Memory, Decision-Making, and the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC): The Roles of Subcallosal and Posterior Orbitofrontal Cortices in Monitoring and Control Processes.

The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) prominently and separately features in neurobiological models of decision-making (e.g., value-encoding) and of memory (e.g., automatic veracity-monitoring). Recent decision-making models propose value judgments that inherently comprise of second-order confidence estimates. These demonstrate quadratic relationships with first-order judgments and are automatically encoded in vmPFC activity. Memory studies use Quantity-Accuracy Profiles to capture similar first-order and second-order meta-mnemonic processes, suggesting convergence across domains. Patients with PFC damage answered general knowledge questionnaires under 2 conditions. During forced report, they chose an answer and rated the probability of it being correct (first-order "monitoring"). During free report, they could choose to volunteer or withhold their previous answers (second-order "control") to maximize performance. We found quadratic relationships between first-order and second-order meta-mnemonic processes; voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping demonstrated that vmPFC damage diminished that relationship. Furthermore, damage to subcallosal vmPFC was specifically associated with impaired monitoring and additional damage to posterior orbitofrontal cortex led to deficient control. In decision-making, these regions typically support valuation and choice, respectively. Persistent spontaneous confabulation (false memory production) confirmed the clinical relevance of these dissociations. Compared with patients with no confabulation history, patients who currently confabulate were impaired on both monitoring and control, whereas former confabulators demonstrated impaired monitoring but intact control.

Metacognitive myopia in change detection: A collective approach to overcome a persistent anomaly.

Going beyond the origins of cognitive biases, which have been the focus of continued research, the notion of metacognitive myopia refers to the failure to monitor, control, and correct for biased inferences at the metacognitive level. Judgments often follow the given information uncritically, even when it is easy to find out or explicitly explained that information samples are misleading or invalid. The present research is concerned with metacognitive myopia in judgments of change. Participants had to decide whether pairs of binomial samples were drawn from populations with decreasing, equal, or increasing proportions p of a critical feature. Judgments of p changes were strongly affected by changes in absolute sample size n, such that only increases (decreases) in p that came along with increasing (decreasing) n were readily detected. Across 4 experiments these anomalies persisted even though the distinction of p and n was strongly emphasized through outcome feedback and full debriefing (Experiment 1-4), simultaneous presentation (Experiments 2-4), and recoding of experienced samples into descriptive percentages (Experiment 3-4). In Experiment 4, a joint attempt was made by 10 scientists working in 7 different institutions to develop an effective debiasing training, suggesting how multilab-collaboration might improve the quality of science in the early stage of operational research designing. Despite significant improvements in change judgments, debiasing treatments did not eliminate the anomalies. Possible ways of dealing with the metacognitive deficit are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Control over grain size in memory reporting--with and without satisfying knowledge.

When answering questions from memory, respondents strategically control the precision or coarseness of their answers. This grain control process is guided by 2 countervailing aims: to be informative and to be correct. Previously, M. Goldsmith, A. Koriat, and A. Weinberg Eliezer (2002) proposed a satisfying model in which respondents provide the most precise answer that passes a minimum-confidence report criterion. Pointing to social-pragmatic considerations, the present research shows the need to incorporate a minimum-informativeness criterion as well. Unlike its predecessor, the revised, "dual-criterion" model implies a distinction between 2 theoretical knowledge states: Under moderate-to-high levels of satisfying knowledge, a grain size can be found that jointly satisfies both criteria--confidence and informativeness. In contrast, under lower levels of unsatisfying knowledge, the 2 criteria conflict--one cannot be satisfied without violating the other. In support of the model, respondents often violated the confidence criterion in deference to the informativeness criterion, particularly when answering under low knowledge, despite having full control over grain size. Results also suggest a key role for the "don't know" response which, when available, can be used preferentially to circumvent the criterion conflict.

Attention to distinguishing features in object recognition: An interactive-iterative framework.

