Moral experts as members of ethics commissions as seen through the prism of comprehensive doctrines.

Ethics commissions provide expert advice to governments on what policies to implement regarding pressing ethical issues, most often in bioethics. These commissions distinguish themselves by having members from the professions we are most likely to think of as moral experts, if we believe that these exist. The relationship between moral experts and the composition of ethics commissions is worthy of further exploration, especially because of the highly controversial nature of whether moral expertise exists and, if so, how, and whether, we can identify moral experts. Moreover, it has been argued that the emergence of ethics commissions and how they have been composed have led to a "thinner" debate. In the first part of the article, the problem regarding checks for identifying moral experts is discussed. I argue that one way to handle this difficulty is through the application of Rawls' concept of comprehensive doctrines. These doctrines have inherent standards that function similarly to independent checks, making it possible to identify moral experts from within such different doctrines. Using this approach makes it manageable to appoint moral experts to ethics commissions. In the second part, I consider the implications of seeing moral expertise through the prism of comprehensive doctrines for the composition of ethics commissions. One natural conclusion is that we should select moral experts representing different reasonable comprehensive doctrines to serve as members of ethics commissions. I consider six challenges to my proposal and demonstrate why these lack merit, and I point out some practical concerns that need further inquiry.

Moral expertise revisited.

In recent years, there has been a lively (bio-)ethical debate on the nature of moral expertise and the concept of moral experts. However, there is currently no common ground concerning most issues. Against this background, this paper has two main goals. First, in more general terms, it examines some of the problems concerning moral expertise and experts, with a special focus on moral advice and testimony. Second, it applies the results in the context of medical ethics, especially in the clinical setting. By situating the debate in the clinical setting, one arrives at some important conclusions to better understand the relevant concepts and vital problems in the general discussion on moral expertise and the requirements of who counts as a moral expert.

Policy-Development and Deference to Moral Experts.

The involvement of ethicists, philosophers or others who might qualify as 'moral experts' in policy-development, where they are sometimes, typically as members of a committee, given an advisory role, is often seen as problematic, for several reasons. First, there may be doubts as to the very existence of moral experts, and it may be hard to know who the moral experts are. Next, even if these problems are solved, giving experts a special role in policy-making might be problematic from a democratic point of view, if it involves politicians deferring to the moral judgements of experts. The paper considers possible replies to this problem of moral deference. One reply is that moral deference is unnecessary, because even moral non-experts are well equipped to assess the arguments offered by moral experts; I argue that this reply underestimates the complexity of moral arguments. Another reply is that if moral experts are simply given the 'technical' role of clarifying which concrete positions that follow from the values which decision-makers already accept, deference is not problematic. I will argue that this reply underestimates how a given set of moral values underdetermines which concrete positions follow from it. Finally, I will consider and defend the reply that since policy decisions are subject to a requirement that they be justified within the limits of public reason, and since these limits include a requirement that the justification be accessible, moral experts are barred from providing policy advice which rests on too complex moral arguments.

Moral Philosophy, Moral Expertise, and the Argument from Disagreement.

Several recent articles have weighed in on the question of whether moral philosophers can be counted as moral experts. One argument denying this has been rejected by both sides of the debate. According to this argument, the extent of disagreement in modern moral philosophy prevents moral philosophers from being classified as moral experts. Call this the Argument From Disagreement (AD). In this article, I defend a version of AD. Insofar as practical issues in moral philosophy are characterized by disagreement between moral philosophers who are more or less equally well credentialed on the issue, non-philosophers have no good reasons to defer to their views.

Moral philosophers are moral experts! A reply to David Archard.

In his article 'Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be Moral Experts' David Archard attempts to show that his argument from common-sense morality is more convincing than other competing arguments in the debate. I examine his main line of argumentation and eventually refute his main argument in my reply.

Malleable Morality: Re-Shaping Moral Judgments in Health Policymaking.

When confronted with moral dilemmas related to health, governments frequently turn to "moral experts," such as bioethicists and moral philosophers, for guidance and advice. They commonly assume that these experts' moral judgments are primarily a product of deliberate reasoning. The article challenges this assumption, arguing that experts' moral judgments may instead be primarily a product of moral intuitions which, often subconsciously, respond to the social setting.