Development of a Single-Cycle Infectious SARS-CoV-2 Virus Replicon Particle System for Use in Biosafety Level 2 Laboratories.

Research activities with infectious severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) are currently permitted only under biosafety level 3 (BSL3) containment. Here, we report the development of a single-cycle infectious SARS-CoV-2 virus replicon particle (VRP) system with a luciferase and green fluorescent protein (GFP) dual reporter that can be safely handled in BSL2 laboratories to study SARS-CoV-2 biology. The spike (S) gene of SARS-CoV-2 encodes the envelope glycoprotein, which is essential for mediating infection of new host cells. Through deletion and replacement of this essential S gene with a luciferase and GFP dual reporter, we have generated a conditional SARS-CoV-2 mutant (ΔS-VRP) that produces infectious particles only in cells expressing a viral envelope glycoprotein of choice. Interestingly, we observed more efficient production of infectious particles in cells expressing vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) glycoprotein G [ΔS-VRP(G)] than in cells expressing other viral glycoproteins, including S. We confirmed that infection from ΔS-VRP(G) is limited to a single round and can be neutralized by anti-VSV serum. In our studies with ΔS-VRP(G), we observed robust expression of both luciferase and GFP reporters in various human and murine cell types, demonstrating that a broad variety of cells can support intracellular replication of SARS-CoV-2. In addition, treatment of ΔS-VRP(G)-infected cells with either of the anti-CoV drugs remdesivir (nucleoside analog) and GC376 (CoV 3CL protease inhibitor) resulted in a robust decrease in both luciferase and GFP expression in a drug dose- and cell-type-dependent manner. Taken together, our findings show that we have developed a single-cycle infectious SARS-CoV-2 VRP system that serves as a versatile platform to study SARS-CoV-2 intracellular biology and to perform high-throughput screening of antiviral drugs under BSL2 containment. IMPORTANCE Due to the highly contagious nature of SARS-CoV-2 and the lack of immunity in the human population, research on SARS-CoV-2 has been restricted to biosafety level 3 laboratories. This has greatly limited participation of the broader scientific community in SARS-CoV-2 research and thus has hindered the development of vaccines and antiviral drugs. By deleting the essential spike gene in the viral genome, we have developed a conditional mutant of SARS-CoV-2 with luciferase and fluorescent reporters, which can be safely used under biosafety level 2 conditions. Our single-cycle infectious SARS-CoV-2 virus replicon system can serve as a versatile platform to study SARS-CoV-2 intracellular biology and to perform high-throughput screening of antiviral drugs under BSL2 containment.

Preclinical coronavirus studies and pathology: Challenges of the high-containment laboratory.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the critical role that animal models play in elucidating the pathogenesis of emerging diseases and rapidly analyzing potential medical countermeasures. Relevant pathologic outcomes are paramount in evaluating preclinical models and therapeutic outcomes and require careful advance planning. While there are numerous guidelines for attaining high-quality pathology specimens in routine animal studies, preclinical studies using coronaviruses are often conducted under biosafety level-3 (BSL3) conditions, which pose unique challenges and technical limitations. In such settings, rather than foregoing pathologic outcomes because of the inherent constraints of high-containment laboratory protocols, modifications can be made to conventional best practices of specimen collection. Particularly for those unfamiliar with working in a high-containment laboratory, the authors describe the logistics of conducting such work, focusing on animal experiments in BSL3 conditions. To promote scientific rigor and reproducibility and maximize the value of animal use, the authors provide specific points to be considered before, during, and following a high-containment animal study. The authors provide procedural modifications for attaining good quality pathologic assessment of the mouse lung, central nervous system, and blood specimens under high-containment conditions while being conscientious to maximize animal use for other concurrent assays.

Biosafety during a pandemic: shared resource laboratories rise to the challenge.

Biosafety has always been an important aspect of daily work in any research institution, particularly for cytometry Shared Resources Laboratories (SRLs). SRLs are common-use spaces that facilitate the sharing of knowledge, expertise, and ideas. This sharing inescapably involves contact and interaction of all those within this working environment on a daily basis. The current pandemic caused by SARS-CoV-2 has prompted the re-evaluation of many policies governing the operations of SRLs. Here we identify and review the unique challenges SRLs face in maintaining biosafety standards, highlighting the potential risks associated with not only cytometry instrumentation and samples, but also the people working with them. We propose possible solutions to safety issues raised by the COVID-19 pandemic and provide tools for facilities to adapt to evolving guidelines and future challenges.

