Primate Amygdala Neurons Simulate Decision Processes of Social Partners.

By observing their social partners, primates learn about reward values of objects. Here, we show that monkeys' amygdala neurons derive object values from observation and use these values to simulate a partner monkey's decision process. While monkeys alternated making reward-based choices, amygdala neurons encoded object-specific values learned from observation. Dynamic activities converted these values to representations of the recorded monkey's own choices. Surprisingly, the same activity patterns unfolded spontaneously before partner's choices in separate neurons, as if these neurons simulated the partner's decision-making. These "simulation neurons" encoded signatures of mutual-inhibitory decision computation, including value comparisons and value-to-choice conversions, resulting in accurate predictions of partner's choices. Population decoding identified differential contributions of amygdala subnuclei. Biophysical modeling of amygdala circuits showed that simulation neurons emerge naturally from convergence between object-value neurons and self-other neurons. By simulating decision computations during observation, these neurons could allow primates to reconstruct their social partners' mental states.

Seeing and understanding epistemic actions.

Many actions have instrumental aims, in which we move our bodies to achieve a physical outcome in the environment. However, we also perform actions with epistemic aims, in which we move our bodies to acquire information and learn about the world. A large literature on action recognition investigates how observers represent and understand the former class of actions; but what about the latter class? Can one person tell, just by observing another person's movements, what they are trying to learn? Here, five experiments explore epistemic action understanding. We filmed volunteers playing a "physics game" consisting of two rounds: Players shook an opaque box and attempted to determine i) the number of objects hidden inside, or ii) the shape of the objects inside. Then, independent subjects watched these videos and were asked to determine which videos came from which round: Who was shaking for number and who was shaking for shape? Across several variations, observers successfully determined what an actor was trying to learn, based only on their actions (i.e., how they shook the box)-even when the box's contents were identical across rounds. These results demonstrate that humans can infer epistemic intent from physical behaviors, adding a new dimension to research on action understanding.

Brain activity supporting alternating speech for semantic words: simultaneous magnetoencephalographic recording.

Communication, especially conversation, is essential for human social life. Many previous studies have examined the neuroscientific underpinnings of conversation, i.e. language comprehension and speech production. However, conversation inherently involves two or more people, and unless two people actually interact with one another, the nature of the conversation cannot be truly revealed. Therefore, in this study, we used two magnetoencephalographs that were connected together, and simultaneously recorded brain activity while two people took turns speaking in a word association/alphabet completion task. We compared the amplitude modulation of the alpha- and beta-band rhythms within each of the 62 brain regions under semantic (word association; less predictable) and non-semantic (alphabet completion; more predictable) conditions. We found that the amplitudes of the rhythms were significantly different between conditions in a wide range of brain regions. Additionally, significant differences were observed in nearly the same group of brain regions after versus before each utterance, indicating that a wide range of brain areas is involved in predicting a conversation partner's next utterance. This result supports the idea that mentalizing, e.g. predicting another person's speech, plays an important role in conversation, and suggests that the neural network implicated in mentalizing extends over a wide range of brain regions.

A conceptual framework for consciousness.

This article argues that consciousness has a logically sound, explanatory framework, different from typical accounts that suffer from hidden mysticism. The article has three main parts. The first describes background principles concerning information processing in the brain, from which one can deduce a general, rational framework for explaining consciousness. The second part describes a specific theory that embodies those background principles, the Attention Schema Theory. In the past several years, a growing body of experimental evidence-behavioral evidence, brain imaging evidence, and computational modeling-has addressed aspects of the theory. The final part discusses the evolution of consciousness. By emphasizing the specific role of consciousness in cognition and behavior, the present approach leads to a proposed account of how consciousness may have evolved over millions of years, from fish to humans. The goal of this article is to present a comprehensive, overarching framework in which we can understand scientifically what consciousness is and what key adaptive roles it plays in brain function.

Autism attenuates the perception of the mind-body divide.

