Toward a causal model of curiosity and creativity.

We extend Ivancovsky et al.'s finding on the association between curiosity and creativity by proposing a sequential causal model assuming that (a) curiosity determines the motivation to seek information and that (b) creativity constitutes a capacity to act on that motivation. This framework assumes that both high levels of curiosity and creativity are necessary for information-seeking behavior.

Peace in other primates.

We elaborate on Glowacki's claim that humans are more capable of establishing peace than other mammals. We present three aspects suggesting caution. First, the social capabilities of nonhuman primates should not be underestimated. Second, the effect of these capabilities on peace establishment is nonmonotonous. Third, defining peace by human-centered values introduces a fallacy.

More than two intuitions.

We consider an underdeveloped feature of De Neys's model. Decisions with multiple intuitions per option are neither trivial to explain nor rare. These decision scenarios are crucial for an assessment of the model's generalizability and adequacy. Besides monitoring absolute differences in intuition strength, the mind might add the strengths of intuitions per choice option, leading to competing and testable hypotheses.

Similarity and the coordination of ownership.

We discuss and expand Boyer's idea of ownership coordination. Interpersonal similarity, we suggest, can moderate the attainment of coordination: Perceived similarity predicts coordination costs, whereas actual similarity dictates coordination success and the severity of illusory assumptions regarding a shared understanding of ownership. The example of similarity highlights the complexity of the social projection process uncritically assumed behind ownership coordination.

Hell of a theory.

The theory of group-selected Big God religions is a master narrative of cultural evolution. The evidence is a positive manifold of correlated assumptions and variables. Although provocative, the theory is overly elastic. Its critical ingredient - belief in Big Gods - is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for in-group prosociality and discipline. Four specific issues illustrate this elasticity.

Strategic thinking in the shadow of self-enhancement: Benefits and costs.

Using a variant of the hide-and-seek game, we show in three studies that self-enhancement can help or hinder strategic thinking. In this guessing game, one player chooses a number while another player tries to guess it. Each player does this either in a random fashion (throwing a mental die) or by active thinking. The structure of the game implies that guessers benefit from thinking about a number, whereas choosers are disadvantaged. Yet, regardless of their role, respondents prefer to actively think about a number. For choosers, the belief they can outthink the opponent amounts to self-enhancement, whereas for guessers, the same belief can be rationally justified. We discuss the implications of the findings for theories of strategic cognition and applications to real-world contexts.

Deciding what to replicate: A decision model for replication study selection under resource and knowledge constraints.

Robust scientific knowledge is contingent upon replication of original findings. However, replicating researchers are constrained by resources, and will almost always have to choose one replication effort to focus on from a set of potential candidates. To select a candidate efficiently in these cases, we need methods for deciding which out of all candidates considered would be the most useful to replicate, given some overall goal researchers wish to achieve. In this article we assume that the overall goal researchers wish to achieve is to maximize the utility gained by conducting the replication study. We then propose a general rule for study selection in replication research based on the replication value of the set of claims considered for replication. The replication value of a claim is defined as the maximum expected utility we could gain by conducting a replication of the claim, and is a function of (a) the value of being certain about the claim, and (b) uncertainty about the claim based on current evidence. We formalize this definition in terms of a causal decision model, utilizing concepts from decision theory and causal graph modeling. We discuss the validity of using replication value as a measure of expected utility gain, and we suggest approaches for deriving quantitative estimates of replication value. Our goal in this article is not to define concrete guidelines for study selection, but to provide the necessary theoretical foundations on which such concrete guidelines could be built. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Feeling good without doing good: Comment on Orth and Robins (2022).

Reviewing the literature of the past two decades, Orth and Robins (2022) conclude that high self-esteem yields reliable benefits. In this commentary, we caution that for objective outcome measures, these effects are variable- and domain-dependent. The allure of high self-esteem remains largely a matter of mind and memory, not behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Not Too Much and Not Too Little: Information Processing for a Good Purchase Decision.