Building biosecurity for synthetic biology.

The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.

Validated Methods for Removing Select Agent Samples from Biosafety Level 3 Laboratories.

The Federal Select Agent Program dictates that all research entities in the United States must rigorously assess laboratory protocols to sterilize samples being removed from containment areas. We validated procedures using sterile filtration and methanol to remove the following select agents: Francisella tularensis, Burkholderia pseudomallei, B. mallei, Yersinia pestis, and Bacillus anthracis. We validated methanol treatment for B. pseudomallei. These validations reaffirm safety protocols that enable researchers to keep samples sufficiently intact when samples are transferred between laboratories.

Use and reliability of multiplex bead-based assays (Luminex) at Containment Level 4.

In the UK, research on hazard group 4 (HG4) pathogens requires specialised Containment Level 4 (CL4) facilities. These differ from Biosafety Level 4 (BSL4) conditions in that work is conducted in class III microbiological safety cabinets for primary containment instead of using positive pressure suits. This presents unique challenges associated with the physical restrictions of working in a limited space, and prohibits the use of many techniques and specialist equipment. In consequence, detailed studies on the biology of HG4 pathogens and in particular their immunological relationships with the host are understudied in the UK; for example, the majority of immunological assays with which the immune system is interrogated require specialist equipment that is unsuitable for CL4. Multiplexing to simultaneously measure multiple analytes is increasingly being used in immunological studies. This assay is attractive for CL4 work because it reduces the time spent in the laboratory whilst maximising the use of valuable sample volume. The Luminex microsphere approach allows for the determination of many cytokines and chemokines, however, the detection system uses fixed aligned lasers and integrated computer systems which are unsuitable for use at CL4. Therefore, we have developed an approach in which the Luminex assay is conducted within the CL4 laboratory and a formalin-fixation stage is introduced to allow for analysis to be undertaken outside of containment. Quality control preparations allow the assay characteristics to be monitored and analysis of assay performance to be evaluated. Our data demonstrate that Luminex is an applicable tool for use at CL4 and that assays can be run reliably to generate reproducible standardised data across different plates and individual experiments.

Assessment of biorisk management systems in high containment laboratories, 18 countries in Europe, 2016 and 2017.

Europe-wide activities to improve biosafety and biosecurity performed within the frameworks of the European Union (EU)-funded Joint Actions EMERGE and QUANDHIP led to the development of an Integrated European Checklist for Laboratory Biorisk Management (ECL).To better understand different approaches shaping biorisk management (BRM) systems on an operational level in high containment laboratories, the ECL was used to map the implementation of BRM in 32 high containment laboratories in 18 countries in Europe. The results suggest that the BRM elements referring to standard microbiological working practices and the handling of infectious material were fulfilled particularly well. The elements safety exercises involving internal and external emergency responders, and appropriate decommissioning plans were not fulfilled particularly well. BRM in Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 laboratories handling Risk Group (RG) 4 viruses appear to vary among each other less than BSL3 laboratories handling RG 3 bacteria. It is important to agree on comparable regulations in Europe as high containment laboratories are indispensable for a safe, quick and effective response to public health threats. As high containment laboratories may also present a public health risk it is crucial to have robust BRM on organisational and operational levels.

COVID-19: Postmortem Diagnostic and Biosafety Considerations.

As a result of the 2019 novel human coronavirus (COVID-19) global spread, medical examiner/coroner offices will inevitably encounter increased numbers of COVID-19-infected decedents at autopsy. While in some cases a history of fever and/or respiratory distress (eg, cough or shortness of breath) may suggest the diagnosis, epidemiologic studies indicate that the majority of individuals infected with COVID-19 develop mild to no symptoms. Those dying with-but not of-COVID-19 may still be infectious, however. While multiple guidelines have been issued regarding autopsy protocol in cases of suspected COVID-19 deaths, there is some variability in the recommendations. Additionally, limited recommendations to date have been issued regarding scene investigative protocol, and there is a paucity of publications characterizing COVID-19 postmortem gross and histologic findings. A case of sudden unexpected death due to COVID-19 is presented as a means of illustrating common autopsy findings, as well as diagnostic and biosafety considerations. We also review and summarize the current COVID-19 literature in an effort to provide practical evidence-based biosafety guidance for medical examiner-coroner offices encountering COVID-19 at autopsy.

