Re-situating fieldwork and re-narrating disciplinary history in global mega-geomorphology.

In 1985, more than thirty geomorphologists, planetary scientists, and remote sensing specialists gathered at a conference center in Oracle, Arizona, to discuss an emerging area of research that they called "mega-geomorphology." Building on a conference of the same name held in London in 1981, they argued that new techniques of remote sensing and insights emerging from the study of extraterrestrial planets had created opportunities for geomorphology to broaden its spatial and temporal scope. This new approach was, however, neither unproblematic nor uncontested. In the discussions around mega-geomorphology that took place in the mid-1980s, the perceived conflict between the use of remote-sensing techniques to observe phenomena on vast spatial scales, on one hand, and the disciplinary centrality of fieldwork and field experience to geomorphology, on the other, was a recurrent theme. In response, mega-geomorphologists attempted to re-situate fieldwork and re-narrate disciplinary histories in such a way as to make remote sensing and planetary science not only compatible with geomorphological traditions but also means of revitalizing them. Only partially successful, these attempts reveal that the process of adopting a planetary perspective in geomorphology, as in other earth sciences, was neither straightforward nor inevitable. They also show how the field and fieldwork could remain central to geomorphology while also being extensively revised in light of new technical possibilities and theoretical frameworks.

Trackable life: Data, sequence, and organism in movement ecology.

Over the past decade an increasing number of ecologists have begun to frame their work as a contribution to the emerging research field of movement ecology. This field's primary object of research is the movement track, which is usually operationalized as a series of discrete "steps and stops" that represent a portion of an animal's "lifetime track." Its practitioners understand their field as dependent on recent technical advances in tracking organisms and analyzing their movements. By making movement their primary object of research, rather than simply an expression of deeper biological phenomena, movement ecologists are able to generalize across the movement patterns of a wide variety of species and to draw on statistical techniques developed to model the movements of non-living things. Although it can trace its roots back to a long tradition of statistical models of movement, the field relies heavily on metaphors from genomics; in particular, movement tracks have been seen as similar to DNA sequences. Though this has helped movement ecology consolidate around a shared understanding of movement, the field may need to broaden its understanding of movement beyond the sequence if it is to realize its potential to address urgent concerns such as biodiversity loss.

Naming the Ethological Subject.

Argument In recent decades, through the work of Jane Goodall and other ethologists, the practice of giving personal names to nonhuman animals who are the subjects of scientific research has become associated with claims about animal personhood and scientific objectivity. While critics argue that such naming practices predispose the researcher toward anthropomorphism, supporters suggest that it sensitizes the researcher to individual differences and social relations. Both critics and supporters agree that naming tends to be associated with the recognition of individual animal rights. The history of the naming of research animals since the late nineteenth century shows, however, that the practice has served a variety of purposes, most of which have raised few ethical or epistemological concerns. Names have been used to identify research animals who play dual roles as pets, workers, or patients, to enhance their market value, and to facilitate their identification in the field. The multifaceted history of naming suggests both that the use of personal names by Goodall and others is less of a radical break with previous practices than it might first appear to be and that the use of personal names to recognize the individuality, sentience, or rights of nonhuman animals faces inherent limits and contradictions.