Consciousness, philosophy, and neuroscience.

The aim of this mini-review paper is to present an overview of work on consciousness from a philosophical perspective, and to argue for the continuing relevance of philosophy in consciousness research. After introducing some major philosophical positions about the relationship between consciousness and matter, we argue that the problem of consciousness that many authors have focused on-the mind-body or mind-brain problem-is only one among several problems of consciousness. We illustrate the idea that the perplexities about consciousness go beyond its relationship with matter by discussing the relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness, and selfhood. This discussion also indicates ways in which philosophy and neuroscience can learn from each other.

Disorder of Selfhood in Schizophrenia: A Symptom or a Gestalt?

INTRODUCTION: The concept of schizophrenia (SCZ) was originally associated with a disorder of formal strata of the self. During the last two decades, empirical studies have demonstrated a selective hyper-aggregation of self-disorders in the SCZ spectrum. As with other scientific research areas, the role of self-disturbances in SCZ has been up for debate in various disciplines including cognitive sciences, philosophy of mind, and psychopathology. Several philosophical papers have used the psychopathological phenomena of "thought insertion" as an alleged example of a complete loss of minimal selfhood. In the field of psychopathology, it has been claimed that self-disorders may comprise a transdiagnostic phenotype. Common to these approaches is the underlying assumption that self-disorders reflect well-delineated and isolated symptoms akin to the notion of symptom in the medical model. The aim of this paper was to argue that the clinical manifestation of self-disturbances is to be seen as aspects of a Gestalt of disturbed experiential selfhood. METHODS: Seven videotaped interviews of patients with SCZ who were emblematic of very diverse symptomatological constellations were selected and jointly watched and discussed by the authors, who reached a consensus assessment. The interviews were semi-structured and narrative in nature in order to obtain faithful self-descriptions according to the standards of phenomenologically oriented interviews. For the purpose of this article, we chose 4 videos from which excerpts were verbatim transcribed and translated from Danish into English. RESULTS: The patients describe unique combinations of various psychopathological phenomena such as diminished sense of embodied self-presence, loss of ego boundaries, diminished sense of self, alienation and objectification of the experiential processes, mirror-phenomena, and Schneiderian passivity phenomena. DISCUSSION: Through an interweaving of the four vignettes and their subsequent psychopathological discussions, we argue that the invariant commonality across the different symptomatic expressions in these patients resides in a Gestalt of pervasive disturbance of self-experience. From a phenomenological perspective, these self-disturbances target a basic structure of phenomenal consciousness, namely, the first-person givenness of experience. We conclude that self-disorders reflect a trait-instability in the most basic structures of consciousness in SCZ and that its clinical manifestations are to be seen as aspects of a particular Gestalt rather than appearing as separate and well-delineated symptoms.

Individuality and community: The limits of social constructivism.

Is selfhood socially constituted and distributed? Although the view has recently been defended by some cognitive scientists, it has long been popular within anthropology and cultural psychology. Whereas older texts by Marcel Mauss, Clifford Geertz, Hazel Rose Markus, and Shinobu Kitayama often contrast a Western conception of a discrete, bounded, and individual self with a non-Western sociocentric conception, it has more recently become common to argue that subjectivity is a fluid intersectional construction fundamentally relational and conditioned by discursive power structures. I assess the plausibility of these claims and argue that many of these discussions of self and subjectivity remain too crude. By failing to distinguish different dimension of selfhood, many authors unwittingly advocate a form of radical social constructivism that is not only incapable of doing justice to first-person experience but which also fails to capture the heterogeneity of real communal life.

Sociality and Embodiment: Online Communication During and After Covid-19.

