Meta-analysis to explain unknown causes of the origins of SARS-COV-2.

New Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) causes the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), an infectious illness that has generated a pandemic crisis worldwide. One of the fundamental questions in science and society is how SARS-CoV-2 has been originated to design best practices directed to prevent and/or to cope with future hazardous pathogens. The study confronts this question here developing a meta-analysis, which endeavors to explain, whenever possible, unknown sources of the SARS-CoV-2. Findings suggest that the natural spillover of novel viral agents that generate more than 6.00 M deaths worldwide in about two years (such as, SARS-CoV-2 from February 2020 to March 2022) has a remote probability of occurrence (using an analogy with the probability of natural disasters generating a lot of fatalities), whereas science advances on hazardous viral agents and consequential lab accident have a (higher) probability of occurrence (about 13-20% like in manifold lab accidents). The findings of this meta-analysis suggest the vital role of improving the technical guidelines of biosafety at all levels in laboratories during the development of scientific research of experimental virology on hazardous pathogens to minimize risks of pandemic threats in environment and human society.

A survey of laboratory biosafety and protective measures in blood transfusion departments during the COVID-19 pandemic.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Thousands of healthcare workers (HCWs) have been infected with 2019 novel coronavirus pneumonia (COVID-19) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Laboratory personnel in blood transfusion departments may be infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) if laboratory biosafety protection is insufficient. Therefore, we investigated the current situation of laboratory biosafety protection in blood transfusion departments to determine how to improve the safety of laboratory processes. MATERIALS AND METHODS: An online survey was conducted in blood transfusion departments from 1st to 6th May 2020 in China. A total of 653 individuals completed the questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed with reference to COVID-19 laboratory biosafety summarized in Annex II. All responses were summarized using only descriptive statistics and expressed as frequencies and ratios [n (%)]. RESULTS: Most participants were concerned about COVID-19. Some participants had inadequate knowledge of COVID-19. Two participants stated that there were laboratory personnel infected with SARS-CoV-2 in their departments. A total of 31 (4.7%) participants did not receive any safety and security training. In terms of laboratory biosafety protection practices, the major challenges were suboptimal laboratory safety practices and insufficient laboratory conditions. CONCLUSION: The major deficiencies were insufficient security and safety training, and a lack of personal protective equipment, automatic cap removal centrifuges and biosafety cabinets. Consequently, we should enhance the security and safety training of laboratory personnel to improve their laboratory biosafety protection practices and ensure that laboratory conditions are sufficient to improve the safety of laboratory processes.

Laboratory Focus on Improving the Culture of Biosafety: Statewide Risk Assessment of Clinical Laboratories That Process Specimens for Microbiologic Analysis.

The Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene challenged Wisconsin laboratories to examine their biosafety practices and improve their culture of biosafety. One hundred three clinical and public health laboratories completed a questionnaire-based, microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment. Greater than 96% of the respondents performed activities related to specimen processing, direct microscopic examination, and rapid nonmolecular testing, while approximately 60% performed culture interpretation. Although they are important to the assessment of risk, data specific to patient occupation, symptoms, and travel history were often unavailable to the laboratory and, therefore, less contributory to a microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment than information on the specimen source and test requisition. Over 88% of the respondents complied with more than three-quarters of the mitigation control measures listed in the survey. Facility assessment revealed that subsets of laboratories that claim biosafety level 1, 2, or 3 status did not possess all of the biosafety elements considered minimally standard for their respective classifications. Many laboratories reported being able to quickly correct the minor deficiencies identified. Task assessment identified deficiencies that trended higher within the general (not microbiology-specific) laboratory for core activities, such as packaging and shipping, direct microscopic examination, and culture modalities solely involving screens for organism growth. For traditional microbiology departments, opportunities for improvement in the cultivation and management of highly infectious agents, such as acid-fast bacilli and systemic fungi, were revealed. These results derived from a survey of a large cohort of small- and large-scale laboratories suggest the necessity for continued microbiology-based understanding of biosafety practices, vigilance toward biosafety, and enforcement of biosafety practices throughout the laboratory setting.

Comparison of Brazilian High- and Maximum-Containment Laboratories Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulations to Legal Frameworks in the United States and Other Countries: Gaps and Opportunities.

