Airborne transmission of human-isolated avian H3N8 influenza virus between ferrets.

H3N8 avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in China caused two confirmed human infections in 2022, followed by a fatal case reported in 2023. H3N8 viruses are widespread in chicken flocks; however, the zoonotic features of H3N8 viruses are poorly understood. Here, we demonstrate that H3N8 viruses were able to infect and replicate efficiently in organotypic normal human bronchial epithelial (NHBE) cells and lung epithelial (Calu-3) cells. Human isolates of H3N8 virus were more virulent and caused severe pathology in mice and ferrets, relative to chicken isolates. Importantly, H3N8 virus isolated from a patient with severe pneumonia was transmissible between ferrets through respiratory droplets; it had acquired human-receptor-binding preference and amino acid substitution PB2-E627K necessary for airborne transmission. Human populations, even when vaccinated against human H3N2 virus, appear immunologically naive to emerging mammalian-adapted H3N8 AIVs and could be vulnerable to infection at epidemic or pandemic proportion.

Bayesian phylodynamics reveals the transmission dynamics of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus at the human-live bird market interface in China.

In 2013 to 2017, avian influenza A(H7N9) virus has caused five severe epidemic waves of human infections in China. The role of live bird markets (LBMs) in the transmission dynamics of H7N9 remains unclear. Using a Bayesian phylodynamic approach, we shed light on past H7N9 transmission events at the human-LBM interface that were not directly observed using case surveillance data-based approaches. Our results reveal concurrent circulation of H7N9 lineages in Yangtze and Pearl River Delta regions, with evidence of local transmission during each wave. Our results indicate that H7N9 circulated in humans and LBMs for weeks to months before being first detected. Our findings support the seasonality of H7N9 transmission and suggest a high number of underreported infections, particularly in LBMs. We provide evidence for differences in virus transmissibility between low and highly pathogenic H7N9. We demonstrate a regional spatial structure for the spread of H7N9 among LBMs, highlighting the importance of further investigating the role of local live poultry trade in virus transmission. Our results provide estimates of avian influenza virus (AIV) transmission at the LBM level, providing a unique opportunity to better prepare surveillance plans at LBMs for response to future AIV epidemics.

Recent H9N2 avian influenza virus lost hemagglutination activity due to a K141N substitution in hemagglutinin.

The H9N2 avian influenza virus (AIV) represents a significant risk to both the poultry industry and public health. Our surveillance efforts in China have revealed a growing trend of recent H9N2 AIV strains exhibiting a loss of hemagglutination activity at 37°C, posing challenges to detection and monitoring protocols. This study identified a single K141N substitution in the hemagglutinin (HA) glycoprotein as the culprit behind this diminished hemagglutination activity. The study evaluated the evolutionary dynamics of residue HA141 and studied the impact of the N141K substitution on aspects such as virus growth, thermostability, receptor-binding properties, and antigenic properties. Our findings indicate a polymorphism at residue 141, with the N variant becoming increasingly prevalent in recent Chinese H9N2 isolates. Although both wild-type and N141K mutant strains exclusively target α,2-6 sialic acid receptors, the N141K mutation notably impedes the virus's ability to bind to these receptors. Despite the mutation exerting minimal influence on viral titers, antigenicity, and pathogenicity in chicken embryos, it significantly enhances viral thermostability and reduces plaque size on Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells. Additionally, the N141K mutation leads to decreased expression levels of HA protein in both MDCK cells and eggs. These findings highlight the critical role of the K141N substitution in altering the hemagglutination characteristics of recent H9N2 AIV strains under elevated temperatures. This emphasizes the need for ongoing surveillance and genetic analysis of circulating H9N2 AIV strains to develop effective control and prevention measures.IMPORTANCEThe H9N2 subtype of avian influenza virus (AIV) is currently the most prevalent low-pathogenicity AIV circulating in domestic poultry globally. Recently, there has been an emerging trend of H9N2 AIV strains acquiring increased affinity for human-type receptors and even losing their ability to bind to avian-type receptors, which raises concerns about their pandemic potential. In China, there has been a growing number of H9N2 AIV strains that have lost their ability to agglutinate chicken red blood cells, leading to false-negative results during surveillance efforts. In this study, we identified a K141N mutation in the HA protein of H9N2 AIV to be responsible for the loss of hemagglutination activity. This finding provides insight into the development of effective surveillance, prevention, and control strategies to mitigate the threat posed by H9N2 AIV to both animal and human health.