During the Covid-19 pandemic we increasingly turned to technology to stay in touch with our family, friends, and colleagues. Even as lockdowns and restrictions ease many are encouraging us to embrace the replacement of face-to-face encounters with technologically mediated ones. Yet, as philosophers of technology have highlighted, technology can transform the situations we find ourselves in. Drawing insights from the phenomenology of sociality, we consider how digitally-enabled forms of communication and sociality impact our experience of one another. In particular, we draw attention to the way in which our embodied experience of one another is altered when we meet in digital spaces, taking as our focus the themes of perceptual access, intercorporeality, shared space, transitional spaces, and self-presentation. In light of the way in which technological mediation alters various dimensions of our social encounters, we argue that digital encounters constitute their own forms of sociality requiring their own phenomenological analysis. We conclude our paper by raising some broader concerns about the very framework of thinking about digitally and non-digitally mediated social encounters simply in terms of replacement.

Disordered Selfhood in Schizophrenia and the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience: Accumulated Evidence and Experience.

Disordered selfhood in schizophrenia was rediscovered at the turn of the millennium. In 2005, Psychopathology published the psychometric instrument, the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE). In this article, we summarize the historical background of the creation of the EASE, explicate the notion of the disorder of basic or minimal self with the help of phenomenological philosophy, and provide a brief description of clinical manifestations targeted by the EASE. We also present our personal experience using and teaching the EASE and summarize the empirical evidence obtained so far. We conclude that the basic self-disorder represents a crucial phenotype of schizophrenia spectrum disorders and that this phenotype offers a potential avenue to empirical pathogenetic research and psychotherapeutic treatment.

The practice of phenomenology: The case of Max van Manen.

Since its inception, phenomenological philosophy has exerted an influence on empirical science. But what is the best way to practice, use and apply phenomenology in a non-philosophical context? How deeply rooted in phenomenological philosophy must qualitative research be in order to qualify as phenomenological? How many of the core commitments of phenomenology must it accept? In the following contribution, I will take a closer look at Max van Manen's work. I will argue that van Manen's understanding of and presentation of phenomenology is quite problematic and that his book Phenomenology of Practice rather than amounting to a clear and accessible presentation of the phenomenological method that would make it do-able to researchers who are not themselves professional philosophers is in fact both abstruse and excessively complicated. I will then turn to nursing, and by taking that as my example, outline a better way to apply and practice phenomenology.

Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia.

In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have referred to the case of thought insertion as a clear counter example. In this study, we address and refute the claim that episodes of thought insertion represent examples of experiences lacking for-me-ness. We highlight certain unaddressed methodological and psychopathological problems that tend to hamper philosophical discussions of thought insertion. Although thought insertion does not involve a lack of for-me-ness, we do argue that thought insertion involves a disturbed for-me-ness. Finally, we offer a novel account of how for-me-ness is disturbed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders and we discuss how a disturbed for-me-ness may be involved in the formation of thought insertion.

Getting It Quite Wrong: Van Manen and Smith on Phenomenology.

Max van Manen and Jonathan Smith have recently had an exchange in Qualitative Health Research concerning their respective use of phenomenology. I welcome the attempt to get clearer on what phenomenology amounts to and I agree with van Manen that an overly arbitrary use of the term will lead to an erosion of the reputation of phenomenology. However, I think both of them are to blame for promoting various confusions concerning the nature of phenomenology. The aim of my article is to make some critical remarks concerning van Manen's and Smith's understanding of phenomenology and to suggest alternative resources for qualitative researchers interested in phenomenology.

Empathy ≠ sharing: Perspectives from phenomenology and developmental psychology.

We argue that important insights regarding the topic of sharing can be gathered from phenomenology and developmental psychology; insights that in part challenge widespread ideas about what sharing is and where it can be found. To be more specific, we first exemplify how the notion of sharing is being employed in recent discussions of empathy, and then argue that this use of the notion tends to be seriously confused. It typically conflates similarity and sharing and, more generally speaking, fails to recognize that sharing proper involves reciprocity. As part of this critical analysis, we draw on sophisticated analyses of the distinction between empathy and emotional sharing that can be found in early phenomenology. Next, we turn to developmental psychology. Sharing is not simply one thing, but a complex and many-layered phenomenon. By tracing its early developmental trajectory from infancy and beyond, we show how careful psychological observations can help us develop a more sophisticated understanding of sharing than the one currently employed in many discussions in the realm of neuroscience. In our conclusion, we return to the issue of empathy and argue that although empathy does not involve or entail sharing, empathy understood as a basic sensitivity to and understanding of others (rather than as a special prosocial concern for others) might be a precondition for sharing.