People are intuitive Dualists-they tacitly consider the mind as ethereal, distinct from the body. Here we ask whether Dualism emerges naturally from the conflicting core principles that guide reasoning about objects, on the one hand, and about the minds of agents (theory of mind, ToM), on the other. To address this question, we explore Dualist reasoning in autism spectrum disorder (ASD)-a congenital disorder known to compromise ToM. If Dualism arises from ToM, then ASD ought to attenuate Dualism and promote Physicalism. In line with this prediction, Experiment 1 shows that, compared to controls, people with ASD are more likely to view psychological traits as embodied-as likely to manifest in a replica of one's body. Experiment 2 demonstrates that, unlike controls, people with ASD do not consider thoughts as disembodied-as persistent in the afterlife (upon the body's demise). If ASD promotes the perception of the psyche as embodied, and if (per Essentialism) embodiment suggests innateness, then ASD should further promote Nativism-this bias is shown in Experiment 3. Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrates that, in neurotypical (NT) participants, difficulties with ToM correlate with Physicalism. These results are the first to show that ASD attenuates Dualist reasoning and to link Dualism to ToM. These conclusions suggest that the mind-body distinction might be natural for people to entertain.

Young children infer and manage what others think about them.

We care about what others think of us and often try to present ourselves in a good light. What cognitive capacities underlie our ability to think (or even worry) about reputation, and how do these concerns manifest as strategic self-presentational behaviors? Even though the tendency to modify one's behaviors in the presence of others emerges early in life, the degree to which these behaviors reflect a rich understanding of what others think about the self has remained an open question. Bridging prior work on reputation management, communication, and theory of mind development in early childhood, here we investigate young children's ability to infer and revise others' mental representation of the self. Across four experiments, we find that 3- and 4-y-old children's decisions about to whom to communicate (Experiment 1), what to communicate (Experiments 2 and 3), and which joint activity to engage in with a partner (Experiment 4) are systematically influenced by the partner's observations of the children's own past performance. Children in these studies chose to present self-relevant information selectively and strategically when it could revise the partner's outdated, negative representation of the self. Extending research on children's ability to engage in informative communication, these results demonstrate the sophistication of early self-presentational behaviors: Even young children can draw rich inferences about what others think of them and communicate self-relevant information to revise these representations.

Precision Mapping of the Default Network Reveals Common and Distinct (Inter)activity for Autobiographical Memory and Theory of Mind.

The default network is widely implicated as a common neural substrate for self-generated thought, such as remembering one's past (autobiographical memory) and imagining the thoughts and feelings of others (theory of mind). Findings that the default network comprises subnetworks of regions - some commonly and some distinctly involved across processes - suggest that one's own experiences inform their understanding of others. With the advent of precision fMRI methods, however, it is unclear if this shared substrate is observed instead due to traditional group analysis methods. We investigated this possibility using a novel combination of methodological strategies. Twenty-three participants underwent multi-echo resting-state and task fMRI. We used their resting-state scans to conduct cortical parcellation sensitive to individual variation but preserving our ability to conduct group analysis. Using multivariate analyses, we assessed the functional activation and connectivity profiles of default network regions while participants engaged in autobiographical memory, theory of mind, or a sensorimotor control condition. Across the default network, we observed stronger activity associated with both autobiographical memory and theory of mind compared to the control condition. Nonetheless, we also observed that some regions showed preferential activity to either experimental condition, in line with past work. The connectivity results similarly indicated shared and distinct functional profiles. Our results support that autobiographical memory and theory of mind - two theoretically important and widely-studied domains of social cognition - evoke common and distinct aspects of the default network even when ensuring high fidelity to individual-specific characteristics.

Functional alterations in resting-state networks for Theory of Mind in Parkinson's disease.

In Parkinson's disease (PD), impairment of Theory of Mind (ToM) has recently attracted an increasing number of neuroscientific investigations. If and how functional connectivity of the ToM network is altered in PD is still an open question. First, we explored whether ToM network connectivity shows potential PD-specific functional alterations when compared to healthy controls (HC). Second, we tested the role of the duration of PD in the evolution of functional alterations in the ToM network. Between-group connectivity alterations were computed adopting resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) data of four groups: PD patients with short disease duration (PD-1, n = 72); PD patients with long disease duration (PD-2, n = 22); healthy controls for PD-1 (HC-1, n = 69); healthy controls for PD-2 (HC-2, n = 22). We explored connectivity differences in the ToM network within and between its three subnetworks: Affective, Cognitive and Core. PD-1 presented a global pattern of decreased functional connectivity within the ToM network, compared to HC-1. The alterations mainly involved the Cognitive and Affective ToM subnetworks and their reciprocal connections. PD-2-those with longer disease duration-showed an increased connectivity spanning the entire ToM network, albeit less consistently in the Core ToM network, compared to both the PD-1 and the HC-2 groups. Functional connectivity within the ToM network is altered in PD. The alterations follow a graded pattern, with decreased connectivity at short disease duration, which broadens to a generalized increase with longer disease duration. The alterations involve both the Cognitive and Affective subnetworks of ToM.