Detection of clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus in New York City.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b were detected in North America in the winter of 2021/2022. These viruses have spread across the Americas, causing morbidity and mortality in both wild and domestic birds as well as some mammalian species, including cattle. Many surveillance programs for wildlife as well as commercial poultry operations have detected these viruses. In this study, we conducted surveillance of avian species in the urban environment in New York City. We detected highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses in six samples from four different bird species and performed whole-genome sequencing. Sequencing analysis showed the presence of multiple different genotypes. Our work highlights that the interface between animals and humans that may give rise to zoonotic infections or even pandemics is not limited to rural environments and commercial poultry operations but extends into the heart of our urban centers.IMPORTANCEWhile surveillance programs for avian influenza viruses are often focused on migratory routes and their associated stop-over locations or commercial poultry operations, many bird species-including migratory birds-frequent or live in urban green spaces and wetlands. This brings them into contact with a highly dense population of humans and pets, providing an extensive urban animal-human interface in which the general public may have little awareness of circulating infectious diseases. This study focuses on virus surveillance of this interface, combined with culturally responsive science education and community outreach.

The mammary glands of cows abundantly display receptors for circulating avian H5 viruses.

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) from the H5N1 2.3.4.4b clade are circulating in dairy farms in the USA.; ruminants were presumed not to be hosts for IAVs. Previously, IAV-positive mammalian species were hunters and scavengers, possibly getting infected while feeding on infected birds. It is now recognized that H5N1 viruses that circulate in US dairy cattle transmit through a mammary gland route, in contrast to transmission by aerosols via the respiratory tract. The sialome in the cow mammary and respiratory tract is so far solely defined using plant lectins. Here, we used recombinant HA proteins representing current circulating and classical H5 viruses to determine the distribution of IAV receptors in the respiratory and mammary tract tissues of cows. We complemented our study by mapping the glycan distribution of the upper and lower respiratory tracts of horses and pigs. Most of the sialome of the cow respiratory tract is lined with sialic acid modifications, such as N-glycolyl and O-acetyl, which are not bound by IAV. Interestingly, the H5 protein representing the cow isolates is bound significantly in the mammary gland, whereas classical H5 proteins failed to do so. Furthermore, whereas the 9-O-acetyl modification is prominent in all tissues tested, the 5-N-glycolyl modification is not, resulting in the display of receptors for avian IAV hemagglutinins. This could explain the high levels of virus found in these tissues and milk, adding supporting data to this virus transmission route.IMPORTANCEH5N1 influenza viruses, which usually affect birds, have been found on dairy farms in the USA. Surprisingly, these viruses are spreading among dairy cows, and there is a possibility that they do not spread through the air but through their milk glands. To understand this better, we studied how the virus attaches to tissues in the cow's respiratory tract and mammary glands using specific viral proteins. We found that the cow-associated virus binds strongly to the mammary glands, unlike older versions infecting birds. This might explain why the virus is found in cow's milk, suggesting a new way the virus could be spreading.

Spatiotemporal genotype replacement of H5N8 avian influenza viruses contributed to H5N1 emergence in 2021/2022 panzootic.

