[A case of abscess-associated hepatocellular carcinoma with massive lymphoid cell infiltration].

A 76-year-old Japanese man was admitted to our hospital with chills and fever. Computed tomography revealed a 10-cm cystic tumor with peripheral ring enhancement in the left lobe of the liver and several small low-density areas with early peripheral enhancement in both lobes. The large liver mass was diagnosed as a pyogenic abscess and treated with antibiotics. However, elevation of the tumor marker, PIVKA-II, raised the possibility of hepatocellular carcinoma. A fine-needle aspiration biopsy was performed, and malignant hepatic cells were identified. The patient underwent left hepatectomy. Histological analyses of the resected surgical specimen confirmed necrotic liver abscess and residual hepatocellular carcinoma with massive lymphoid cell infiltration. Immunohistochemical analyses revealed that the lymphoid cells were positive for CD3 and CD8. The PIVKA-II level returned to normal after surgery and the hepatic lesions disappeared within 10 months. These findings suggest that the liver abscess stimulated cancer immunity, resulting in the proliferation of cytotoxic T lymphocytes and, subsequently, tumor regression.

Parochial trust and cooperation across 17 societies.

International challenges such as climate change, poverty, and intergroup conflict require countries to cooperate to solve these complex problems. However, the political tide in many countries has shifted inward, with skepticism and reluctance to cooperate with other countries. Thus, cross-societal investigations are needed to test theory about trust and cooperation within and between groups. We conducted an experimental study in 17 countries designed to test several theories that explain why, who, and where people trust and cooperate more with ingroup members, compared with outgroup members. The experiment involved several interactions in the trust game, either as a trustor or trustee. We manipulated partner group membership in the trust game (ingroup, outgroup, or unknown) and if their reputation was at stake during the interaction. In addition to the standard finding that participants trust and cooperate more with ingroup than outgroup members, we obtained findings that reputational concerns play a decisive role for promoting trust and cooperation universally across societies. Furthermore, men discriminated more in favor of their ingroup than women. Individual differences in cooperative preferences, as measured by social value orientation, predicted cooperation with both ingroup and outgroup members. Finally, we did not find support for three theories about the cross-societal conditions that influence the degree of ingroup favoritism observed across societies (e.g., material security, religiosity, and pathogen stress). We discuss the implications for promoting cooperation within and between countries.

Response time in economic games reflects different types of decision conflict for prosocial and proself individuals.

Behavioral and neuroscientific studies explore two pathways through which internalized social norms promote prosocial behavior. One pathway involves internal control of impulsive selfishness, and the other involves emotion-based prosocial preferences that are translated into behavior when they evade cognitive control for pursuing self-interest. We measured 443 participants' overall prosocial behavior in four economic games. Participants' predispositions [social value orientation (SVO)] were more strongly reflected in their overall game behavior when they made decisions quickly than when they spent a longer time. Prosocially (or selfishly) predisposed participants behaved less prosocially (or less selfishly) when they spent more time in decision making, such that their SVO prosociality yielded limited effects in actual behavior in their slow decisions. The increase (or decrease) in slower decision makers was prominent among consistent prosocials (or proselfs) whose strong preference for prosocial (or proself) goals would make it less likely to experience conflict between prosocial and proself goals. The strong effect of RT on behavior in consistent prosocials (or proselfs) suggests that conflict between prosocial and selfish goals alone is not responsible for slow decisions. Specifically, we found that contemplation of the risk of being exploited by others (social risk aversion) was partly responsible for making consistent prosocials (but not consistent proselfs) spend longer time in decision making and behave less prosocially. Conflict between means rather than between goals (immediate versus strategic pursuit of self-interest) was suggested to be responsible for the time-related increase in consistent proselfs' prosocial behavior. The findings of this study are generally in favor of the intuitive cooperation model of prosocial behavior.

Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in economic games.

Human prosociality has been traditionally explained in the social sciences in terms of internalized social norms. Recent neuroscientific studies extended this traditional view of human prosociality by providing evidence that prosocial choices in economic games require cognitive control of the impulsive pursuit of self-interest. However, this view is challenged by an intuitive prosociality view emphasizing the spontaneous and heuristic basis of prosocial choices in economic games. We assessed the brain structure of 411 players of an ultimatum game (UG) and a dictator game (DG) and measured the strategic reasoning ability of 386. According to the reflective norm-enforcement view of prosociality, only those capable of strategically controlling their selfish impulses give a fair share in the UG, but cognitive control capability should not affect behavior in the DG. Conversely, we support the intuitive prosociality view by showing for the first time, to our knowledge, that strategic reasoning and cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were not related to giving in the UG but were negatively related to giving in the DG. This implies that the uncontrolled choice in the DG is prosocial rather than selfish, and those who have a thicker dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and are capable of strategic reasoning (goal-directed use of the theory of mind) control this intuitive drive for prosociality as a means to maximize reward when there are no future implications of choices.

Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity.

The strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human cooperation has gained some acceptance, partly on the basis of support from experimental findings. The observation that unfair offers in the ultimatum game are frequently rejected constitutes an important piece of the experimental evidence for strong reciprocity. In the present study, we have challenged the idea that the rejection response in the ultimatum game provides evidence of the assumption held by strong reciprocity theorists that negative reciprocity observed in the ultimatum game is inseparably related to positive reciprocity as the two sides of a preference for fairness. The prediction of an inseparable relationship between positive and negative reciprocity was rejected on the basis of the results of a series of experiments that we conducted using the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the trust game, and the prisoner's dilemma game. We did not find any correlation between the participants' tendencies to reject unfair offers in the ultimatum game and their tendencies to exhibit various prosocial behaviors in the other games, including their inclinations to positively reciprocate in the trust game. The participants' responses to postexperimental questions add support to the view that the rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is a tacit strategy for avoiding the imposition of an inferior status.

In search of Homo economicus.

Homo economicus, a model for humans in neoclassical economics, is a rational maximizer of self-interest. However, many social scientists regard such a person as a mere imaginary creature. We found that 31 of 446 residents of relatively wealthy Tokyo suburbs met the behavioral definition of Homo economicus. In several rounds of economic games, participants whose behavior was consistent with this model always apportioned the money endowed by the experimenter to themselves, leaving no share for their partners. These participants had high IQs and a deliberative decision style. An additional 39 participants showed a similar disregard for other people's welfare, although they were slightly more altruistic than those in the Homo economicus group. The psychological composition of these quasi-Homo economicus participants was distinct from that of participants in the Homo economicus group. Although participants in the latter group behaved selfishly on the basis of rational calculations, those in the former group made selfish choices impulsively. The implications of these findings concerning the two types of extreme noncooperators are discussed.

[A test of the strong reciprocity model: relationship between cooperation and punishment].

The strong reciprocity model of human cooperation (SRM) argues that strong reciprocators, who cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, sustain within-group cooperation. However, the assumption that altruism and punishment are products of the same psychological mechanism of strong reciprocity has not been fully verified. Second-party punishment, for example as measured through rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game, has been demonstrated to have no relationship with cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and other games. In this study, we tested the assumption of the SRM by comparing the participants' levels of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game and their inclination for punishment in a third-party punishment game. Non-student recruited from the general population (N = 182) participated in the study. The results show a weak but positive correlation between cooperation and third-party punishment, which is consistent with the SRM model.

[Effect of consensus on punitive behavior].

In addition to the cost of punishment, the fear that others would evaluate punishers negatively can be a major obstacle for resolving the second-order social dilemma or failure of providing sanctions useful for solving a social dilemma problem. In an experiment with 81 participants, we tested whether providing information that other participants were in favor of punishing non-cooperators in a social dilemma situation would enhance cooperation in the second-order dilemma (i.e., punishment of non-cooperators). Participants received feedback of three bogus "participants" choices in a four-person social dilemma, in which one bogus participant defected and two others cooperated, and then received a chance to punish the sole non-cooperator. The hypothesis was supported among those who were motivated to punish the non-cooperator. They punished the non-cooperator when they were informed that the other participants also wanted to punish the non-cooperator. The feedback information that the other participants wanted to punish the non-cooperator induced the participants who were not motivated to punish the non-cooperator to punish less.

The private rejection of unfair offers and emotional commitment.

In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that certain players of an economic game reject unfair offers even when this behavior increases rather than decreases inequity. A substantial proportion (30-40%, compared with 60-70% in the standard ultimatum game) of those who responded rejected unfair offers even when rejection reduced only their own earnings to 0, while not affecting the earnings of the person who proposed the unfair split (in an impunity game). Furthermore, even when the responders were not able to communicate their anger to the proposers by rejecting unfair offers in a private impunity game, a similar rate of rejection was observed. The rejection of unfair offers that increases inequity cannot be explained by the social preference for inequity aversion or reciprocity; however, it does provide support for the model of emotion as a commitment device. In this view, emotions such as anger or moral disgust lead people to disregard the immediate consequences of their behavior, committing them to behave consistently to preserve integrity and maintain a reputation over time as someone who is reliably committed to this behavior.

