Transmission and Protection against Reinfection in the Ferret Model with the SARS-CoV-2 USA-WA1/2020 Reference Isolate.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has initiated a global pandemic, and several vaccines have now received emergency use authorization. Using the reference strain SARS-CoV-2 USA-WA1/2020, we evaluated modes of transmission and the ability of prior infection or vaccine-induced immunity to protect against infection in ferrets. Ferrets were semipermissive to infection with the USA-WA1/2020 isolate. When transmission was assessed via the detection of viral RNA (vRNA) at multiple time points, direct contact transmission was efficient to 3/3 and 3/4 contact animals in 2 respective studies, while respiratory droplet transmission was poor to only 1/4 contact animals. To determine if previously infected ferrets were protected against reinfection, ferrets were rechallenged 28 or 56 days postinfection. Following viral challenge, no infectious virus was recovered in nasal wash samples. In addition, levels of vRNA in the nasal wash were several orders of magnitude lower than during primary infection, and vRNA was rapidly cleared. To determine if intramuscular vaccination protected ferrets, ferrets were vaccinated using a prime-boost strategy with the S protein receptor-binding domain formulated with an oil-in-water adjuvant. Upon viral challenge, none of the mock or vaccinated animals were protected against infection, and there were no significant differences in vRNA or infectious virus titers in the nasal wash. Combined, these studies demonstrate direct contact is the predominant mode of transmission of the USA-WA1/2020 isolate in ferrets and that immunity to SARS-CoV-2 is maintained for at least 56 days. Our studies also indicate protection of the upper respiratory tract against SARS-CoV-2 will require vaccine strategies that mimic natural infection or induce site-specific immunity. IMPORTANCE The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) USA-WA1/2020 strain is a CDC reference strain used by multiple research laboratories. Here, we show that the predominant mode of transmission of this isolate in ferrets is by direct contact. We further demonstrate ferrets are protected against reinfection for at least 56 days even when levels of neutralizing antibodies are low or undetectable. Last, we show that when ferrets were vaccinated by the intramuscular route to induce antibodies against SARS-CoV-2, ferrets remain susceptible to infection of the upper respiratory tract. Collectively, these studies suggest that protection of the upper respiratory tract will require vaccine approaches that mimic natural infection.

Risk assessment of a highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus from mink.

Outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses in farmed mink and seals combined with isolated human infections suggest these viruses pose a pandemic threat. To assess this threat, using the ferret model, we show an H5N1 isolate derived from mink transmits by direct contact to 75% of exposed ferrets and, in airborne transmission studies, the virus transmits to 37.5% of contacts. Sequence analyses show no mutations were associated with transmission. The H5N1 virus also has a low infectious dose and remains virulent at low doses. This isolate carries the adaptive mutation, PB2 T271A, and reversing this mutation reduces mortality and airborne transmission. This is the first report of a H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus exhibiting direct contact and airborne transmissibility in ferrets. These data indicate heightened pandemic potential of the panzootic H5N1 viruses and emphasize the need for continued efforts to control outbreaks and monitor viral evolution.

Intranasal SARS-CoV-2 RBD decorated nanoparticle vaccine enhances viral clearance in the Syrian hamster model.