Since 2020, clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 and H5N1 viruses have swept through continents, posing serious threats to the world. Through comprehensive analyses of epidemiological, genetic, and bird migration data, we found that the dominant genotype replacement of the H5N8 viruses in 2020 contributed to the H5N1 outbreak in the 2021/2022 wave. The 2020 outbreak of the H5N8 G1 genotype instead of the G0 genotype produced reassortment opportunities and led to the emergence of a new H5N1 virus with G1's HA and MP genes. Despite extensive reassortments in the 2021/2022 wave, the H5N1 virus retained the HA and MP genes, causing a significant outbreak in Europe and North America. Furtherly, through the wild bird migration flyways investigation, we found that the temporal-spatial coincidence between the outbreak of the H5N8 G1 virus and the bird autumn migration may have expanded the H5 viral spread, which may be one of the main drivers of the emergence of the 2020-2022 H5 panzootic.IMPORTANCESince 2020, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 subtype variants of clade 2.3.4.4b have spread across continents, posing unprecedented threats globally. However, the factors promoting the genesis and spread of H5 HPAI viruses remain unclear. Here, we found that the spatiotemporal genotype replacement of H5N8 HPAI viruses contributed to the emergence of the H5N1 variant that caused the 2021/2022 panzootic, and the viral evolution in poultry of Egypt and surrounding area and autumn bird migration from the Russia-Kazakhstan region to Europe are important drivers of the emergence of the 2020-2022 H5 panzootic. These findings provide important targets for early warning and could help control the current and future HPAI epidemics.

Characterization of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in retail dairy products in the US.

In March 2024, clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) was detected in dairy cattle in the US, and it was discovered that the virus could be detected in raw milk. Although affected cow's milk is diverted from human consumption and current pasteurization requirements are expected to reduce or eliminate infectious HPAIV from the milk supply, a study was conducted to characterize whether the virus could be detected by quantitative real-time RT-PCR (qrRT-PCR) in pasteurized retail dairy products and, if detected, to determine whether the virus was viable. From 18 April to 22 April 2024, a total of 297 samples of Grade A pasteurized retail milk products (23 product types) were collected from 17 US states that represented products from 132 processors in 38 states. Viral RNA was detected in 60 samples (20.2%), with qrRT-PCR-based quantity estimates (non-infectious) of up to 5.4log1050% egg infectious doses per mL, with a mean and median of 3.0log10/mL and 2.9log10/mL, respectively. Samples that were positive for type A influenza by qrRT-PCR were confirmed to be clade 2.3.4.4 H5 HPAIV by qrRT-PCR. No infectious virus was detected in any of the qrRT-PCR-positive samples in embryonating chicken eggs. Further studies are needed to monitor the milk supply, but these results provide evidence that the infectious virus did not enter the US pasteurized milk supply before control measures for HPAIV were implemented in dairy cattle.IMPORTANCEHighly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) infections in US dairy cattle were first confirmed in March 2024. Because the virus could be detected in raw milk, a study was conducted to determine whether it had entered the retail food supply. Pasteurized dairy products were collected from 17 states in April 2024. Viral RNA was detected in one in five samples, but infectious virus was not detected. This provides a snapshot of HPAIV in milk products early in the event and reinforces that with current safety measures, infectious viruses in milk are unlikely to enter the food supply.

Recombinant parainfluenza virus 5 expressing clade 2.3.4.4b H5 hemagglutinin protein confers broad protection against H5Ny influenza viruses.

