Koro: a socially-transmitted delusional belief.

INTRODUCTION: Koro is a delusion whereby a man believes his penis is shrinking into his abdomen and this may result in his death. This socially-transmitted non-neuropsychological delusional belief occurs (in epidemic form) in South-East and South Asia. We investigated whether the two-factor theory of delusion could be applied to epidemic Koro. METHODS: We scrutinised the literature on epidemic Koro to isolate features relevant to the two questions that must be answered to provide a two-factor account: What could initially prompt the Koro delusional hypothesis? Why is this hypothesis adopted as a belief? RESULTS: We concluded that the Koro hypothesis is usually prompted by the surprising observation of actual penis shrinkage-but only if the man has access to background beliefs about Koro. Whether the hypothesis is then adopted as a belief will depend on individual factors such as prior belief in the Koro concept or limited formal education and sociocultural factors such as deference to culture, to media, or to rumours spread by word of mouth. Social transmission can influence how the first factor works and how the second factor works. CONCLUSION: The two-factor theory of delusion can be applied to a socially-transmitted delusion that occurs in epidemic form.

Inattentional blindness: Attentional set for efficient task success.

Inattentional blindness is the failure to notice an unexpected object in plain sight when attention is otherwise engaged. We investigated what determines observers' attentional set in a dynamic-counting inattentional blindness paradigm, when task instructions and visual distinctiveness of task-relevant objects were either congruent or in opposition. In seven experiments, observers counted bounces by task-relevant objects, with the instruction either to count-by-shape (squares, diamonds, crosses) or count-by-colour (blue, purple). To manipulate visual distinctiveness, we varied the extent to which task-relevant and task-irrelevant objects looked different on two dimensions: shape and colour. When colour better distinguished task-relevant from task-irrelevant objects, observers-even if instructed count-by-shape-reported an unexpected object that matched the colour of task-relevant objects. Crucially, when instructed count-by-colour, but shape better distinguished task-relevant from task-irrelevant objects, observers reported an unexpected object that matched the shape of task-relevant objects. We conclude that observers set their attention to promote efficient task performance.

Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation.

INTRODUCTION: Cotard delusion-the delusional belief "I am dead"-is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard. Ramachandran and Blakeslee proposed that the idea "I am dead" comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if "I am dead" were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world. METHODS: We scrutinised the literature on people who expressed the delusional belief "I am dead", looking for data on whether such patients are reported as entirely lacking in emotional responsivity. RESULTS: In numerous cases, patients with Cotard delusion are described as experiencing emotions including anxiety, fear, guilt, distress, euphoria and worry. CONCLUSIONS: We conclude that complete absence of emotional responsivity cannot be what prompts the delusional idea that one is dead. We propose that, in at least some cases, the idea "I am dead" comes to mind in response to symptoms of depersonalisation or derealisation, often present in cases of Cotard delusion, and give examples of Cotard patients with abnormalities in various neural areas that could be responsible for the presence of such symptoms.

What is Capgras delusion?

INTRODUCTION: Capgras delusion is sometimes defined as believing that close relatives have been replaced by strangers. But such replacement beliefs also occur in response to encountering an acquaintance, or the voice of a familiar person, or a pet, or some personal possession. All five scenarios involve believing something familiar has been replaced by something unfamiliar. METHODS: We evaluate the proposal that these five kinds of delusional belief should count as subtypes of the same delusion. RESULTS: Personally familiar stimuli activate the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) much more strongly than unfamiliar stimuli. In Capgras delusion, this difference is absent, prompting the delusional idea that a familiar person is actually a stranger. We suggest this absence of an effect of familiarity on SNS response will occur in all five scenarios and will prompt the idea that the familiar has been replaced by the unfamiliar. CONCLUSIONS: We propose that: (a) all five scenarios be referred to as subtypes of Capgras delusion; (b) in all five, ideas about replacement are prompted by weakness of SNS responses to familiar stimuli; (c) this is insufficient to generate delusion. For a delusional idea to become a belief, a second factor (impaired hypothesis evaluation) must also be present.

How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway.

People acquire new beliefs in various ways. One of the most important of these is that new beliefs are acquired as a response to experiencing events that one did not expect. This involves a form of inference distinct from both deductive and inductive inference: abductive inference. The concept of abduction is due to the American pragmatist philosopher C. S. Peirce. Davies and Coltheart (in press) elucidated what Peirce meant by abduction, and identified two problems in his otherwise promising account requiring solution if that account were to become fully workable. Here we propose solutions to these problems and offer an explicit cognitive model of how people derive new beliefs from observations of unexpected events, based on Peirce's work and Sokolov's ideas about prediction error triggering new beliefs. We consider that this model casts light not only upon normal processes of belief formation but also upon the formation of delusional beliefs.

Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief.

INTRODUCTION: In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies ([2021]. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. Consciousness and Cognition, 87, 103037. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037) attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce. METHODS: In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief. RESULTS: We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from (delusional) hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence. CONCLUSIONS: In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.

Two-year results from a phase 2 extension study of oral amiselimod in relapsing multiple sclerosis.