Introduction: Although the United States and other countries have implemented comprehensive legislation, regulations, and policies to support biosafety and biosecurity of high- and maximum-containment laboratories, Brazil's legislation has notable gaps and inconsistencies. Objective: To evaluate the Brazilian approach to ensuring nationwide biosafety and biosecurity oversight and governance of high- and maximum-containment laboratories. Methods: A systematic gap analysis was conducted to compare Brazilian biosafety and biosecurity legislation, regulations, and policies with their international counterparts, with a particular focus on the oversight and governance of high- and maximum-containment laboratories. Results: We found that Brazilian biosafety and biosecurity legislation, regulations, and policies have relevant gaps. Governance and regulatory oversight of Brazil's high- and maximum-containment laboratories are decentralized with variable levels of adherence to commonly accepted global biosafety and biosecurity compliance standards. These findings represent a limitation not only to governance but also to the preparedness to face current and future challenges related to emergent infectious diseases in Brazil. Enhancing the Brazilian legal framework on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity is necessary and urgent. Reviewing the lessons learned and regulations applied in the United States and other international frameworks helped identify potential areas for improving Brazil's ability to inventory and manage its diverse biocontainment laboratory capabilities and assure these valuable resources align with national needs and priorities. Conclusion: The Brazilian government has an opportunity to revise and improve upon a national set of legislation, regulations, and policies for its high- and maximum-containment laboratories, taking advantage of legislation and guidelines published by other countries.

Case report: a genomics-guided reclassification of a blood culture isolate misassigned by MALDI-TOF as Yersinia pestis.

In this report, we describe a case where Gram-negative rods were isolated from a blood culture which subsequently presented a discordant Yersinia species result by MALDI-TOF. Rapid sequencing provided high-resolution identification of the isolate as Yersinia pseudotuberculosis , which was subsequently confirmed by biochemical tests.

Strengthening laboratory biosafety in Liberia during the COVID-19 pandemic: Experience from the Global Laboratory Leadership Programme.

Background: The Global Laboratory Leadership Programme (GLLP) has biosafety and biosecurity as one of its core competencies and advocates for a One Health approach involving all relevant sectors across the human-animal-environment interface to empower national laboratory systems and strengthen health security. Decentralization of SARS-CoV-2 testing in Liberia coupled with an increase in the number of COVID-19 infections among laboratory professionals raised biosafety concerns. In response, a set of trainings on laboratory biosafety was launched for lab personnel across the country under the framework of the GLLP. The goal was to deliver a comprehensive package for laboratory biosafety in the context of SARS-CoV-2 through active learning. Methods: Three one-day workshops were conducted between September and October 2020, training personnel from human, animal and environmental laboratories through a One Health approach. Concepts critical to laboratory biosafety were delivered in an interactive engagement format to ensure effective learning and retention of concepts. Pre- and post-training assessments were performed, and a paired t-test was used to assess knowledge gain. Results: Of the 67 participants, 64 were from the human health sector, one from veterinary sector and two from environmental health sector. The average pre-test score was 41%. The main gaps identified were failure to acknowledge surgical antisepsis as a form of hand hygiene and recognition of PPE as the best risk control measure. The average post-test score was 75.5%. The mean difference of pre-test and post-test scores was statistically significant (p-value <0.001). Participants indicated satisfaction with the workshop content, mode of delivery and trainers' proficiency. Conclusions: The workshops were impactful as evidenced by significant improvement (34.5%) in the post-test scores and positive participant feedback. Repeated refresher trainings are vital to addressing the gaps, ensuring compliance, and promoting biosafety culture. GLLP's approach to cultivating multisectoral national laboratory leaders ready to take responsibility and ownership for capacity building provides a sustainable solution for attaining strong national laboratory systems better prepared for health emergencies and pandemics like COVID-19.

The rise in preanalytical errors during COVID-19 pandemic.

INTRODUCTION: The COVID-19 pandemic has posed several challenges to clinical laboratories across the globe. Amidst the outbreak, errors occurring in the preanalytical phase of sample collection, transport and processing, can further lead to undesirable clinical consequences. Thus, this study was designed with the following objectives: (i) to determine and compare the blood specimen rejection rate of a clinical laboratory and (ii) to characterise and compare the types of preanalytical errors between the pre-pandemic and the pandemic phases. MATERIALS AND METHODS: This retrospective study was carried out in a trauma-care hospital, presently converted to COVID-19 care centre. Data was collected from (i) pre-pandemic phase: 1st October 2019 to 23rd March 2020 and (ii) pandemic phase: 24th March to 31st October 2020. Blood specimen rejection rate was calculated as the proportion of blood collection tubes with preanalytical errors out of the total number received, expressed as percentage. RESULTS: Total of 107,716 blood specimens were screened of which 43,396 (40.3%) were received during the pandemic. The blood specimen rejection rate during the pandemic was significantly higher than the pre-pandemic phase (3.0% versus 1.1%; P < 0.001). Clotted samples were the commonest source of preanalytical errors in both phases. There was a significant increase in the improperly labelled samples (P < 0.001) and samples with insufficient volume (P < 0.001), whereas, a significant decline in samples with inadequate sample-anticoagulant ratio and haemolysed samples (P < 0.001). CONCLUSION: In the ongoing pandemic, preanalytical errors and resultant blood specimen rejection rate in the clinical laboratory have significantly increased due to changed logistics. The study highlights the need for corrective steps at various levels to reduce preanalytical errors in order to optimise patient care and resource utilisation.

