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When Payment Undermines the Pitch.
Barasch, Alixandra; Berman, Jonathan Z; Small, Deborah A.
Afiliação
  • Barasch A; 1 Department of Marketing, Stern School of Business, New York University.
  • Berman JZ; 2 Department of Marketing, London Business School.
  • Small DA; 3 Department of Marketing, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Psychol Sci ; 27(10): 1388-1397, 2016 10.
Article em En | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-27608649
ABSTRACT
Studies on crowding out document that incentives sometimes backfire-decreasing motivation in prosocial tasks. In the present research, we demonstrated an additional channel through which incentives can be harmful. Incentivized advocates for a cause are perceived as less sincere than nonincentivized advocates and are ultimately less effective in persuading other people to donate. Further, the negative effects of incentives hold only when the incentives imply a selfish motive; advocates who are offered a matching incentive (i.e., who are told that the donations they successfully solicit will be matched), which is not incompatible with altruism, perform just as well as those who are not incentivized. Thus, incentives may affect prosocial outcomes in ways not previously investigated by crowding out individuals' sincerity of expression and thus their ability to gain support for a cause.
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Texto completo: 1 Base de dados: MEDLINE Assunto principal: Altruísmo / Obtenção de Fundos / Motivação Limite: Adult / Female / Humans / Male Idioma: En Revista: Psychol Sci Assunto da revista: PSICOLOGIA Ano de publicação: 2016 Tipo de documento: Article

Texto completo: 1 Base de dados: MEDLINE Assunto principal: Altruísmo / Obtenção de Fundos / Motivação Limite: Adult / Female / Humans / Male Idioma: En Revista: Psychol Sci Assunto da revista: PSICOLOGIA Ano de publicação: 2016 Tipo de documento: Article