This article advances a framework that casts object recognition as a process of discrimination between alternative object identities, in which top-down and bottom-up processes interact-iteratively when necessary-with attention to distinguishing features playing a critical role. In two experiments, observers discriminated between different types of artificial fish. In parallel, a secondary, variable-SOA visual-probe detection task was used to examine the dynamics of visual attention. In Experiment 1, the fish varied in three distinguishing features: one indicating the general category (saltwater, freshwater), and one of the two other features indicating the specific type of fish within each category. As predicted, in the course of recognizing each fish, attention was allocated iteratively to the distinguishing features in an optimal manner: first to the general category feature, and then, based on its value, to the second feature that identified the specific fish. In Experiment 2, two types of fish could be discriminated on the basis of either of two distinguishing features, one more visually discriminable than the other. On some of the trials, one of the two alternative distinguishing features was occluded. As predicted, in the course of recognizing each fish, attention was directed initially to the more discriminable distinguishing feature, but when this feature was occluded, it was then redirected to the less discriminable feature. The implications of these findings, and the interactive-iterative framework they support, are discussed with regard to several fundamental issues having a long history in the literatures on object recognition, object categorization, and visual perception in general.

Real-world cognitive--and metacognitive--dysfunction in schizophrenia: a new approach for measuring (and remediating) more "right stuff".

While the role of impaired cognition in accounting for functional outcome in schizophrenia is generally established by now, the overlap is far from complete. Moreover, little is known about the potential mechanisms that bridge between cognition and functional outcome. The aim of this article is to aid in closing this gap by presenting a novel, more ecologically valid approach for neuropsychological assessment. The new approach is motivated by the view that metacognitive processes of self-monitoring and self-regulation are fundamental determinants of competent functioning in the real world. The new approach incorporates experimental psychological concepts and paradigms used to study metacognition into current standard neuropsychological assessment procedures. Preliminary empirical data that support and demonstrate the utility of the new approach for assessment, as well as remediation efforts, in schizophrenia are presented and discussed.

The neuropsychological basis of competence to consent in first-episode schizophrenia: a pilot metacognitive study.

BACKGROUND: This study was designed to explore the neuropsychological basis of competence to consent to treatment in first-episode schizophrenia by evaluating its differential and joint links with cognitive versus metacognitive performance. METHODS: Twenty-one first-episode patients were assessed with the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T) and a metacognitive version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). In addition to the standard administration of the WCST, subjects were also asked to rate their level of confidence in the correctness of each sort (prior to getting the feedback) and to choose whether they wanted each sort to be "counted" toward their overall performance score on the test. Each "ventured" sort received a bonus of 10 cents if correct but an equal penalty if wrong. RESULTS: Compromised capacity to consent was more strongly related to deficits at the metacognitive level than to cognitive deficits per se. Moreover, prediction of competence to consent significantly improved when adding the new, free-choice metacognitive measures to the conventional WCST measures but not the other way around. CONCLUSIONS: These preliminary results suggest that metacognition plays a fundamental role in capacity to consent, which might be at least equally important for decision-making competence as cognitive deficits per se.

Hierarchical Navigation of Visual Attention: Orienting and Focusing Within and Between Hierarchically Structured Objects.

This study explored the dynamics of attentional navigation between two hierarchically structured objects. Three experiments examined a Hierarchical Attentional Navigation (HAN) hypothesis, by which attentional navigation between two visual stimuli is constrained to follow the path linking the two stimuli in a hierarchical object-based representation. Presented with two adjacent compound-letter objects on each trial, participants successively identified the letter(s) at the specified hierarchical level (global or local) of the origin and destination object, respectively: local-local (Experiment 1), global-local (Experiment 2a), or local-global (Experiment 2b). The organizational complexity of the objects (2-level structure vs. 3-level structure) and their global size (large vs. small) were orthogonally manipulated. Results were generally consistent with the HAN hypothesis: overall response latency was positively related to the number of intervening levels of hierarchical object structure linking the two target levels. Hierarchical navigation was also suggested by the pattern of global size effects. The usefulness of the HAN framework for interpreting these and related findings in attention research is discussed.

Strategic regulation of grain size in memory reporting.

To increase their report accuracy, rememberers may either withhold information that they feel unsure about or provide relatively coarse information that is unlikely to be wrong. In previous work (A. Koriat & M. Goldsmith, 1996c), the authors delineated the metacognitive monitoring and control processes underlying the decision to volunteer or withhold particular items of information (report option) and examined how these processes are used in the strategic regulation of memory accuracy. This article adapts that framework to address control over the grain size (precision-coarseness) of the information that people report. Results show that rememberers strategically regulate the grain of their answers to accommodate the competing goals of accuracy and informativeness. The metacognitive processes underlying this regulation are elucidated.

The neuropsychological basis of insight in first-episode schizophrenia: a pilot metacognitive study.