"Getting the Left Right": The Experience of Hemispatial Neglect After Stroke.

We used a phenomenological approach to gain insight into the experiences of self, other, and world in patients with hemispatial neglect within the first month following stroke. Comprehensive descriptions of circumstances were conjoined with open-ended interviews of 12 participants. The neglect experience was captured in the overarching theme, "getting the left right," which encompasses the two subthemes of (a) surreal awareness of the left and (b) emergence of a different world. Patients had unclear perceptions of their own body and surroundings, their attention was brittle, and they encountered bewildering reactions from other people. They simultaneously pursued the ineffable neglected space and searched for coherence. The vulnerability, loss, and conflicting perceptions that patients with neglect face should be acknowledged and alleviation sought. Facilitating methods should provide additional opportunities for patients to communicate their experiences. We underscore the importance of readjusting the current approaches of neglect and emphasizing meaningfulness in professional guidance.

Faces and ascriptions: mapping measures of the self.

The 'self' is increasingly used as a variable in cognitive experiments and correlated with activity in particular areas in the brain. At first glance, this seems to transform the self from an ephemeral theoretical entity to something concrete and measurable. However, the transformation is by no means unproblematic. We trace the development of two important experimental paradigms in the study of the self, self-face recognition and the adjective self ascription task. We show how the experimental instrumentalization has gone hand in hand with a simplification of the self-concept, and how more conceptual and theoretical reflections on the structure, function and nature of self have either disappeared altogether or receded into the background. We argue that this development impedes and complicates the interdisciplinary study of self.

The uncanny mirror: a re-framing of mirror self-experience.

Mirror self-experience is re-casted away from the cognitivist interpretation that has dominated discussions on the issue since the establishment of the mirror mark test. Ideas formulated by Merleau-Ponty on mirror self-experience point to the profoundly unsettling encounter with one's specular double. These ideas, together with developmental evidence are re-visited to provide a new, psychologically and phenomenologically more valid account of mirror self-experience: an experience associated with deep wariness.

Basic empathy: Developing the concept of empathy from the ground up.

Empathy is a topic of continuous debate in the nursing literature. Many argue that empathy is indispensable to effective nursing practice. Yet others argue that nurses should rather rely on sympathy, compassion, or consolation. However, a more troubling disagreement underlies these debates: There's no consensus on how to define empathy. This lack of consensus is the primary obstacle to a constructive debate over the role and import of empathy in nursing practice. The solution to this problem seems obvious: Nurses need to reach a consensus on the meaning and definition of empathy. But this is easier said than done. Concept analyses, for instance, reveal a profound ambiguity and heterogeneity of the concept of empathy across the nursing literature. Since the term "empathy" is used to refer to a range of perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena, this conceptual ambiguity and heterogeneity is hardly surprising. Our proposal is simple. To move forward, we need to return to the basics. We should develop the concept from the ground up. That is, we should begin by identifying and describing the most fundamental form of empathic experience. Once we identify the most fundamental form of empathy, we will be able to distinguish among the more derivative experiences and behaviors that are addressed by the same name and, ideally, determine the place of these phenomena in the field of nursing. The aim of this article is, consequently, to lay the groundwork for a more coherent concept of empathy and thereby for a more fruitful debate over the role of empathy in nursing. In Part 1, we outline the history of the concept of empathy within nursing, explain why nurses are sometimes warry of adapting concepts from other disciplines, and argue that nurses should distinguish between adapting concepts from applied disciplines and from more theoretical disciplines. In Part 2, we show that the distinction between emotional and cognitive empathy-borrowed from theoretical psychology-has been a major factor in nurses' negative attitudes toward emotional empathy. We argue, however, that both concepts fail to capture the most fundamental form of empathy. In Part 3, we draw on and present some of the seminal studies of empathy that can be found in the work of phenomenological philosophers including Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein. In Part 4, we outline how their understanding of empathy may facilitate current debates about empathy's role in nursing.