Application of Biosafety Principles in Laboratory Analysis of Clinical Samples from Patients with COVID-19.

COVID-19 poses a great challenge to clinical and diagnostic services around the world. The need of biosafety practices can never be emphasised more than under current circumstances. The four pillars of biosafety namely, leadership, standard operating procedures, personal protective equipment (PPE) and engineering controls must be employed for effective and safe practices in the clinical setting in general and laboratory settings in particular. Risk assessment must be carried out before meeting up the diagnostic challenge for COVID-19 and essential biorisk management measures are required to be taken. In our resource-poor settings, we need to adapt safe but cost-effective and improvised solutions to ensure safe handling of clinical samples from COVID-19 patients in the laboratories. The correct use of PPE and their suitable alternatives are available for selection and use. Disinfection of the lab areas and safe disposal of the clinical samples from such patients is also of paramount importance.

[Employee Safety and Biosafety Applications in Microbiology Laboratories; A Multicenter Evaluation in Turkey]. / Mikrobiyoloji Laboratuvarlarinda Çalisan Güvenligi ve Biyogüvenlik Uygulamalari Açisindan Türkiye'de Çok Merkezli Bir Degerlendirme.

Medical laboratory personnel may be exposed to various hazards, especially biological and chemical, during their routine activities. In this multicenter study, which could reflect the nation wide results, it was aimed to determine the safety and biosecurity practices of the employee working in medical microbiology laboratories and to reveal the current situation. A total of 1072 personnel working in the Medical Microbiology Laboratory of 23 hospitals (14 medical faculty hospitals, seven ministry of health training and research hospitals and two state hospitals) from different provinces were provided with a questionnaire consisting of 33 questions inquiring about the rules, opinions, attitudes and behaviors regarding safety and biosafety practices. Statistical analyses were made with institutions, age groups, gender, educational background, working time and occupational groups in terms of exposure to biological and chemical hazards. It was determined that approximately 50% personnel of the university/ training and research hospitals and 2/3 of the state hospitals personnel consumed food and beverages in the laboratories (p<0.05). Compared with other hospitals, it was determined that in state hospitals; the absence of separate resting room (35%), the personnel finding their own knowledge and practices inadequate (28.9%), laboratory coats washed at home (95%), educational organization and participation rates (90%) and medical waste information levels of the personnel were higher (p< 0.05). It was determined that as the age progresses, the rate of education, food and beverage consumption in the laboratory, not being outside the laboratory with protective equipment (gloves, masks and laboratory coats) and the history of laboratory acquired infections were increased (p< 0.05). It was observed that washing the laboratory coats at home was higher in the younger age group and hospital washing was higher in the elderly group (p< 0.05). There was no significant difference between the genders in terms of food and beverage consumption in the laboratory (p= 0.09). It was determined that periodic health checks were not performed in 1/3 of both sexes, but the use of gloves and compliance with medical waste rules was lower in men. Female employees find themselves inefficient in terms of knowledge and practices (p< 0.05). The rate of those who did not have their periodic checkups at regular intervals was higher in the high school and master of science education groups; While non-compliance with medical waste rules, food and beverage consumption in the laboratory was highest in the primary and high school graduates, the lowest rates were found in the master and doctorate groups (p< 0.05). The rate of those who had regular health checkups was higher in the group of specialist physicians and technicians (p< 0.05). It was observed that the rule of not going out of the laboratory with protective equipment was fully observed in the 35+ years working group, while compliance was 70-85% in other groups (p< 0.05), hepatitis B vaccination rate was highest in specialist doctors and lowest in cleaning and other personnel group (p< 0.05). Highest non-compliance rate with medical waste rules was observed in the cleaning personnel group (p< 0.05). As a result, although advances have been made in employee safety practices in medical microbiology laboratories in our country in recent years, it has been found that it is not yet sufficient. The results indirectly reflected the profile of medical laboratories in our country. In the laboratories, physical space and equipment deficiencies should be eliminated, periodic health checkups and vaccination should be provided, non-staff entrance to the laboratory and food, beverage and cigarette consumption should be prevented, laboratory coats should be washed in the hospital, in-service trainings, including medical waste training, should be conducted and these trainings should be developed through mechanisms that will change the behavior.