The aim of the present study was to explore the neuropsychological basis of insight in first-episode schizophrenia, by evaluating its differential and joint links with cognitive vs. metacognitive performance. Thirty first-episode patients were assessed with the Scale of Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD) and a metacognitive version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). In addition to the standard administration of the WCST, subjects were also asked to rate their level of confidence in the correctness of each sort (prior to getting the feedback), and to choose whether they wanted each sort to be "counted" toward their overall performance score on the test. Each "volunteered" sort received a bonus of 10 cents if correct, but an equal penalty if wrong. Insight into illness had higher correlations with free-choice metacognitive indices derived from confidence ratings and volunteered sorts than with the conventional scores from the WCST. Moreover, prediction of poor insight was significantly improved when adding the new, free-choice metacognitive measures to the conventional WCST measures, but not the other way around. These preliminary results suggest that metacognition is an important mediator between basic cognitive deficits and poor insight, and might be even more relevant to poor insight than cognitive deficits per se.

Modulation of object-based attention by spatial focus under endogenous and exogenous orienting.

In R. Egly, J. Driver, and R. D. Rafal's (1994) influential double-rectangle spatial-cuing paradigm, exogenous cues consistently induce object-based attention, whereas endogenous cues generally induce space-based attention. This difference suggests an interdependency between mode of orienting (endogenous vs exogenous) and mode of selection (object based vs space based). However, mode of orienting is generally confounded with initial focus of attention: Endogenous orienting begins with attention focused on a central cue, whereas exogenous orienting begins with attention widely spread. In this study, an attentional-focusing hypothesis is examined and supported by experiments showing that for both endogenous and exogenous cuing, object-based effects are obtained under conditions that encourage spread attention, but they are attenuated under conditions that encourage focused attention. General implications for object-based attention are discussed. ((c) 2003 APA, all rights reserved)

Dolphins on the witness stand? The comparative psychology of strategic memory regulation.

Smith et al. show that monkeys and dolphins can respond adaptively under conditions of uncertainty, suggesting that they monitor subjective uncertainty and control their behavior accordingly. Drawing on our own work with humans on the strategic regulation of memory reporting, we argue that, so far, the distinction between monitoring and control has not been addressed sufficiently in metacognitive animal research.

Metacognitive effects of initial question difficulty on subsequent memory performance.

In two experiments, we examined whether relative retrieval fluency (the relative ease or difficulty of answering questions from memory) would be translated, via metacognitive monitoring and control processes, into an overt effect on the controlled behavior-that is, the decision whether to answer a question or abstain. Before answering a target set of multiple-choice general-knowledge questions (intermediate-difficulty questions in Exp. 1, deceptive questions in Exp. 2), the participants first answered either a set of difficult questions or a set of easy questions. For each question, they provided a forced-report answer, followed by a subjective assessment of the likelihood that their answer was correct (confidence) and by a free-report control decision-whether or not to report the answer for a potential monetary bonus (or penalty). The participants' ability to answer the target questions (forced-report proportion correct) was unaffected by the initial question difficulty. However, a predicted metacognitive contrast effect was observed: When the target questions were preceded by a set of difficult rather than easy questions, the participants were more confident in their answers to the target questions, and hence were more likely to report them, thus increasing the quantity of freely reported correct information. The option of free report was more beneficial after initial question difficulty than after initial question ease, in terms of both the gain in accuracy (Exp. 2) and a smaller cost in quantity (Exps. 1 and 2). These results demonstrate that changes in subjective experience can influence metacognitive monitoring and control, thereby affecting free-report memory performance independently of forced-report performance.

Exploring metacognitive components of confidence and control in individuals with obsessive-compulsive tendencies.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Obsessive-compulsive (OC) patients typically display reduced metacognitive confidence, but findings regarding the scope of this phenomenon and factors that mediate it have been inconsistent. This study aimed to further the understanding of reduced metacognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) by exploring the relationship between metacognitive processes and OC tendencies. METHODS: High and low OC participants answered a general-knowledge questionnaire, rated their confidence in each answer, and decided whether or not to report each answer. RESULTS: High and low OC participants did not differ either in their performance (general knowledge) or in their subjective estimations or confidence regarding their performance. The two groups also did not differ in the effectiveness of their metacognitive monitoring or in the relationship between monitoring and report-control decisions (control sensitivity). However, the two groups did differ in response criterion, with high OC participants less willing to report answers held with low-to-medium levels of subjective confidence. LIMITATIONS: The study was conducted with non-clinical participants, which limits generalization to OCD. CONCLUSIONS: These results suggest that conservative response criterion among OC individuals might be the critical factor underlying feelings of doubt and uncertainty endemic in OCD.