BACKGROUND: Amiselimod, an oral selective sphingosine-1-phosphate 1 receptor modulator, suppressed disease activity dose-dependently without clinically relevant bradyarrhythmia in a 24-week phase 2, placebo-controlled study in relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis. OBJECTIVE: To assess safety and efficacy of amiselimod over 96 weeks. METHODS: After completing the core study, patients on amiselimod continued at the same dose, whereas those on placebo were randomised 1:1:1 to amiselimod 0.1, 0.2 or 0.4 mg for another 72 weeks. Most patients receiving 0.1 mg were re-randomised to 0.2 or 0.4 mg upon availability of the core study results. RESULTS: Of 415 patients randomised in the core study, 367 (88.4%) entered and 322 (77.6%) completed the extension. One or more adverse events were reported in 303 (82.6%) of 367 patients: 'headache', 'lymphocyte count decreased', 'nasopharyngitis' and 'MS relapse' were most common (14.7%-16.9%). No serious opportunistic infection, macular oedema or malignancy was reported and no bradyarrhythmia of clinical concern was observed by Holter or 12-lead electrocardiogram. The dose-dependent effect of amiselimod on clinical and magnetic resonance imaging-related outcomes from the core study was sustained in those continuing on amiselimod and similarly observed after switching to active drug. CONCLUSION: For up to 2 years of treatment, amiselimod was well tolerated and dose-dependently effective in controlling disease activity.

Inattentional blindness on the full-attention trial: Are we throwing out the baby with the bathwater?

When attention is otherwise engaged, observers may experience inattentional blindness, failing to notice objects or events that are presented in plain sight. In an inattentional blindness experiment, an unexpectedstimulus ispresented alongside primary-task stimuli, and its detection is probed. We evaluate a criterion that is commonly used to exclude observers from the data analysis. On the final experimental trial, observers do not perform the primary task, but instead look for anything new. Observers who fail to report the unexpected stimulus on thisfull-attention trialare excluded. On the basis of 4 hypothetical experiments and a review of 128 actual experiments from the literature, we demonstrate some potentially problematic consequences of implementing the full-attention-trial exclusion criterion. Excluded observers may cluster in experimental conditions and the exclusion criterion may lead researchers to understate the pervasiveness of inattentional blindness. It may even render usblindto inattentional blindness on the full-attention trial.

Metabolism and disposition of the dipeptidyl peptidase IV inhibitor teneligliptin in humans.

1. The absorption, metabolism and excretion of teneligliptin were investigated in healthy male subjects after a single oral dose of 20 mg [(14)C]teneligliptin. 2. Total plasma radioactivity reached the peak concentration at 1.33 h after administration and thereafter disappeared in a biphasic manner. By 216 h after administration, ≥90% of the administered radioactivity was excreted, and the cumulative excretion in the urine and faeces was 45.4% and 46.5%, respectively. 3. The most abundant metabolite in plasma was a thiazolidine-1-oxide derivative (designated as M1), which accounted for 14.7% of the plasma AUC (area under the plasma concentration versus time curve) of the total radioactivity. The major components excreted in urine were teneligliptin and M1, accounting for 14.8% and 17.7% of the dose, respectively, by 120 h, whereas in faeces, teneligliptin was the major component (26.1% of the dose), followed by M1 (4.0%). 4. CYP3A4 and FMO3 are the major enzymes responsible for the metabolism of teneligliptin in humans. 5. This study indicates the involvement of renal excretion and multiple metabolic pathways in the elimination of teneligliptin from the human body. Teneligliptin is unlikely to cause conspicuous drug interactions or changes in its pharmacokinetics patients with renal or hepatic impairment, due to a balance in the elimination pathways.

Spatial limits on the nonvisual self-touch illusion and the visual rubber hand illusion: subjective experience of the illusion and proprioceptive drift.

The nonvisual self-touch rubber hand paradigm elicits the compelling illusion that one is touching one's own hand even though the two hands are not in contact. In four experiments, we investigated spatial limits of distance (15 cm, 30 cm, 45 cm, 60 cm) and alignment (0°, 90° anti-clockwise) on the nonvisual self-touch illusion and the well-known visual rubber hand illusion. Common procedures (synchronous and asynchronous stimulation administered for 60s with the prosthetic hand at body midline) and common assessment methods were used. Subjective experience of the illusion was assessed by agreement ratings for statements on a questionnaire and time of illusion onset. The nonvisual self-touch illusion was diminished though never abolished by distance and alignment manipulations, whereas the visual rubber hand illusion was more robust against these manipulations. We assessed proprioceptive drift, and implications of a double dissociation between subjective experience of the illusion and proprioceptive drift are discussed.

When you fail to see what you were told to look for: inattentional blindness and task instructions.

Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified shape but observers developed an attentional set for colour, because we made the black-white discrimination easier than the square-diamond discrimination. None of the observers instructed to count bounces by squares reported an unexpected white square, whereas two-thirds of observers instructed to count bounces by diamonds did report the white square. When attentional set departs from task instructions, you may fail to see what you were told to look for.

Quantitative and qualitative analysis of naphthenic acids in natural waters surrounding the Canadian oil sands industry.

The Canadian oil sands industry stores toxic oil sands process-affected water (OSPW) in large tailings ponds adjacent to the Athabasca River or its tributaries, raising concerns over potential seepage. Naphthenic acids (NAs; C(n)H(2n-Z)O(2)) are toxic components of OSPW, but are also natural components of bitumen and regional groundwaters, and may enter surface waters through anthropogenic or natural sources. This study used a selective high-resolution mass spectrometry method to examine total NA concentrations and NA profiles in OSPW (n = 2), Athabasca River pore water (n = 6, representing groundwater contributions) and surface waters (n = 58) from the Lower Athabasca Region. NA concentrations in surface water (< 2-80.8 µg/L) were 100-fold lower than previously estimated. Principal components analysis (PCA) distinguished sample types based on NA profile, and correlations to water quality variables identified two sources of NAs: natural fatty acids, and bitumen-derived NAs. Analysis of NA data with water quality variables highlighted two tributaries to the Athabasca River-Beaver River and McLean Creek-as possibly receiving OSPW seepage. This study is the first comprehensive analysis of NA profiles in surface waters of the region, and demonstrates the need for highly selective analytical methods for source identification and in monitoring for potential effects of development on ambient water quality.