Biosafety procedures for handling intraoperative surgical samples during COVID-19 pandemic: an Italian pathology laboratory experience.

Up to now, Italy is one of the European centers with the most active Coronavirus cases with 233,836 positive cases and 33,601 total deaths as of June 3rd. During this pandemic and dramatic emergency, Italian hospitals had also to face neoplastic pathologies, that still afflict the Italian population, requiring urgent surgical and oncological treatment. In our Cancer Center Hospital, the high volume of surgical procedures have demanded an equally high volume of intraoperative pathological examinations, but also posed an additional major challenge for the safety of the staff involved. The current commentary reports our experience in the past two months (since March 9th) for a total of 1271 frozen exams from 893 suspect COVID-19 patients (31 confirmed).

[Principles and suggestions on biosafety protection of biological specimen preservation during prevalence of COVID-19].

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a grade B infectious disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). In pace with the spreading of the disease, biosafety risk of the biological specimen preservation in biobanks has been significantly increased and biosafety protection during biological specimen preservation become increasingly important. According to the related national rules and the corresponding guidelines of Chinese Medical Association, this paper introduced the etiology about SARS-CoV-2, epidemiology about COVID-19, and the biosafety protection principles of individuals and biological specimen storage places in the process of personal protection, protection of collection, transport, handling, preservation, detection, post-detection disposal and emergencies of biological specimen. Emphasized to carry out a strict biosafety-risk assessment on biological specimen basing on virus load information, infectivity, and sample type (possible contact transmission, aerosol transmission, and fecal oral transmission).

Human Factors Risk Analyses of a Doffing Protocol for Ebola-Level Personal Protective Equipment: Mapping Errors to Contamination.

Background: Doffing protocols for personal protective equipment (PPE) are critical for keeping healthcare workers (HCWs) safe during care of patients with Ebola virus disease. We assessed the relationship between errors and self-contamination during doffing. Methods: Eleven HCWs experienced with doffing Ebola-level PPE participated in simulations in which HCWs donned PPE marked with surrogate viruses (ɸ6 and MS2), completed a clinical task, and were assessed for contamination after doffing. Simulations were video recorded, and a failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analyses were performed to identify errors during doffing, quantify their risk (risk index), and predict contamination data. Results: Fifty-one types of errors were identified, many having the potential to spread contamination. Hand hygiene and removing the powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) hood had the highest total risk indexes (111 and 70, respectively) and number of types of errors (9 and 13, respectively). ɸ6 was detected on 10% of scrubs and the fault tree predicted a 10.4% contamination rate, likely occurring when the PAPR hood inadvertently contacted scrubs during removal. MS2 was detected on 10% of hands, 20% of scrubs, and 70% of inner gloves and the predicted rates were 7.3%, 19.4%, 73.4%, respectively. Fault trees for MS2 and ɸ6 contamination suggested similar pathways. Conclusions: Ebola-level PPE can both protect and put HCWs at risk for self-contamination throughout the doffing process, even among experienced HCWs doffing with a trained observer. Human factors methodologies can identify error-prone steps, delineate the relationship between errors and self-contamination, and suggest remediation strategies.

Assessing Viral Transfer During Doffing of Ebola-Level Personal Protective Equipment in a Biocontainment Unit.

Background: Personal protective equipment (PPE) protects healthcare workers (HCWs) caring for patients with Ebola virus disease (EVD), and PPE doffing is a critical point for preventing viral self-contamination. We assessed contamination of skin, gloves, and scrubs after doffing Ebola-level PPE contaminated with surrogate viruses: bacteriophages MS2 and Φ6. Methods: In a medical biocontainment unit, HCWs (n = 10) experienced in EVD care donned and doffed PPE following unit protocols that incorporate trained observer guidance and alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR). A mixture of Φ6 (enveloped), MS2 (nonenveloped), and fluorescent marker was applied to 4 PPE sites, approximating body fluid viral load (Φ6, 105; MS2, 106). They performed a patient care task, then doffed. Inner gloves, face, hands, and scrubs were sampled for virus, as were environmental sites with visible fluorescent marker. Results: Among 10 HCWs there was no Φ6 transfer to inner gloves, hands, or face; 1 participant had Φ6 on scrubs at low levels (1.4 × 102). MS2 transfer (range, 101-106) was observed to scrubs (n = 2), hands (n = 1), and inner gloves (n = 7), where it was highest. Most (n = 8) had only 1 positive site. Environmental samples with visible fluorescent marker (n = 21) were negative. Conclusions: Among experienced HCWs, structured, observed doffing using ABHR protected against hand contamination with enveloped virus. Nonenveloped virus was infrequent on hands and scrubs but common on inner gloves, suggesting that inner gloves, but not necessarily ABHR, protect against hand contamination. Optimizing doffing protocols to protect against all types of viruses may require reinforcing careful handling of scrubs and good glove/hand hygiene with effective agents.

