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1.
BMC Med Inform Decis Mak ; 16 Suppl 1: 58, 2016 07 18.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-27454754

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: To facilitate long-term safety surveillance of marketing drugs, many spontaneously reporting systems (SRSs) of ADR events have been established world-wide. Since the data collected by SRSs contain sensitive personal health information that should be protected to prevent the identification of individuals, it procures the issue of privacy preserving data publishing (PPDP), that is, how to sanitize (anonymize) raw data before publishing. Although much work has been done on PPDP, very few studies have focused on protecting privacy of SRS data and none of the anonymization methods is favorable for SRS datasets, due to which contain some characteristics such as rare events, multiple individual records, and multi-valued sensitive attributes. METHODS: We propose a new privacy model called MS(k, θ (*) )-bounding for protecting published spontaneous ADE reporting data from privacy attacks. Our model has the flexibility of varying privacy thresholds, i.e., θ (*) , for different sensitive values and takes the characteristics of SRS data into consideration. We also propose an anonymization algorithm for sanitizing the raw data to meet the requirements specified through the proposed model. Our algorithm adopts a greedy-based clustering strategy to group the records into clusters, conforming to an innovative anonymization metric aiming to minimize the privacy risk as well as maintain the data utility for ADR detection. Empirical study was conducted using FAERS dataset from 2004Q1 to 2011Q4. We compared our model with four prevailing methods, including k-anonymity, (X, Y)-anonymity, Multi-sensitive l-diversity, and (α, k)-anonymity, evaluated via two measures, Danger Ratio (DR) and Information Loss (IL), and considered three different scenarios of threshold setting for θ (*) , including uniform setting, level-wise setting and frequency-based setting. We also conducted experiments to inspect the impact of anonymized data on the strengths of discovered ADR signals. RESULTS: With all three different threshold settings for sensitive value, our method can successively prevent the disclosure of sensitive values (nearly all observed DRs are zeros) without sacrificing too much of data utility. With non-uniform threshold setting, level-wise or frequency-based, our MS(k, θ (*))-bounding exhibits the best data utility and the least privacy risk among all the models. The experiments conducted on selected ADR signals from MedWatch show that only very small difference on signal strength (PRR or ROR) were observed. The results show that our method can effectively prevent the disclosure of patient sensitive information without sacrificing data utility for ADR signal detection. CONCLUSIONS: We propose a new privacy model for protecting SRS data that possess some characteristics overlooked by contemporary models and an anonymization algorithm to sanitize SRS data in accordance with the proposed model. Empirical evaluation on the real SRS dataset, i.e., FAERS, shows that our method can effectively solve the privacy problem in SRS data without influencing the ADR signal strength.


Assuntos
Sistemas de Notificação de Reações Adversas a Medicamentos/normas , Anonimização de Dados , Modelos Teóricos , Privacidade , Humanos
2.
JMIR Med Inform ; 9(10): e28752, 2021 Oct 28.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-34709197

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: Spontaneous reporting systems (SRSs) have been increasingly established to collect adverse drug events for fostering adverse drug reaction (ADR) detection and analysis research. SRS data contain personal information, and so their publication requires data anonymization to prevent the disclosure of individuals' privacy. We have previously proposed a privacy model called MS(k, θ*)-bounding and the associated MS-Anonymization algorithm to fulfill the anonymization of SRS data. In the real world, the SRS data usually are released periodically (eg, FDA Adverse Event Reporting System [FAERS]) to accommodate newly collected adverse drug events. Different anonymized releases of SRS data available to the attacker may thwart our single-release-focus method, that is, MS(k, θ*)-bounding. OBJECTIVE: We investigate the privacy threat caused by periodical releases of SRS data and propose anonymization methods to prevent the disclosure of personal privacy information while maintaining the utility of published data. METHODS: We identify potential attacks on periodical releases of SRS data, namely, BFL-attacks, mainly caused by follow-up cases. We present a new privacy model called PPMS(k, θ*)-bounding, and propose the associated PPMS-Anonymization algorithm and 2 improvements: PPMS+-Anonymization and PPMS++-Anonymization. Empirical evaluations were performed using 32 selected FAERS quarter data sets from 2004Q1 to 2011Q4. The performance of the proposed versions of PPMS-Anonymization was inspected against MS-Anonymization from some aspects, including data distortion, measured by normalized information loss; privacy risk of anonymized data, measured by dangerous identity ratio and dangerous sensitivity ratio; and data utility, measured by the bias of signal counting and strength (proportional reporting ratio). RESULTS: The best version of PPMS-Anonymization, PPMS++-Anonymization, achieves nearly the same quality as MS-Anonymization in both privacy protection and data utility. Overall, PPMS++-Anonymization ensures zero privacy risk on record and attribute linkage, and exhibits 51%-78% and 59%-82% improvements on information loss over PPMS+-Anonymization and PPMS-Anonymization, respectively, and significantly reduces the bias of ADR signal. CONCLUSIONS: The proposed PPMS(k, θ*)-bounding model and PPMS-Anonymization algorithm are effective in anonymizing SRS data sets in the periodical data publishing scenario, preventing the series of releases from disclosing personal sensitive information caused by BFL-attacks while maintaining the data utility for ADR signal detection.

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