Intergroup Reconciliation between Flemings and Walloons: The Predictive Value of Cognitive Style, Authoritarian Ideology, and Intergroup Emotions.

Testifying to the gap in fundamental research on positive intergroup outcomes, we investigated reconciliation attitudes in a non-violent intergroup context (i.e., the linguistic conflict in Belgium). By incorporating both important predictors of negative outgroup attitudes (i.e., individual differences in rigid cognitive styles and authoritarian ideologies), and important predictors of reconciliation (i.e., intergroup emotions), we aimed to contribute to a more comprehensive theoretical framework for the analysis of intergroup relations. We recruited one Flemish (N = 310) and one Walloon (N = 365) undergraduate students sample to test the proposed model. Structural equation analyses with maximum likelihood estimation were conducted using the Lavaan package. In both samples, similar patterns were found. More in particular, the need for cognitive closure appeared to be the basic predictor of right-wing attitudes (i.e., right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation) and essentialist thinking, which were then associated with less outgroup empathy and trust, and more outgroup anger. Furthermore, outgroup trust and empathy were positively related to reconciliation. Interestingly, some differences between the Flemish and Walloon sample were found, such as the direct effects of need for closure and social dominance orientation in the first sample, and the non-significant effects of essentialism in the latter sample. Considering the ongoing public and political debate about the linguistic conflict in Belgium, these findings shed a new light on how individual differences relate to specific outgroup emotions, and how these are associated with important intergroup outcomes in the face of intergroup conflict.

Rationally blind? Rationality polarizes policy support for colour blindness versus multiculturalism.

Do White Americans prefer society to be 'colour-blind' by rising above racial identities, or 'multicultural' by openly discussing and considering them? We developed an ideology-rationality model to understand support for these diversity perspectives. Specifically, since people endorse a diversity perspective in line with their ideological values, we hypothesized that conservatism is related to a relative preference for colour blindness over multiculturalism. However, since colour blindness and multiculturalism are complex and multi-layered ideologies, we further hypothesized that the relationship between conservatism and a preference for colour blindness over multiculturalism is especially pronounced under higher levels of rationality. Results confirmed the hypotheses, either when rationality was operationalized within a dual process theory (Study 1, N = 496) or experimentally induced within a tripartite model of cognition (Study 2, N = 497). Higher levels of rationality guided White Americans high in conservatism towards a stronger preference for colour-blindness, but those low in conservatism towards a stronger preference for multiculturalism. These results suggest that among White Americans the endorsement of colour blindness versus multiculturalism stems from the interplay between ideological orientation and rationality and that rational considerations about racial policies may further divide rather than unify along ideological lines.

The association between political orientation and political knowledge in 45 nations.

Political knowledge is crucial for well-functioning democracies, with most scholars assuming that people at the political extremes are more knowledgeable than those at the center. Here, we adopt a data-driven approach to examine the relationship between political orientation and political knowledge by testing a series of polynomial curves in 45 countries (N = 63,544), spread over 6 continents. Contrary to the dominant perspective, we found no evidence that people at the political extremes are the most knowledgeable about politics. Rather, the most common pattern was a fourth-degree polynomial association in which those who are moderately left-wing and right-wing are more knowledgeable than people at the extremes and center of the political spectrum. This pattern was especially, though not exclusively, prevalent in Western countries. We conclude that the relationship between political orientation and political knowledge is more context-dependent and complex than assumed, and caution against (implicit) universal conclusions in social sciences.

Selective exposure bias predicts views on diversity over time.

Despite growing diversity, many individuals do not support it, posing a challenge to the successful functioning of societies, institutions, and organizations. We investigated the role of the selective exposure bias on diversity beliefs. In a large-scale nationally representative Spanish sample (N = 2,297), we conducted a time-lagged experiment with two time points 5 months apart in which we offered participants a monetary incentive to (allegedly) read attitude contradictory versus conforming information about societal support for refugees. The selective exposure bias asymmetrically predicted future diversity beliefs. Among individuals with a positive intergroup orientation, the selective exposure bias did not predict future diversity beliefs. However, among individuals with a negative intergroup orientation, the selective exposure bias predicted lower pro-diversity beliefs over time, over and above initial pro-diversity beliefs and ideological dispositions. These findings suggest that the absence of pro-diversity beliefs partly originates from a cognitive bias, holding critical implications for policymakers seeking to improve intergroup relations.