Risk factors for internalizing symptoms: The influence of empathy, theory of mind, and negative thinking processes.

Internalizing symptoms such as elevated stress and sustained negative affect can be important warning signs for developing mental disorders. A recent theoretical framework suggests a complex interplay of empathy, theory of mind (ToM), and negative thinking processes as a crucial risk combination for internalizing symptoms. To disentangle these relationships, this study utilizes neural, behavioral, and self-report data to examine how the interplay between empathy, ToM, and negative thinking processes relates to stress and negative affect. We reanalyzed the baseline data of N = 302 healthy participants (57% female, Mage = 40.52, SDage = 9.30) who participated in a large-scale mental training study, the ReSource project. Empathy and ToM were assessed using a validated fMRI paradigm featuring naturalistic video stimuli and via self-report. Additional self-report scales were employed to measure internalizing symptoms (perceived stress, negative affect) and negative thinking processes (rumination and self-blame). Our results revealed linear associations of self-reported ToM and empathic distress with stress and negative affect. Also, both lower and higher, compared to average, activation in the anterior insula during empathic processing and in the middle temporal gyrus during ToM performance was significantly associated with internalizing symptoms. These associations were dependent on rumination and self-blame. Our findings indicate specific risk constellations for internalizing symptoms. Especially people with lower self-reported ToM and higher empathic distress may be at risk for more internalizing symptoms. Quadratic associations of empathy- and ToM-related brain activation with internalizing symptoms depended on negative thinking processes, suggesting differential effects of cognitive and affective functioning on internalizing symptoms. Using a multi-method approach, these findings advance current research by shedding light on which complex risk combinations of cognitive and affective functioning are relevant for internalizing symptoms.

Agreeableness modulates mental state decoding: Electrophysiological evidence.

Agreeableness is one of the five personality traits which is associated with theory of mind (ToM) abilities. One of the critical processes involved in ToM is the decoding of emotional cues. In the present study, we investigated whether this process is modulated by agreeableness using electroencephalography (EEG) while taking into account task complexity and sex differences that are expected to moderate the relationship between emotional decoding and agreeableness. This approach allowed us to identify at which stage of the neural processing agreeableness kicks in, in order to distinguish the impact on early, perceptual processes from slower, inferential processing. Two tasks were employed and submitted to 62 participants during EEG recording: the reading the mind in the eyes (RME) task, requiring the decoding of complex mental states from eye expressions, and the biological (e)motion task, involving the perception of basic emotional actions through point-light body stimuli. Event-related potential (ERP) results showed a significant correlation between agreeableness and the contrast for emotional and non-emotional trials in a late time window only during the RME task. Specifically, higher levels of agreeableness were associated with a deeper neural processing of emotional versus non-emotional trials within the whole and male samples. In contrast, the modulation in females was negligible. The source analysis highlighted that this ERP-agreeableness association engages the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our findings expand previous research on personality and social processing and confirm that sex modulates this relationship.

Theory of mind in mild cognitive impairment and Parkinson's disease: The role of memory impairment.