Multiple vaccines have been developed and licensed for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). While these vaccines reduce disease severity, they do not prevent infection. To prevent infection and limit transmission, vaccines must be developed that induce immunity in the respiratory tract. Therefore, we performed proof-of-principle studies with an intranasal nanoparticle vaccine against SARS-CoV-2. The vaccine candidate consisted of the self-assembling 60-subunit I3-01 protein scaffold covalently decorated with the SARS-CoV-2 receptor-binding domain (RBD) using the SpyCatcher-SpyTag system. We verified the intended antigen display features by reconstructing the I3-01 scaffold to 3.4 A using cryogenicelectron microscopy. Using this RBD-grafted SpyCage scaffold (RBD + SpyCage), we performed two intranasal vaccination studies in the "gold-standard" pre-clinical Syrian hamster model. The initial study focused on assessing the immunogenicity of RBD + SpyCage combined with the LTA1 intranasal adjuvant. These studies showed RBD + SpyCage vaccination induced an antibody response that promoted viral clearance but did not prevent infection. Inclusion of the LTA1 adjuvant enhanced the magnitude of the antibody response but did not enhance protection. Thus, in an expanded study, in the absence of an intranasal adjuvant, we evaluated if covalent bonding of RBD to the scaffold was required to induce an antibody response. Covalent grafting of RBD was required for the vaccine to be immunogenic, and animals vaccinated with RBD + SpyCage more rapidly cleared SARS-CoV-2 from both the upper and lower respiratory tract. These findings demonstrate the intranasal SpyCage vaccine platform can induce protection against SARS-CoV-2 and, with additional modifications to improve immunogenicity, is a versatile platform for the development of intranasal vaccines targeting respiratory pathogens.IMPORTANCEDespite the availability of efficacious COVID vaccines that reduce disease severity, SARS-CoV-2 continues to spread. To limit SARS-CoV-2 transmission, the next generation of vaccines must induce immunity in the mucosa of the upper respiratory tract. Therefore, we performed proof-of-principle, intranasal vaccination studies with a recombinant protein nanoparticle scaffold, SpyCage, decorated with the RBD of the S protein (SpyCage + RBD). We show that SpyCage + RBD was immunogenic and enhanced SARS-CoV-2 clearance from the nose and lungs of Syrian hamsters. Moreover, covalent grafting of the RBD to the scaffold was required to induce an immune response when given via the intranasal route. These proof-of-concept findings indicate that with further enhancements to immunogenicity (e.g., adjuvant incorporation and antigen optimization), the SpyCage scaffold has potential as a versatile, intranasal vaccine platform for respiratory pathogens.

Aerosolized Hydrogen Peroxide Decontamination of N95 Respirators, with Fit-Testing and Viral Inactivation, Demonstrates Feasibility for Reuse during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

In response to the demand for N95 respirators by health care workers during the COVID-19 pandemic, we evaluated decontamination of N95 respirators using an aerosolized hydrogen peroxide (aHP) system. This system is designed to dispense a consistent atomized spray of aerosolized, 7% hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) solution over a treatment cycle. Multiple N95 respirator models were subjected to 10 or more cycles of respirator decontamination, with a select number periodically assessed for qualitative and quantitative fit testing. In parallel, we assessed the ability of aHP treatment to inactivate multiple viruses absorbed onto respirators, including phi6 bacteriophage, herpes simplex virus 1 (HSV-1), coxsackievirus B3 (CVB3), and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). For pathogens transmitted via respiratory droplets and aerosols, it is critical to address respirator safety for reuse. This study provided experimental validation of an aHP treatment process that decontaminates the respirators while maintaining N95 function. External National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health (NIOSH) certification verified respirator structural integrity and filtration efficiency after 10 rounds of aHP treatment. Virus inactivation by aHP was comparable to the decontamination of commercial spore-based biological indicators. These data demonstrate that the aHP process is effective, with successful fit-testing of respirators after multiple aHP cycles, effective decontamination of multiple virus species, including SARS-CoV-2, successful decontamination of bacterial spores, and filtration efficiency maintained at or greater than 95%. While this study did not include extended or clinical use of N95 respirators between aHP cycles, these data provide proof of concept for aHP decontamination of N95 respirators before reuse in a crisis-capacity scenario. IMPORTANCE The COVID-19 pandemic led to unprecedented pressure on health care and research facilities to provide personal protective equipment. The respiratory nature of the SARS-CoV2 pathogen makes respirator facepieces a critical protective measure to limit inhalation of this virus. While respirator facepieces were designed for single use and disposal, the pandemic increased overall demand for N95 respirators, and corresponding manufacturing and supply chain limitations necessitated the safe reuse of respirators when necessary. In this study, we repurposed an aerosolized hydrogen peroxide (aHP) system that is regularly utilized to decontaminate materials in a biosafety level 3 (BSL3) facility, to develop a method for decontamination of N95 respirators. Results from viral inactivation, biological indicators, respirator fit testing, and filtration efficiency testing all indicated that the process was effective at rendering N95 respirators safe for reuse. This proof-of-concept study establishes baseline data for future testing of aHP in crisis-capacity respirator-reuse scenarios.

