Your browser doesn't support javascript.
loading
Frontrunning the signals: As arbitrage between sophisticates.
Akerlof, George A; Tong, Hui.
Afiliação
  • Akerlof GA; McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057; gaa53@georgetown.edu htong@imf.org.
  • Tong H; International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 gaa53@georgetown.edu htong@imf.org.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A ; 118(13)2021 03 30.
Article em En | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33758103
This paper presents a model in which some sophisticated investors do not wait for receipt of a signal before purchasing an asset. Its critical innovation is an arbitrage equation for frontrunning. Some sophisticates who will receive information in the next period arbitrage against similar sophisticates who will act on that information in that next period when the information is received. The costs of such frontrunning are borne totally by unsophisticated traders-with no gain or loss to sophisticates. Nor does the frontrunning produce any information discovery. Thus, this paper describes a financial-market anomaly: of inefficient financial transactions with gains to no one.
Palavras-chave

Texto completo: 1 Base de dados: MEDLINE Idioma: En Revista: Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Ano de publicação: 2021 Tipo de documento: Article

Texto completo: 1 Base de dados: MEDLINE Idioma: En Revista: Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Ano de publicação: 2021 Tipo de documento: Article