BACKGROUND: Social cognition is impaired in Parkinson's disease (PD). Whether social cognitive impairment (iSC) is a by-product of the underlying cognitive deficits in PD or a process independent of cognitive status is unknown. To this end, the present study was designed to investigate the weight of specific cognitive deficits in social cognition, considering different mild cognitive impairment subtypes of PD (PD-MCI). METHODS: Fifty-eight PD patients underwent a neuropsychological battery assessing executive functions, memory, language, and visuospatial domains, together with social cognitive tests focused on theory of mind (ToM). Patients were divided into subgroups according to their clinical cognitive status: amnestic PD-MCI (PD-aMCI, n = 18), non-amnestic PD-MCI (PD-naMCI, n = 16), and cognitively unimpaired (PD-CU, n = 24). Composite scores for cognitive and social domains were computed to perform mediation analyses. RESULTS: Memory and language impairments mediated the effect of executive functioning in social cognitive deficits in PD patients. Dividing by MCI subgroups, iSC occurred more frequently in PD-aMCI (77.8%) than in PD-naMCI (18.8%) and PD-CU (8.3%). Moreover, PD-aMCI performed worse than PD-CU in all social cognitive measures, whereas PD-naMCI performed worse than PD-CU in only one subtype of the affective and cognitive ToM tests. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that ToM impairment in PD can be explained by memory dysfunction that mediates executive control. ToM downsides in the amnesic forms of PD-MCI may suggest that subtle changes in social cognition could partly explain future transitions into dementia. Hence, the evaluation of social cognition in PD is critical to characterize a possible behavioral marker of cognitive decline.

Dogs do not use their own experience with novel barriers to infer others' visual access.

Despite extensive research into the Theory of Mind abilities in non-human animals, it remains controversial whether they can attribute mental states to other individuals or whether they merely predict future behaviour based on previous behavioural cues. In the present study, we tested pet dogs (in total, N = 92) on adaptations of the 'goggles test' previously used with human infants and great apes. In both a cooperative and a competitive task, dogs were given direct experience with the properties of novel screens (one opaque, the other transparent) inserted into identical, but differently coloured, tunnels. Dogs learned and remembered the properties of the screens even when, later on, these were no longer directly visible to them. Nevertheless, they were not more likely to follow the experimenter's gaze to a target object when the experimenter could see it through the transparent screen. Further, they did not prefer to steal a forbidden treat first in a location obstructed from the experimenter's view by the opaque screen. Therefore, dogs did not show perspective-taking abilities in this study in which the only available cue to infer others' visual access consisted of the subjects' own previous experience with novel visual barriers. We conclude that the behaviour of our dogs, unlike that of infants and apes in previous studies, does not show evidence of experience-projection abilities.

A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Social Cognition Among People Living with HIV: Implications for Non-Social Cognition and Social Everyday Functioning.

Social cognition-the complex mental ability to perceive social stimuli and negotiate the social environment-has emerged as an important cognitive ability needed for social functioning, everyday functioning, and quality of life. Deficits in social cognition have been well documented in those with severe mental illness including schizophrenia and depression, those along the autism spectrum, and those with other brain disorders where such deficits profoundly impact everyday life. Moreover, subtle deficits in social cognition have been observed in other clinical populations, especially those that may have compromised non-social cognition (i.e., fluid intelligence such as memory). Among people living with HIV (PLHIV), 44% experience cognitive impairment; likewise, social cognitive deficits in theory of mind, prosody, empathy, and emotional face recognition/perception are gradually being recognized. This systematic review and meta-analysis aim to summarize the current knowledge of social cognitive ability among PLHIV, identified by 14 studies focused on social cognition among PLHIV, and provides an objective consensus of the findings. In general, the literature suggests that PLHIV may be at-risk of developing subtle social cognitive deficits that may impact their everyday social functioning and quality of life. The causes of such social cognitive deficits remain unclear, but perhaps develop due to (1) HIV-related sequelae that are damaging the same neurological systems in which social cognition and non-social cognition are processed; (2) stress related to coping with HIV disease itself that overwhelms one's social cognitive resources; or (3) may have been present pre-morbidly, possibly contributing to an HIV infection. From this, a theoretical framework is proposed highlighting the relationships between social cognition, non-social cognition, and social everyday functioning.

People Have Systematically Different Ownership Intuitions in Seemingly Simple Cases.

Our understanding of ownership influences how we interact with objects and with each other. Here, we studied people's intuitions about ownership transfer using a set of simple, parametrically varied events. We found that people (N = 120 U.S. adults) had similar intuitions about ownership for some events but sharply opposing intuitions for others (Experiment 1). People (N = 120 U.S. adults) were unaware of these conflicts and overestimated ownership consensus (Experiment 2). Moreover, differences in people's ownership intuitions predicted their intuitions about the acceptability of using, altering, controlling, and destroying the owned object (N = 130 U.S. adults; Experiment 3), even when ownership was not explicitly mentioned (N = 130 U.S. adults; Experiment 4). Subject-level analyses suggest that these disagreements reflect at least two underlying intuitive theories, one in which intentions are central to ownership and another in which physical possession is prioritized.