Central-cue discriminability modulates object-based attention by influencing spatial attention.

The role of central-cue discriminability in modulating object-based effects was examined using Egly, Driver, and Rafal's (1994) "double-rectangle" spatial cueing paradigm. Based on the attentional focusing hypothesis (Goldsmith & Yeari, 2003), we hypothesized that highly discriminable central-arrow cues would be processed with attention spread across the two rectangles (potential target locations), thereby strengthening the perceptual representation of these objects so that they influence the subsequent endogenous deployment of attention, yielding object-based effects. By contrast, less discriminable central-arrow cues should induce a more narrow attentional focus to the center of the display, thereby weakening the rectangle object representations so that they no longer influence the subsequent attentional deployment. Central-arrow-cue discriminability was manipulated by size and luminance contrast. The results supported the predictions, reinforcing the attentional focusing hypothesis and highlighting the need to consider central-cue discriminability when designing experiments and in comparing experimental results.

Source-constrained recall: front-end and back-end control of retrieval quality.

Research on the strategic regulation of memory accuracy has focused primarily on monitoring and control processes used to edit out incorrect information after it is retrieved (back-end control). Recent studies, however, suggest that rememberers also enhance accuracy by preventing the retrieval of incorrect information in the first place (front-end control). The present study put forward and examined a mechanism called source-constrained recall (cf. Jacoby, Shimizu, Velanova, & Rhodes, 2005) by which rememberers process and use recall cues in qualitatively different ways, depending on the manner of original encoding. Results of 2 experiments in which information about source encoding depth was made available at test showed that when possible, participants constrained recall to the solicited targets by reinstating the original encoding operations on the recall cues. This reinstatement improved the quality of the information that came to mind, which, together with improved postretrieval monitoring, enhanced actual recall performance.

Metacognitive regulation of text learning: on screen versus on paper.

Despite immense technological advances, learners still prefer studying text from printed hardcopy rather than from computer screens. Subjective and objective differences between on-screen and on-paper learning were examined in terms of a set of cognitive and metacognitive components, comprising a Metacognitive Learning Regulation Profile (MLRP) for each study media. Participants studied expository texts of 1000-1200 words in one of the two media and for each text they provided metacognitive prediction-of-performance judgments with respect to a subsequent multiple-choice test. Under fixed study time (Experiment 1), test performance did not differ between the two media, but when study time was self-regulated (Experiment 2) worse performance was observed on screen than on paper. The results suggest that the primary differences between the two study media are not cognitive but rather metacognitive--less accurate prediction of performance and more erratic study-time regulation on screen than on paper. More generally, this study highlights the contribution of metacognitive regulatory processes to learning and demonstrates the potential of the MLRP methodology for revealing the source of subjective and objective differences in study performance among study conditions.

Organizational and spatial dynamics of attentional focusing in hierarchically structured objects.

Is the focusing of visual attention object-based, space-based, both, or neither? Attentional focusing latencies in hierarchically structured compound-letter objects were examined, orthogonally manipulating global size (larger vs. smaller) and organizational complexity (two-level structure vs. three-level structure). In a dynamic focusing task, participants successively identified the global and local letters in the same trial. Overall response latencies were generally longer for larger versus smaller global objects and for three-level versus two-level object structure, indicating that attentional focusing time increases both with the magnitude of change in attentional aperture size and with the number of traversed levels of object structure. Additional experiments showed that this pattern is unique to tasks that require dynamic attentional focusing. Taken together, the results support a hierarchical object-based-spatial model of attentional focusing.

Is object-based attention mandatory? Strategic control over mode of attention.

Is object-based attention mandatory or under strategic control? In an adapted spatial cuing paradigm, participants focused initially on a central arrow cue that was part of a perceptual group (Experiment 1) or a uniformly connected object (Experiment 2), encompassing one of the potential target locations. The cue always pointed to an opposite, different-object location. By varying cue validity, the strategic incentive to prevent the spread of attention to the entire cue object, and consequently to the same-object location, was manipulated: With invalid cuing and (consequently) equal probability of targets at same-object and different-object locations, a same-object target identification advantage was observed. With highly valid cuing and targets much more probable at the different-object location than at the same-object location, the same-object advantage disappeared. Object-based attention appears to be a default mode that may be ecologically adaptive but can be overridden by strategic control when there is a strong immediate benefit in doing so.