The global circulation of clade 2.3.4.4b H5Ny highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) in poultry and wild birds, increasing mammal infections, continues to pose a public health threat and may even form a pandemic. An efficacious vaccine against H5Ny HPAIVs is crucial for emergency use and pandemic preparedness. In this study, we developed a parainfluenza virus 5 (PIV5)-based vaccine candidate expressing hemagglutinin (HA) protein of clade 2.3.4.4b H5 HPAIV, termed rPIV5-H5, and evaluated its safety and efficacy in mice and ferrets. Our results demonstrated that intranasal immunization with a single dose of rPIV5-H5 could stimulate H5-specific antibody responses, moreover, a prime-boost regimen using rPIV5-H5 stimulated robust humoral, cellular, and mucosal immune responses in mice. Challenge study showed that rPIV5-H5 prime-boost regimen provided sterile immunity against lethal clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus infection in mice and ferrets. Notably, rPIV5-H5 prime-boost regimen provided protection in mice against challenge with lethal doses of heterologous clades 2.2, 2.3.2, and 2.3.4 H5N1, and clade 2.3.4.4h H5N6 viruses. These results revealed that rPIV5-H5 can elicit protective immunity against a diverse clade of highly pathogenic H5Ny virus infection in mammals, highlighting the potential of rPIV5-H5 as a pan-H5 influenza vaccine candidate for emergency use.IMPORTANCEClade 2.3.4.4b H5Ny highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have been widely circulating in wild birds and domestic poultry all over the world, leading to infections in mammals, including humans. Here, we developed a recombinant PIV5-vectored vaccine candidate expressing the HA protein of clade 2.3.4.4b H5 virus. Intranasal immunization with rPIV5-H5 in mice induced airway mucosal IgA responses, high levels of antibodies, and robust T-cell responses. Importantly, rPIV5-H5 conferred complete protection in mice and ferrets against clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus challenge, the protective immunity was extended against heterologous H5Ny viruses. Taken together, our data demonstrate that rPIV5-H5 is a promising vaccine candidate against diverse H5Ny influenza viruses in mammals.

Epidemiology, biosafety, and biosecurity of Avian Influenza: Insights from the East Mediterranean region.

The World Organization for Animal Health defines Avian Influenza Virus as a highly infectious disease caused by diverse subtypes that continue to evolve rapidly, impacting poultry species, pet birds, wild birds, non-human mammals, and occasionally humans. The effects of Avian influenza viruses have been recognised as a precursor for serious health concerns among affected birds, poultry, and human populations in the Middle East. Furthermore, low and high pathogenic avian influenza viruses lead to respiratory illness with varying severity, depending on the virus subtype (e.g., H5, H7, H9, etc.). Possible future outbreaks and endemics of newly emerging subtypes are expected to occur, as many studies have reported the emergence of novel mutations and viral subtypes. However, proper surveillance programs and biosecurity applications should be developed, and countries with incapacitated defences against such outbreaks should be encouraged to undergo complete reinstation and reinforcement in their health and research sectors. Public education regarding biosafety and virus prevention is necessary to ensure minimal spread of avian influenza endemic.

Safety and Immunogenicity of a Delayed Heterologous Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Vaccine Boost Following Different Priming Regimens: A Randomized Clinical Trial.

BACKGROUND: Influenza A (H7N9) has caused multiple disease waves with evidence of strain diversification. Optimal influenza A (H7N9) prime-boost vaccine strategies are unknown. METHODS: We recruited participants who had received monovalent inactivated A/Shanghai/2/2013 (H7N9) vaccine (MIV) approximately 5 years earlier, as follows: MIV with MF59 (MF59 × 2 group), MIV with AS03 (AS03 × 2 group), unadjuvanted MIV (No Adj group), MIV with MF59 or AS03 followed by unadjuvanted MIV (Adjx1 group), and A/H7-naive (unprimed group). Participants were randomized to receive 1 dose of AS03-adjuvanted or unadjuvanted A/Hong Kong/125/2017 (H7N9) MIV and were followed for safety and immunogenicity using hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) and neutralizing antibody assays. RESULTS: We enrolled 304 participants: 153 received the adjuvanted boost and 151 received the unadjuvanted boost. At 21 days postvaccination, the proportion of participants with HAI antibody titers against the boosting vaccine strain of ≥40 in the adjuvanted and unadjuvanted arms, respectively, were 88% and 49% in MF59 × 2 group, 89% and 75% in AS03 × 2 group, 59% and 20% in No Adj group, 94% and 55% in Adjx1group, and 9% and 11% in unprimed group. CONCLUSIONS: Serologic responses to a heterologous A(H7N9) MIV boost were highest in participants primed and boosted with adjuvant-containing regimens. CLINICAL TRIALS REGISTRATION: NCT03738241.

An Update on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus, Clade 2.3.4.4b.