Observers Efficiently Extract the Minimal and Maximal Element in Perceptual Magnitude Sets: Evidence for a Bipartite Format.

The mind represents abstract magnitude information, including time, space, and number, but in what format is this information stored? We show support for the bipartite format of perceptual magnitudes, in which the measured value on a dimension is scaled to the dynamic range of the input, leading to a privileged status for values at the lowest and highest end of the range. In six experiments with college undergraduates, we show that observers are faster and more accurate to find the endpoints (i.e., the minimum and maximum) than any of the inner values, even as the number of items increases beyond visual short-term memory limits. Our results show that length, size, and number are represented in a dynamic format that allows for comparison-free sorting, with endpoints represented with an immediately accessible status, consistent with the bipartite model of perceptual magnitudes. We discuss the implications for theories of visual search and ensemble perception.

Subthalamic Nucleus Stimulation Modulates Cognitive Theory of Mind in Parkinson's Disease.

BACKGROUND: Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' mental state, is essential for social interaction among human beings. It has been widely reported that both cognitive (inference of knowledge) and affective (inference of emotion) components of ToM are disrupted in Parkinson's disease (PD). Previous studies usually focused on the involvement of the prefrontal cortex. OBJECTIVE: This study investigated the causal role of the subthalamic nucleus (STN), a key hub of the fronto-basal ganglia loops, in ToM. METHODS: Thirty-four patients with idiopathic PD (15 women, aged 62.2 ± 8.3 years) completed a Yoni task with deep brain stimulation (DBS) ON and OFF. The Yoni task was designed to separate the cognitive and affective components of ToM. Volumes of tissue activated (VTA) were computed for three subregions of the STN. RESULTS: DBS showed insignificant effects on ToM inference costs at the group level, which may be due to the large interindividual variability. The associative VTA correlated with the cognitive inference cost change but not the affective inference cost change. Patients with greater associative STN stimulation infer more slowly on cognitive ToM. Stimulating associative STN can adversely affect cognitive ToM in PD patients, especially in patients with a wide range of stimulation (≥0.157) or cognitive decline (Montreal Cognitive Assessment < 26). CONCLUSIONS: The associative STN plays a causal role in cognitive ToM in patients with PD. However, stimulating the associative STN likely impairs cognitive ToM and potentially leads to social interaction deficits in PD. © 2024 International Parkinson and Movement Disorder Society.

Effects of metacognitive training (MCT) on social cognition for schizophrenia spectrum and related psychotic disorders: a systematic review and meta-analysis.

BACKGROUND: Individuals with schizophrenia spectrum and related psychotic disorders (SSD) experience significant impairments in social cognition that impede functioning. Social cognition is a multidimensional construct consisting of four domains: 1. theory of mind, 2. emotion processing, 3. attributional style and 4. social perception. Metacognitive training (MCT) is an intervention designed to target cognitive biases in psychosis containing two modules addressing social cognition. METHODS: A systematic review and meta-analysis was conducted to investigate the effects of MCT on social cognition and two of its domains: theory of mind and emotion processing. Ten electronic databases were scoured from 2007 to 1 February 2022 for MCT studies reporting social cognition outcomes for people with SSD (1050 identified, 282 assessed). Effect sizes were calculated using Cohen's d in R. RESULTS: Nine studies were included in the meta-analysis (nMCT = 212, ncontrol = 194). MCT had a small but positive effect on global social cognition (d = 0.28 [95% CI 0.07-0.49]) and theory of mind (d = 0.27 [95% CI 0.01-0.52]). MCT showed no evidence of an effect on emotion processing (d = 0.03 [95% CI -0.26 to 0.32]). CONCLUSION: MCT has a small but significant effect on social cognition for people with SSD. Our results add to other recent meta-analyses showing significant effects of MCT on clinically relevant outcomes such as positive symptoms, cognitive biases and cognitive insight. We recommend that future studies on MCT report outcomes on all four domains of social cognition. TRIAL REGISTRATION: PROSPERO (in the process of registration) available at https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/#recordDetails.

