcement learning is used to design a social mechanism that humans prefer by majority. A large group of humans played an online investment game that involved deciding whether to keep a monetary endowment or to share it with others for collective benefit. Shared revenue was returned to players under two different redistribution mechanisms, one designed by the AI and the other by humans. The AI discovered a mechanism that redressed initial wealth imbalance, sanctioned free riders and successfully won the majority vote. By optimizing for human preferences, Democratic AI offers a proof of concept for value-aligned policy innovation.

Model-based hierarchical reinforcement learning and human action control.

Recent work has reawakened interest in goal-directed or 'model-based' choice, where decisions are based on prospective evaluation of potential action outcomes. Concurrently, there has been growing attention to the role of hierarchy in decision-making and action control. We focus here on the intersection between these two areas of interest, considering the topic of hierarchical model-based control. To characterize this form of action control, we draw on the computational framework of hierarchical reinforcement learning, using this to interpret recent empirical findings. The resulting picture reveals how hierarchical model-based mechanisms might play a special and pivotal role in human decision-making, dramatically extending the scope and complexity of human behaviour.

Inferring the intentional states of autonomous virtual agents.

Inferring the mental states of other agents, including their goals and intentions, is a central problem in cognition. A critical aspect of this problem is that one cannot observe mental states directly, but must infer them from observable actions. To study the computational mechanisms underlying this inference, we created a two-dimensional virtual environment populated by autonomous agents with independent cognitive architectures. These agents navigate the environment, collecting "food" and interacting with one another. The agents' behavior is modulated by a small number of distinct goal states: attacking, exploring, fleeing, and gathering food. We studied subjects' ability to detect and classify the agents' continually changing goal states on the basis of their motions and interactions. Although the programmed ground truth goal state is not directly observable, subjects' responses showed both high validity (correlation with this ground truth) and high reliability (correlation with one another). We present a Bayesian model of the inference of goal states, and find that it accounts for subjects' responses better than alternative models. Although the model is fit to the actual programmed states of the agents, and not to subjects' responses, its output actually conforms better to subjects' responses than to the ground truth goal state of the agents.