Plans or Outcomes: How Do We Attribute Intelligence to Others?

Humans routinely make inferences about both the contents and the workings of other minds based on observed actions. People consider what others want or know, but also how intelligent, rational, or attentive they might be. Here, we introduce a new methodology for quantitatively studying the mechanisms people use to attribute intelligence to others based on their behavior. We focus on two key judgments previously proposed in the literature: judgments based on observed outcomes (you're smart if you won the game) and judgments based on evaluating the quality of an agent's planning that led to their outcomes (you're smart if you made the right choice, even if you didn't succeed). We present a novel task, the maze search task (MST), in which participants rate the intelligence of agents searching a maze for a hidden goal. We model outcome-based attributions based on the observed utility of the agent upon achieving a goal, with higher utilities indicating higher intelligence, and model planning-based attributions by measuring the proximity of the observed actions to an ideal planner, such that agents who produce closer approximations of optimal plans are seen as more intelligent. We examine human attributions of intelligence in three experiments that use MST and find that participants used both outcome and planning as indicators of intelligence. However, observing the outcome was not necessary, and participants still made planning-based attributions of intelligence when the outcome was not observed. We also found that the weights individuals placed on plans and on outcome correlated with an individual's ability to engage in cognitive reflection. Our results suggest that people attribute intelligence based on plans given sufficient context and cognitive resources and rely on the outcome when computational resources or context are limited.

Population dynamics of threatened Lahontan cutthroat trout in Summit Lake, Nevada.

Summit Lake, Nevada (USA) is the last high-desert terminal lake to have a native self-sustaining population of threatened Lahontan cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarkii henshawi). From spring 2015 to fall 2017, we quantified adult abundance and survival and the total annual spawning run. Abundance and survival were estimated with mark-recapture using PIT tags, and the annual spawning run was estimated with PIT tag detections and counts of spawners. Adult abundance fluctuated from 830 (95% CI 559-1248) to 1085 (95% CI 747-1614), with no overall temporal trend, as a decrease in male abundance was generally offset by an equal increase in female abundance. Estimated mean adult survival was 0.51 (95% CI 0.44-0.58). The spawning run increased from 645 (2015) to 868 (2016), but then decreased slightly to 824 (2017, mean = 789 ± 118). Female spawners increased in 2016 but decreased slightly in 2017, whereas male spawners decreased each year. In addition, the proportion of adults that spawned each year increased overall. Our study suggests that the adult population remained stable although most of the study period included the recent, severe regional drought in the western United States (2012-2016).

Lengthening the duration of response execution does not modulate blindness to action-compatible stimuli.

Action-compatible blindness refers to the finding that target stimuli are perceived less frequently if they are presented during the planning or execution of a compatible action (e.g., a left arrow presented during a left manual key press) than during an incompatible action (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997 a, b). We investigated the effect of lengthening the response execution phase in the action-compatible blindness paradigm by requiring subjects to tap a response key once or three times on the assumption that tapping three times would increase the duration of the execution phase of the response. Prior research (e.g., Stevanovski, Oriet, & Jolicoeur, 2002; Wühr & Müsseler, 2001) has shown that larger blindness effects are observed for targets presented during the execution phase of a response than after the response has been made. We investigated whether a larger blindness effect would be observed in the three-tap condition than in the one-tap condition, or whether lengthening the duration of the response would extend the time course of the blindness effect. Neither of these possibilities was supported by the data irrespective of whether the number of taps to be made was blocked or mixed within a block of trials. The results are discussed in terms of current accounts of action-compatible blindness and the possible cognitive differences between making a single response and repeating a response.