Sequential Transmission of Influenza Viruses in Ferrets Does Not Enhance Infectivity and Does Not Predict Transmissibility in Humans.

Airborne transmission in ferrets is a key component of pandemic risk assessment. However, some emerging avian influenza viruses transmit between ferrets but do not spread in humans. Therefore, we evaluated sequential rounds of airborne transmission as an approach to enhance the predictive accuracy of the ferret model. We reasoned that infection of ferrets via the respiratory route and onward transmission would more closely model transmission in humans. We hypothesized that pandemic and seasonal viruses would transmit efficiently over two rounds of transmission, while emerging avian viruses would fail to transmit in a second round. The 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pdm09) and seasonal H3N2 viruses were compared to avian-origin H7N9 and H3N8 viruses. Depending on the virus strain, transmission efficiency varied from 50 to 100% during the first round of transmission; the efficiency for each virus did not change during the second round, and viral replication kinetics in both rounds of transmission were similar. Both the H1N1pdm09 and H7N9 viruses acquired specific mutations during sequential transmission, while the H3N2 and H3N8 viruses did not; however, a global analysis of host-adaptive mutations revealed that minimal changes were associated with transmission of H1N1 and H3N2 viruses, while a greater number of changes occurred in the avian H3N8 and H7N9 viruses. Thus, influenza viruses that transmit in ferrets maintain their transmission efficiency through serial rounds of transmission. This answers the question of whether ferrets can propagate viruses through more than one round of airborne transmission and emphasizes that transmission in ferrets is necessary but not sufficient to infer transmissibility in humans. IMPORTANCE Airborne transmission in ferrets is used to gauge the pandemic potential of emerging influenza viruses; however, some emerging influenza viruses that transmit between ferrets do not spread between humans. Therefore, we evaluated sequential rounds of airborne transmission in ferrets as a strategy to enhance the predictive accuracy of the ferret model. Human influenza viruses transmitted efficiently (>83%) over two rounds of airborne transmission, demonstrating that, like humans, ferrets infected by the respiratory route can propagate the infection onward through the air. However, emerging avian influenza viruses with associated host-adaptive mutations also transmitted through sequential transmission. Thus, airborne transmission in ferrets is necessary but not sufficient to infer transmissibility in humans, and sequential transmission did not enhance pandemic risk assessment.

Vitamin D and the Ability to Produce 1,25(OH)2D Are Critical for Protection from Viral Infection of the Lungs.

Vitamin D supplementation is linked to improved outcomes from respiratory virus infection, and the COVID-19 pandemic renewed interest in understanding the potential role of vitamin D in protecting the lung from viral infections. Therefore, we evaluated the role of vitamin D using animal models of pandemic H1N1 influenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection. In mice, dietary-induced vitamin D deficiency resulted in lung inflammation that was present prior to infection. Vitamin D sufficient (D+) and deficient (D-) wildtype (WT) and D+ and D- Cyp27B1 (Cyp) knockout (KO, cannot produce 1,25(OH)2D) mice were infected with pandemic H1N1. D- WT, D+ Cyp KO, and D- Cyp KO mice all exhibited significantly reduced survival compared to D+ WT mice. Importantly, survival was not the result of reduced viral replication, as influenza M gene expression in the lungs was similar for all animals. Based on these findings, additional experiments were performed using the mouse and hamster models of SARS-CoV-2 infection. In these studies, high dose vitamin D supplementation reduced lung inflammation in mice but not hamsters. A trend to faster weight recovery was observed in 1,25(OH)2D treated mice that survived SARS-CoV-2 infection. There was no effect of vitamin D on SARS-CoV-2 N gene expression in the lung of either mice or hamsters. Therefore, vitamin D deficiency enhanced disease severity, while vitamin D sufficiency/supplementation reduced inflammation following infections with H1N1 influenza and SARS-CoV-2.