Worry Postponement From the Metacognitive Perspective: A Randomized Waitlist-Controlled Trial.

Background: Pathological worry is associated with appraisals of worrying as uncontrollable. Worry postponement (WP) with a stimulus control rationale appears to be effective in non-clinical samples. However, preliminary research in participants with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) does not support its efficacy in reducing negative metacognitions or worry. The aim of this study was to investigate the efficacy of WP with a metacognitive rationale. Method: Participants with GAD (n = 47) or hypochondriasis (HYP; n = 35) were randomly assigned to either an intervention group (IG) or waitlist (WL). The IG received a two-session long WP intervention aiming at mainly reducing negative metacognitions concerning uncontrollability of worrying. Participants were instructed to postpone their worry process to a predetermined later time during the six days between the two sessions. Participants completed questionnaires of negative metacognitions and worry at pre-assessment, post-assessment, and follow-up. Results: We observed a significant Time*Group interaction for negative metacognitions and worry. Post-hoc analyses on the total sample and separately for GAD and HYP revealed significantly lower worry scores in the treated GAD sample compared to the WL, representing the only significant effect. In the GAD group, pre-post-effect sizes were small for negative metacognitions and large for worry. Effects persisted to a four-week follow-up. Conclusion: WP with a metacognitive rationale seems to be effective in reducing worry in participants with GAD. The effectiveness for HYP seems limited, possibly due to the small sample size.

Psychological interventions for generalized anxiety disorder: Effects and predictors in a naturalistic outpatient setting.

OBJECTIVE: Numerous randomized controlled trials (RCTs) demonstrate the efficacy of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), metacognitive therapy (MCT), and methods to reduce intolerance of uncertainty (IU-CBT) in the treatment of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). However, few studies have investigated these treatments under conditions of routine clinical care. The main objective of this study was to investigate the effectiveness of psychotherapy for GAD in an outpatient setting and to identify factors influencing treatment outcome. METHODS: Fifty-nine GAD patients received naturalistic CBT (including MCT and IU-CBT) in an outpatient clinic and postgraduate training center for psychotherapy. Patients completed self-report questionnaires at the beginning and end of therapy regarding the main outcome worry as well as metacognitions, intolerance of uncertainty, depression, and general psychopathology. RESULTS: Worry, negative metacognitions, intolerance of uncertainty, depression, and general psychopathology decreased significantly (p's < .001) with large effect sizes for all symptoms (d = 0.83-1.49). A reliable change in the main outcome worry was observed in 80% of patients, and recovery occurred in 23%. Higher worry scores at posttreatment were predicted by higher pretreatment scores, female sex, and less change in negative metacognitive beliefs during treatment. CONCLUSIONS: Naturalistic CBT for GAD appears to be effective in routine clinical care for worry as well as depressive symptoms, with particular benefits associated with altering negative metacognitions. However, a recovery rate of only 23% is lower than the rates reported in RCTs. Treatment needs to be improved, especially for patients with more severe GAD and for women.

The effectiveness of cognitive behavioural therapy for social anxiety disorder in routine clinical practice.

Numerous randomized controlled trials have shown cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) to be effective in treating social anxiety disorder (SAD). Yet, less is known about the effectiveness of CBT for SAD conducted by psychotherapists in training in routine clinical practice. In this study, 231 patients with SAD were treated with CBT under routine conditions and were examined at pre- and post-treatment as well as at 6 and 12 months follow-up. We applied self-reports to assess symptoms of SAD (defined as primary outcome), depression and psychological distress (defined as secondary outcome). We conducted both completer and intent-to-treat analyses and also assessed the reliability of change with the reliable change index. Results revealed significant reductions in symptoms of SAD between pre- and post-assessments, with effect sizes ranging from d = 0.9 to 1.2. Depending on the SAD specific questionnaire applied, 47.8% to 73.5% of the sample showed a reliable positive change, whereas 1.9% to 3.8% showed a reliable negative change. Depressive symptoms and psychological distress also decreased significantly from pre- to post-assessment, with large effect sizes. Significant treatment gains regarding both primary and secondary outcomes were further observed at 6 and 12 months follow-up. The current findings based on a large sample of patients suggest that psychotherapists in CBT training working under routine conditions can effectively treat symptoms of SAD, depression and psychological distress.

Assessing metacognitive beliefs about worry: validation of German versions of the Why Worry Scale II and the Consequences of Worry Scale.

BACKGROUND: Metacognitive beliefs have been proposed to play a key role in initiating and maintaining worry. The Why Worry-Scale-II (WW-II) and Consequences of Worry Scale (COWS) are self-report questionnaires assessing positive and negative metacognitive beliefs. The main goal of this study was to validate German versions of these two questionnaires. METHOD: N = 603 participants completed a questionnaire battery, including the two self-report measures of metacognitive beliefs. We conducted confirmatory factor analyses, calculated internal consistencies, and examined convergent and divergent validity. In addition, the questionnaires' power in predicting worry, repetitive negative thinking (RNT) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptoms were investigated. RESULTS: The factor structure of the original versions could be replicated for both measures. Furthermore, the translated questionnaires demonstrated excellent internal consistency and evidence of convergent and divergent validity. Importantly they also possessed predictive power in explaining worry, RNT and GAD symptoms, even over and above the Metacognitions Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30) as the current gold standard. CONCLUSIONS: Overall, our findings suggest that the WW-II and COWS show solid psychometric properties and are useful in measuring metacognitive beliefs independently from the MCQ-30.

