Why pro-life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics.

I argued in 'Pro-life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing' that arguments presented by pro-life philosophers are mistaken and cannot show infanticide to be immoral. Several scholars have offered responses to my arguments. In this paper, I reply to my critics: Daniel Rodger, Bruce P. Blackshaw and Clinton Wilcox. I also reply to Christopher Kaczor. I argue that pro-life arguments still are not convincing.

Pro-Life Arguments Against Infanticide and Why they are Not Convincing.

Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article 'After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?' has received a lot of criticism since its publishing. Part of the recent criticism has been made by pro-life philosopher Christopher Kaczor, who argues against infanticide in his updated book 'Ethics of Abortion'. Kaczor makes four arguments to show where Giubilini and Minerva's argument for permitting infanticide goes wrong. In this article I argue that Kaczor's arguments, and some similar arguments presented by other philosophers, are mistaken and cannot show Giubilini and Minerva's view to be flawed. I claim that if one wants to reject the permissibility of infanticide, one must find better arguments for doing so.

The Viable Violinist.

In the aftermath of the Kermit Gosnell trial and Giubilini and Minerva's article 'After-birth abortion', abortion-rights advocates have been pressured to provide an account of the moral difference between abortion, particularly late-term abortion, and infanticide. In response, some scholars have defended a moral distinction by appealing to an argument developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson in A defense of abortion. However, once Thomson's analogy is refined to account for the morally relevant features of late-term pregnancy, rather than distinguishing between late-term abortion and infanticide, it reinforces their moral similarity. This is because late-term abortion requires more than detachment - it requires an act of feticide to ensure the death of the viable fetus. As such, a Thomsonian account cannot be deployed successfully as a response to Giubilini and Minerva. Those wishing to defend late-term abortion while rejecting the permissibility of infanticide will need to provide an alternative account of the difference, or else accept Giubilini and Minerva's conclusion.

Strange Bedfellows? Common Ground on the Moral Status Question.

When does a developing human being acquire moral status? I outline three different positions based on substance ontology that attempt to solve the question by locating some morally salient event in the process of human development question. In the second section, I consider some specific empirical objections to one of these positions, refute them, and then show how similar objections and responses would generalize to the other substance-based positions on the question. The crucial finding is that all the attempts to answer the question that involve substance ontology need to appeal to dispositions.

Failures of Imagination: Disability and the Ethics of Selective Reproduction.

The article addresses the problem of disability in the context of reproductive decisions based on genetic information. It poses the question of whether selective procreation should be considered as a moral obligation of prospective parents. To answer this question, a number of different ethical approaches to the problem are presented and critically analysed: the utilitarian; Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence; the rights-based. The main thesis of the article is that these approaches fail to provide any appealing principles on which reproductive decisions should be based. They constitute failures of imagination which may result in counter-intuitive moral judgments about both life with disability and genetic selection. A full appreciation of the ethical significance of recognition in procreative decisions leads to a more nuanced and morally satisfying view than other leading alternatives presented in the article.

What exactly did you claim?

Philosophers should express their ideas clearly. They should do this in any field of specialization, but especially when they address issues of practical consequence, as they do in bioethics. This article dissects a recent and much-debated contribution to philosophical bioethics by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, examines how exactly it fails to meet the requirement of clarity, and maps a way forward by outlining the ways in which philosophical argumentation could validly and soundly proceed in bioethics.

The grand leap of the whale up the Niagara Falls: converting philosophical conclusions into policy prescriptions.

This article analyzes a neat conjuring trick employed in bioethics, that is, the immediate conversion of a philosophical conclusion into a policy prescription, and compares it to the "grand leap of the whale up the Niagara Falls" mentioned by Benjamin Franklin. It is shown that there is no simple and easy way to achieve the conversion, by considering arguments falling under four headings: (1) reasonable disagreement about values and theories, (2) general jurisprudential arguments, (3) the differences between policymaking and philosophy, and (4) the messy world of implementation. The particular issue used to illustrate the difficulties in moving from philosophical conclusion to policy description is infanticide of healthy infants, but the analysis is general, and the conclusion that the immediate move to policy is illegitimate is quite general.

How to insure against utilitarian overconfidence.

This paper addresses two examples of overconfident presentations of utilitarian moral conclusions. First, there is Peter Singer's widely discussed claim that if the consequences of a medical experiment are sufficiently good to justify the use of animals, then we should be prepared to perform the experiment on human beings with equivalent mental capacities. Second, I consider defences of infanticide or after-birth abortion. I do not challenge the soundness of these arguments. Rather, I accuse those who seek to translate these conclusions into moral advice of a dangerous overconfidence. This paper offers an insurance policy that protects against some of the costs of mistaken moral reasoning. An interest in moral insurance is motivated by the recognition that, in the event that overconfident ethicists have reasoned incorrectly, some actions recommended by their conclusions are not just bad, but very bad. We should reject suggestions that we conduct medical experiments on humans or kill newborns.