Effects of a fully enclosed hollow-fiber centrifugal ultrafiltration technique for laboratory biosafety improvement.

Laboratory biosafety has become a core focus in biological analysis, owing to the frequent occurrence of laboratory-acquired infections caused by the leakage of pathogenic microorganisms. For this purpose, the authors developed a safe pretreatment device combining a sealing technique with a direct injection technique. In this study, several bacteria and viruses were used to validate the filtration effect of the invention. Data show that the new device can completely filter bacteria and that the filtration rates for hepatitis B virus and hepatitis C virus reached 94% and 96%, respectively. The results show that the new preparation device can effectively block these pathogens and can improve biological safety and provide powerful protection for technicians.

Laboratory biosafety in China: past, present, and future.

The launch of the new journal, Biosafety and Health, presents me with a unique opportunity to recount the progress of laboratory biosafety (LB) in China and my contribution to this area over the past 30 years. Since the severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic in 2003, China has constructed a primary network of high-level biosafety laboratories at different levels and established an expert team on LB. Furthermore, a series of LB management documents, including laws, regulations, standards, and guidelines, have been developed and published. This gradually maturing LB system has played a pivotal role in emerging infectious disease control and prevention, as well as in research, which in turn contributes to public health. In recent years, international collaboration between China and other countries has also been accelerated. Despite these achievements, we are still facing many challenges and opportunities in the field of LB. Sustainable LB development requires the joint efforts of the entire society and continuous international cooperation to safeguard global public health.

Development of a Biosecurity Checklist for Laboratory Assessment and Monitoring.

INTRODUCTION: Laboratory biosecurity is of continuously growing interest due to increasing concerns about deliberate misuse of biological materials and emerging biological risks. These risks continue to be magnified by globalization, the rapid pace of scientific development, and dual-use technologies. Worldwide laboratory capacities are expanding, which calls for concrete actions to improve laboratory biosafety and biosecurity practices to protect researchers and the community. Hence, laboratories require comprehensive biorisk management programs to minimize the risk of accidental and deliberate release of infectious biological materials. OBJECTIVE: Malaysia has prioritized the concern of national biosecurity and aims to consolidate laboratory biosecurity performance to detect and prevent the deliberate release of biological agents. METHODS: Two 3-day workshops were organized over the course of four months in which Malaysia collaborated with The Netherlands. This bilateral engagement aimed to integrate biosecurity practices in their national biorisk management programs, and resulted into a comprehensive biosecurity checklist for laboratory assessment and monitoring. RESULTS: This biosecurity checklist is based on Malaysian and Dutch expert opinions and national and international guidelines and regulations. The biosecurity checklist is a survey-driven tool that consists of a set of concrete questions for each key biosecurity area, which are discussion points for assessment. CONCLUSION: We display a practical biosecurity checklist for laboratory assessment and monitoring. Although the presented checklist was the template for the specific Malaysia checklist, it could serve as a template for other countries.

[Establishment of a risk assessment model for laboratory biosafety of Cryptosporidium].

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the risk assessment model of Cryptosporidium laboratory, so as to provide the basis for laboratory personnel engaging in the operation of Cryptosporidium. METHODS: Firstly, the risk factors of Cryptosporidium infection in laboratory were determined by the literature and Delphi, and then the weights of risk factors were determined by fuzzy analytic hierarchy process. A risk assessment model for laboratory biosafety of Cryptosporidium was established. RESULTS: Compared to the indexes, based on the risk assessment model, stool sample processing was the two steps in the laboratory with high risk of infection and high risk factors, with the combination weights of risk possibility and hazard rating were 0.111 and 0.107, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: The risk assessment model established is feasible. It can be used to make some suggestions for the related laboratory staff.

A Case-Study of Implementation of Improved Strategies for Prevention of Laboratory-acquired Brucellosis.

BACKGROUND: In 2012, the Alaska Section of Epidemiology investigated personnel potentially exposed to a Brucella suis isolate as it transited through three laboratories. METHODS: We summarize the first implementation of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2013 revised recommendations for monitoring such exposures: (1) risk classification; (2) antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis; (3) serologic monitoring; and (4) symptom surveillance. RESULTS: Over 30 people were assessed for exposure and subsequently monitored for development of illness. No cases of laboratory-associated brucellosis occurred. Changes were made to gaps in laboratory biosafety practices that had been identified in the investigation. CONCLUSION: Achieving full compliance for the precise schedule of serologic monitoring was challenging and resource intensive for the laboratory performing testing. More refined exposure assessments could inform decision making for follow-up to maximize likelihood of detecting persons at risk while not overtaxing resources.