RESUMO
Methods for analyzing the full complement of a biomolecule type, e.g., proteomics or metabolomics, generate large amounts of complex data. The software tools used to analyze omics data have reshaped the landscape of modern biology and become an essential component of biomedical research. These tools are themselves quite complex and often require the installation of other supporting software, libraries and/or databases. A researcher may also be using multiple different tools that require different versions of the same supporting materials. The increasing dependence of biomedical scientists on these powerful tools creates a need for easier installation and greater usability. Packaging and containerization are different approaches to satisfy this need by delivering omics tools already wrapped in additional software that makes the tools easier to install and use. In this systematic review, we describe and compare the features of prominent packaging and containerization platforms. We outline the challenges, advantages and limitations of each approach and some of the most widely used platforms from the perspectives of users, software developers and system administrators. We also propose principles to make the distribution of omics software more sustainable and robust to increase the reproducibility of biomedical and life science research.
RESUMO
We now need more than ever to make genome analysis more intelligent. We need to read, analyze, and interpret our genomes not only quickly, but also accurately and efficiently enough to scale the analysis to population level. There currently exist major computational bottlenecks and inefficiencies throughout the entire genome analysis pipeline, because state-of-the-art genome sequencing technologies are still not able to read a genome in its entirety. We describe the ongoing journey in significantly improving the performance, accuracy, and efficiency of genome analysis using intelligent algorithms and hardware architectures. We explain state-of-the-art algorithmic methods and hardware-based acceleration approaches for each step of the genome analysis pipeline and provide experimental evaluations. Algorithmic approaches exploit the structure of the genome as well as the structure of the underlying hardware. Hardware-based acceleration approaches exploit specialized microarchitectures or various execution paradigms (e.g., processing inside or near memory) along with algorithmic changes, leading to new hardware/software co-designed systems. We conclude with a foreshadowing of future challenges, benefits, and research directions triggered by the development of both very low cost yet highly error prone new sequencing technologies and specialized hardware chips for genomics. We hope that these efforts and the challenges we discuss provide a foundation for future work in making genome analysis more intelligent.
RESUMO
MOTIVATION: The rapid decrease in the sequencing technology costs leads to a revolution in medical research and clinical care. Today, researchers have access to large genomic datasets to study associations between variants and complex traits. However, availability of such genomic datasets also results in new privacy concerns about personal information of the participants in genomic studies. Differential privacy (DP) is one of the rigorous privacy concepts, which received widespread interest for sharing summary statistics from genomic datasets while protecting the privacy of participants against inference attacks. However, DP has a known drawback as it does not consider the correlation between dataset tuples. Therefore, privacy guarantees of DP-based mechanisms may degrade if the dataset includes dependent tuples, which is a common situation for genomic datasets due to the inherent correlations between genomes of family members. RESULTS: In this article, using two real-life genomic datasets, we show that exploiting the correlation between the dataset participants results in significant information leak from differentially private results of complex queries. We formulate this as an attribute inference attack and show the privacy loss in minor allele frequency (MAF) and chi-square queries. Our results show that using the results of differentially private MAF queries and utilizing the dependency between tuples, an adversary can reveal up to 50% more sensitive information about the genome of a target (compared to original privacy guarantees of standard DP-based mechanisms), while differentially privacy chi-square queries can reveal up to 40% more sensitive information. Furthermore, we show that the adversary can use the inferred genomic data obtained from the attribute inference attack to infer the membership of a target in another genomic dataset (e.g. associated with a sensitive trait). Using a log-likelihood-ratio test, our results also show that the inference power of the adversary can be significantly high in such an attack even using inferred (and hence partially incorrect) genomes. AVAILABILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION: https://github.com/nourmadhoun/Inference-Attacks-Differential-Privacy.
Assuntos
Genômica , Privacidade , Família , Frequência do Gene , Estudo de Associação Genômica Ampla , HumanosRESUMO
MOTIVATION: The rapid progress in genome sequencing has led to high availability of genomic data. Studying these data can greatly help answer the key questions about disease associations and our evolution. However, due to growing privacy concerns about the sensitive information of participants, accessing key results and data of genomic studies (such as genome-wide association studies) is restricted to only trusted individuals. On the other hand, paving the way to biomedical breakthroughs and discoveries requires granting open access to genomic datasets. Privacy-preserving mechanisms can be a solution for granting wider access to such data while protecting their owners. In particular, there has been growing interest in applying the concept of differential privacy (DP) while sharing summary statistics about genomic data. DP provides a mathematically rigorous approach to prevent the risk of membership inference while sharing statistical information about a dataset. However, DP does not consider the dependence between tuples in the dataset, which may degrade the privacy guarantees offered by the DP. RESULTS: In this work, focusing on genomic datasets, we show this drawback of the DP and we propose techniques to mitigate it. First, using a real-world genomic dataset, we demonstrate the feasibility of an inference attack on differentially private query results by utilizing the correlations between the entries in the dataset. The results show the scale of vulnerability when we have dependent tuples in the dataset. We show that the adversary can infer sensitive genomic data about a user from the differentially private results of a query by exploiting the correlations between the genomes of family members. Second, we propose a mechanism for privacy-preserving sharing of statistics from genomic datasets to attain privacy guarantees while taking into consideration the dependence between tuples. By evaluating our mechanism on different genomic datasets, we empirically demonstrate that our proposed mechanism can achieve up to 50% better privacy than traditional DP-based solutions. AVAILABILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION: https://github.com/nourmadhoun/Differential-privacy-genomic-inference-attack. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Supplementary data are available at Bioinformatics online.