When deciding on an online purchase, consumers often face a plethora of information. Yet, individuals consumers differ greatly in the amount of information they are willing and able to acquire and process before making purchasing decisions. Extensively processing all available information does not necessarily promote good decisions. Instead, the empirical evidence suggests that reviewing too much information or too many choice alternatives can impair decision quality. Using simulated contract conclusion scenarios, we identify distinctive types of information processing styles and find that certain search and selection strategies predict the quality of the final choice. Participants (N = 363) chose a cellular service contract in a web-based environment that closely resembled actual online settings in the country of study. Using information processing data obtained with tracking software, we identify three consumer segments differing along two dimensions - the extent dimension, referring to the overall effort invested in information processing, and the focus dimension, referring to the degree to which someone focuses on the best available options. The three subgroups of respondents can be characterized as follows: (1) consumers with a low-effort and low-focus information processing strategy (n = 137); (2) consumers with a moderate-effort and high-focus information processing strategy (n = 124); and (3) consumers with high-effort and low-focus information processing strategy (n = 102). The three groups differed not only in their information processing but also in the quality of their decisions. In line with the assumption of ecological rationality, most successful search strategies were not exhaustive, but instead involved the focused selection and processing of a medium amount of information. Implications for effective consumer information are provided.

Prediction and Explanation in a Postmodern World.

The experimental research paradigm lies at the core of empirical psychology. New data analytical and computational tools continually enrich its methodological arsenal, while the paradigm's mission remains the testing of theoretical predictions and causal explanations. Predictions regarding experimental results necessarily point to the future. Once the data are collected, the causal inferences refer to a hypothesis now lying in the past. The experimental paradigm is not designed to permit strong inferences about particular incidents that occurred before predictions were made. In contrast, historical research and scholarship in other humanities focus on this backward direction of inference. The disconnect between forward-looking experimental psychology and backward-looking historical (i.e., narrative) psychology is a challenge in the postmodern era, which can be addressed. To illustrate this possibility, I discuss three historical case studies in light of theory and research in contemporary psychology.

Is the allure of self-esteem a mirage after all?

Comments on the original article "Do people's self-views matter? Self-concept and self-esteem in everyday life," by W. B. Swann, Jr., C. Chang-Schneider, and K. L. McClarty. Swann et al argued that people's self-views, and their global self-esteem in particular, yield a suite of behavioral effects that are beneficial to the individual and to society at large. The Swann et al article is the latest link in a debate on the causal utility of self-esteem. Specifically, the article is a reply to a report published by the American Psychological Society Task Force on Self-Esteem (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). As members of that task force, the current authors wish to express their broad agreement with Swann et al. At the same time, in the comment presented here, they clarify pockets of disagreement.

Methodological individualism in experimental games: not so easily dismissed.

Orthodox game theory and social preference models cannot explain why people cooperate in many experimental games or how they manage to coordinate their choices. The theory of evidential decision making provides a solution, based on the idea that people tend to project their own choices onto others, whatever these choices might be. Evidential decision making preserves methodological individualism, and it works without recourse to social preferences. Rejecting methodological individualism, team reasoning is a thinly disguised resurgence of the group mind fallacy, and the experiments reported by Colman et al. [Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Rose, J. (this issue). Collective rationality in interactive decisions: Evidence for team reasoning. Acta Psychologica, doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.08.003.] do not offer evidence that uniquely supports team reasoning.

Towards a deeper understanding of impression formation-New insights gained from a cognitive-ecological perspective.