Evaluation of local changes in radio-frequency signal waveform and brightness caused by vessel dilatation for ascertaining reliability of elasticity estimation inside heterogeneous plaque: a preliminary study.

PURPOSE: To diagnose plaque characteristics, we previously developed an ultrasonic method to estimate the local elastic modulus from the ratio of the pulse pressure to the strain of the arterial wall due to dilatation in systole by transcutaneously measuring the minute thinning in thickness during one cardiac cycle. For plaques, however, some target regions became thicker as the vessel dilates, resulting in false elasticity. Therefore, a method to identify a reliable target for the elastic modulus estimation is indispensable. As a candidate for an identification index of plaques that become thicker during one cardiac cycle, the correlation of the radio-frequency (RF) signals remains high and it is not sufficient to obtain the elasticity. In this study, we thoroughly observed the target with a high correlation but positive strain in the plaque and characterized it by the property of the surrounding area. METHODS: For the plaque formed in the right carotid sinus of a patient with hyperlipidemia and the wall of the right common carotid artery of a young healthy male, (1) the correlation value as the similarity between the RF signals, (2) change in brightness obtained from the log-compressed envelope signals, and (3) strain obtained between the time of the R-wave and that of the maximum vessel dilatation were observed to characterize the region in the plaque. RESULTS: In the plaque, it was found that the region with high correlation and positive strain and its surrounding area could be classified into one of the three typical patterns. CONCLUSION: As a preliminary study, this study provides a clue to assert the reliability of elasticity estimates for a region with high correlation and positive strain in the plaque based on measurable properties.

The neuroanatomy of social trust predicts depression vulnerability.

Trust attitude is a social personality trait linked with the estimation of others' trustworthiness. Trusting others, however, can have substantial negative effects on mental health, such as the development of depression. Despite significant progress in understanding the neurobiology of trust, whether the neuroanatomy of trust is linked with depression vulnerability remains unknown. To investigate a link between the neuroanatomy of trust and depression vulnerability, we assessed trust and depressive symptoms and employed neuroimaging to acquire brain structure data of healthy participants. A high depressive symptom score was used as an indicator of depression vulnerability. The neuroanatomical results observed with the healthy sample were validated in a sample of clinically diagnosed depressive patients. We found significantly higher depressive symptoms among low trusters than among high trusters. Neuroanatomically, low trusters and depressive patients showed similar volume reduction in brain regions implicated in social cognition, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), dorsomedial PFC, posterior cingulate, precuneus, and angular gyrus. Furthermore, the reduced volume of the DLPFC and precuneus mediated the relationship between trust and depressive symptoms. These findings contribute to understanding social- and neural-markers of depression vulnerability and may inform the development of social interventions to prevent pathological depression.

National parochialism is ubiquitous across 42 nations around the world.

Cooperation within and across borders is of paramount importance for the provision of public goods. Parochialism - the tendency to cooperate more with ingroup than outgroup members - limits contributions to global public goods. National parochialism (i.e., greater cooperation among members of the same nation) could vary across nations and has been hypothesized to be associated with rule of law, exposure to world religions, relational mobility and pathogen stress. We conduct an experiment in participants from 42 nations (N = 18,411), and observe cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma with ingroup, outgroup, and unidentified partners. We observe that national parochialism is a ubiquitous phenomenon: it is present to a similar degree across the nations studied here, is independent of cultural distance, and occurs both when decisions are private or public. These findings inform existing theories of parochialism and suggest it may be an obstacle to the provision of global public goods.

Theory of mind enhances preference for fairness.

The purpose of the current study was to examine the role of theory of mind in fairness-related behavior in preschoolers and to introduce a tool for examining fairness-related behavior in children. A total of 68 preschoolers played the Ultimatum Game in a face-to-face setting. Acquisition of theory of mind was defined as the understanding of false beliefs using the Sally-Anne task. The results showed that preschoolers who had acquired theory of mind proposed higher mean offers than children who had not acquired theory of mind. These findings imply that the ability to infer the mental states of others plays an important role in fairness-related behavior.

Salivary testosterone levels and autism-spectrum quotient in adults.