Since the resurgence of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, during 2021, these viruses have spread widely among birds worldwide, causing poultry outbreaks and infections of a wide range of terrestrial and marine mammal species. During 2024, HPAI A(H5N1) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, was detected in dairy cattle for the first time and caused an ongoing multistate outbreak, with high levels of virus documented in raw cow milk. Human infections with clade 2.3.4.4b viruses from exposures to infected poultry or dairy cattle have resulted in a wide spectrum of illness severity, from conjunctivitis or mild respiratory illness to severe and fatal pneumonia in different countries. Vigilance, and stronger global virologic surveillance among birds, poultry, terrestrial and marine mammals, and humans, with virus characterization and rapid data sharing, is needed to inform the threat of clade 2.3.4.4b viruses, as they continue to evolve, to public health.

First Known Human Death After Infection With the Avian Influenza A/H3N8 Virus: Guangdong Province, China, March 2023.

Here, we report on a case of human infection with the H3N8 avian influenza virus. The patient had multiple myeloma and died of severe infection. Genome analysis showed multiple gene mutations and reassortments without mammalian-adaptive mutations. This suggests that avian influenza (A/H3N8) virus infection could be lethal for immunocompromised persons.

A Phase 2 Clinical Trial to Evaluate the Safety, Reactogenicity, and Immunogenicity of Different Prime-Boost Vaccination Schedules of 2013 and 2017 A(H7N9) Inactivated Influenza Virus Vaccines Administered With and Without AS03 Adjuvant in Healthy US Adults.

INTRODUCTION: A surge of human influenza A(H7N9) cases began in 2016 in China from an antigenically distinct lineage. Data are needed about the safety and immunogenicity of 2013 and 2017 A(H7N9) inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs) and the effects of AS03 adjuvant, prime-boost interval, and priming effects of 2013 and 2017 A(H7N9) IIVs. METHODS: Healthy adults (n = 180), ages 19-50 years, were enrolled into this partially blinded, randomized, multicenter phase 2 clinical trial. Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 6 vaccination groups evaluating homologous versus heterologous prime-boost strategies with 2 different boost intervals (21 vs 120 days) and 2 dosages (3.75 or 15 µg of hemagglutinin) administered with or without AS03 adjuvant. Reactogenicity, safety, and immunogenicity measured by hemagglutination inhibition and neutralizing antibody titers were assessed. RESULTS: Two doses of A(H7N9) IIV were well tolerated, and no safety issues were identified. Although most participants had injection site and systemic reactogenicity, these symptoms were mostly mild to moderate in severity; injection site reactogenicity was greater in vaccination groups receiving adjuvant. Immune responses were greater after an adjuvanted second dose, and with a longer interval between prime and boost. The highest hemagglutination inhibition geometric mean titer (95% confidence interval) observed against the 2017 A(H7N9) strain was 133.4 (83.6-212.6) among participants who received homologous, adjuvanted 3.75 µg + AS03/2017 doses with delayed boost interval. CONCLUSIONS: Administering AS03 adjuvant with the second H7N9 IIV dose and extending the boost interval to 4 months resulted in higher peak antibody responses. These observations can broadly inform strategic approaches for pandemic preparedness. Clinical Trials Registration. NCT03589807.

Recent Changes in Patterns of Mammal Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Worldwide.

We reviewed information about mammals naturally infected by highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus subtype H5N1 during 2 periods: the current panzootic (2020-2023) and previous waves of infection (2003-2019). In the current panzootic, 26 countries have reported >48 mammal species infected by H5N1 virus; in some cases, the virus has affected thousands of individual animals. The geographic area and the number of species affected by the current event are considerably larger than in previous waves of infection. The most plausible source of mammal infection in both periods appears to be close contact with infected birds, including their ingestion. Some studies, especially in the current panzootic, suggest that mammal-to-mammal transmission might be responsible for some infections; some mutations found could help this avian pathogen replicate in mammals. H5N1 virus may be changing and adapting to infect mammals. Continuous surveillance is essential to mitigate the risk for a global pandemic.

Novel Avian Influenza A(H5N6) Virus in Wild Birds, South Korea, 2023.