Specifically altered brain responses to threat in generalized anxiety disorder relative to social anxiety disorder and panic disorder.

BACKGROUND: Despite considerable effort, the neurobiological underpinnings of hyper-responsive threat processing specific to patients suffering from generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) remain poorly understood. The current functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study aims to delineate GAD-specific brain activity during immediate threat processing by comparing GAD patients to healthy controls (HC), to social anxiety disorder (SAD) and to panic disorder (PD) patients. METHOD: Brain activation and functional connectivity patterns to threat vs. neutral pictures were investigated using event-related fMRI. The sample consisted of 21 GAD, 21 PD, 21 SAD and 21 HC. RESULTS: GAD-specific elevated activity to threat vs. neutral pictures was found in cingulate cortex, dorsal anterior insula/frontal operculum (daI/FO) and posterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Defining these effects as seed regions, we detected GAD-specific increased functional connectivity to threat vs. neutral pictures between posterior dlPFC and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, between cingulate cortex and amygdala, between cingulate cortex and anterior insula, as well as decreased functional connectivity between daI/FO and mid-dlPFC. CONCLUSION: The findings present the first evidence for GAD-specific neural correlates of hyper-responsive threat processing, possibly reflecting exaggerated threat sensitivity, maladaptive appraisal and attention-allocation processes.

Do Metacognitions and Intolerance of Uncertainty Predict Worry in Everyday Life? An Ecological Momentary Assessment Study.

Cognitive models of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) suggest that excessive worry is due to positive and negative metacognitive beliefs and/or intolerance of uncertainty. Empirical support mainly derives from cross-sectional studies with limited conclusiveness, using self-report measures and thereby possibly causing recall biases. The aim of the present study therefore was to examine the power of these cognitive variables to predict levels of worry in everyday life using Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA). Metacognitions and intolerance of uncertainty were assessed using well-established self-report questionnaires in 41 nonclinical participants who subsequently completed ratings on worry intensity and burden on a portable device for 1week at seven times a day once every 2hours. Results showed significant associations of negative metacognitive beliefs and intolerance of uncertainty, but not positive metacognitive beliefs, with worry in everyday life. In multilevel regression analyses, a substantial proportion of variance of everyday worry could be accounted for by negative metacognitions over and above trait worry and daily hassles. Intolerance of uncertainty likewise emerged as a valid predictor when tested in isolation, but did not explain additional variance once negative metacognitions were controlled. The findings support current cognitive models of excessive worry and highlight the role of negative metacognitions. By using EMA to assess levels of worry in everyday life, they extend earlier findings focusing exclusively on retrospective questionnaire measures.

Metacognitions, worry and sleep in everyday life: Studying bidirectional pathways using Ecological Momentary Assessment in GAD patients.

BACKGROUND: The metacognitive model of generalized anxiety disorder proposes that negative metacognitive beliefs are crucial in the maintenance of excessive worry. Furthermore, according to the cognitive model of insomnia, worry leads to problems falling or staying asleep and poor sleep quality. In order to test the assumed causal relationships, the present study examined the time-dependent course of negative metacognition and worry as well as worry and sleep quality, using Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA). METHOD: Negative metacognitions, worry and sleep were assessed by self-report questionnaires as well as EMA in 56 GAD patients who carried a portable device for 1 week and logged sleep quality, negative metacognition and worry processes four times a day. RESULTS: Metacognitions, worry and sleep were significantly correlated. Structural equation modeling using multilevel analyses showed a unidirectional relationship of negative metacognitions leading to prolonged worry processes and a bidirectional relationship of worry and sleep quality. CONCLUSIONS: These findings support the theoretically derived assumptions on the relationship between negative metacognitions, worry and sleep. Implications for further research as well as clinical implications are discussed.

Superior perception of phasic physiological arousal and the detrimental consequences of the conviction to be aroused on worrying and metacognitions in GAD.

Although people suffering from generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) often report arousal symptoms, psychophysiological studies show no evidence of autonomic hyperarousal. Hypersensitivity toward and catastrophic interpretation of phasic arousal cues may explain this discrepancy. The authors tested (a) whether GAD sufferers perceive nonspecific skin conductance fluctuations (NSCFs), an indicator of phasic autonomic arousal, better than controls do and (b) whether the conviction to be aroused contributes to the maintenance of worrying and metacognitive beliefs about worrying. Thirty-three GAD sufferers and 34 healthy controls participated in 2 experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to detect their own NSCFs during a signal detection task. GAD sufferers accurately detected more of their NSCFs than did controls, who tended to miss NSCFs. In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to relax following worry induction. While relaxing, they received nonveridical feedback indicating either arousal or relaxation. Arousal feedback conserved negative metacognitive beliefs regarding worrying and also maintained negative mood and worry exclusively in GAD participants. These findings suggest that superior perception of phasic arousal cues and their catastrophic misinterpretation increases worrying, negative metacognitive beliefs about worrying, and anxious mood in GAD.