Phenomenology in nursing studies: New perspectives.

Nursing studies have for decades drawn on the philosophical tradition of phenomenology when developing their own methodology and theoretical foundation. This use and application of phenomenology has, however, not been met with universal approval. One prominent and persistent opponent has been John Paley, who has sent a clear message to the nursing community: If you are looking for philosophical inspiration or methodological guidance, do not look to phenomenology. As we argue in the article, in formulating his criticism, Paley completely overlooks a rich tradition of applied phenomenology that dates back to the beginning of the 20th century and which has undergone a momentous revival during the last 20-25 years. That Paley seems oblivious to this tradition is one thing. What is more astonishing is that this also holds true for the vast majority of those scholars working within nursing science who happens to be interested in phenomenology. The aim of this article is, first, to present and consider Paley's criticism in some detail and, then, to discuss some of the significant applications of phenomenology that have often been overlooked by qualitative researchers. As has been amply demonstrated over the years, phenomenology can not only make a difference in the handling, analysis, and interpretation of the available data, but also, in how the data are obtained in the first place, for instance, through special interview techniques. We will consider some central figures in classical phenomenological psychology and phenomenological psychiatry, and present some of the more recent developments in cognitive science. We will then discuss three concrete cases that demonstrate how phenomenology has been applied in clinical work with patients with schizophrenia, cerebral palsy, and hemispatial neglect. Our main message to qualitative researchers interested in phenomenology is the following. You should also start to consider and draw inspiration from the way in which phenomenology has been applied outside of the domain of qualitative research. There are quite successful applications of phenomenology to be found elsewhere, applications that can offer substantial theoretical and methodological support to qualitative researchers. Relevant resources include classical phenomenological psychology, classical and contemporary phenomenological psychiatry, and contemporary discussions of naturalized phenomenology.

Simulation, projection and empathy.

Simulationists have recently started to employ the term "empathy" when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler's classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding-in particular the understanding of emotional expressions-that are not explicable in terms of simulation-plus-projection routines.

Fenomenologia aplicada: porque é seguro ignorar a epoché / Applied phenomenology: why is it safe to ignore the epoché / Fenomenología aplicada: ¿por qué es seguro ignorar epoché?

A questão de saber se uma investigação e análise propriamente fenomenológicas requerem a performance da epoché e a redução não tem sido apenas discutida dentro da filosofia fenomenológica. É também uma questão que tem sido intensamente debatida dentro da pesquisa qualitativa. Amedeo Giorgi, em particular, insistiu que nenhuma pesquisa científica pode reivindicar um status fenomenológico a menos que seja apoiada por algum uso da epoché e redução. Giorgi fundamenta parcialmente tal afirmação em idéias encontradas nos escritos de Husserl sobre psicologia fenomenológica. No presente artigo examino as ideias de Husserl e argumento que enquanto a epoché e a redução são cruciais para a fenomenologia transcendental, é algo muito mais questionável se elas também são relevantes para uma aplicação não-filosófica da fenomenologia.

The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl's writings on phenomenological psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl's ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology.

La cuestión de si una investigación y análisis fenomenológico adecuado requiere que uno realice la época y la reducción no solo se ha discutido dentro de la filosofía fenomenológica. También es una pregunta que se ha debatido acaloradamente dentro de la investigación cualitativa. Amedeo Giorgi, en particular, ha insistido en que ninguna investigación científica puede reclamar un estado fenomenológico a menos que esté respaldada por algún uso de la época y la reducción. Giorgi basa parcialmente esta afirmación en ideas encontradas en los escritos de Husserl sobre psicología fenomenológica. En el presente artículo, discuto las ideas de Husserl y sostengo que si bien la época y la reducción son cruciales para la fenomenología trascendental, es mucho más cuestionable si también son relevantes para una aplicación no filosófica de la fenomenología.