Beyond pragmatism: defending the 'bright line' of birth.

It is usually accepted by ethicists that birth does not alter moral status. Rather, it is thought that the rule according full legal rights at birth is pragmatic. Pragmatic reasoning is vulnerable to competing practical concerns and stronger moral principles. This 'bright line' has therefore been criticised both by those who believe personhood begins before birth and those who believe it begins afterward. In particular, a recent article by Giubilini and Minerva puts forward both pragmatic and moral arguments in favour of permitting infanticide, and the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has suggested there is a strong case for abandoning the bright line (R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278). If we desire to defend current legal doctrine against such criticism, a medical and philosophical basis for the law should be articulated. This article suggests such a medical and philosophical basis. It argues that both the multiplicity of biological changes occurring in the neonate at birth and the extrauterine context (the world) provide a justification for the distinction drawn at law between abortion and infanticide. With reference to Robert Nozick's 'experience machine' thought-experiment and elements of phenomenological philosophy, it advances two propositions to explain the status-changing nature of the neonate's emergence out of the womb. First, that expressing sentience in the world is essential for the attainment of personhood. Second, that having become a person, the harm in killing is disruption of this engagement with the world and the reduction from personhood to non-existence. This is the distinction between a neonate's death and the termination of a foetus, underscoring the qualitative difference between the two sides of the bright line drawn in law.

Capacity, harm and experience in the life of persons as equals.

This paper identifies and contests the thesis it takes to be the central premise of Giubilini and Minerva, 'Why should the baby live?', namely that rights, subjecthood and personhood have as a necessary condition that the undergoing of a harm be experienced. That thesis entails the repugnant or absurd conclusion that we do not have the right not to be killed in our sleep. The conclusion can be avoided by adding some premise or qualification about actual capacities for experience of harm, but nothing in the Giubilini and Minerva article shows that such capacities do not exist, as actual and not merely potential, in the newly born human infant (and indeed in the unborn human child/foetus). The present paper reviews an earlier philosophical attempt to deploy an awareness criterion of personhood, and proposes objections to some other aspects of the article under consideration.

The common premise for uncommon conclusions.

Recent controversy over philosophical advocacy of infanticide (or the comically-styled euphemism 'postnatal abortion') reveals a surprisingly common premise uniting many of the opponents and supporters of the practice. This is the belief that the moral status of the early fetus or embryo with respect to a right to life is identical to that of a newly born or even very young baby. From this premise, infanticidists and strong anti-abortionists draw opposite conclusions, the former that the healthy newly born have no inherent right to life and the latter that minute embryos and the very early fetus have the same right to life as young babies. (Indeed strong anti-abortionists tend to regard this right to life as identical to that possessed by adult humans.) This paper argues that these opposed conclusions are both deeply implausible and that the implausibility resides in the common premise. The argument requires some attention to the structure of the philosophical case underpinning the supposed vice of speciesism that has been given intellectual currency by many philosophers, most notably Peter Singer, and also to the reasoning behind the strong anti-abortionist adoption of the common premise.

Infanticide, moral status and moral reasons: the importance of context.

Giubilini and Minerva ask why birth should be a critical dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for terminating existence. Their argument is that birth does not change moral status in the sense that is relevant: the ability to be harmed by interruption of one's aims. Rather than question the plausibility of their position or the argument they give, we ask instead about the importance to scholarship or policy of publishing the article: does it to any extent make a novel or needed addition to the literature? Giubilini and Minerva's argument is remarkably similar to one advanced by Michael Tooley in 'Abortion and Infanticide,' almost 40 years ago. There have been immense changes in the intervening 40 years: in the ability to diagnose conditions early in pregnancy, in genetics and in the availability of in vitro fertilization; in understanding of the capabilities of persons with disabilities; in law; in economic support and access to healthcare for pregnant women and their children; in social customs and arrangements; and even in philosophy, with developments in feminist thought, bioethics and cognitive science. Some of these changes have been for the better, but others, such as the unravelling of social safety nets, have arguably been for the worse. Any or all of these changes might give rise to moral reasons for the relevance of birth that were not available 40 years ago. These changes might also be relevant to the identification of cases, if any, in which 'after-birth abortion' might be considered. If context is relevant to the applicability of moral reasons-as for theorists of justice in the non-idealised world it surely should be-it is questionable whether a view of the birth-line that ignores contextualising change can be adequate.

Concern for our vulnerable prenatal and neonatal children: a brief reply to Giubilini and Minerva.

This is a response to Giubilini and Minerva arguing that, on the basis of the similar moral status of the fetus and infant, infanticide is justifiable for many of the same reasons that justify abortion. It argues that, although the authors are correct in claiming the logical connection between abortion and infanticide, they are mistaken in their moral anthropology and so misunderstand which way the reasoning should cut. It concludes with an exhortation-especially to fellow pro-lifers-to have a different kind of discourse on these matters.