Neural activations during cognitive and affective theory of mind processing in healthy adults with a family history of alcohol use disorder.

BACKGROUND: Social cognition impairments are a common feature of alcohol use disorders (AUD). However, it remains unclear whether these impairments are solely the consequence of chronic alcohol consumption or whether they could be a marker of vulnerability. METHODS: The present study implemented a family history approach to address this question for a key process of social cognition: theory of mind (ToM). Thirty healthy adults with a family history of AUD (FH+) and 30 healthy adults with a negative family history of AUD (FH-), matched for age, sex, and education level, underwent an fMRI cartoon-vignette paradigm assessing cognitive and affective ToM. Participants also completed questionnaires evaluating anxiety, depressive symptoms, childhood trauma, and alexithymia. RESULTS: Results indicated that FH+ individuals differed from FH- individuals on affective but not cognitive ToM processing, at both the behavioral and neural levels. At the behavioral level, the FH+ group had lower response accuracy for affective ToM compared with the FH- group. At the neural level, the FH+ group had higher brain activations in the left insula and inferior frontal cortex during affective ToM processing. These activations remained significant when controlling for depressive symptoms, anxiety, and childhood trauma. CONCLUSIONS: These findings highlight difficulties during affective ToM processing among first-degree relatives of AUD patients, supporting the idea that some of the impairments exhibited by these patients may already be present before the onset of AUD and may be considered a marker of vulnerability.

Female Cerebellum Seems Sociable; An iTBS Investigation.

The cerebellum has been shown to be engaged in tasks other than motor control, including cognitive and affective functions. Prior neuroimaging studies have documented the role of this area in social cognition and despite these findings, no studies have yet examined the causal relationship between the cerebellum and social cognition. This study aimed to investigate the role of the cerebellum in empathy and theory of mind (ToM) in a randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind, parallel study. 32 healthy participants were assigned to either a sham or active group. For the active group, an intermittent theta-burst stimulation (iTBS) protocol at 100% of the motor threshold was applied to the cerebellum, while the control group received sham stimulation. An eyes-closed EEG session, the Empathy Quotient (EQ) test, and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) were administered before and after the iTBS session. The results demonstrated differences in cognitive empathy, ToM, and a decrease in the activity of the default mode network (DMN) between the active and sham groups in females. Females also showed a decrease in the activity of the affective empathy network and connectivity in the DMN. We conclude that cognitive empathy and ToM are associated with cerebellar activity, and due to sex-related differences in the cortical organization of this area which is modulated by sex hormones, the stimulation of the cerebellum in males and females yields different results.

Testing the social motivation theory of autism: the role of co-occurring anxiety.

BACKGROUND: The Social Motivation Theory proposes that social reward processing differences underlie autism. However, low social motivation has also been linked to higher anxiety. Given the co-occurrence between autism and anxiety, it is possible that anxiety drives the association between social motivation and autistic characteristics. This study tests the mechanisms underlying the association between social motivation and autistic traits. METHODS: Participants were 165 adolescents (71 male), aged 10-16 years, from the Mapping profiles of cognition, motivation and attention in childhood (C-MAPS) study, enriched for autistic traits (70 participants with an autism diagnosis, 37 male). Participants completed a battery of online experimental tasks, including a Choose-a-Movie social motivation task and social cognition measures (theory of mind; emotion recognition), alongside parent-reported child anxiety and autistic traits. RESULTS: Higher social motivation was significantly associated with lower autistic traits (ß = -.26, p < .001). Controlling for social cognition did not change the association between social motivation and autistic traits. Controlling for anxiety did significantly reduce the strength of the association (unstandardized coefficient change: p = .003), although social motivation remained associated with autistic traits (ß = -.16, p = .004). Post hoc analyses demonstrated differential sex-effects: The association between social motivation and autistic traits was significant only in the females (ß = -.38, p < .001), as was the attenuation by anxiety (unstandardized coefficient change: p < .001). CONCLUSIONS: The association between social motivation and autistic traits could be partially attributed to co-occurring anxiety. Sex-specific effects found in females may be due to environmental factors such as increased social demands in adolescent female relationships. Results are consistent with self-report by autistic individuals who do not identify as having reduced social motivation.