Laboratory Focus on Improving the Culture of Biosafety: Statewide Risk Assessment of Clinical Laboratories That Process Specimens for Microbiologic Analysis.

The Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene challenged Wisconsin laboratories to examine their biosafety practices and improve their culture of biosafety. One hundred three clinical and public health laboratories completed a questionnaire-based, microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment. Greater than 96% of the respondents performed activities related to specimen processing, direct microscopic examination, and rapid nonmolecular testing, while approximately 60% performed culture interpretation. Although they are important to the assessment of risk, data specific to patient occupation, symptoms, and travel history were often unavailable to the laboratory and, therefore, less contributory to a microbiology-focused biosafety risk assessment than information on the specimen source and test requisition. Over 88% of the respondents complied with more than three-quarters of the mitigation control measures listed in the survey. Facility assessment revealed that subsets of laboratories that claim biosafety level 1, 2, or 3 status did not possess all of the biosafety elements considered minimally standard for their respective classifications. Many laboratories reported being able to quickly correct the minor deficiencies identified. Task assessment identified deficiencies that trended higher within the general (not microbiology-specific) laboratory for core activities, such as packaging and shipping, direct microscopic examination, and culture modalities solely involving screens for organism growth. For traditional microbiology departments, opportunities for improvement in the cultivation and management of highly infectious agents, such as acid-fast bacilli and systemic fungi, were revealed. These results derived from a survey of a large cohort of small- and large-scale laboratories suggest the necessity for continued microbiology-based understanding of biosafety practices, vigilance toward biosafety, and enforcement of biosafety practices throughout the laboratory setting.

A guide to the contained use of plant virus infectious clones.

Plant virus infectious clones are important tools with wide-ranging applications in different areas of biology and medicine. Their uses in plant pathology include the study of plant-virus interactions, and screening of germplasm as part of prebreeding programmes for virus resistance. They can also be modified to induce transient plant gene silencing (Virus Induced Gene Silencing - VIGS) and as expression vectors for plant or exogenous proteins, with applications in both plant pathology and more generally for the study of plant gene function. Plant viruses are also increasingly being investigated as expression vectors for in planta production of pharmaceutical products, known as molecular farming. However, plant virus infectious clones may pose a risk to the environment due to their ability to reconstitute fully functional, transmissible viruses. These risks arise from both their inherent pathogenicity and the effect of any introduced genetic modifications. Effective containment measures are therefore required. There has been no single comprehensive review of the biosafety considerations for the contained use of genetically modified plant viruses, despite their increasing importance across many biological fields. This review therefore explores the biosafety considerations for working with genetically modified plant viruses in contained environments, with focus on plant growth facilities. It includes regulatory frameworks, risk assessment, assignment of biosafety levels, facility features and working practices. The review is based on international guidance together with information provided by plant virus researchers.

Potential applications and human biosafety of nanomaterials used in nanomedicine.

With the rapid development of nanotechnology, potential applications of nanomaterials in medicine have been widely researched in recent years. Nanomaterials themselves can be used as image agents or therapeutic drugs, and for drug and gene delivery, biological devices, nanoelectronic biosensors or molecular nanotechnology. As the composition, morphology, chemical properties, implant sites as well as potential applications become more and more complex, human biosafety of nanomaterials for clinical use has become a major concern. If nanoparticles accumulate in the human body or interact with the body molecules or chemical components, health risks may also occur. Accordingly, the unique chemical and physical properties, potential applications in medical fields, as well as human biosafety in clinical trials are reviewed in this study. Finally, this article tries to give some suggestions for future work in nanomedicine research. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.