Cultural dyes: Cultural norms color person perception.

People from different cultures may perceive the same behavior in contrasting ways, thereby reaching very different conclusions. We argue that cultural norms not only guide our own behaviors but also color the way we perceive others. Here, we overview research on the different cultural norms people may use when judging others. Specifically, we discuss work on norms pertaining to how people describe, evaluate, and support others. Additionally, we also highlight some important implications of the reviewed research and underscore some key environmental factors that motivate stronger adherence to cultural norms. We conclude that the study of interpersonal perception is incomplete without taking into account the influence cultural norms have on the way we perceive others.

Warmth and competence perceptions of key protagonists are associated with containment measures during the COVID-19 pandemic: Evidence from 35 countries.

It is crucial to understand why people comply with measures to contain viruses and their effects during pandemics. We provide evidence from 35 countries (Ntotal = 12,553) from 6 continents during the COVID-19 pandemic (between 2021 and 2022) obtained via cross-sectional surveys that the social perception of key protagonists on two basic dimensions-warmth and competence-plays a crucial role in shaping pandemic-related behaviors. Firstly, when asked in an open question format, heads of state, physicians, and protest movements were universally identified as key protagonists across countries. Secondly, multiple-group confirmatory factor analyses revealed that warmth and competence perceptions of these and other protagonists differed significantly within and between countries. Thirdly, internal meta-analyses showed that warmth and competence perceptions of heads of state, physicians, and protest movements were associated with support and opposition intentions, containment and prevention behaviors, as well as vaccination uptake. Our results have important implications for designing effective interventions to motivate desirable health outcomes and coping with future health crises and other global challenges.

Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial.

In the study of utilitarian morality, the sacrificial dilemma paradigm has been the dominant approach for years. However, to address some of the most pressing issues in the current research literature, the present studies adopt an alternative approach by using a minimal group paradigm in which participants have to make decisions about the allocation of resources. This approach allows not only to pit utilitarianism against equality-based morality, but also to study these modes of morality for both harm and benefit, and to directly address the role of group identity affecting the (im)partial nature of 'utilitarian' (i.e., outcome maximizing) decisions. In our experiments, across four different samples (total N = 946), we demonstrate that although participants generally prefer equality-based allocations over maximizing distributions, outcome maximizing choices become more prevalent when they served to minimize harm compared to maximizing benefit. Furthermore, reducing the objective value of the equal distribution outcomes further prompts participants to adopt a more utilitarian approach in situations involving harm, but has little effect in situations where benefits have to be distributed. Finally, the introduction of (minimal) group identity consistently demonstrates that decisions that maximize the overall outcome are more likely if they also serve the ingroup compared to when they rather serve the outgroup. We discuss how these findings have meaningful implications that may be especially relevant for recent movements that advocate a utilitarian approach to charity, and for our understanding of (im)partiality in lay people's 'utilitarian' decision making.

Investigating the Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect Across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style.

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

The relationship between emotional abilities and right-wing and prejudiced attitudes.

Previous research revealed that cognitive abilities are negatively related to right-wing and prejudiced attitudes. No study has, however, investigated if emotional abilities also show such a relationship, although this can be expected based on both classic and recent literature. The aim of the present study was 2-fold: (a) to investigate the relationship between emotional abilities and right-wing and prejudiced attitudes, and (b) to pit the effects of emotional and cognitive abilities on these attitudes against each other. Results from 2 adult samples (n = 409 and 574) in which abilities scores were collected in individual testing sessions, revealed that emotional abilities are significantly and negatively related to social-cultural and economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes, as well as to blatant ethnic prejudice. These relationships were as strong as those found for cognitive abilities. For economic-hierarchical right-wing attitudes, emotional abilities were even the only significant correlate. It is therefore concluded that the study of emotional abilities has the potential to significantly advance our understanding of right-wing and prejudiced attitudes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).