OBJECTIVES: The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between salivary testosterone levels and autistic traits in adults. METHODS: A total of 92 male and female adults participated in the present study. Their salivary testosterone level (T) and score of Japanese version of Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ) were assessed to examine the relationship between salivary testosterone level and autistic traits in adults. RESULTS: We observed a positive correlation between T and AQ in a group of both sexes. The correlation disappeared when we conducted correlation analysis by sex. However, although there was no sex difference in the score of the subscale of attention switching, attention switching was related to T. CONCLUSIONS: Although the relationship between T and AQ may mainly result from sex differences, the subscale of attention switching may be modulated by testosterone.

Salivary alpha-amylase levels and big five personality factors in adults.

OBJECTIVES: Salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) has been utilized as a non-invasive measure of sympathoadrenal medullary (SAM) activation. Little is known regarding the relationship between personality inventories and baseline sAA. This study was designed to examine the relationships between the scores of big five inventory (BFI) factors, age, and sAA in adults (aged twenty to seventy years old). METHODS: We assessed 97 participants' BFI scores and sAA. The correlations between the BFI factor scores and sAA were examined. RESULTS: We observed (1) a positive correlation between Neuroticism and sAA, and a negative correlation between Agreeableness and sAA and (2) a positive correlation between age and sAA. These correlations between BFI scores and sAA remained significant after controlling for age. After controlling for age, all BFI factors except Conscientiousness were related to sAA. CONCLUSIONS: Subjects with high Neuroticism and low Extraversion, Agreeableness and Openness may have high sAA. sAA has been demonstrated to be useful for examining the relationship between adrenergic activity and personality, in a non-invasive manner.

Stress hormones predict hyperbolic time-discount rates six months later in adults.

OBJECTIVES: Stress hormones have been associated with temporal discounting. Although time-discount rate is shown to be stable over a long term, no study to date examines whether individual differences in stress hormones could predict individuals' time-discount rates in the relatively distant future (e.g., six month later), which is of interest in neuroeconomics of stress-addiction association. METHODS: We assessed 87 participants' salivary stress hormone (cortisol, cortisone, and alpha-amylase) levels and hyperbolic discounting of delayed rewards consisting of three magnitudes, at the time-interval of six months. For salivary steroid assays, we employed a liquid chromatography/ mass spectroscopy (LC/MS) method. The correlations between the stress hormone levels and time-discount rates were examined. RESULTS: We observed that salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) levels were negatively associated with time-discount rates in never-smokers. Notably, salivary levels of stress steroids (i.e., cortisol and cortisone) negatively and positively related to time-discount rates in men and women, respectively, in never-smokers. Ever-smokers' discount rates were not predicted from these stress hormone levels. CONCLUSIONS: Individual differences in stress hormone levels predict impulsivity in temporal discounting in the future. There are sex differences in the effect of stress steroids on temporal discounting; while there was no sex defference in the relationship between sAA and temporal discounting.

[Adaptive foundation of group-based reciprocity].

A one-shot sequential prisoner's dilemma game with an in-group and an out-group member was conducted to test the group heuristic hypothesis for the in-group bias in minimal groups. Eighty-nine participants played the role of a second player and faced a fully cooperative first player. The results showed that in-group bias occurred only in the common knowledge condition in which the first player and the second player mutually knew each other's group membership, but not in the private knowledge condition in which the first player did not know the second player's group membership. These results provide support for the group heuristic hypothesis that in-group bias is an adaptive strategy in an assumed generalized exchange system to avoid a bad reputation as a defector.

[Accuracy of judgment about others' cooperative behavior: effects of attractiveness and facial expressiveness].

Cooperation in interdependent relationships is based on reciprocity in repeated interactions. However, cooperation in one-shot relationships cannot be explained by reciprocity. Frank, Gilovich, & Regan (1993) argued that cooperative behavior in one-shot interactions can be adaptive if cooperators displayed particular signals and people were able to distinguish cooperators from non-cooperators by decoding these signals. We argue that attractiveness and facial expressiveness are signals of cooperators. We conducted an experiment to examine if these signals influence the detection accuracy of cooperative behavior. Our participants (blind to the target's behavior in a Trust Game) viewed 30-seconds video-clips. Each video-clip was comprised of a cooperator and a non-cooperator in a Trust Game. The participants judged which one of the pair gave more money to the other participant. We found that participants were able to detect cooperators with a higher accuracy than chance. Furthermore, participants rated male non-cooperators as more attractive than male cooperators, and rated cooperators more expressive than non-cooperators. Further analyses showed that attractiveness inhibited detection accuracy while facial expressiveness fostered it.