Motor Coordination and Strategic Cooperation in Joint Action.

Naturalistic joint action between two agents typically requires both motor coordination and strategic cooperation. However, these two fundamental processes have systematically been studied independently. We presented 50 dyads of adult participants with a novel collaborative task that combined different levels of motor noise with different levels of strategic noise, to determine whether the sense of agency (the experience of control over an action) reflects the interplay between these low-level (motor) and high-level (strategic) dimensions. We also examined how dominance in motor control could influence prosocial behaviors. We found that self-agency was particularly dependent on motor cues, whereas joint agency was particularly dependent on strategic cues. We suggest that the prime importance of strategic cues to joint agency reflects the co-representation of coagents' interests during the task. Furthermore, we observed a reduction in prosocial strategies in agents who exerted dominant motor control over joint action, showing that the strategic dimension of human interactions is also susceptible to the influence of low-level motor characteristics.

The impact of intrinsic and extrinsic features on delay discounting.

Delay discounting refers to the tendency of people to evaluate immediate rewards as being more valuable than those that are distant in time. Several models explain this phenomenon by a set of intrinsic and extrinsic features. Intrinsic features are related to the inherent traits and neurological conditions of the individual, whereas extrinsic features are related to the characteristics of the reward. In this study, we refer to extraversion and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder symptoms (attention and hyperactivity-impulsivity) as intrinsic features, and to fungibility, perishability, and magnitude of the reward as extrinsic features. Whereas there is a known main effect to these intrinsic and extrinsic features, the current research examines their additive and interactive contributions to delay discounting. A total of 222 participants filled out an online questionnaire measuring intrinsic features and presenting decision tasks with different types of rewards. The scores of the intrinsic variables and the delay discounting rate for each reward were calculated and analyzed. The results replicated previous findings showing main effects of hyperactivity, fungibility, perishability, and magnitude. They also provided new findings on an interaction between fungibility-perishability and hyperactivity-the effect of hyperactivity on delay discounting was larger when the rewards were fungible and nonperishable than when the rewards were perishable and nonfungible. This interaction has practical implications that can help in moderating delay discounting in clinical treatments of impulsivity as well as in constructing efficient economic models for consumers.

Contrasting temporal difference and opportunity cost reinforcement learning in an empirical money-emergence paradigm.

Money is a fundamental and ubiquitous institution in modern economies. However, the question of its emergence remains a central one for economists. The monetary search-theoretic approach studies the conditions under which commodity money emerges as a solution to override frictions inherent to interindividual exchanges in a decentralized economy. Although among these conditions, agents' rationality is classically essential and a prerequisite to any theoretical monetary equilibrium, human subjects often fail to adopt optimal strategies in tasks implementing a search-theoretic paradigm when these strategies are speculative, i.e., involve the use of a costly medium of exchange to increase the probability of subsequent and successful trades. In the present work, we hypothesize that implementing such speculative behaviors relies on reinforcement learning instead of lifetime utility calculations, as supposed by classical economic theory. To test this hypothesis, we operationalized the Kiyotaki and Wright paradigm of money emergence in a multistep exchange task and fitted behavioral data regarding human subjects performing this task with two reinforcement learning models. Each of them implements a distinct cognitive hypothesis regarding the weight of future or counterfactual rewards in current decisions. We found that both models outperformed theoretical predictions about subjects' behaviors regarding the implementation of speculative strategies and that the latter relies on the degree of the opportunity costs consideration in the learning process. Speculating about the marketability advantage of money thus seems to depend on mental simulations of counterfactual events that agents are performing in exchange situations.

Sour grapes and sweet victories: How actions shape preferences.

