What explains differences in waiting times for health care across socioeconomic status?

In publicly funded health systems, waiting times act as a rationing mechanism that should be based on need rather than socioeconomic status. However, several studies suggest that individuals with higher socioeconomic status wait less. Using individual-level data from administrative registers, we estimate and explain socioeconomic inequalities in access to publicly funded care for seven planned hospital procedures in Denmark. For each procedure, we first estimate the association between patients' waiting time for health care and their socioeconomic status as measured by income and education, controlling for patient severity. Then, we investigate how much of the association remains after controlling for (i) other individual characteristics (patients' family status, labor market status, and country of origin) that may be correlated with income and education, (ii) possible selection due to patients' use of a waiting time guarantee, and (iii) hospital factors which allow us to disentangle whether inequalities in waiting times arise across hospitals or within the hospital. Only for a few procedures, we find inequalities in waiting times related to income and education. These inequalities can be explained mostly by geographical and institutional factors across hospitals. But we also find inequalities for some procedures in relation to non-Western immigrants within hospitals.

Pure altruism and misjudgement: A bad combination?

Stated preference studies on the value of health risk reductions have found valuations elicited from a private perspective to be both higher and lower compared to valuations elicited from a public perspective. Although relevant, the individual's ability to correctly predict the valuation that other individuals assign to the risk reduction has been insufficiently researched. We aim to verify whether individuals exhibit pure altruistic preferences and if this is the case, whether the presence of pure altruism leads to biased valuation of public risk reductions due to misjudgement about other individuals' preferences. We conduct a large-scale online incentivised experiment as a variant of a public good game in which the individual's final endowment is determined by choices made in the experiment. Results suggest that individuals act as pure altruists and hence try to account for the benefits obtained by others of being insured. The results also suggest that individuals fail to correctly predict other individuals' benefits from the insurance, which leads to non-optimal outcomes and biased valuations.