The Italian reaction to the Giubilini and Minerva paper.

From 28 February to the end of March 2012, the Italian media reacted fiercely to the Giubilini and Minerva paper published in the Journal of Medical Ethics a few days earlier. The first article viewed the proposal as analogous to 'barbaric invasions', but in a first stage of the debate it could be seen as a case of the usual controversy between Catholics and secularists. Then emotive reactions prevailed and a flood of papers expressed strong opposition to 'infanticide'. The authors were even deemed insane; the fact that both are Italian certainly increased interest in the subject as well as surprise at their proposal, which some reckoned to be an insult to their 'national identity'. Even freedom of academic research and discussion was put in question, and defenders of free debate were accused of being supporters of the theory of infanticide.

The moral significance of being born.

This paper is a response to Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide. I argue that any account of moral worth or moral rights that depends on the intrinsic properties of individuals alone is committed to agreeing with Giubilini and Minerva that birth cannot by itself make a moral difference to the moral worth of the infant. However, I argue that moral worth need not depend on intrinsic properties alone. It might also depend on relational and social properties. I claim that the in principle availability of neonates to participate in scaffolded interactions with carers might plausibly be seen as contributing to their moral worth.

Yes, the baby should live: a pro-choice response to Giubilini and Minerva.

In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and Minerva elect to call this 'after-birth abortion' rather than infanticide. In this paper, I argue that their thesis is incorrect, and that the moral permissibility of abortion does not entail the moral permissibility of 'after-birth' abortion.

Infanticide: a reply to Giubilini and Minerva.

Alberto Giubilini and Francesco Minerva's recent infanticide proposal is predicated on their personism and actualism. According to these related ideas, human beings achieve their moral status in virtue of the degree to which they are capable of laying value upon their lives or exhibiting certain qualities or being desirable to third-party family members. This article challenges these criteria, suggesting that these and related ideas are rely on arbitrary and discriminatory notions of human moral status. Our propensity to sleep, fall unconscious, pass out and so on, demonstrates that we often exhibit our status as 'potential persons' who are not in the condition of attributing any value to their own existence. Our abilities, age and desirability can and do fluctuate. The equal dignity principle, distinguished in turn from both the excesses of vitalism and consequentialism, is analysed and defended in the context of human rights logic and law. The normalisation of non- and involuntary euthanasia, via such emerging practices as the self-styled Groningen Protocol, is considered. Substituted consent to the euthanasia of babies and others is scrutinised and the implications of institutionalising non-voluntary euthanasia in the context of financial, research and political interests are considered. The impact on the medical and legal professions, carers, families and societies, as well as public attitudes more generally, is discussed. It is suggested that eroding the value of human life carries with it significant destructive long-term implications. To elevate some, often short-term, implications while ignoring others demonstrates the irrational nature of the effort to institutionalise euthanasia.

Potentials and burdens: a reply to Giubilini and Minerva.

This article responds to Giubilini and Minerva's article 'After birth abortion: why should the baby live?' published in the Journal of Medical Ethics. They argue for the permissibility of 'after-birth abortion', based on two conjoined considerations: (1) the fetus or newborn, though a 'potential person', is not an actual person, because it is not mature enough to appreciate its own interests, and (2) because we allow parents to terminate the life of a fetus when it is diagnosed with a deformity or fatal illness because of the burden it will place on the child, parent, family or society we should also allow parents to do the same to their newborn, since it is no more a person than the fetus. The author critiques this case by pointing out (a) the metaphysical ambiguity of potential personhood and (b) why the appeal to burdens is irrelevant or unnecessary.

The moral status of babies.

In their controversial paper 'After-birth abortion', Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that there is no rational basis for allowing abortion but prohibiting infanticide ('after-birth abortion'). We ought in all consistency either to allow both or prohibit both. This paper rejects their claim, arguing that much-neglected considerations in philosophical discussions of this issue are capable of explaining why we currently permit abortion in some circumstances, while prohibiting infanticide.

Abortion, infanticide and moral context.

In 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?', Giubilini and Minerva argue that infanticide should be permitted for the same reasons as abortion. In particular, they argue that infanticide should be permitted even for reasons that do not primarily serve the interests (or would-be best interests) of the newborn. They claim that abortion is permissible for reasons that do not primarily serve the interests (or would-be interests) of the fetus because fetuses lack a right to life. They argue that newborns also lack a right to life, and they conclude that therefore, the same reasons that justify abortion can justify infanticide. This conclusion does not follow. The lack of a right to life is not decisive. Furthermore, the justificatory power of a given reason is a function of moral context. Generalisations about reasons across dissimilar moral contexts are invalid. However, a similar conclusion does follow-that fetus-killing and newborn-killing are morally identical in identical moral contexts-but this conclusion is trivial, since fetuses and newborns are never in identical moral contexts.