Classical decision theory postulates that choices proceed from subjective values assigned to the probable outcomes of alternative actions. Some authors have argued that opposite causality should also be envisaged, with choices influencing subsequent values expressed in desirability ratings. The idea is that agents may increase their ratings of items that they have chosen in the first place, which has been typically explained by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance. However, evidence in favor of this reverse causality has been the topic of intense debates that have not reached consensus so far. Here, we take a novel approach using Bayesian techniques to compare models in which choices arise from stable (but noisy) underlying values (one-way causality) versus models in which values are in turn influenced by choices (two-way causality). Moreover, we examined whether in addition to choices, other components of previous actions, such as the effort invested and the eventual action outcome (success or failure), could also impact subsequent values. Finally, we assessed whether the putative changes in values were only expressed in explicit ratings, or whether they would also affect other value-related behaviors such as subsequent choices. Behavioral data were obtained from healthy participants in a rating-choice-rating-choice-rating paradigm, where the choice task involves deciding whether or not to exert a given physical effort to obtain a particular food item. Bayesian selection favored two-way causality models, where changes in value due to previous actions affected subsequent ratings, choices and action outcomes. Altogether, these findings may help explain how values and actions drift when several decisions are made successively, hence highlighting some shortcomings of classical decision theory.

Evolutionary origins of money categorization and exchange: an experimental investigation in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.).

Money is a cultural artefact with a central role in human society. Here, we investigated whether some features of money may be traced back to the exchange habits of nonhuman animals, capitalizing on their ability to flexibly use tokens in different domains. In Experiment 1, we evaluated whether capuchins can recognize token validity. Six subjects were required to exchange with the experimenter valid/familiar tokens, valid/unfamiliar tokens, invalid tokens, and no-value items. They first exchanged a similar number of valid/familiar and valid/unfamiliar tokens, followed by exchanges of invalid tokens and no-value items. Thus, as humans, capuchins readily recognized token validity, regardless of familiarity. In Experiment 2, we further evaluated the flexibility of the token-food association by assessing whether capuchins could engage in reverse food-token exchanges. Subjects spontaneously performed chains of exchanges, in which a food item was exchanged for a token, and then the token was exchanged for another food. However, performance was better as the advantage gained from the exchange increased. Overall, capuchins recognized token validity and successfully engaged in chains of reverse and direct exchanges. This suggests that-although nonhuman animals are far from having fully-fledged monetary systems-for capuchins tokens share at least some features with human money.

Choose, rate or squeeze: Comparison of economic value functions elicited by different behavioral tasks.

A standard view in neuroeconomics is that to make a choice, an agent first assigns subjective values to available options, and then compares them to select the best. In choice tasks, these cardinal values are typically inferred from the preference expressed by subjects between options presented in pairs. Alternatively, cardinal values can be directly elicited by asking subjects to place a cursor on an analog scale (rating task) or to exert a force on a power grip (effort task). These tasks can vary in many respects: they can notably be more or less costly and consequential. Here, we compared the value functions elicited by choice, rating and effort tasks on options composed of two monetary amounts: one for the subject (gain) and one for a charity (donation). Bayesian model selection showed that despite important differences between the three tasks, they all elicited a same value function, with similar weighting of gain and donation, but variable concavity. Moreover, value functions elicited by the different tasks could predict choices with equivalent accuracy. Our finding therefore suggests that comparable value functions can account for various motivated behaviors, beyond economic choice. Nevertheless, we report slight differences in the computational efficiency of parameter estimation that may guide the design of future studies.

An Allais paradox without mental time travel.

The capacity to anticipate future experiences of regret has been hypothesized to explain otherwise irrational aspects of human decision-making, including the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Econometrica 47:263-291) and the common ratio effect (Allais (1953) Econometrica 21:503-546). The anticipated regret hypothesis predicts that individuals incapable of episodically imagining their personal futures, as has been reported for people with extensive damage to medial temporal lobe structures and resulting deficits in episodic thought, should be immune to these effects. We report that K.C., who has extensive bilateral damage to his hippocampus and adjacent medial temporal lobe structures and nearly complete deficits in his ability to episodically imagine his personal future, nonetheless displays both the certainty and the common ratio effects. These results suggest that the episodic anticipation of future regret does not explain the general human tendency to display the certainty and common ratio effects.

Experiential values are underweighted in decisions involving symbolic options.