Impression formation is a basic module of fundamental research in social cognition, with broad implications for applied research on interpersonal relations, social attitudes, employee selection, and person judgments in legal and political context. Drawing on a pool of 28 predominantly positive traits used in Solomon Asch's (1946) seminal impression studies, two research teams have investigated the impact of the number of person traits sampled randomly from the pool on the evaluative impression of the target person. Whereas Norton, Frost, and Ariely (2007) found a "less-is-more" effect, reflecting less positive impressions with increasing sample size n, Ullrich, Krueger, Brod, and Groschupf (2013) concluded that an n-independent averaging rule can account for the data patterns obtained in both labs. We address this issue by disentangling different influences of n on resulting impressions, namely varying baserates of positive and negative traits, different sampling procedures, and trait diagnosticity. Depending on specific task conditions, which can be derived on theoretical grounds, the strength of resulting impressions (in the direction of the more prevalent valence) (a) increases with increasing n for diagnostic traits, (b) is independent of n for nondiagnostic traits, or (c) decreases with n when self-truncated sampling produces a distinct primacy effect. This refined pattern, which holds for the great majority of individual participants, illustrates the importance of strong theorizing in cumulative science (Fiedler, 2017) built on established empirical laws and logically sound theorizing. (PsycINFO Database Record

Perceptions of self and other in the prisoner's dilemma: outcome bias and evidential reasoning.

In the prisoner's dilemma, self-interest clashes with collective interest. The way players resolve this conflict affects how others view them. Cooperators are seen as more moral than defectors, and, when there is no information about the other player's choice, cooperators and defectors are seen as equally competent. However, players who are defected against are seen as less competent, especially if they themselves cooperated (Experiments 1 and 2). Similarly, cooperators see themselves as more moral, but not as less competent, than defectors do (Experiments 3). Independent of concerns about reputation and self-image maintenance, evidential reasoning contributes to cooperative behavior. Players who project their own attitudes onto others are more likely to cooperate (Experiments 3). Compared with classic game theory, a theory of reputational concerns and evidential reasoning is better equipped to explain empirical patterns of choice behavior in social dilemmas.

The Heuristic Value of p in Inductive Statistical Inference.

Many statistical methods yield the probability of the observed data - or data more extreme - under the assumption that a particular hypothesis is true. This probability is commonly known as 'the' p-value. (Null Hypothesis) Significance Testing ([NH]ST) is the most prominent of these methods. The p-value has been subjected to much speculation, analysis, and criticism. We explore how well the p-value predicts what researchers presumably seek: the probability of the hypothesis being true given the evidence, and the probability of reproducing significant results. We also explore the effect of sample size on inferential accuracy, bias, and error. In a series of simulation experiments, we find that the p-value performs quite well as a heuristic cue in inductive inference, although there are identifiable limits to its usefulness. We conclude that despite its general usefulness, the p-value cannot bear the full burden of inductive inference; it is but one of several heuristic cues available to the data analyst. Depending on the inferential challenge at hand, investigators may supplement their reports with effect size estimates, Bayes factors, or other suitable statistics, to communicate what they think the data say.

Rationality, perception, and the all-seeing eye.

Seeing-perception and vision-is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman's arguments against the omniscience of economic agents-and the concept of bounded rationality-depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an "all-seeing eye." We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon's pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman's work-particularly his article "Maps of Bounded Rationality"-to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics-the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.

Expectations and Decisions in the Volunteer's Dilemma: Effects of Social Distance and Social Projection.

In a Volunteer's Dilemma (VoD) one individual needs to bear a cost so that a public good can be provided. Expectations regarding what others will do play a critical role because they would ideally be negatively correlated with own decisions; yet, a social-projection heuristic generates positive correlations. In a series of 2-person-dilemma studies with over 1,000 participants, we find that expectations are indeed correlated with own choice, and that people tend to volunteer more than game-theoretic benchmarks and their own expectations would allow. We also find strong evidence for a social-distance heuristic, according to which a person's own probability to volunteer and the expectation that others will volunteer decrease as others become socially more remote. Experimentally induced expectations make opposite behavior more likely, but respondents underweight these expectations. As a result, there is a small but systematic effect of over-volunteering among psychologically close individuals.