We isolated novel reassortant avian influenza A(H5N6) viruses containing genes from clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus and low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in carcasses of whooper swans and bean geese in South Korea during December 2023. Neuraminidase gene was from a clade 2.3.4.4b H5N6 virus infecting poultry and humans in China.

Fatal Infection in Ferrets after Ocular Inoculation with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus.

Ocular inoculation of a clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus caused severe and fatal infection in ferrets. Virus was transmitted to ferrets in direct contact. The results highlight the potential capacity of these viruses to cause human disease after either respiratory or ocular exposure.

Seroprevalence of Avian Influenza A(H5N6) Virus Infection, Guangdong Province, China, 2022.

In 2022, we assessed avian influenza A virus subtype H5N6 seroprevalence among the general population in Guangdong Province, China, amid rising numbers of human infections. Among the tested samples, we found 1 to be seropositive, suggesting that the virus poses a low but present risk to the general population.

Multiplex Dual-Target Reverse Transcription PCR for Subtyping Avian Influenza A(H5) Virus.

An increased risk for human infection with avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses is of concern. We developed an internally controlled, dual-target reverse transcription PCR for influenza A(H5) subtyping. This test could be used to detect influenza A(H5) in clinical samples.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus Infection in Domestic Dairy Cattle and Cats, United States, 2024.

We report highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in dairy cattle and cats in Kansas and Texas, United States, which reflects the continued spread of clade 2.3.4.4b viruses that entered the country in late 2021. Infected cattle experienced nonspecific illness, reduced feed intake and rumination, and an abrupt drop in milk production, but fatal systemic influenza infection developed in domestic cats fed raw (unpasteurized) colostrum and milk from affected cows. Cow-to-cow transmission appears to have occurred because infections were observed in cattle on Michigan, Idaho, and Ohio farms where avian influenza virus-infected cows were transported. Although the US Food and Drug Administration has indicated the commercial milk supply remains safe, the detection of influenza virus in unpasteurized bovine milk is a concern because of potential cross-species transmission. Continued surveillance of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in domestic production animals is needed to prevent cross-species and mammal-to-mammal transmission.

Outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Seals, St. Lawrence Estuary, Quebec, Canada1.

We describe an unusual mortality event caused by a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus clade 2.3.4.4b involving harbor (Phoca vitulina) and gray (Halichoerus grypus) seals in the St. Lawrence Estuary, Quebec, Canada, in 2022. Fifteen (56%) of the seals submitted for necropsy were considered to be fatally infected by HPAI H5N1 containing fully Eurasian or Eurasian/North American genome constellations. Concurrently, presence of large numbers of bird carcasses infected with HPAI H5N1 at seal haul-out sites most likely contributed to the spillover of infection to the seals. Histologic changes included meningoencephalitis (100%), fibrinosuppurative alveolitis, and multiorgan acute necrotizing inflammation. This report of fatal HPAI H5N1 infection in pinnipeds in Canada raises concerns about the expanding host of this virus, the potential for the establishment of a marine mammal reservoir, and the public health risks associated with spillover to mammals.Nous décrivons un événement de mortalité inhabituelle causé par un virus de l'influenza aviaire hautement pathogène A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b chez des phoques communs (Phoca vitulina) et gris (Halichoerus grypus) dans l'estuaire du Saint-Laurent au Québec, Canada, en 2022. Quinze (56%) des phoques soumis pour nécropsie ont été considérés comme étant fatalement infectés par le virus H5N1 de lignées eurasiennes ou de réassortiment eurasiennes/nord-américaines. Un grand nombre simultané de carcasses d'oiseaux infectés par le H5N1 sur les sites d'échouement a probablement contribué à la contamination de ces phoques. Les changements histologiques associés à cette infection incluaient : méningo-encéphalite (100%), alvéolite fibrinosuppurée et inflammation nécrosante aiguë multi-organique. Cette documentation soulève des préoccupations quant à l'émergence de virus mortels, à la possibilité d'établissement de réservoirs chez les mammifères marins, et aux risques pour la santé publique associés aux propagations du virus chez les mammifères.