Standard models of decision-making assume each option is associated with subjective value, regardless of whether this value is inferred from experience (experiential) or explicitly instructed probabilistic outcomes (symbolic). In this study, we present results that challenge the assumption of unified representation of experiential and symbolic value. Across nine experiments, we presented participants with hybrid decisions between experiential and symbolic options. Participants' choices exhibited a pattern consistent with a systematic neglect of the experiential values. This normatively irrational decision strategy held after accounting for alternative explanations, and persisted even when it bore an economic cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that experiential and symbolic values are not symmetrically considered in hybrid decisions, suggesting they recruit different representational systems that may be assigned different priority levels in the decision process. These findings challenge the dominant models commonly used in value-based decision-making research.

Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: still compatibilists.

Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a 'performance error model' according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the 'performance error model' should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the 'performance error model' should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data.

Economic behaviours among non-human primates.

Do we have any valid reasons to affirm that non-human primates display economic behaviour in a sufficiently rich and precise sense of the phrase? To address this question, we have to develop a set of criteria to assess the vast array of experimental studies and field observations on individual cognitive and behavioural competences as well as the collective organization of non-human primates. We review a sample of these studies and assess how they answer to the following four main challenges. (i) Do we see any economic organization or institutions emerge among groups of non-human primates? (ii) Are the cognitive abilities, and often biases, that have been evidenced as underlying typical economic decision-making among humans, also present among non-human primates? (iii) Can we draw positive lessons from performance comparisons among primate species, humans and non-humans but also across non-human primate species, as elicited by canonical game-theoretical experimental paradigms, especially as far as economic cooperation and coordination are concerned? And (iv) in which way should we improve models and paradigms to obtain more ecological data and conclusions? Articles discussed in this paper most often bring about positive answers and promising perspectives to support the existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Are the roots of human economic systems shared with non-human primates?

We review and analyze evidence for an evolutionary rooting of human economic behaviors and organization in non-human primates. Rather than focusing on the direct application of economic models that a priori account for animal decision behavior, we adopt an inductive definition of economic behavior in terms of the contribution of individual cognitive capacities to the provision of resources within an exchange structure. We spell out to what extent non-human primates' individual and strategic decision behaviors are shared with humans. We focus on the ability to trade, through barter or token-mediated exchanges, as a landmark of an economic system among members of the same species. It is an open question why only humans have reached a high level of economic sophistication. While primates have many of the necessary cognitive abilities (symbolic and computational) in isolation, one plausible issue we identify is the limits in exerting cognitive control to combine several sources of information. The difference between human and non-human primates' economies might well then be in degree rather than kind.

An asymmetry of treatment between lotteries involving gains and losses in rhesus monkeys.

Decision-making in humans is known to be subject to several biases. For instance, when facing bets, humans demonstrate some asymmetry concerning their preference for the riskiest option depending on whether stakes involve potential gains or potential losses. They are indeed risk-averse for bets involving gains but risk seeking for bets involving losses. They also exhibit a distorted perception of probabilities. It is not clear whether non-human primates exhibit the same biases. Setting up a protocol that allowed two rhesus monkeys to make choices between lotteries involving either gains or losses, we demonstrated that rhesus monkeys facing bets exhibited an asymmetry in the treatment of gains and losses comparable with that of humans.

The influence of prior reputation and reciprocity on dynamic trust-building in adults with and without autism spectrum disorder.

The present study was designed to investigate the effects of reputational priors and direct reciprocity on the dynamics of trust building in adults with (N = 17) and without (N = 25) autism spectrum disorder (ASD) using a multi-round Trust Game (MTG). On each round, participants, who played as investors, were required to maximize their benefits by updating their prior expectations (the partner's positive or negative reputation), based on the partner's directed reciprocity, and adjusting their own investment decisions accordingly. Results showed that reputational priors strongly oriented the initial decision to trust, operationalized as the amount of investment the investor shares with the counterpart. However, while typically developed participants were mainly affected by the direct reciprocity, and rapidly adopted the optimal Tit-for-Tat strategy, participants with ASD continued to rely on reputational priors throughout the game, even when experience of the counterpart's actual behavior contradicted their prior-based expectations. In participants with ASD, the effect of the reputational prior never disappeared, and affected judgments of trustworthiness and reciprocity of the partner even after completion of the game. Moreover, the weight of prior reputation positively correlated with the severity of the ASD participant's social impairments while the reciprocity score negatively correlated with the severity of repetitive and stereotyped behaviors, as measured by the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R). In line with Bayesian theoretical accounts, the present findings indicate that individuals with ASD have difficulties encoding incoming social information and using it to revise and flexibly update prior social expectations, and that this deficit might severely hinder social learning and everyday life interactions.

Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed.

A coherent practice of mens rea ('guilty mind') ascription in criminal law presupposes a concept of mens rea which is insensitive to the moral valence of an action's outcome. For instance, an assessment of whether an agent harmed another person intentionally should be unaffected by the severity of harm done. Ascriptions of intentionality made by laypeople, however, are subject to a strong outcome bias. As demonstrated by the Knobe effect, a knowingly incurred negative side effect is standardly judged intentional, whereas a positive side effect is not. We report the first empirical investigation into intentionality ascriptions made by professional judges, which finds (i) that professionals are sensitive to the moral valence of outcome type, and (ii) that the worse the outcome, the higher the propensity to ascribe intentionality. The data shows the intentionality ascriptions of professional judges to be inconsistent with the concept of mens rea supposedly at the foundation of criminal law.

Short-term reward experience biases inference despite dissociable neural correlates.

Optimal decision-making employs short-term rewards and abstract long-term information based on which of these is deemed relevant. Employing short- vs. long-term information is associated with different learning mechanisms, yet neural evidence showing that these two are dissociable is lacking. Here we demonstrate that long-term, inference-based beliefs are biased by short-term reward experiences and that dissociable brain regions facilitate both types of learning. Long-term inferences are associated with dorsal striatal and frontopolar cortex activity, while short-term rewards engage the ventral striatum. Stronger concurrent representation of reward signals by mediodorsal striatum and frontopolar cortex correlates with less biased, more optimal individual long-term inference. Moreover, dynamic modulation of activity in a cortical cognitive control network and the medial striatum is associated with trial-by-trial control of biases in belief updating. This suggests that counteracting the processing of optimally to-be-ignored short-term rewards and cortical suppression of associated reward-signals, determines long-term learning success and failure.

The Alternative Omen Effect: Illusory negative correlation between the outcomes of choice options.

In situations of choice between uncertain options, one might get feedback on both the outcome of the chosen option and the outcome of the unchosen option ("the alternative"). Extensive research has shown that when both outcomes are eventually revealed, the alternative's outcome influences the way people evaluate their own outcome. In a series of experiments, we examined whether the outcome of the alternative plays an additional role in the decision-making process by creating expectations regarding the outcome of the chosen option. Specifically, we hypothesized that people see a good (bad) alternative's outcome as a bad (good) sign regarding their own outcome when the two outcomes are in fact uncorrelated, a phenomenon we call the "Alternative Omen Effect" (ALOE). Subjects had to repeatedly choose between two boxes, the outcomes of which were then sequentially revealed. In Experiments 1 and 2 the alternative's outcome was presented first, and we assessed the individual's prediction of their own outcome. In Experiment 3, subjects had to predict the alternative's outcome after seeing their own. We find that even though the two outcomes were in fact uncorrelated, people tended to see a good (bad) alternative outcome as a bad (good) sign regarding their own outcome. Importantly, this illusory negative correlation affected subsequent behavior and led to irrational choices. Furthermore, the order of presentation was critical: when the outcome of the chosen option was presented first, the effect disappeared, suggesting that this illusory negative correlation is influenced by self-relevance. We discuss the possible sources of this illusory correlation as well as its implications for research on counterfactual thinking.

Brain injury unmasking Ehlers-Danlos syndromes after trauma: the fiber print.

BACKGROUND: The role of physical trauma in the onset of symptoms in Ehlers-Danlos syndrome (EDS) has never been characterized. We sought to search and describe brain lesions EDS patients also having personal history of physical trauma. We systematically performed brain magnetic resonance imaging in a first cohort of patients with a hypermobility type of EDS which described the onset of their disease or its worsening after a physical trauma. Unexpected yet consistent findings that were thought to be related to the reported traumas led to perform brain imaging in all subsequent patients with similar symptoms regardless of a history of trauma and to search for a prior trauma by active questioning. RESULTS: Fifty-nine patients were recruited and analyzed, among which 53 (89.8%) were women. Overall, 26 (44.1%) reported a personal history of physical trauma. Six signs pertaining to subcortical lesions and affecting white matter tracts were identified. Those included lesions of the reticular formation, the two lenticular nuclei, the corpus callosum and the arcuate fasciculus. Thirty-six patients (61.0%) had at least 5 of the 6 imaging signs. In case of a trauma before 18, patients had significantly more lesions of the reticular formation (100% vs. 50%; p = 0.0035). CONCLUSIONS: Patients with EDS, hypermobility type, were found to have consistent and specific brain lesions involving white matter tracts. Moreover, the record of a physical trauma in a substantial proportion of cases suggests that these lesions could be post-trauma consequences. Therefore, physical trauma could be a triggering factor in EDS.

Discounting of future rewards in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer's disease.

OBJECTIVE: The clinical differential diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease (AD) and behavioral-variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) can no longer rely only on episodic memory impairment or executive dysfunctions, as highlighted by recent findings showing that both diseases could present with similar impairments. Objective cognitive tests assessing specific symptoms, such as impulsivity in bvFTD, are thus crucially needed. The aim of this study was to evaluate the differences in impulsivity between bvFTD and AD using a delay-discounting paradigm. METHOD: An ecological delay-discounting test was administrated to 70 participants including 30 ADs, 20 bvFTD and 20 controls. AD patients were divided according to the severity of the disease into mild or moderate group. The delay-discounting score, reflecting the total percentage of impulsive choice across the entire task, was analyzed for each group. RESULTS: This score showed that bvFTD patients were significantly more impulsive than controls and AD patients at mild or moderate stage. AD patients, regardless of disease stage, did not differ from controls. ROC analyses revealed high and significant area under the curve (AUC, 95% confidence interval) for this score to differentiate bvFTD from AD (0.704) or controls (0.904), or both group (AD + controls; AUC = 0.791). CONCLUSION: The total delay-discounting score provided by our task showed that it could accurately differentiate bvFTD patients from AD and controls. These results support the relevancy of using tests inspired by experimental psychoeconomics and taping into reward processing to increase the distinction between both diseases.

Behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia patients do not succumb to the Allais paradox.

The Allais Paradox represents one of the earliest empirical challenges to normative models of decision-making, and suggests that choices in one part of a gamble may depend on the possible outcome in another, independent, part of the gamble-a violation of the so-called "independence axiom." To account for Allaisian behavior, one well-known class of models propose that individuals' choices are influenced not only by possible outcomes resulting from one's choices, but also the anticipation of regret for foregone options. Here we test the regret hypothesis using a population of patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), a clinical population known to present ventromedial prefrontal cortex dysfunctions and associated with impaired regret processing in previous studies of decision-making. Compared to matched controls and Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients, we found a striking diminution of Allaisian behavior among bvFTD patients. These results are consistent with the regret hypothesis and furthermore suggest a crucial role for prefrontal regions in choices that typically stands in contradiction with a basic axiom of rational decision-making.

Optimal short-sighted rules.

The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of methodological transfers from behavioral ecology to experimental economics with respect to the elicitation of intertemporal preferences. More precisely our discussion will stem from the analysis of Stephens and Anderson's (2001) seminal article. In their study with blue jays they document that foraging behavior typically implements short-sighted choice rules which are beneficial in the long run. Such long-term profitability of short-sighted behavior cannot be evidenced when using a self-control paradigm (one which contrasts in a binary way sooner smaller and later larger payoffs) but becomes apparent when ecological patch-paradigms (replicating economic situations in which the main trade-off consists in staying on a food patch or leaving for another patch) are implemented. We transfer this methodology in view of contrasting foraging strategies and self-control in human intertemporal choices.